7. For as he who hath made a vow of obedience, hath divested himself of all pretences of contradicting what shall be imposed; and if his conscience shall check him in the instance, he ought to look upon it as a temptation, and use it accordingly so must it be also in every subject, who by the laws of God is as much tied to obey his superior, as he can be by any law which he puts upon himself. The effect of these suggestions is this, that in things where the law of God hath not declared positively, an erring conscience is not to be attended to; but the law of the superior, and his sentence, must be the guide of his conscience.

To this discourse I answer in short, that it is all very true; that the lawful superiors are God's vicegerents, appointed over us in things pertaining to God, so as to be executioners of the Divine laws; and besides this, to make laws in things indifferent and pertaining to men; that all contempt done to them is done to God; that it is scandalous to refuse obedience to them; that he is a proud man who says he is wiser than his superiors; and he is intolerable that prefers his private folly before the public wisdom; and therefore it is well inferred, that the error of an abused conscience ought to be laid down; and though he cannot in particular answer the arguments which trouble him, yet if he have reason to believe that though the arguments be too hard for him, the superior's command is innocent; it were well if he would lay aside those arguments, and adhere to authority. Yet all this touches not the secret of the question; for,

He that compares the law of conscience with the law of the superior, compares the law of God and the law of man; and the question is not, whether a man should follow his superior or follow himself? but, whether God or man be to be obeyed, whether the superior or the supreme be to be attended to? The reason of this is, because the conscience stands bound by the supposed law of God, which being superior to all the law of man, must rather be obeyed; and therefore, although the arguments conclude rightly that an erring conscience, disobeying his superior's lawful command, does sin greatly; yet they cannot conclude, that he avoids sin by obeying against his conscience; for his condition is indeed perplexed, and he can no way avoid sin, but by laying his error aside

first, and then obeying. And since he sins, whether he obeys his superior's just command or the unjust command of his conscience, the inquiry is, in this sad conjunction of things, by what hand he must be smitten, on which side he must fall, that he may fall the easier? To this the rule answers, that his erring conscience must be obeyed rather, because he is persuaded that God speaks there, and is not persuaded that God speaks by his superior. Now, though in this he be deceived, yet he that will not go there where he thinks God is, and leave that where he thinks God is not,-does uncertainly go towards God, but does certainly forsake him, as much as lies in him. For,

It is to the conscience all one as if the law of God were really upon it, if it be thought it is. "Idem est esse et apparere" in this case; and therefore the erring conscience is to be attended to, because the will and the affections are for God, though the judgment hath mistaken a glowworm for the sun. But this is to be understood only when the conscience errs innocently and unavoidably, which it can never do in the precepts of nature, and brightest revelation.

But if the conscience does err vincibly, that is, with an actual fault, and an imperfect, artificial resolution, such a one as a good man will not, and a wise man need not have, this present persuasion excuses him not from a double sin, for breaking a double duty; for he is bound to correct his error, and to perform the precepts of his superior; and if he does not, his sin is more than that which was in the vicious cause of his mispersuasion, as I shewed in the explication of the former rules.

But according as the ignorance and error approaches towards pity, lessening or excusing, so the sin also declines. He that thinks it is not lawful at all to take up arms at the command of his prince, in an unjust or a dubious cause, sins if he does what he thinks so unlawful, and he commits no sin in disobeying, that only excepted which entered into his mispersuasion, which is greater or less, or next to none at all, according as was the cause of his error, which in the whole constitution of affairs he could not well avoid. But he that is foolishly persuaded that all government is unlawful and antichristian, is bound to lay his error down; and besides the vicious cause of his error, he sins in the evil effect

of it, though his imperfect, equivocal conscience, calls on him to the contrary; yet he sins if he does not obey, because in such notorious and evident propositions an error is not only malicious in the principle, but voluntary all the way; and therefore may easily, and must certainly, be laid aside in every period of determination.

Whatsoever cases are between these, partake of the extremes, according to their proper reason and relation.

RULE VII.

The Error of an abused Conscience ought to be reformed, sometimes by the Command of the Will, but ordinarily by a contrary Reason.

1. If the error did begin upon a probable reason, it cannot be reformed but by a reason seeming equal to it, because a less reason hath not naturally the same efficacy with a greater; and to assent to a less probability against a greater, is to do against reason, against all that by which this lesser reason is outweighed. For in this case the will can have no influence, which, not being a cognoscitive and discoursing faculty must be determined by its own motives when it is not determined by reason, that is, by the motives of understanding. Now the motives of will, when it is not moved by right reason, are pleasure and profit, ambition and revenge, partiality and pride, chance or humour: and how these principles can disabuse a conscience is very hard to understand; how readily and certainly they do abuse it, is not hard. Whether the stars be even or odd? whether the soul be generated, or created and infused? whether it be lawful to fight or rail against a prince, what hath the will to do with it? If the will meddles, and makes the resolution, it shall be determined, not as it is best, but as it falls out by chance, or by evil, or by vain inducements. For in the will there is no argument good but reason; I mean, both in the matter of nature and of grace; that is, reason changed into a motive, and an instrument of persuasion, from whatsoever inducing principle.

i Vide Chap. iv.

2. Some have affirmed, that the error of a conscience. may fairly be deposed upon any probable argument, though of less persuasion; which, if it could be admitted, would give leave for a man to choose his side as he pleases; because, in all moral things, as dressed with circumstances, it is very easy to find some degrees of probability, but very difficult to find a case against which nothing can be disputed. And therefore, if it happens that a man be better persuaded of his error than of the contrary truth, that truth cannot be chosen wisely, nor the error honestly deposed, because it is done against the way of a man, not absolutely, but comparatively against reason.

3. If the reason on both sides seems equally probable, the will may determine by any of its proper motives that are honest; any prudent interest, any fair compliance, any custom, in case these happen to be on the right side. When the arguments seem equal, the understanding or conscience cannot determine. It must either be a chance, and a special providence of God, or a particular grace, that casts us on the right side. But whatsoever it be that then determines us to the right, if of itself it be innocent, it is in that case an effect of God's grace, and an apt instrument of a right conscience.

4. When the conscience is erroneous, and the error unreasonable, commenced wholly upon interest, trifling regards, or vicious principles, the error may be deposed honestly, though there be no reason thought of to the contrary, besides the discovery of the first abuse. The will in this case is enough. "Volo servare animam meam," said one ;—“ I will, I am resolved to save my own soul." A man may, and ought to hate the evil principle of his error, and decline it upon the stock of indignation, which in this case is a part of repentance. And this insinuates the reason of this discourse. For,

Repentance is founded principally in the will; and whatsoever a man is to leave upon the stock of repentance, he may do it wholly upon the stock of his will, informed or inclined by general propositions, without any cognizance of the particulars

J Sanchez, select. 99. disp. 41, num. 27. Merolla in florileg. verb. conscientiâ, num. 14. Bardus de Conscientià, discep. iii. c. 11.

of the present question. Eratosthenes, coming among the Persian magi, and observing their looser customs of marrying their sisters and their mothers, falls in love with his half-sister Lampra, and marries her. A while after, perceiving that he entered upon this action upon no other account but lust and fancy, and compliance with the impurer magi, he began to hate his act for the evil inducement, and threw away her and his folly together. This he might do without any further reasonings about the indecency of the mixture, by perceiving that a crime or a folly stood at the entrance, and invited him to an evil lodging. He that begins without reason, hath reason enough to leave off, by perceiving he had no reason to begin : and in this case the will is the great agent, which therefore here is no ill principle, because it leaves the error upon the stock of grace and repentance.*k

But

5. If the will entertained the error without any reason at all, as oftentimes it does, it knows not why, she may also depose it honestly without any reason relating to the particular, upon this general, that it could not make the action to be conscientious to have it done without any inducement. then the taking up the contrary truth upon as little reason, is innocent, because it happens to be on the right side; but it is not virtue nor conscience till it be persuaded by something, that is a fit inducement either in the general or in the particular.

RULE VIII.

The Error of a Conscience is not always to be opened to the erring Person by the Guides of Souls, or any other charitable Adviser.

If the error began with a sin, and still dwells there upon the same stock, or if it be productive of a sin, it is always to be discovered, though the greatest temporal inconvenience were certainly consequent to the discovery. Because a man must not be suffered to lie in sin, no, not a minute, if he can be

* Vide Chap. iv. Rule 5.