claim to obedience, and children born of alien parents within and during such hostile occupation, are not born wthin the allegiance, protection, power and jurisdiction of the rightful sovereign owner of the territory, and are, therefore, excluded from the common law rule of citizenship within the territory.21 § 227. Same-Persons born within the seceded states.—It would seem from the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, upon the status of the seceded and confederate states during the war between the states, that the principle which excludes from citizenship children born of alien parentage within and during hostile occupation of a part of the territory of the country, could not be applied to children born within any of those states during that period. The settled doctrine of the court, as to the status of those states during that period is, that the ordinances of secession adopted by their conventions and ratified by a majority of their citizens, respectively, and all the acts of their respective legislatures intended to give effect to those ordinances, were, under the constitution of the United States, utterly without operation in law, and absolutely null and void, and those states did not cease to be members of the American union, nor did they cease to be states, nor did the citizens of those states cease to be citizens of the United States. Those states did not become foreign, nor did their citizens become aliens, and their occupation, though hostile, was not an alien occupation.22 § 228. Resume as to the qualifying words in the citizenship clause of the fourteenth amendment.-It cannot be doubted that the framers of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution, when they inserted in the citizenship clause thereof the qualifying words, "and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," had in mind the common law rule of citizenship by birth, and the established exceptions to that rule, and also the peculiar relation of the Indian tribes to the general government, and intended to preserve those exceptions in our law of 21 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 732 (42:890); United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 246 (4:562). 22 Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700 (19:227); White v. Hart, 13 Wall. 646 (20:685); Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 176 (24:716); Keith v. Clark, 97 U. S. 454 (24:1071); White v. Cannon, 6 Wall. 443 (18:923); Spratt v. United States, 20 Wall. 459 (22:371); Dewing v. Perdicaries, 96 U. S. 193 (24:654). in the United nationality; and that to be "born. States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," means to be born within the territorial limits of the United States, and of parents who are not ambassadors or foreign ministers, nor aliens in hostile occupation of a part of our territory, nor members of any of the Indian tribes. The qualifying words must be read in the light of the common law, and also in the light of the former adjudications of the supreme court upon the political status of the Indian, and the legislation of congress concerning them, and treaties made by the general government with them.23 § 229. Citizenship by naturalization.-The second source of citizenship is by naturalization. By the constitution of the United States, congress was granted power "to establish an uniform rule of naturalization," 24 and, pursuant to this power, congress has, by successive acts, beginning with the act entitled "An Act to Establish an Uniform Rule of Naturalization," passed at the second session of the first congress under the constitution, made provision for the admission to citizenship of four principal classes of persons: (1) Aliens who have resided for a certain time within the limits and under the jurisdiction of the United States, and naturalized individually by proceedings in a court of record; (2) children of persons so naturalized, dwelling within the United States, and being under the age of twenty-one years at the time of such naturalization; (3) all children born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, whose fathers were or may be at the time of their birth citizens thereof, such fathers having resided in the United States; 25 and (4) women married to citizens of the United States, and who might themselves be lawfully naturalized.20 § 230. Same-Citizenship of married woman follows that of her husband. The object of the second section of the act of 23 Ante, sections 196-207, and authorities cited. 24 U. S. Const. Art.I, sec. 8, cl. 4. 25 1 U. S. Stat. at L. p. 103, chap. 3, p. 414, chap. 20, p. 566, chap. 5; 2 U. S. Stat. at L. p. 153, chap. 28, p. 292, chap. 47; 10 U. S. Stat. at L. p. 604, chap. 71; U. S. Rev. Stat. §§ 1993, 2165, 2172; United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 732 (42:890). 26 10 U. S. Stat. at L. 64, chap. 71, sec. 2; U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1994; Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 499 (19:283). congress of Feb. 10, 1855, was to allow the citizenship of married women to follow that of their husbands.27 § 321. "Collective naturalization" by the admission of new states into the union.-The constitution provides that, "new states may be admitted by congress into the union;" 28 and congress having the power to deal with the people of the territories in view of the future states to be formed from them, there can be no doubt that in the admission of a state into the union a collective naturalization may be effected in accordance with the intention of congress and the people applying for admission. An admission on an equal footing with the original states, in all respects whatever, involves equality of constitutional right and power, which cannot thereafterwards be controlled, and also involves the adoption as citizens of the United States of those whom congress makes members of the political community, and who are recognized as such in the formation of the new state with the consent of congress.29 § 232.-Same-Texas admitted into the union with her population as it stood. By the annexation of Texas, under a joint resolution of congress, and its admission into the union on an equal footing with the original states, all the citizens of the former republic became, without any express declaration, citizens of the United States.30 Texas, prior to her annexation, occupied towards the United States the position of an independent sovereignty. Her citizens were determined by her own laws, and those laws prescribed the manner in which aliens. might become citizens. The United States admitted Texas as 27 10 U. S. Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71, sec. 2; U. S. Rev. Stat. § 1194; Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 499 (19:283); Ware v. Wisner, 50 Fed. 312; United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 83; Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 14, 17; Broadis v. Broadis, 86 Fed. 955; Headman v. Rose, 63 Georgia, 465; Kreitz v. Behrensmeyer, 125 Ill. 197, 8 Am. St. Rep. 376, 17 N. E. 254; Dorsey v. Brigham, 177 Ill. 256, 69 Am. St. Rep. 232, 52 N. E. 304, 42 L. R. A. 810; Luhrs v. Eimer, 80 N. Y. 177; Pequiquot v. Detroit, 16 Fed. 215; Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 562, 31 Pac. 917, 19 L. R. A. 42; 84 Am. Dec. 212, note. 28 U. S. Const. Art. IV, sec. 3, cl 1. 29 Boyd v. State of Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135. 186 (36:103). 30 5 U. S. Stat. at L. 798; 9 U. S. Stat. at L. 108; McKinney v. Saviego, 18 How. 235 (15:365); Cryer v. Andrews, 11 Tex. 170; Barrett v. Kelly, 31 Tex. 476; Carter v. Territory, 1 N. M. 317; Boyd v. State of Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135 186 (36:103). 31 one of the states of the union with her population as it stood under her laws. Those who were citizens of the state became citizens of the United States, while aliens were relegated for naturalization to the laws of the United States on that subject. An alien minor who did not reside in Texas on the day of the Declaration of Independence, but who emigrated to Texas within less than six months before it was admitted into the union, and remained there until its admission in the union, and who was not naturalized and had not taken the oath of allegiance to Texas, was not a citizen of Texas at the time of its admission, and did not become a citizen of the United States.32 34 233. "Collective naturalization" by treaty or statute.-It is well settled that citizenship may spring from collective naturalization by treaty or statute.33 By the second article of Joy's Treaty, British subjects who resided at Detroit and at the time of the evacuation of the territory of Michigan, and who continued to reside there afterwards without at any time prior to the expiration of one year from such evacuation declaring their intention of becoming British subjects became ipso facto to all intents and purposes American citizens.35 And by article three of the Treaty of Paris of 1803,36 it was provided that "the inhabitants of the ceded territory shall be incorporated in the union of the United States, and admitted as soon as possible, according to the principles of the federal constitution, to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages and immunities of citizens of the United States; and in the meantime they shall be maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property, and the religion which they profess." Under this provision it was held that a person 31 Contez v. United States, 179 U. S. 191 (45:148). 32 Contez v. United States, 179 U. S. 191 (45:148). 33 Contez v. United States, 171 U. S. 191 (45:148); Boyd v. State of Nebraska, 143 U. S. 135 (36: 103); Crane v. Reeder, 25 Mich. 303; Desbois' Case, 2 Mart. 185; United States v. Loverty, 3 Mart. 733; Atty. Gen. v. Detroit, 78 Mich. 545, 563, 7 L. R. A. 99; Am- 34 8 U. S. Stat. at L. 116, 117. of French birth who moved into the territory after the treaty and before the state of Louisiana was formed out of it, became a citizen of the state upon its admission into the union.37 The sixth article of the Treaty of 1819 with Spain 38 contained a provision to the same effect as the Treaty of Paris, and in construing it Chief Justice Marshall said: "This treaty is the law of the land, and it admits the inhabitants of Florida to the enjoyment of the privileges, rights and immunities of the citizens of the United States."' 39 § 234. Dual citizenship.-The constitution of the United States, as originally adopted, recognized a dual citizenship, viz.: (1) Citizens of the United States, and (2) citizens of the states, each respectively;10 and this distinction is clearly recognized and established in the fourteenth amendment to the constitution, in the declaration that "all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the states wherein they reside." There is a citizenship of the United States and a citizenship of a state, which are distinct from each. other and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the individual. A man may be a citizen of the United States without being a citizen of a state; all that is necessary to make him a citizen of the United States is that he should be born or naturalized therein and within the jurisdiction thereof, but to become a citizen of a state he must reside in it, and in that event he is invested with the dual citizenship established by the amendment, being a citizen of both the United States and the state. This dual citizenship arises, logically, out of our dual or complex government. We have in our political system a government of the United States and a government of each of the several states. Each one of these governments is distinct from the other, and each has citizens of its own who owe it allegiance, and whose rights, within its jurisdiction, it must protect. The same person may be at the same time a citizen of the United States and a citizen of a 37 Desbois' Case, 2 Mart. 185; United States v. Loverty, 3 Mart. 733. 38 8 U. S. Stat. at L. 256. 39 'American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511, 542 (7:242). 40 Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, 178 (22:627). |