194 U. S. 361, or to selling milk in the city of New York, Lieberman v. Van De Carr (1905), 199 U. S. 552. The sections following deal with the established heads of the police power the protection of health and morals, the preservation of safety and order and the regulation of public callings. Other phases of the police power are discussed in Miller v. Texas (1894), 153 U. S. 535 (regulating the carrying of concealed weapons); Davis v. Massachusetts (1897), 167 U. S. 43 (requiring a license to speak in a public place); Wilson v. Eureka City (1899), 173 U. S. 32 (regulating the moving of buildings on public streets); Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Ry. v. Ohio (1899), 173 U. S. 285 (requiring three trains per day to stop at certain stations); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana (1900), 177 U. S. 190 (prohibiting waste of natural gas); Magnigault v. Springs (1905), 199 U. S. 473 (reclamation of swampy land); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Drainage Commissioners (1906), 200 U. S. 561 (removal of railway bridges in order to permit drainage of land); Bacon v. Walker (1907), 204 U. S. 311 (regulating the grazing of public lands); Western Turf Association v. Greenberger (1907), 204 U. S. 359 (admission of ticket-holders to public places of amusement); McLean v. Arkansas (1909), 211 U. S. 539 (method of payment of coal-miners); Welch v. Swasey (1909), 214 U. S. 91 (restricting height of buildings); Griffith v. Connecticut (1910), 218 U. S. 563 (loans at interest of more than 15 per cent); Noble State Bank v. Haskell (1911), 219 U. S. 104 (creation of fund for guaranty of bank deposits); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. McGuire (1911), 219 U. S. 549 (contracts by employees limiting liability for injuries in contravention of statute governing such liability); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. (1911), 220 U. S. 61 (prohibiting waste of mineral waters); Fifth Avenue Coach Co. v. New York (1911), 221 U. S. 467 (regulation of advertising on street vehicles); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell (1911), 222 U. S. 225 (regulating assignments of wages); Schmidinger v. Chicago (1913), 226 U. S. 578 (regulating the size of loaves of bread); Erie Ry. v. Williams (1914), 233 U. S. 685 (semimonthly payment of employees in certain industries); Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio (1915), 236 U. S. 230 (censorship of moving picture films); Waugh v. Mississippi University (1915), 237 U. S. 589 (prohibition of Greek letter fraternities in State schools); Chicago & Alton Ry. v. Tranbarger (1915), 238 U. S. 67 (railroads required to maintain outlets for water across their rights of way); Armour & Co. v. North Dakota (1916), 240 U. S. 510 (requiring lard to be sold in packages of specified net weight); Lehon v. Atlanta (1916), 242 U. S. 53 (regulation of private detectives); Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa (1916), 242 U. S. 153 (requirement that ice cream shall contain a certain proportion of butter fat); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Company (1917), 242 U. S. 539 ("Blue Sky Law" is a proper regulation of dealers in securities); Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy (1919), 249 U. S. 427 (manufacturers of food products may be required to state on the label the percentage of each ingredient); Terrace v. Thompson (1923), 263 U. S. 197 (aliens who have not declared intention to become citizens may be disqualified for ownership of land); Webb v. O'Brien (1923), 263 U. S. 313 (aliens who are ineligible to citizenship may be disqualified for owning or leasing any interest in land); Lacoste v. Louisiana (1924), 263 U. S. 545 (regulation of the taking of wild animals). For general discussions of the nature of the police power, see Tiedeman, The Police Power; Freund, The Police Power, chapters I, II, and III; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, ch. XVI; McGehee, Due Process of Law, ch. IX; R. E. Cushman, The National Police Power Under the Taxing Clause of the Constitution, Minnesota Law Review, IV, 247. SECTION 2. THE PROTECTION OF HEALTH. RAILROAD COMPANY v. HUSEN. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1877. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Missouri. MR. JUSTICE STRONG delivered the opinion of the court. Five assignments of error appear in this record; but they raise only a single question. It is, whether the statute of Missouri, upon which the action in the State court was founded, is in conflict with the clause of the Constitution of the United States that ordains "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes." The statute, approved January 23, 1872, by its first section, enacted as follows: "No Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle shall be driven or otherwise conveyed into, or remain, in any county in this State, between the first day of March and the first day of November in each year, by any person or persons whatsoever." A later section is in these words: "If any person or persons shall bring into this State any Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle, in violation of the first section of this act, he or they shall be liable, in all cases, for all damages sustained on account of disease communicated by said cattle." Other sections make such bringing of cattle into the State a criminal offense, and provide penalties for it. It was, however, upon the provisions we have quoted that this action was brought against the railroad company that had conveyed the cattle into the county. It is noticeable that the stat ute interposes a direct prohibition against the introduction into the State of all Texas, Mexican, or Indian cattle during eight months of each year, without any distinction between such as may be diseased and such as are not. It is true a proviso to the first section enacts that "when such cattle shall come across the line of the State, loaded upon a railroad car or steamboat, and shall pass through the State without being unloaded, such shall not be construed as prohibited by the act; but the railroad company or owners of a steamboat performing such transportation shall be responsible for damages which may result from the disease called the Spanish or Texas fever, should the same occur along the line of transportation; and the existence of such disease along the line of such route shall be prima facie evidence that such disease has been communicated by such transportation." This proviso imposes burdens and liabilities for transportation through the State, though the cattle be not unloaded, while the body of the section absolutely prohibits the introduction of any such cattle into the State, with the single exception mentioned. It seems hardly necessary to argue at length, that, unless the statute can be justified as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, it is a usurpation of the power vested exclusively in Congress. It is a plain regulation of interstate commerce, a regulation extending to prohibition. Whatever may be the power of a State over commerce that is completely internal, it can no more prohibit or regulate that which is interstate than it can that which is with foreign nations. Power over one is given by the Constitution of the United States to Congress in the same words in which it is given over the other and in both cases it is necessarily exclusive. That the transportation of property from one State to another is a branch of interstate commerce is undeniable, and no attempt has been made in this case to deny it. The Missouri statute is a plain interference with such transportation, an attempted exercise over it of the highest possible power, that of destruction. We are thus brought to the question whether the Missouri statute is a lawful exercise of the police power of the State. We admit that the deposit in Congress of the power to regulate foreign commerce and commerce among the States was not a surrender of that which may properly be denominated police power. What that power is, it is difficult to define with sharp precision. It is generally said to extend to making regulations promotive of domestic order, morals, health, and safety. . . But whatever may be the nature and reach of the police power of a State, it cannot be exercised over a subject confided exclusively to Congress by the Federal Constitution. It cannot invade the domain of the national government. It was said in Henderson et al. v. Mayor of the City of New York et al., 92 U. S. 259, to "be clear, from the nature of our complex form of government, that whenever the statute of a state invades the domain of legislation which belongs exclusively to the Congress of the United States, it is void, no matter under what class of powers it may fall, or how closely allied it may be to powers conceded to belong to the States." Substantially the same thing was said by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. Neither the unlimited powers of a State to tax, nor any of its large police powers, can be exercised to such an extent as to work a practical assumption of the powers properly conferred upon Congress by the Constitution. Many acts of a State may, indeed, affect commerce, without amounting to a regulation of it, in the constitutional sense of the term. And it is sometimes difficult to define the distinction between that which merely affects or influences and that which regulates or furnishes a rule of conduct. There is no such difficulty in the present case. While we unhesitatingly admit that a State may pass sanitary laws, and laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property within its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, &c., from entering the State; while for the purpose of self-protection it may establish quarantine, and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with transportation into or through the State, beyond what is absolutely necessary for its self-protection. It may not, under cover of exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden either foreign or interstate commerce. Tried by this rule, the statute of Missouri is a plain intrusion upon the exclusive domain of Congress. It is not a quarantine law. It is not an inspection law. It says to all natural persons and to all transportation companies, "You shall not bring into the State any Texas cattle or any Mexican cattle or Indian cattle, between March 1 and Dec. 1, in any year, no matter whether they are free from disease or not, no matter whether they may do an injury to the inhabitants of the State or not; and if you do bring them in, even for the purpose of carrying them through the State without unloading them, you shall be subject to extraordinary liabilities." Such a statute, we do not doubt, it is beyond the power of the State to enact. To hold otherwise would be to ignore one of the leading objects which the Constitution of the United States was designed to secure. Judgment reversed. HOLDEN v. HARDY. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1898. 169 United States, 366. Error to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. [The Legislature of Utah enacted a law providing that workmen should not be employed in underground mines or smelters or other institutions for the reduction of ores or metals for more than eight hours per day except in certain cases of emergency. Violation of the statute was made a misdemeanor. The plaintiff in error having been convicted thereunder applied to the Supreme Court of Utah for a writ of habeas corpus praying his discharge on the ground that the statute was contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court having remanded him to the custody of the sheriff, he sued out this writ of error.] MR. JUSTICE BROWN delivered the opinion of the The validity of the statute in question is... challenged upon the ground of an alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, in that it abridges the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; deprives both the employer and the laborer of his property without due process of law, and denies to them the equal protection of the laws. [Here follows an elaborate examination and classification of the decisions of the Supreme Court in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment.] The latest utterance of this court upon this subject is contained in the case of Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 591, in which it was held that an act of Louisiana which prohibited individuals within the State from making contracts of insurance with corporations doing business in New York, was a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Peckham remarked: "In the privilege of pursuing an ordinary calling or trade, and of acquiring, holding, |