The Provisions of Section 4953, General Code, in Regard to Apportionment of Delegates and Alternates for a State Convention to be Held for the Selection of Candidates for Presidential Electors, do not so Limit the Authority of a State Committee as to Prevent or Prohibit it from Prescribing and Directing a Reasonable Division of Said Apportionment Within a County.

No. 1262

(Opinion Dated February 12, 1916.) Hon. Charles Q. Hildebrant, Secretary of State, Columbus, Ohio. Dear Sir: I have your letter of February 10, 1916, as fol

lows:

"Under the law of the state of Ohio, are state central committees authorized to have counties districted so that delegates and alternates to state convention may be elected from such districts in such counties, or must delegates and alternates to state conventions be elected at large from such counties?"

Your inquiry involves a consideration of Section 4953 G. C., 103 O. L., 478, which provides as follows:

"Candidates for presidential elector shall be nominated by delegate state conventions, the delegates to which shall be chosen at a primary election which shall be held on the last Tuesday in April, 1916, and similarly every fourth year thereafter. The state committee of each political party shall determine the time and place for holding the state convention of such party and shall apportion the delegates and alternates throughout the state in proportion to its party vote for governor cast in the several counties at the last preceding general election. Each state committee shall also by resolution determine the ratio of representation in such state convention. In addition to nominating candidates for presidential elector such state convention shall formulate the state party platform for that year."

The primary purpose of the foregoing section is to require that delegates to state conventions which nominate candidates for presidential electors shall be chosen at a primary election held on the last Tuesday in April, 1916, and every fourth year thereafter. It must be conceded that without any other or further provision than the requirement that delegates to said convention shall be elected at a primary election the state committee of each political party would be authorized to make all other necessary provisions to carry this purpose of the law into effect. This is so because at common law such committees are vested with such power and authority as the political organization which they rep

resent confers upon them. The legislature knew this and, therefore, in the further provisions of this section it did not furnish or undertake to furnish a complete, detailed method or plan whereby all matters connected with the selection of delegates to said conventions should be regulated. It provided, however, that the state committee of each party shall fix the time and place of holding its convention, that it shall determine the ratio of representation in that convention, and that the delegates thereto should be apportioned by it throughout the state in proportion to the party vote for governor cast in the several counties in the state at the last preceding general election. It it contended that under these provisions of the law the authority of the state committees with regard to the selection of delegates ends with the execution of the power thus conferred and that, therefore, said committees have no further rights that may be exercised in the determination of how and in what manner each county may apportion its delegates. It is further contended that, by the express provisions of the foregoing section, with reference to the apportionment of delegates, the county is made the unit for the election of said delegates.

I am unable to agree with either contention. The authority delegated by this statute to state committees to fix the time and place of holding a convention, to determine the ratio of representation and to apportion delegates in proportion to the vote of each county, did not confer upon them any new rights or vest in them any authority they did not already possess. The authority to do these things has always been vested in such committees and gives them such authority by virtue of the rules and regulations of the political organizations which they represent. The statute recognizes the existence of political parties and does not attempt to (and it is quite doubtful if the legislature would have the power to) prescribe all the powers and duties of political parties. There is nothing to show any purpose of the legislature to in any way limit or restrict the ordinary rights and authority of state committees but, upon the contrary, the provisions under consideration are very general in their character and, as before observed, do not in any manner confer any new rights or authority upon said committees.

I am unable, therefore, to conclude that it was the intention of the legislature, in the enactment of these provisions, to in any manner impose any restriction upon the recognized jurisdiction and authority of state committees. Again, it is not by any means clear that the provision regarding apportionment, measured by its

own language, has the effect of making a county the unit for the election of delegates. It is very difficult to determine from the language used, whether the vote of each county is not made the unit of apportionment rather than the unit of election. In other words, it is the vote of each county which determines the apportionment and when such apportionment is made in accordance with said vote I am unable to see, from the provisions of the law, any limitation or restriction made upon the right of a committee to subdivide such apportionment within such county. The apportionment must be in proportion to the vote of each county and when that requirement of the law is met no further condition or restriction is imposed upon any action a state committee may determine to take in reference to said apportionment.

I am therefore of the opinion that the provisions of said section in regard to the apportionment provided for therein do not so limit the authority of a state committee as to prevent or prohibit it from prescribing and directing a reasonable division of said apportionment within a county. In this connection there may be some question as to whether any apportionment of delegates within a county may be made effective by reason of the provisions of the primary election laws. That is to say, whether when such apportionment of delegates is made their election is feasible under the general system of primary elections, as provided by law. This is a matter which must be considered by any authority in making a division of delegates within a county. Any subdivision of territory for the election of delegates must be made with due regard to the operation of the primary election law. Whether or nt the division of territory is practicable for the conduct of the primary is a matter for the determination of the election authorities.

Council Has Authority in Municipalities to Determine Who Shall Let Contracts for Printing Municipal Bonds, Contracts and Other Instruments in Writing, Unless Otherwise Specifically Provided by Statute.

No. 1260-(Opinion Dated February 10, 1916.) Bureau of Inspection and Supervision of Public Offices, Columbus, Ohio.

Gentlemen: I am in receipt of your letter of February 2nd, in which you request my opinion as follows:

"We enclose herewith brief submitted by Honorable Fred L. Carhart, city solicitor of Marion, Ohio, and we would re

spectfully request your written opinion upon the following questions:

"Who is the proper municipal authority in cities to make contract for printing of municipal bonds? Has council the authority within itself, or may it delegate such authority to some other official, or is the authority lodged in the city solicitor? An early reply will be appreciated."

The brief of Mr. Carhart, referred to and enclosed in your letter, is in support of his claim that the authority to make contracts for the printing of municipal bonds is, in cities, lodged in the city solicitor. This claim is based entirely upon the language of Section 4305 of the General Code, which is as follows:

"The solicitor shall prepare all contracts, bonds and other instruments in writing in which the city is concerned, and shall serve the several directors and officers mentioned in this title as legal counsel and attorney."

A reasonable and sensible construction of the language used in the above section must lead to the conclusion that the word "prepare" was intended to apply to the form, phraseology and contents of such contracts, bonds and other instruments in writing, and not to require the solicitor to reproduce by printing or otherwise the many required copies. To adopt the literal construction of the language of Section 4375, urged in the brief submitted, would result in the conclusion that the manual preparation of all the numerous copies of contracts, bonds and other instruments in writing in which the city is concerned is the statutory duty of the city solicitor, and this would lead to the further conclusion that if council failed to make an appropriation to pay the expense of typewriting or printing the necessary blank contracts, bonds and other instruments, the city solicitor would himself be obliged to write or print them, or pay the expense of such writing or printing from his own pocket.

There is no section of the General Code which definitely provides who shall make contracts for the printing of municipal bonds, contracts, etc. It follows, therefore, that the authority to authorize the making of such contracts rests in the council, which may make provision therefor either by general ordinance or by special act in each instance.

In the case of McCormick v. City, 81 O. S., 246, wherein was considered the question of who was by law authorized to let contracts for the publication of municipal ordinances, the court, in the second branch of the syllabus, uses the following language:

"Where the statute has not prescribed the person who shall execute such contracts in behalf of a municipal corporation, it is consistent with Section 1536-653 R. S. for the council, by ordinance or resolution, to authorize the clerk thereof to execute such contract according to the directions of the council."

At page 254 of the opinion in the above case the court say:

"It would seem that council may authorize, by resolution or ordinance, the board or department of public service to contract for the public printing, and we see no valid objection to giving the clerk of council authority to make such contracts. The council appears to be the source of authority to contract, and it is the authority to make the necessary appropriations."

I therefore advise you that the authority in municipalities to determine who shall let contracts for printing of municipal bonds, contracts and other instruments in writing, in which the city is concerned, unless otherwise specifically provided by the General Code, is lodged in the municipal council which may make provision therefor either by general ordinance or by special actions as occasion arises.

It is the Duty of Clerks of Courts to Charge and Collect the Commission Prescribed in Section 2901, General Code, Upon Receipts and Disbursements of Alimony Ordered Paid to Such Clerks by the Court. The Fee of 25 Cents Provided in Said Section for Entering Costs on Cash Book May be Charged but Once in Each Cause. Commissions May Not be Charged on Deposits for Costs in Divorce Cases, but Commissions May be Charged on Attorney Fees Received and Disbursed by the Clerk, if Same Are Made a Part of the Judgment Proper, but May Not be Charged if Said Attorney Fees Are Taxed as Costs in the Case.

No. 1249-(Opinion Dated February 8, 1916.) The Bureau of Inspection and Supervision of Public Offices, Columbus, Ohio.

Gentlemen: Your inquiry under date of January 28, 1916, is as follows:

"Sections 2977 and 2978 of the county salary law requires the officers therein named to tax and collect all the fees atlowed by law for the benefit of their fee funds. Section 2901 General Code contains the following provision:

666* * * For receiving and disbursing money, other than costs and fees, paid to such clerks in pursuance of an order of court or on judgments, and which has not been col