also, may make an alteration; yet even in those laws which are directly obligatory, the power of God who made them cannot be denied to be equal in the alteration: and indeed he that can annul nature, can also at least alter her laws, which are consequent to nature, and intended only for her preservation. : The case seems to be the same with eating and drinking, which God hath made necessary for our life, as justice is to societies but as he can take away the necessity from this person at this time to eat, and can supply it otherwise,—so he can also conserve human society in the mutation of cases and extraordinary contingencies as well as in the ordinary effects of justice. Indeed God cannot do an unjust thing; because whatsoever he wills or does, is therefore just because he wills and does it; but his will being the measure of justice, and his providence the disposer of those events and states of things to which the instances of justice can relate,when he wills an extraordinary case, and hath changed the term of the relation, then he hath made that instance, which before was unjust, now to become just; and so hath not changed justice into injustice, but the denomination of the whole action, concerning which the law was made, is altered from unjust to just, or on the contrary. It is not to be supposed, that the whole law of nature can be altered, as long as our nature is the same; any more than the fashion of our garments can be generally altered as long as our body is of this shape: and, therefore, it is not to be thought that he that makes a doublet shall ever make three sleeves, unless a man have three arms,-or a glove with six fingers for him that hath but five; but many particular laws of nature suffer variety and alteration, according to the changes that are in our nature and in our necessities, or by any measure of man or men which God shall superinduce. Duo cum idem faciunt, sæpe ut possis dicere, do The rule of nature is always the same; yet one may what another may not; and sometimes that is lawful which Terent. Adelph. act. v. sc. 1. Mattaire, p. 198. at another is criminal; not because the measure is changeable, but the thing measured suffers variety." So that in effect, the sense and extent of truth in this question is this; that although as long as this world lasts and men in it, the law of nature cannot be abrogated, because it is that law which is framed proportionable to man's nature; yet it may be derogated, that is, lessened, or enlarged in instances, changed in the integrity of many of its particulars, made relative to several states and new necessities; and this is that which, in true speaking, does affirm that the laws of nature may be changed. For although there are some propositions and decrees so general, that they are in their nature applicable to all variety of things, and therefore cannot be changed; yet they are rather the foundation of laws than laws themselves: because a law must be mixed with a material part, it must be a direction of actions, and a bond upon persons, which does suppose many things that can be changed: and, therefore, although, the propositions, upon which the reasonableness and justice of the law does depend, serve to the contrary instances by analogy, and common influence, yet the law, being material, does not, and therefore is alterable. But of this I shall give a fuller account in the ninth and tenth rules of this chapter. For the present I observe, The want of considering this hath made difficulty in this question and errors in many. Every natural proposition is not a law; but those antecedent propositions, by the proportions of which laws stand or fall, are the measures of laws. They are rules, not laws: and indeed the rules of nature are eternal and unalterable; that is, all those natural and reasonable propositions which are dictates of prime reason, and abstract from all persons, and all states, and all relations: such as are 'God is to be honoured :'—' Justice is to be done: -'Contracts are to be affirmed: '- -'Reason is to be obeyed:'- Good is to be followed: Evil to be eschewed.' These are the common measures of all laws, and all actions: but these are made laws when they are prescribed to persons, and applied to matter: and when they are, because that matter can have variety, the law also can, though the rule cannot. That we are to restore all that was intrusted to us, is a VOL. XII. Q natural law derived from the rule of doing justice; but this may be derogated and prejudiced without sin. For prescription transfers the possession, and disobliges the fiduciary from restitution. By the law of nature relying upon the rule of performing contracts, clandestine marriages are valid and firm but yet some churches, particularly the Church of Rome, in the Council of Trent, hath pronounced some marriages void, which, by the rule of nature, and afterwards by a law, were rate and legal; particularly, clandestine marriages, and marriages not clandestine by the ingress of one of the parties into religion, as is to be seen in the eighth session. By the law of nature a testimony under two or three witnesses may stand, but in the case of the accusation of a cardinal deacon in Rome, they require the concurrence of seven and twenty; of a cardinal priest, sixty-four; of a cardinal bishop, seventy and two, and, in England, one shall serve the turn, if it be for the king. In codicils the civil law requires five witnesses. In testaments there must be seven when a controversy is concerning the eminence and prelation of excellent persons, fifteen are demanded. But if these things may be prejudiced by men, much more may they be altered by God. But this extends itself a little further. For in some of these instances, that which is a law of nature, becomes so inconvenient as to do much evil,and then it is to be estimated by a new rule; and, therefore, the whole law is changed, when it comes to have a new measure, and the analogy of a new reason. Upon the account of these premises it follows, that it is but a weak distinction to affirm some things to be forbidden by God, because they are unlawful; and some to be unlawful, because they are forbidden.' For this last part of the distinction takes in all that is unlawful in the world, and therefore the other is a dead member and may be lopped off. So Ochams affirms against the more common sentence of the schools (as his manner is); "Nullus est actus malus, nisi quatenus à Deo prohibitus est, et qui non possit fieri bonus si à Deo præcipiatur, et è converso; - Every thing is good or bad according as it is commanded or forbidden by God, 2. q. 19, ad 3, et 4. and no otherwise." For nothing is unlawful antecedently to God's commandment. Sin is a transgression of some law, and this law must be made by a superior, and there is no superior but who depends on God, and therefore his law is its measure. There are some things good, which God hath not commanded; but then they are such which he hath commended by counsels, or analogies and proportions. But whatsoever is a sin, is so therefore because it is forbidden; and without such a prohibition, although it might be unreasonable, yet it cannot be criminal or unjust. Since, therefore, all measure of good and evil, in the intercourses of men, wholly rely upon the law of God, and are consequent to his will, although it can never be that we can have leave to be unjust or unchaste, that is, to do against a law in being with all its circumstances, yet the law may be so changed that the whole action which was forbidden, may become permitted and innocent,-and that which was permitted, may become criminal. I instance in the adeλpouigia, or the conjunction of the nearest kindred,' which once was lawful, and ever since is become criminal. The purpose of this discourse is this;-that we look no further for tables of the law of nature, but take in only those precepts which bind us Christians unto Christ our lawgiver, who hath revealed to us all his Father's will. All the laws of Christ concerning moral actions are the laws of nature: and all the laws of nature, which any wise nation ever reckoned, either are taken away by God, or else are commanded by Christ. So that Christianity is a perfect system of all the laws of nature, and of all the will of God, that is, of all the obligatory will; of all the commandments. In those things where Christianity hath not interposed, we are left to our natural liberty, or a 'jus permissivum,—a permission,' except where we have restrained ourselves by contract or dedition. RULE II. The Law of Nature is the Foundation of all Laws, and the Measure of their Obligation. For all good laws, and all justice, hath the same reasonableness, the same rules and measures, and are therefore good because they are profitable,—and are therefore just, because they are measured by the common analogies and proportions;—and are therefore necessary, because they are bound upon us by God mediately or immediately. And, therefore, Cicero defined virtue to be "perfecta et ad summum perducta natura," or, "animi habitus naturæ modo, rationi consentaneus, "b"The perfection of nature," or, "a habit of mind agreeing to natural reason." But more expressly and full in his second book de Legibus:" "Lex est, justorum injustorumque distinctio, ad illam antiquissimam et rerum omnium principem expressa naturam, ad quam leges hominum diriguntur, quæ supplicio improbos afficiunt, defendunt ac tuentur bonos;- A law is the distinction of good and bad, of just and unjust, expressed or fitted to nature, which is the first and the prince of all, and to which human laws are directed for the punishment of evil-doers, and the defence of the good." And it is evident in all the moral precepts of Christianity all which are so agreeable to a man's felicity and state of things, to which a man is designed both here and hereafter, that a man cannot be happy without them: and, therefore, they all rely upon some prime natural reason, which reason, although possibly some or all of it was discovered to us by revelation and the wise proper discourses of the religion, and was not generally known to men before Christ,—yet the reasons are nothing but consonancies to our state and being, introductive of felicity, perfective of our nature, wise, and prudent, and noble, and such which, abstracting from the rewards hereafter, are infinitely eligible, and to be preferred for temporal regards before their contraries. a De Leg. i. c. 8. Davis. Rath. p. 38. |