contract. But if that effect is produced, it is immaterial whether it is done by acting on the remedy or directly on the contract itself. In either case it is prohibited by the constitution." The legislature has the control of the modes of proceedings and the forms of procedure to enforce contracts, and may alter them, provided it furnishes a remedy which is complete and which secures all the substantial rights of the parties to contracts.1 It is a settled rule that the laws which prescribe the mode of enforcing a contract, which are in existence when and where a contract is made and is to be performed, are so far a part of the contract that no changes in those laws which seriously interfere with that enforcement are valid, because they impair its obligation within the meaning of the constitution of the United States.10 15 § 338. Same-Rule stated by Mr. Justice Bradley.-In a case decided by the supreme court of the United States at the October Term, 1889, Mr. Justice Bradley stated the rule on this subject as follows: "It is well settled by the adjudications of this court, that the obligation of a contract is impaired, in the sense of the constitution, by any act which prevents its enforcement, or which materially abridges the remedy for enforcing it, which existed at the time it was contracted, and does not apply an alternative remedy equally adequate and efficacious." 17 § 339. Change in statute of limitations.-It is the settled doctrine that state legislatures may prescribe a limitation for the bringing of suits where none previously existed, as well as 14 Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 (11:143); McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608 (11:398); Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How. (16:753); Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S. 627 (24:858); Seibert v. United States, 122 U. S. 284 (30:1163); Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203 (26:132); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118, 132 (41:93). 15 Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69 (24:610); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118 (41:93). 16 Brine v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 96 U. S. 627 (24:858); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U. S. 118 (41:93); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662 (34:304). 17 McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662 (34:304); citing Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311 (11:143); Woodruff v. Trapnall, 10 How. 190. (13:383); Furman v. Nichol, 8 Wall. 44 (19:370); Walker V. Whitehead. 16 Wall. 314 (21:357); Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (18:403); Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69 (24:610); Memphis v. United States, 97 U. S. 293 (24: 920); Memphis v. Brown, 97 U. S. 300 (24:924); Howard v. Bugbee, 24 How. 461 (16:753). shorten the time within which suits to enforce existing causes of action may be commenced, provided, in each case, a reasonable time, taking all the circumstances into consideration, be given by the new law for the commencement of suits before the bar takes effect. The passage of a new statute of limitations giving a shorter time for the bringing of actions than existed before, even as applied to actions which had accrued, does not necessarily affect the remedy to such an extent as to impair the obligation of the contract within the meaning of the constitution, provided a reasonable time is given for the bringing of such actions.18 § 340. Judgment for tort not a contract.-A judgment recovered upon a liability for a tort, created by statute, is not a contract within the meaning of the constitutional provision forbidding state legislation impairing its obligation, for the reason that the term "contract" is used in the constitution in its ordinary sense as signifying the agreement of two or more minds, for considerations proceeding from one to the other to do or not to do certain acts; and a state law taking away the means and remedy of collecting such a judgment is not within the constitutional inhibition.19. § 341. Withdrawing the power of taxation from municipal corporations impairs contract, when.-When a state has authorized a municipal corporation to contract and to exercise the power of local taxation to the extent necessary to meet its engagements, the power thus given cannot be withdrawn until the contract is satisfied. The state and the corporation, in such cases, are equally bound. The power given becomes a trust which the donor cannot annul, and which the donee is bound to execute; and neither the state nor the corporation can any more impair the obligation of a contract in this way than in any other way.20 18 Wheeler v. Jackson, 137 U. S. 245 (34:569); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662 (34:304); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628, 632 (24:365); Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U. S. 668, 675 (26:886); Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U. S. 633, 643 (28:279). 19 Louisiana v. New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285 (27.936); Chase v. Cur tis, 113 U. S. 452, 464 (28:1038); Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405 (33:193). 20 Van Hoffman v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (18:403); Galena v. United States, 5 Wall. 705, 710 (18: 560); United States v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358 (26:395); Ralls County v. United States, 105 U. S. 733 (26:1220); Louisiana v. Police § 342. Increasing exemptions from execution sales.—A law of the state increasing the exemptions of property of debtors from seizure and sale under execution is unconstitutional as to contracts made before the passage of such law.21 § 343. Laws altering terms of contracts.-A law which alters the terms of a contract by imposing new conditions, or dispensing with those expressed, is a law impairing its obligation.22 And a state statute which, in an effort to tax the bonds of corporations held by non-residents, requires the corporations doing business within its limits and which pay interest to their bondholders or other creditors, to pay a part of that interest to the state for taxes upon the bonds, is void.23 § 344. What are laws.-The constitution of a state is a law of the state within the meaning of the constitution of the United States, prohibiting states from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts.2+ § 345. Same—Judicial decisions. In order to come within the provision of the constitution of the United States, which declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligation of contracts, not only must the obligation of a contract. have been impaired, but it must have been impaired by some act of the legislative power of the state or some provision of the state constitution, and not by a decision of its judicial department only. The supreme court of the United States is not authorized to review the judgments of the state courts because their judgments refuse to give effect to valid contracts, or because those judgments, in their effect, impair the obligation of contracts. The appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court, upon writ of error to a state court, on the ground that the obligation of a contract has been impaired, can be invoked only Jury, 111 U. S. 716 (28:574); Louisiana v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716 (28:574); Mobile v. Watson, 116 U. S. 289 (29:620); Wolff v. New Orleans, 103 U. S. 358 (26:395). 21 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595, 611 (24:793). 22 Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432 (24:760); Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300, 326 (21:179). 23 Cleveland, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15 Wall. 300, 326 (21:179). 24 Bier v. McGehee, 148 U. S. 137 (37:397); Mississippi & M. R. R. Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511 (19: 997); Bank v. Thomas, 18 How. 384 (15:460); White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646 (20:685); Delma v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co., 14 Wall. 661 (20:757); Gunn v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610 (21:412), when an act of the legislature alleged to be repugnant to the constitution of the United States has been decided by the state court to be valid, and not when an act admitted to be valid has been misconstrued by the court.25 § 346. Same-Same-Change of state decision.-The contract clause of the constitution cannot be invoked against a change in the decisions of the highest court of a state.26 It is now definitely settled that a contract can be impaired within the meaning of this clause of the constitution, so as to give the supreme court of the United States jurisdiction upon writ of error to review the judgment of a state court, only by some subsequent act of the legislative power of the state or some provision of the state constitution which has been upheld and given effect by the state court." § 347. Same-Same.-If a contract, when made, is valid by the constitution and laws of the state, as then expounded by the highest authorities of the state whose duty it is to administer them, no subsequent action by the legislature or the judiciary can impair its obligation.28 § 348. The constitutional inhibition prospective only. The inhibition of the constitution against impairing contracts is wholly prospective. The states may legislate as to contracts thereafter made, as they may see fit. It is only those in existence when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its effects.29 25 Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103, 112 (40:91); Bank v. Buckingham, 5 How. 317, 343 (12:181); Lawler v. Walker, 14 How. 149, 154 (14:364); Leigh Water Co. v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388, 392 (30:1059); New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Co., 125 U. S. 18, 30 (31:607); Brown v. Smart, 145 U. S. 454 (36: 773); Wood v. Brady, 150 U. S. 18 (37:987); Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511, 515 (19: 997); Knox v. Exchange Bank, 14 Wall. 661, 665 (20:757); University v. People, 99 U. S. 309, 319 (25:387); Chicago Life Ins. Co. v Needles, 113 U. S. 574, 587 (28: 1084); Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273 (41:157); Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207 (41:132); National Mutual Building & Loan Asso. v. Brahan, 193 U. S. 635, 651 (48:823). 26 National Mutual Building & Loan Asso. v. Brahan, 193 U. S. 635, 651 (48:823). 27 Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207 (41:132). 28 Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. 294 (18:38); Gelpeck v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175 (17:520); Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50 (19:594); Olcott v. Fond du Lac County, 16 Wall. 678 (21:382). 29 Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595 (24:793); Denny v. Bennett, 128 U. S. 489, 503 (32:491); Mississippi & M. R. Co. v. Rock, 4 Wall. (j) NO STATE TO EMIT BILLS OF CREDIT. 31 349. Bills of credit defined.-The states are forbidden by the constitution to "emit bills of credit.'' 30 Bills of credit are paper issued by a state, upon its faith, designed to circulate as money, and to be received and used as such in the ordinary business of life, redeemable at a future day. A warrant drawn by the state authorities in payment of an appropriation made by the legislature, when the warrant is payable upon presentation if there be funds in the treasury, and which has been issued to an individual in payment of the debt of the state to him, is not a bill of credit or treasury warrant intended to circulate as money.32 $ 350. Same-Defined by Chief Justice Marshall.-"The word 'emit' is never employed in describing those contracts by which a state binds itself to pay money at a future day for services actually received, or for money borrowed for present use; nor are instruments executed for such purposes, in common language, denominated 'bills of credit.' To 'emit bills of credit' conveys to the mind the idea of issuing paper intended to circulate through the community for its ordinary purpose, as money, which paper is redeemable at a future day. This is the sense in which the terms have been always understood." 35 (k) BILLS OF ATTAINDER AND EX POST FACTO LAWS. § 351. Bills of attainder and ex post facto laws.-Both the federal and state governments are forbidden by the constitution to pass bills of attainder or ex post facto laws; 34 and these subjects have been treated in the chapter next preceding in the discussion of the constitutional limitations upon the federal government.35 177 (18:381); Northwestern Uni- (14:30); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 283 (29:185); Houston & Texas Central R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 103 (44:673). 32 Houston & Texas Central R. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 103 (44: 673). 33 Craig v. Missouri, 4 Pet. 410 (7:903). 34 U. S. Const. art. II. sec. 9 cl. 3, and sec 10, cl. 1. 35 Ante, secs. 103, 104, 155-100. |