on juries, when it is not shown that the actual administration of such constitution and laws was evil, but only that evil was possible under them.84

$320. The fourteenth amendment does not require state judicial procedure to be uniform. The provision of the fourteenth amendment, declaring that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," does not require that state judicial procedure shall be uniform throughout the territorial limits of the state, but allows diversity in the organization, jurisdiction and procedure of the courts in the different political divisions of the state, as its legislature may determine. The amendment does not prohibit state legislation which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed, or by the territory within which it is to operate; it merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The state has the right to make political subdivisions of its territory for governmental purposes, and establish for them different systems for the administration of justice.85 A state statute may allow the state a larger number of peremptory challenges in capital cases in populous cities and a smaller number in rural districts; 86 or it may abridge the right of trial by jury in large cities without making a similar abridgement in the counties of the state; 87 or it may establish different appellate tribunals for the large cities and for the counties of the state.88 It is fundamental rights which the fourteenth amendment safeguards, and not the mere forum which a state may see proper to designate for the enforcement and protection of such rights. Given, therefore, a condition. where fundamental rights are equally protected and preserved, it is impossible to say that rights which are thus protected

84 Williams v. State of Mississipppi, 179 U. S. 213, 225 (42:1012). 85 Bowman v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22 (25:989); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 72 (30:578); Chappell Chemical & Fertilizer Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co., 172 U. S. 474, 475 (43:520); Cincinnati Street

Railway Company v. Snell, 193
U. S. 30, 38 (48:604).

86 Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 72 (30:578).

87 Chappell Chemical & Fertilizer Co. v. Sulphur Mines Co., 172 U. S. 474, 475 (43:520).

88 Bowman v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22 (25:989).

and preserved have been denied because the state has deemed best to provide for a trial in one forum or another. It is not, under any view, the mere tribunal into which a person is authorized to proceed by a state which determines whether the equal protection of the law has been afforded, but whether in the tribunals which the state has provided equal laws prevail. The mere direction of the state law that a cause, under given circumstances, shall be tried in one forum instead of another,. or may be transferred, when brought, from one forum to another, can have no tendency to violate the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws, where in both forums equality of law governs and equality of administration prevails.89

§ 321. Power of the state to classify cities for the registration of voters.-The state has the power to classify according to population the cities within its limits for the purpose of the registration of voters, and to apply to one city a registration law different in essential particulars from that which regulates the conduct of registration and elections in other cities in the state; and such diversity of legislation does not deny the equal protection of the laws to the citizens of the one city which is withdrawn from the operation of the law controlling the other cities in the state, although the law applicable to that one city may not as effectually safeguard the right and privileges of voting as the laws applicable to other cities.90

§ 322. State law imposing penalty on railroad companies for disseminating Johnson grass seed.-The Texas statute which imposes upon railway companies alone a penalty of twentyfive dollars for permitting Johnson grass or Russian thistle to mature and go to seed upon their right of way, such penalty to be recovered in an action brought by the owners of contiguous farms, who are themselves innocent of doing the same thing, does not deny such companies the equal protection of the laws. In deciding the case cited, the supreme court, speaking by Mr. Justice Holmes, said:

91

"It is admitted that Johnson grass is a menace to crops, that it is propagated only by seed, and that a general regulation of it for the protection of farming would be valid. It is admit

89 Cincinnati Street Car Co. v. Snell, 193 U. S. 30, 38 (48:604). 90 Mason v. Missouri, 179 U. S. 328, 335 (45:214).

91 Missouri, Kansas & Texas Railway Company v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 271 (48:971).

ted also that legislation may be directed against a class when any fair ground for the discrimination exists. But it is said that this particular subjection of railroad companies to a liability not imposed on other owners of lands on which Johnson grass may grow is so arbitrary as to amount to a denial of the equal protection of the laws. There is no dispute about general principles. The question is whether this case lies on one side or the other of the line which has to be worked out between cases differing only in degree. With regard to the manner in which such a question should be approached, it is obvious that the legislature is the only judge of the policy of a proposed discrimination. The principle is similar to that which is established with regard to a decision of congress that certain means are necessary and proper to carry out one of its express powers. When a state legislature has declared that, in its opinion, policy requires a certain measure, its action should not be disturbed by the courts under the fourteenth amendment, unless they can see clearly that there is no fair reason for the law that would not require with equal force its extension to others whom it leaves untouched.

"Approaching the question in this way, we feel unable to say that the law before us may not have been justified by the local conditions. It would have been more obviously fair to extend the regulation at least to highways. But it may have been found, for all that we know, that the seed of Johnson grass is dropped from the cars in such quantities as to cause special trouble. It may be that the neglected strips occupied by railroads afford a ground where noxious weeds especially flourish, and that whereas self-interest leads the owners of farms to keep down pests, the railroad companies have done nothing in a matter which concerns their neighbors only. Other reasons may be imagined. Great constitutional provisions must be administered with caution. Some play must be allowed for the joints of the machine, and it must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts."

§ 323. The design of the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amendment.—The inhibition that no state shall deprive any person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws was designed to prevent any person or class of

persons from being singled out as a special subject for discriminating and hostile legislation; 92 it was not designed to prohibit legislation which, in carrying out a public purpose, is limited in its application, either in the objects to which it is directed, or by the territory within which it is to operate, if within the sphere of its operation it affects alike all persons. and property similarly situated.93

§ 324. Conspiracy to deprive persons of the equal protection of the laws-Section 5519, U. S. Revised Statutes, void.-The provisions of the first section of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution have reference to state action exclysively and not to any action of private individuals; and, therefore, section 5519 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, making it a criminal offense for two or more persons in any state or territory to conspire or go in disguise upon the highway or on the premises of another for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws, or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any state or territory from giving or securing to all persons within such state or territory the equal protection of the laws, is, as to its operation within a state, unauthorized by the federal constitution or any amendment thereto, and is void."*

(h) THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS OF THE UNITED STATES TO VOTE NOT TO BE ABRIDGED ON ACCOUNT OF RACE, COLOR, or

PREVIOUS CONDITION OF SERVITUDE.

§ 325. The fifteenth amendment does not confer the right to vote. The fifteenth amendment to the federal constitution declares that: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of race, color, or previous condition

92 Pembina Con. Silver Mining, etc. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 190 (31:650).

93 Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 71 (30:578); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (28:923); Bowman v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22 (25: 989); Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578, 582 (32:544); Wurts v. Hoog

land, 114 U. S. 606 (29:229); Richmond F. & P. R. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U. S. 529 (24:737).

94 United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 644 (27:290); Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 707 (30: 766); Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 263, 310 (36;429).

of servitude;" and that, "The congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."

This amendment does not confer upon any person, or class of persons, or persons of any race the right to exercise the elective franchise; it simply prohibits the United States and the several states from discriminating against any person in respect to that right on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, and gives congress the power to enforce the prohibition by appropriate legislation.95

§ 326. The right to vote derived from the state. The right to vote in the states comes from the states;96 and the right to vote which was intended to be protected by the fifteenth amendment, is the right to vote as established by the laws. and constitution of the state." 97

§ 327. The fifteenth amendment a limitation upon the federal and state governments.-The first section of the fifteenth amendment to the federal constitution is a limitation or prohibition upon the federal and state governments; it has reference to state and federal action, and not to any action of private individuals." And a federal statute which enacts that "every person who prevents, hinders, controls, or intimidates another from exercising, or in exercising the right of suffrage, to whom that right is guarantied by the fifteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States, by means of bribery, or threats of depriving such person of employment or occupation, or of ejecting such person from a rented house, lands, or other property, or by threats of refusing to renew leases or contracts for labor, or by threats of violence to himself or family, shall be punished" as for a criminal offense, cannot be sustained as an appropriate exercise of the power conferred by the fifteenth amendment upon congress to enforce the limitation upon the states therein contained, and such statute is unconstitutional.99

95 United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 256 (23:563); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 569 (23:588); Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178 (22:627); James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 142 (47: 979); Pope v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 634 (48:817).

96 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 569 (23:588); Pope

v. Williams, 193 U. S. 621, 634 (48: 817).

97 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 42 (36:869).

98 United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 217 (23:563); James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 142 (47: 979).

99 James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127, 142 (47:979).