§ 328. Same-The only inhibited abridgment is one based on race, color or previous condition of servitude.-A denial or abridgement of the right of citizens of the United States to vote must, in order to be in violation of the amendment, be one which is made "on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." The power of congress to legislate at all upon the subject of voting at state elections rests upon this amendment; the amendment does not confer upon congress authority to impose penalties for every wrongful refusal to receive the vote of a qualified elector at state elections; it is only when the wrongful refusal at such an election is because of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, that congress can interfere and provide for its punishment. And a penal statute enacted by congress, for the purpose of enforcing the inhibition of the fifteenth amendment, which is in general language broad enough to cover wrongful acts without as well as within its constitutional power, can not be limited by judicial construction so as to make it operate only on that which congress may rightfully prohibit and punish.1

(i) LAWS IMPAIRING THE OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS.

§ 329. No state to pass law impairing obligation of contracts-Prohibition upon the states--Method of enforcement.It is declared by the constitution that: No state shall pass any "law impairing the obligation of contracts."2 This is a pro

1 United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 217 (23:563); James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 142 (47:979); Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 634 (48:817); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 569 (23:588). "It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible offenders and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who should be set at large. This would,, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of the government. The courts enforce the legislative will

when ascertained, if within the constitutional grant of power. Within its legitimate sphere, congress is supreme and beyond the control of the courts; but if it steps outside of its constitutional limitation and attempts that which is beyond its reach, the courts are authorized to, and when called upon in due course of legal proceedings must, annul its encroachments upon the reserved power of the states and the people." Chief Justice Waite in United States v. Reese, supra.

2 U. S. Const. Art. II. sec. 10.

hibition on the states, and has always been enforced under the twenty-fifth section of the original judiciary act, by writ of error from the supreme court of the United States to the highest courts of the states, in cases involving state statutes alleged to be repugnant to the constitutional provision, where such statutes have been upheld by the highest courts of the state.3

$ 330. Same-Same-Power of United States circuit courts to declare such statutes void.-The circuit courts of the United States have the power, in suits originally brought before them, or removed into them from state courts, to declare void any state statute which is repugnant to the contract clause of the federal constituion, if the validity of such statute be in issue in the suit. The first case arising under the contract clause of the constitution was originally brought in the circuit court of the United States for the district of Massachusetts, which held void a statute of the state of Georgia because it impaired the obligation of a contract made by that state, and the decision of the circuit court was, upon writ of error, affirmed by the supreme court of the United States; and since that decision, the jurisdiction of the federal circuit courts to declare invalid state statutes which are repugnant to the contract clause of the constitution has been regarded as beyond question.1

§ 331. The federal supreme court will determine for itself whether there is a contract, and whether its obligation is impaired. Upon writ of error, in reaching a conclusion on the question whether the judgment of the supreme court of a state has given effect to a law of the state which, in violation of the constitution of the United States, impairs the obligation of a contract, the supreme court of the United States will decide

3 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 715 (4:629); Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How. 304, 322 (14:705); Walker v. Whitehead, 16 Wall. 314 (21:357); U. S. v. Quincy, 4 Wall. 535 (18:403); Louisiana v. St. Martin's Parish, 111 U. S. 716 (28:574); Houstan & Texas Central Railroad Co. v. State of Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 103 (44:673).

4 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87,

148 (3:162); Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 108 (5:547); Sturges v. Crowinshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 208 (4:529); Ogden v. Saunders, 12 Wheat. 214, 369 (6:606); Bronson v. Kinzie, 1 How. 311, 332 (11:143); McCracken v. Hayward, 2 How. 608, 619 (11:397); Shapleigh v. San Angelo, 167 U. S. 646 (42:310); Bedford v. Eastern Bldg. & L. Assn., 181 U. S. 227 (45:834).

for itself, independently of the decision of the state court, (1) whether there is a contract, and (2) whether its obligation is impaired; and if the decision of the question as to the existence of the alleged contract requires a construction of state constitutions and laws, the supreme court of the United States is not necessarily governed by previous decisions of the state court upon the same or similar points, except where they have been so firmly established as to constitute a rule of property.5

§ 332. Contract defined.-A contract is a compact between two or more parties, and is either executed or executory. A contract executed is one in which everything that was to be done is done, and nothing remains to be done, and the object of the contract is performed and accomplished; and such a contract requires no consideration to support it. A consummated gift is as valid in law as a contract made upon a valuable consideration. A grant actually made is an executed contract. An executory contract is one in which it is stipulated, upon a sufficient consideration, that something is to be done or not to be done by one or both of the parties. A contract executed, as well as one which is executory, contains obligations binding on the parties. An executed contract divests the parties of the rights, titles and estates which they, respectively, by such contract have granted away or parted with, and imposes on them an obligation not to re-assert such rights, titles and estates. A grant estops the grantor, and imposes on him a continuing obligation not to assert any right in opposition to his own grant and relinquishment. The constitutional inhibition against the impairment of the obligation of contracts applies alike to both executory and executed contracts, by whomsoever made."

5 Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co. v Palmes, 109 U. S. 244, 258 (27:922); Bank v. Knoop, 16 How. 369, 391 (14:977); Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens Gas Light Co., 115 U. S. 638, 700 (29:510); Vicksburg, Shrevesport & Pacific R. R. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665, 671 (29: 770); Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791, 797 (25:921); Bank v. Skelly,

1 Black, 436, 450 (17:173); Bryan v. Board of Education, 151 U. S. 639, 658 (38:297); Mobile & Ohio R. Co. v. Tennessee, 153 U. S. 486, 509 (38:793); Shelby County v. Union & Planters' Bank, 161 U. S. 149, 161 (40:651).

• Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87, 143 (3:162); Green v. Biddle, 8 Wheat. 1, 108 (5:547); Davis v.

§ 333. Same-Charters of private corporations.-Every provision of the charter of a private corporation granting to the incorporators any valuable right, privilege or franchise, and which conduced to an acceptance of the charter and an organi

zation under it, is a contract within the meaning of the contract clause of the constitution and is protected by it, unless the power to change the charter is reserved in the charter itself, or in some constitutional or statutory provision; and this is true although the corporation engages in a public business, such as the business of a public carrier, and its property is affected with a public interest.