Statement of the Case. Plaintiff prays that the industrial commission of Ohio be perpetually enjoined from sending such notices, and from revoking, changing, or modifying such findings of fact made and certified by the commission to plaintiff, and from carrying out and perpetuating the resolution of December 1, 1917, and from revoking, changing or modifying its finding of fact for and on behalf of any employer who is of sufficient financial ability and credit to render certain the payment of compensation and the furnishing of services to employes and their dependents as provided in Section 1465-69, General Code, and who maintains the bond required by the commission and abides by its rulings and pays the required amount into the surplus of the state insurance fund. Plaintiff prays for such other and further relief to which he may be entitled. The answer and cross-petition of The Cleveland Stamping & Tool Company avers similar facts, and prays for the same relief. To the petition of plaintiff and to the answer and cross-petition of The Cleveland Stamping & Tool Company the defendants filed general demurrers, which were sustained by the common pleas court. The cause was appealed to the court of appeals of Franklin county, Ohio, which court held that the plaintiff was entitled to a temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants as prayed for in his petition until the 29th day of April, 1918, and upon the facts stated in the petition not entitled to a perpetual injunction, and sustained the demurrer to the answer and cross-petition of The Cleveland Stamping & Tool Company. Opinion, per DONAHUE, J. This proceeding in error is brought in this court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. Mr. Judson Harmon and Messrs. Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, for plaintiff in error. Mr. Joseph McGhee, attorney general; Mr. William J. Ford; Mr. Frank Davis, Jr.; Mr. Timothy S. Hogan and Mr. George B. Okey, for defendants in error. DONAHUE, J. Section 35, Article II of the Constitution of Ohio, as adopted September 3, 1912, authorizes the general assembly of Ohio to pass laws establishing a state fund to be created by compulsory contribution thereto by employers, and administered by the state, for the purpose of providing compensation to workmen and their dependents, for death, injury, or occupational diseases occasioned in the course of such workmen's employment. In pursuance of this authority the general assembly enacted a Workmen's Compensation Law (103 O. L., 72-92). Section 22 of this act (Section 1465-69, General Code) provided among other things that certain employers under certain conditions might elect to pay individually, or from a benefit fund, department or association, compensation to workmen and their dependents for death or injuries received in the course of employment. Under the provisions of Section 35, Article II of the Constitution, the general assembly was not required to make any such exception in favor of any employer, but could have required every employer, Opinion, per DONAHUE, J. mentioned in subdivision 2 of Section 13 of that act to pay into the state insurance fund the amount of premium determined and fixed by the state liability board of awards; and, if it could have done this, then undoubtedly it can at any time amend Section 22 of that act by striking out such exceptions in favor of employers of sufficient financial ability to render certain the payment of compensation to injured employes, or to the dependents of killed employes, and the furnishing of medical, surgical, nursing and hospital attention and services, medicines and funeral expenses equal to or greater than provided in the original act. It necessarily follows that if the general assembly has the power at any time to withdraw from these employers this privilege to elect to pay such compensation and furnish such services and attention and funeral expenses directly, it can from time to time impose such conditions as in its judgment seem wise and necessary to safeguard the main purpose and intent, not only of the act itself, but of the constitutional provision under authority of which this law was passed. It also follows that whoever seeks to avail himself of the benefits of this exception in his favor must comply with the conditions imposed. Verducci v. Casualty Company of America, 96 Ohio St., 260. While the contract of insurance described in the petition does not provide for any definite term, nevertheless, at the time it was made, it must have been within the contemplation of the parties thereto that they could not by contract limit the power of Opinion, per DONAHUE, J. the general assembly conferred upon it by Section 35, Article II of the Constitution, to withdraw this privilege or to limit it by other and further conditions that would render such contract of indemnity wholly useless to the employer. The question is in every way analogous to the one arising in the case of Louisville & Nashville Rd. Co. v. Mottley, 219 U. S., 467, in which it was held by the supreme court of the United States that "The power of Congress to act in regard to matters delegated to it is not hampered by contracts made in regard to such matters by individuals; but contracts of that nature are made subject to the possibility that even if valid when made Congress may by exercising its power render them invalid." To the same effect is the decision of the supreme court of Vermont in the case of Fitzgerald & Co. v. Grand Trunk Rd. Co., 63 Vt., 169. See also Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S., 645; Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S., 25; Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U. S., 814; Butchers' Union Co. v. Crescent City Co., 111 U. S., 746, and C., B. & Q. Rd. Co. v. Nebraska, 170 U. S., 58. But the question in this case does not depend merely upon the general authority of the legislature to exercise police powers, but rather directly upon the constitutional grant of power and the further consideration that the privilege granted to certain employers by Section 22 of The Workmen's Compensation Act, to pay compensation direct, is an exception to the general provisions of that act, in their favor, Opinion, per Donahue, J. There is therefore no reasonable hypothesis upon which to base the theory that a private contract, to continue for an indefinite number of years, could in any way prevent the legislature from withdrawing this privilege or adding other and further conditions. There is, however, a further provision in Section 22 of the original act that seems to have been overlooked in the argument of this case. That provision (as amended, 107 O. L., 160) reads as follows: "The industrial commission of Ohio may at any time change or modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if in its judgment such action is necessary or desirable to secure or assure a strict compliance with all of the provisions of the law in reference to the payment of compensation and the furnishing of medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines and funeral expenses to injured and the dependents of killed employes." The experience of four or more years under this Workmen's Compensation Law may have demonstrated to the entire satisfaction of this commission that it is necessary or desirable to change or modify its former findings of fact in order to secure or assure a strict compliance with the law, where employers have elected to pay this compensation direct and have later entered into a contract with an indemnity company, by the terms of which, as averred in this petition, "The insurance company * * agreed to pay to the injured employes of plaintiff such amounts for medical, nurse and hospital services and medicines, and such compensation as were |