would be unaffected by local prejudices and sectional views, it would be a dereliction of their duty not to exercise an independent judgment in cases not foreclosed by previous adjudication.9

§ 74. Only the strictly local laws of the state are binding on federal courts.-It was held at an early day and recently approved by the supreme court, that the true interpretation of the thirty-fourth section of the judiciary act limits its application to state laws strictly local, that is, to the positive statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals, and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the right and title to real estate and other matters immovable and infraterritorial in their character, and that it has no application to general commercial law.10

§ 75. When United States supreme court follows state decisions construing state constitutions and statutes-General rule. Upon the construction of the constitution and laws of the state, the supreme court, as a general rule, follows the decisions of the highest courts of the state, unless they conflict with or impair the efficacy of some provision of the federal constitution, or of a federal statute, or a rule of general commercial law. And this is so where a course of those decisions, whether founded on statutes or not, have become rules of property within the state; also in regard to rules of evidence in actions at law; and also in reference to the common law of the state, and its laws and customs of a local character when established by repeated decision. Substantially conclusive effect is given to such decisions upon the construction of statutes, as affecting title to real estate within the state. And while the rule is thoroughly settled that remedies in the courts of the United States are at common law or in equity, according to the essential character of the case, uncontrolled in that particular by the practice of the state, yet an enlargement of equitable rights by state statute may be administered by the circuit courts of

U. S. 555, 558 (31:795), and authorities cited.

9 Burgess v. Selegman, 107 U. S. 20, 38 (27:359); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 363 (37: 772).

10 Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1, 24 (10:8C5); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U. S. 368, 411 (37: 772).

the United States as well as by the courts of the state; and when the case is one of a remedial proceeding, essentially of an equitable character, there can be no objection to the exercise of the jurisdiction.11

§ 76. Construction of state constitutions and statutes when federal question involved-Impairing obligation of contract.In cases involving the question whether the obligation of a contract alleged to have arisen from state legislation or by agreement with the agents of a state by its authority, has been impaired by a state law, a federal question is presented for determination, and, in such cases, the supreme court of the United States will, independently of the decisions of the highest court of the state, decide for itself (1) whether a contract was created by the state statute or other authority of the state, and (2) if there be a contract whether its obligation has been impaired; and, if the decision of these questions require a construction of the constitution and laws of the state, the court in construing them will act upon its own judgment and independently of the previous adjudications of the state court upon the same or similar questions.12

§ 77. State decisions on enactment of state laws and their harmony with state constitution.-Whether the statutes of a state have been duly enacted in accordance with the requirements of its constitution is not a federal question, and the decision of the highest court of a state as to what are the laws of the state,13 or that the procedure prescribed by the state constitution to be observed by its legislature in the enactment of laws is mandatory and that enactments passed in violation

11 Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 350 (33:909).

12 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v. Palmes, 109 U. S. 244, 258 (27:922); Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens Gas Light Co., 115 U. S. 633, 700 (29:510); Citizens Savings Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636, 662 (43:840); McCulloch v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102, 133 (43:382); Bank v. Skelley, 1 Black, 436, 443 (17:173); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 665 (34:305);

Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488, (42:553); Wright v. Nagles, 101 U. S. 791, 797 (25:92); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223, 262 (45:162).

13 Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 468 (35:225); Railroad Co. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359 (25:185); Leavenworth County, v. Barnes, 94 U. S. 70 (24:63); South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 I. S. 260 (24: 154); Bank v. Ottawa, 105 U. S. 667 (26:1204).

thereof are void,1 or that a statute of the state is in harmony with the state constitution,15 or that a statute imposing a license tax on commerce does not apply to interstate commerce,16 or that the procedure by which a state officer has been removed from office was in accordance with the constitution and laws of the state,17 or construing the statute of limitations of a state,18 will be followed by the United States supreme court.

§ 78. Construction of state statutes providing for the levy and collection of taxes.-It is the peculiar province of the highest court of a state to decide whether or not the method pursued in the assessment, levy and collection of taxes is in conformity with the statutes of the state upon the subject, to construe such statutes, and determine whether or not they are in conformity with the state constitution; and such decision, no federal question being involved, will be followed by the supreme court of the United States.19

§ 79. State decisions not allowed to impair the obligation of contracts. The construction given by the highest tribunal of a state to its statute or a provision of its constitution must be taken as correct as to all contracts made under the statute, or constitutional provisions so construed, and the validity and obligation of such contracts cannot be impaired by any subsequent decision altering the construction; the construction, so far as contract obligations incurred under it are concerned, constitutes a part of the law as much as if embodied in it. So far does this doctrine extend that when a statute of two states, expressed in the same terms, is construed differently by their highest courts, they are treated by the United States supreme court as different laws, each embodying the particular construction of its own state and enforced in accordance with it

14 Wilkes County Comrs. v. Coler, 180 U. S. 506, 533 (45:642).

15 Railroad Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 424 (38:1031); County of Lincoln v. Luning, 133 U. S. 529 (33:766); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 177 (44:119).

16 Osborn v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650, 656 (41:586).

17 Wilson v. North Carolina, 169 U. S. 586, 600 (42:865).

18 Dibble v. Bellingham Bay Land Co., 163 U. S. 63 (41:72). 19 Taylor v. Secor, 92 U. S. 575 (23:663); Bailey v. Maguire, 22 Wall. 215 (22:850); Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 660, 670 (33: 772); Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18 (35: 613); Provident Sav. Inst. 7. Mass., 6 Wall. 611, 632 (18:907); Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2 Black, 510, 518 (17:305).

in all cases arising under it. The statute as thus expounded determines the validity of all contracts made under it, and a subsequent change in its interpretation can affect only subsequent contracts. The true rule upon this subject, as established by a long line of decisions of the supreme court of the United States, "is to give a change of judicial construction in respect to a statute the same effect in its operation on contracts and existing contract rights that would be given to a legislative amendment; that is to say, make it prospective, not retroactive. After a statute has been settled by judicial construction, the construction becomes, so far as contract rights under it are concerned, as much a part of the statute as the text itself, and a change of decision is, to all intents and purposes, the same in its effect on contracts as an amendment of the law by legislative enactment." It is not only the right but the duty of the highest court of a state to change its opinions, whenever in its judgment the necessity arises, and such change may be made for new reasons or because of a change of opinion in respect to old ones; but the supreme court of the United States will not follow a state court in its change of opinion when it affects rights vested before the change was made.20

§ 80. State decisions establishing rules of property.-When the decisions of the highest court of a state, whether founded on statute or not, have become rules of property within the state, such decisions are binding on the federal courts of law and equity in adjudicating upon titles in that state.21 The ti

20 Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 302 (26:1090); Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U. S. 686 (25: 971); Christy v. Pridgeon, 4 Wall. 197 (18:322); Gelpcke V. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 75 (17:520); Thompson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327 (18:177); Lee County V. Rogers, 7 Wall. 181 (19:160); Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50 (19:594); Olcott v. Supervisors, 16 Wall. 678 (21:382); Fairfield v. Gallatin County, 100 U. S. 47 (25: 544); Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134; Ohio Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Debolt, 16 How. 416; Loeb v. Trustees of

Columbia Township, 179 U. S. 472, 494 (45:280), and authorities. cited. This is not in conflict with B. & L. Asso. v. Brahan, 193 U. S. 635-651 (48:823).

21 Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 350 (33:909); Polk v. Wendal, 9 Cranch, 87 (3:665); Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. 361 (6:495); Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 291 (8:495); Webster v. Cooper, 14 How. 488 (14:510); League v. Egery, 24 How. 264 (16:655); Russell v. Ely, 2 Black, 575 (17:258); Liffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599 (17:261); Woods v. Freeman, 1 Wall. 398

tle to real estate, and the construction of deeds and statutes in respect thereto are matters of local law and rules of property and bind the federal courts of law and equity.22

§ 81. Statutes of limitations.-No laws of the several states have been more steadfastly or more often recognized by the supreme court of the union, from the beginning, as rules of decisions in the courts of the United States, than statutes of limitations of actions, real and personal, as enacted by the legislature of a state and as construed by its highest court; and the courts of the United States, in the absence of legislation upon the subject by congress, recognize the statutes of limitations of the several states as rules of decision under the thirty-fourth section of the Judiciary Act, and give them the same construction and effect which are given by the state courts.23 Laws limiting the time for bringing suits constitute a part of the lex fori of every country; they are laws for administering justice, one of the most sacred and important sovereign rights.24

§ 82. Statute of frauds.-The statute of frauds, even as applied to commercial instruments, is such a law of the state as

(17:543); Walker v. Marks, 17 Wall. 648 (21:744); McKeen v. Delancy, 5 Cranch, 22 (3:25); Williamson v. Suydam, 6 Wall. 723 (18:967); Bondurant v. Watson, 103 U. S. 281 (26:447).

22 Halstead v. Butler, 140 U. S. 273, 278 (35;484); Ridings v. Johnson, 128 U. S. 212 (32:401); Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 608 (37:867); St. Louis v. Rutz, 138 U. S. 226 (34:964); Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528 (35:843); Van Rensseler v. Kearney, 11 How. 297 (13:703); Warburton White, 176 U. S. 484 (44:555); Bardon v. Land & R. Imp. Co., 157 U. S. 327 (39:719); Williams v. Gaylord, 186 U. S. 157 (46:1102); Middleton v. McCrew, 23 How. 45 (16:403); Blanchard v. Brown, 3 Wall. 245 (18:69); Gage v. Pum

V.

pelly, 115 U. S. 454 (29:449); Lippincott v. Mitchell, 94 U. S. 767 (24:315); Ross v. M'Lung, 6 Pet. 283 (8:400); Henderson v. Griffin, 5 Pet. 151 8:79); Beauregard v. New Orleans, 18 How. 497 (15:469); St. John v. Chew, 12 Wheat. 153 (6:583); Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119 (5:221); Hinde v. Valtier, 5 Pet. 398 (8: 168); Ward V. Chamberlain, 2 Black, 430 (17:319); Clements v. Berry, 11 How. 398 (13:745).

23 Bauserman v. Blount, 147 U. S. 647, 661 (37:316), collecting and citing the authorities on the subject; Balkam V Woodstock Iron Co., 154 U. S. 177, 190 (38: 957), collecting and citing authorities.

24 Amy v. Dubuque, 98 U. S. 470, 471 (25:228).