in bringing the property to adjudication,1 and in the interval he must exercise due care to preserve it from loss or damage. 2 1 Demurrage is given to the claimant, and costs and expenses refused to the captors for improper delay in proceeding to adjudication, The Zee Star, iv. Rob. 71. 2 Restitution in value or damages are given for loss or injury received by a vessel in consequence of a refusal of nautical assistance by the captor.Der Mohr, iv Rob. 314; Die Fire Damer, v Rob. 357. The principle that a captor must not wilfully expose property to danger of capture by the other belligerent by bringing it to England, when he may resort to Admiralty courts in the colonies, was admitted in The Nicholas and Jan, i Rob. 97, though in the particular case the court decided against the claimant of restitution in value on the ground that due discretion had not been exceeded. Ground of the belli gerent right to make use property within belligerent tion. CHAPTER VIII. FORCED EMPLOYMENT IN WARLIKE USES OF NEUTRAL § 74. IT has been seen that the belligerent privileges which have been discussed in the foregoing chapters are all to be referred more or less immediof neutral ately to an assumed right of restraining any acts tending to hinder the successful completion of hosjurisdic- tilities. And from these privileges are derived the whole of the customs by which neutral property is in general affected. But an isolated practice exists, resting upon an entirely different ground, under which the persons and property of neutral individuals are sometimes subjected to control, not because of any acts done by the former, or of any quality in the latter by which the current of the war might be adversely influenced, but solely because, not being protected by special immunities, they are found within the sovereign jurisdiction of a belligerent at a moment when their employment for the objects of his war is necessary or convenient to him. He not merely prevents them from being useful to his enemy, but he compels them to become useful to himself. He uses or sacrifices for his military purposes neutral property within his jurisdiction, and more especially he seizes and employs as transports, with or without their crews, neutral ships lying in his harbours. Burdensome and violent as this practice is, it must be allowed to possess a sufficient theoretic justification. The sovereign power of a state is supreme over all persons and things within its permanent or tempo- | Existing rary jurisdiction which are not invested with a foreign usage. national character, unless its sovereign right has been destroyed or limited by a distinct usage or an express agreement. In the particular matter under consideration, the power of the state cannot be said to have been destroyed, but it has happily become customary to exercise it only in cases of urgent need, and with compensation to the neutral.' Thus in 1870, when some 1 In the end of last century De Martens said (Précis, § 269, ed. 1789) that 'it is doubtful whether the common law of nations gives to a belligerent, except in cases of extreme necessity, the right of seizing neutral vessels lying in his ports at the outbreak of war, in order to meet the requirements of his fleet, on payment of their services. Usage has introduced the exercise of this right, but a number of treaties have abolished it.' Azuni, on the other hand, treats it as a right existing in all cases of 'necessity or public utility,' and declares any vessel attempting to avoid it to be liable to confiscation. Droit Maritime, chap. iii. art. 5. The frequent treaties which at that period stipulated for its abandonment probably show that the practice of it was not uncommon. In 1782 the United Provinces and United States agreed that 'Les marchands, patrons, et propriétaires des navires, matelots, gens de toute sorte, vaisseaux et batiments, et en général aucunes marchandises ni aucuns effets de chacun des alliés ou de leurs sujets ne pourront être assujettis à un embargo ni retenus dans aucuns des pays, territoires, îles, villes, places, ports, rivages, ou domaines quelconques de l'autre allié, pour quelque expédition militaire, usage public ou particulier de qui que ce soit, par saisie, par force, ou de quelque manière semblable.' De Martens, Rec. iii. 435. And treaties to the like effect were concluded in the same year by Russia and Denmark (ib. 474); in 1783 by the United States and Sweden (ib. 573); in 1785 by Prussia and the United States (ib. iv. 44); in 1787 by France and Russia (ib. 209); in the same year by Russia and Portugal (ib. 326); and in 1801 by Russia and Sweden (ib. vii. 333). In 1799 a treaty between Prussia and the United States permits embargo in cases of urgent necessity,' making provision for an indemnity in respect of the property seized. During the present century prohibitory articles have been inserted in the treaties between the United States and Brazil in 1828 (De Martens, Nouv. Rec. ix. 57); Mexico in 1831 (ib. Nouv. Sér. i. 330); Chile in 1832 (ib. ii. 440); and Guatemala in 1849 (Samwer, Nouv. Rec. Gén. i. 304). Of recent writers Sir R. Phillimore (iii. § 29), and M. Heffter (§ 150), unwillingly, and M. Bluntschli (§ 795 bis) less reservedly, recognise the right. English vessels were seized by the German general in command at Rouen, and sunk in the Seine at Duclair in order to prevent French gun-boats from running up the river, and from barring the German corps operating on its two banks from communication with each other, Count Bismarck said that 'the measure in question, however exceptional in its nature, did not overstep the bounds of international warlike usage. The report shows that a pressing danger was at hand, and every other means of meeting it was wanting; the case was therefore one of necessity, which even in time of peace may render the employment or destruction of foreign property admissible under the reservation of indemnification.' The English Government did not dispute the legal correctness of Count Bismarck's position, and confined itself to demands, that the persons whose property had been destroyed should receive the compensation, to which Count Bismarck's despatch had already by implication admitted their right.2 1 Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff, Jan. 25, 1871, State Papers, 1871, lxxxi. c. 250. 2 Sir R. Phillimore (iii. § 29) seems not to be sure that usage has as yet gone to the point of requiring that indemnification shall be paid to the neutrals whose property is taken or used; and Massé (Droit Com mercial, t. i. 1. ii. t. i c. ii. § 7), APPENDICES. APPENDIX I. Extract from the Declaration of Russia as to the principles of the First Armed Neutrality, addressed to the Courts of London and Madrid, July 28, 1780. L'Impératrice de toutes les Russies a cru être de sa justice d'exposer aux yeux de l'Europe les principes qu'elle va suivre, et qui sont propres à lever tout malentendu et ce qui pourrait y donner lieu. Elle le fait avec d'autant plus de confiance, qu'elle trouve consignés ces principes dans le droit primitif des peuples que toute nation est fondée à réclamer, et que les puissances belligérantes ne sauraient les invalider sans violer les lois de la neutralité et sans désavouer les maximes qu'elles ont adoptées, nommément dans différents traités et engagements publics. Ils se réduisent aux points qui suivent : 1. Que les vaisseaux neutres puissent naviguer librement de port en port, et sur les côtes des nations en guerre. 2. Que les effets appartenants aux sujets des dites puissances en guerre soient libres sur les vaisseaux neutres, à l'exception des marchandises de contrebande. 3. Que l'Impératrice se tient quant à la fixation de celles-ci à ce qui est énoncé dans les Articles X et XI de son traité de commerce avec la Grande-Bretagne, en étendant ces obligations à toutes les puissances en guerre. 4. Que pour déterminer ce qui caractérise un port bloqué on n'accorde cette dénomination qu'à celui où il y a, par la disposition de la puissance qui l'attaque avec des vaisseaux arrêtés et suffisamment proches, un danger évident d'entrer. |