ment, is inapplicable, not only because it involved the validity of state action, but because the state statute considered in that case was held to directly burden the performance by the United States of its governmental functions and also to limit rights of the citizens growing out of such functions; and hence it also follows that the observation made in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 97, to the effect that it had been held in the Crandall Case that the privilege of passing from State to State is an attribute of national citizenship, may here be put out of view as inapposite.

With the object of confining our decision to the case before us, we say that nothing we have stated must be considered as implying a want of power in the United States to restrain acts which, although involving ingress or egress into or from a State, have for their direct and necessary effect an interference with the performance of duties which it is incumbent upon the United States to discharge, as illustrated in the Crandall Case, supra. Judgment affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE CLARKE dissents.

NOTE. As a factor in determining the course of American constitutional development, the decision in the Slaughter House Cases is of equal importance with McCulloch v. Maryland or Gibbons v. Ogden, and the court which rendered it evidently acted on Marshall's injunction, "We must never forget it is a constitution we are expounding." The decision was bitterly attacked by those who felt that it sacrificed all the gains to personal liberty which had been won by the Civil War. It was defended by those who saw in it the maintenance of the due authority of the States in the American constitutional system. The judgment concerning it which now prevails is well expressed in Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History, III, 269:

Had the case been decided otherwise, the States would have largely lost their autonomy and become, as political entities, only of historical interest. If every civil right pos sessed by a citizen of a State was to receive the protection of the National Judiciary, and if every case involving such a right was to be subject to its review, the States would be placed in a hopelessly subordinate position; and the ultimate authority over the citizens of the State would rest with the National Government. The boundary lines between the States and the National Government would be practically abolished, and the rights of the citizens of each State would be irrevocably fixed as of the date of the Fourteenth Amendment, without power in the State to modify them, and with a power in the Supreme Court of the Nation to review any b State statute asserted to be in violation of such rights, even

if such statute affected solely a matter of State policy.
It is impossible to conceive of the amount of litigation on
which that Court would have been called to pass, if State
legislation involving every possible civil right of a State
citizen could . . . have been brought before it under
the privilege and immunity clause.

It is interesting to compare with the view expressed in the Slaughter House Cases the view taken of the meaning and scope of the Fourteenth Amendment by the Congress which formulated it. The discussion is well summarized in Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, ch. v. See also Guthrie, Lectures on the Fourteenth Amendment, and an acute discussion of the history and meaning of all the war amendments incorporated by Chief Justice Cooley in his edition of Story's Commentaries, II, 632-692.

The Supreme Court has never attempted any full and exact definition of the phrase "privileges and immunities of citizens" as used in the Constitution, art. IV, sec. 2, and in the Fourteenth Amendment. "It is safer, and more in accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal, to leave its meaning to be determined in each case, upon a view of the particular rights asserted and denied therein," Conner v. Elliott (1856), 18 Howard, 591, 593. "This provision has been held, in repeated adjudications of this court, to prohibit discriminating legislation by one State against the citizens of another State, and to secure to them the equal protection of its laws, and the same freedom possessed by its own citizens in the acquisition and enjoyment of property," Williams v. Bruffy (1877), 96 U. S. 176, 183. But a State is not obliged to extend to citizens of other States the same rights in its common property which it gives to its own citizens, McCready v. Virginia (1877), 94 U. S. 391 (rights in oyster beds), Manchester v. Massachusetts (1891), 139 U. S. 240 (fishing rights in public waters), Geer v. Connecticut (1896), 161 U. S. 519 (rights in wild game), nor is it prevented from imposing upon non-resident suitors who resort to its courts conditions which it does not impose upon its own citizens. It may exact from non-residents security for costs which it does not exact from residents, and it may permit the attachment of a non-resident's property under conditions which do not apply to the attachment of a resident's property. "Such a regulation of the internal affairs of a State cannot reasonably be characteridas hostile to the fundamental rights of citizens of other States.

It has never been supposed that regulations of that character materially interfered with the enjoyment by citizens of each State of the privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution to citizens of the several States," Blake v. McClung (1898), 172 U. S. 239, 256. So a State may apply to a non-resident a shorter statute of limitations than it applies to residents provided it be reasonable, Canadian Northern Ry. v. Eggen (1920), 252 U. S. 553. A State is not bound to recognize privileges and immunities conferred by other States. Hence it is not bound to permit a foreign corporation not engaged in foreign or interstate commerce to exercise its corporate privileges within its jurisdiction. "A grant of corporate existence

is a grant of special privileges to the corporators, enabling them to act for certain designated purposes as a single individual. The corporation being the mere creation of local law can have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sovereignty where created," Paul v. Virginia (1868), 8 Wallace, 168, 181. A corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the privileges and immunities clause, Orient Insurance Co. v. Dagga (1899), 172 U. S. 557, and hence a State may attach conditions to the admission of a foreign corporation unless it is engaged in interstate or foreign commerce or is acting as an agency of the Federal Government, Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania (1888), 125 U. S. 181. But a corporation may claim the protection of all applicable provisions of the Constitution. It may not be compelled to relinquish any Federal right as a condition of permission to enter or contiume. This is of particular im portance in connection with its right to sue in the Federal courts. While a corporation is not a citizen within the meaning of the privi leges and immunities clause, on the other hand it is a citizen withir the meaning of the jurisdictional clause of the Constitution. Many States have sought to prevent foreign corporations from invoking the jurisdiction of the Federal courts, and in the early cases in which such legislation was involved the court failed to give due weight to the fact that a foreign corporation has certain Federal rights of which it cannot be deprived. But in Terrall v. Burke Construction Co. (1922), 257 U. S. 529, in which was involved the validity of a statute of Arkansas which forbade any foreign corporation doing business in that State to remove to a Federal court any proceeding to which it was a party without the consent of the other party, the Supreme Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Taft, said:

The principle established by the more recent decisions of this court is that a State may not, in imposing conditions upon the privilege of a foreign corporation's doing business in the State, exact from it a waiver of the exercise of its constitutional right to resort to the federal courts, or thereafter withdraw the privilege of doing business because of its exercise of such right, whether waived in advance or not. The principle does not depend for its application on the character of the business the corporation does, whether state or interstate, although that has been suggested as a dis tinction in some cases. It rests on the ground that the Federal Constitution confers upon citizens of one State the right to resort to federal courts in another, that state action, whether legislative or executive, necessarily calculated to curtail the free exercise of the right thus secured is void because the sovereign power of a State in excluding for eign corporations, as in the exercise of all others of its sov. ereign powers, is subject to the limitations of the supreme fundamental law. It follows that the cases of Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U. S. 535, and Security Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Prewitt, 202 U. S. 246, must be considered as overruled and that the views of the minority judges in those cases have become the law of this court

For discussion of various rights claimed to be under the protection of the privileges and immunities clause see Butchers' Union Slaughter House Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Co. (1884), 111 U. S. 746 (the right to pursue any of the ordinary occupations); Ward v. Maryland (1870), 12 Wallace, 418; Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Connecticut (1902), 185 U. S. 364; Chalker v. Birmingham & Northwestern Ry. (1919), 249 U. S. 522 (right to be free from discriminatory taxes); United States v. Reese (1875), 92 U. S. 214; United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 92 U. S. 542; (right to be free from discrimination in the exercise of the franchise); Minor v. Happersett (1874), 21 Wallace, 162 (right to vote); Bradwell v. Illinois (1873), 16 Wallace, 130; In re Lockwood (1894), 154 U. S. 116 (right to practice law); Bartemeyer v. Iowa (1873), 16 Wallace, 130 (right to sell liquor); Maxwell v. Dow (1900), 176 U. S. 581 (the guaranties of the first eight Amendments); Williams v. Fears (1900), 179 U. S. 270 (tax on emigration agents); Ferry v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Ry. (1922), 258 U. S. 314 (dower).

In order to determine whether a State law deprives a party of any of the privileges or immunities of citizenship, not only the title and avowed purport of the act must be examined, but also its practical operation and effect, Henderson v. Mayor of New York (1876), 92 U. S. 259; Stockard v. Morgan (1902), 185 Ụ. S. 27; Ludwig v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1910), 216 U. S. 146; St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Arkansas (1914), 235 U. S. 350; Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington (1917), 243 U. S. 219.

The protection of the Fourteenth Amendment is afforded only against acts of the States, and not against acts of individuals, United States v. Cruikshank (1876), 92 U. S. 542; Virginia v. Rives (1879), 100 U. S. 313; Civil Rights Cases (1883), 109 U. S. 3; Hodges v. United States (1906), 203 U. S. 1. The same rule applies to the Fifteenth Amendment, James v. Bowman (1903), 190 U. S. 127.

CHAPTER IV.

PROTECTION TO PERSONS ACCUSED OF CRIME.

SECTION 1. Ex POST FACTO LAWS.

CALDER v. BULL.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1798.
3 Dallas, 386.

In error from the State of Connecticut.

CHASE, JUSTICE.-The decision of one question determines (in my opinion) the present dispute. I shall, therefore, state from the record no more of the case, than I think necessary for the consideration of that question only.

The legislature of Connecticut, on the 2d Thursday of May, 1795, passed a resolution or law, which, for the reasons assigned, set aside a decree of the Court of Probate for Hartford, on the 21st of March 1793, which decree disapproved of the will of Normand Morrison (the grandson), made the 21st of August 1779, and refused to record the said will; and granted a new hearing by the said court of probate, with liberty of appeal therefrom, in six months. A new hearing was had, in virtue of this resolution, or law, before the said court of probate, who, on the 27th of July, 1795, approved the said bill, and ordered it to be recorded. At August 1795, appeal was then had to the superior court at Hartford, who, at February term 1796, affirmed the decree of the court of probate. Appeal was had to the supreme court of errors of Connecticut, who, in June 1796, adjudged that there were no errors. More than eighteen months elapsed from the decree of the court of probate (on the 1st of March 1793), and thereby Caleb Bull and wife were barred of all right of appeal, by a statute of Connecticut. There was no law of that state whereby a new hearing or trial, before the said court of probate, might be obtained. Calder and wife claim the premises in question, in right of his wife, as heiress of N.