themselves have knit. Some are weary, and many are involved, and more are foolish; and it is as possible for a man to be a fool in one proposition as in another, and, therefore, his error may be this, that which part soever he chooses, he shall sin;'-what is to be done here? is the question.

The case is this: Pratinus, a Roman soldier, turns Christian, and having taken his military sacrament before, and still continuing the employment, he is commanded to put to death certain criminals, which he undertakes, because he is bound to it by his oath. Going to the execution he finds they were condemned for being Christians; then he starts, remembering his sacrament or oath on one side, and his faith on the other; that is, his religion on both; by which he is bound neither to be perjured, nor to kill his brethren: the question is not how he might expedite his doubt, and secure his conscience by choosing the surer part, but what he is to do,-this perplexity remaining, that is, he not being able to lay aside either part of the doubt; for his question is not whether of the two he shall do, but is persuaded that to do either is a high crime.

1. Concerning this, it is evident, that if the cases be equal, and the event not to be distinguished by him in the greatness of its consequent or malice of it, it is indifferent to him which he chooses; and, therefore, there can be no rule given, which he must take, unless he could be convinced of one that it is lawful, and the other unlawful; but in this case that not being to be done, he ought to know, that, in this case, he sins not if he takes either, because all sin is with liberty and choice, at least with complacency: but his error is an infelicity and no sin, if he neither chooses it nor delights in it, which in the present case he is supposed not to do.

2. But if, in the event of the actions and parts of choice, there be a real or apprehended difference, he is bound to choose that part which he believes to be the less sin,- this being a justification of his will, the best that can be in the present case; but if he chooses that which is of worse event, he hath nothing to excuse it.

RULE III.

He that is troubled with Scruples, ought to rely upon the Judgment of a prudent Guide.

THE reason is, because his own understanding is troubled and restless, and yet his reason determined; and, therefore, he can but use the best way of cure, which, in his particular, is to follow an understanding that is equally determined as is his own, and yet not so diseased.

Add to this, that God hath appointed spiritual persons, guides of souls, whose office is to direct and comfort, to give peace and conduct, to refresh the weary and to strengthen the weak, to confirm the strong and instruct the doubtful; and, therefore, to use their advice is that proper remedy which God hath appointed. And it hath also in it this advantage, that there is in it humility of understanding, a not relying on our own wisdom, which, by way of blessing and disposition, will obtain of God that we be directed. "Consule bonos, prudentesque viros, et acquiesce eis," was an old advice, and derived from Solomon and Tobit; "Lean not on thy own understanding," but ask counsel of all that are wise, and despise not any counsel that is profitable.

RULE IV.

When a Doubt is resolved in the Entrance of an Action, we must judge of our Action afterwards by the same Measures as before: for he that changes his Measures, turns his Doubt into a Scruple.

THE reason of the rule is this: That which is sufficient for satisfaction before, is sufficient for peace afterwards. A Christian, in the diocese of Salamis, being faint in his stomach before the reception of the holy sacrament, disputes a Antonin. in sum. 1, p. tit. 3, c. 10.

whether he may take a cordial or a glass of wine. Upon inquiry, he is told, that to receive the holy sacrament virgine saliva,-fasting,' is a custom of the Church later than the times of the apostles, as appears by the Corinthian usages mentioned by St. Paul; that it having no authority but custom, no sanction but a pious fancy, and a little proportion and analogy of reverence, it ought to yield to the elicit acts of charity upon this account he, being satisfied, drinks a little, is well, and communicates with health, and joy, and holiness. But afterwards, reflecting upon what he had done, he begins to fear he had not done well; that he had done against the customs of the Church, that it was at least infirmity in him, and upon what account with God that should be, which, in his own most gentle sentence, was, at least, infirmity, he knew not: and twenty other little things he thought of, which signified nothing, but did something,—they meant no good, but did great evil: and finding himself got into a net, he calls for help, but is told that he must get out of it by the same way that he came in, and that which was the sufficient cause of his doing the action, was sufficient also for the justification of it, and let him confront the reasons which introduced the action against these flies and little pretensions which disturb his mind, and he shall find that he hath reason to be ashamed of debauching and prostituting his understanding to such trifles and images of argument for let a man look to his grounds when he begins to act, and, when he hath acted, let him remember that he did his duty, and give God thanks. For if any just cause appear for which he ought to reprove his former determination, that just cause can have no influence upon what is past, if the first proceeding was probable, and reasonable, and disinterest. He knows something which he did not know before; and, for the time to come, is to walk by this newly kindled taper; but if he, in the first instance, walked by all the light he had, he is not tied to walk it over again: for as God will not, of a child, exact the prudence and cautions of a man, but in every age expects a duty answerable to the abilities of it; so it is in all the stages of our reason and growing understanding. According to what we have, and not according to what we have not, we shall give accounts. This

is intended to prove, that, if we proceed probably, we are not tied to sorrow and repentance, though afterwards we find a greater reason to the contrary; but this concludes more in the present question of scruple, in which the greater probability goes before, and the less comes after.

But the rule is to be managed with these cautions:

1. Take heed, that, in the beginning, we do not mistake our desires to have it done, for a sufficient warrant that it may. For if we enter in at a wrong door, or at the windows, we must go back, and cannot own that entrance which was like a thief, or that action which was done with more craft than prudence.

2. Be not too easy in the arguments of probation. For although in actions concerning our eternal interest, God expects no more of us but that we should talk by the measures of a man; yet we do not perform our duty if we act by the measures of a child or a fool. If we could do no better, the action might be more reprovable than the man; but if we could consider better and wiser than when we reflect afterwards upon what we did before, and find a fault or a sin, a negligence or an avoidable error in the principle, we cannot from thence bring rest and confidence to our consciences.

3. Separate your question as much as you can from interest, that your determination and inquiry be pure; and if more arguments occur afterwards than did in the first inquiry, remember that it was well enough at first, if it was probable enough; and for the rest, pray to God to accept you, if you did well and wisely, and to pardon you in what was done amiss, or negligently, or imperfectly.

RULE V.

A scrupulous Conscience is to be cured by Remedies proper to the Disease, and Remedies proper to the Man.

THAT is, there are some advices, which are directly intended for the lessening the scruple, — and some others, which take away the scruple by curing the man, and taking

off his distemperature.

Those which are directly intended against the scruple, besides the rules before described, are these:

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Remedies against the Scruple.

1. Let the afflicted and disquiet man often meditate of the infinite goodness of God, and how his justice is equity, and his judgments are in mercy; that he judges us by what we heartily endeavour, but does not put our infelicities into our accounts of sins.

2. Let him be instructed, that all laws, Divine and human, are desirous of sweet and merciful interpretations, and that of themselves they love to yield to necessity and to charity; and that severity and exactness of measures is not only contrary to the goodness, but to the justice of God, who therefore will pity us because we are made of dust, and are a lump of folly and unavoidable infirmities; and by the same justice by which God is eternally angry with the fallen angels, by the same justice he is not finally angry with man for his first follies, and pities all his unavoidable evils.

3. Let it be remembered, that charity is the fulfilling the law, and by the degrees of it a man tends to perfection, and not by forms and tittles of the letter, and 'apices' of handwriting or ordinances. And that if he loves God and does his best, and concerning the doing his best makes the same judgments real and material, that he does of the other actions of his life, he certainly does all that can belong to him, and all that which can be wise and safe. He that acts according to the reason of a man, ought to have the confidences of a man; for no other confidence can be reasonable. That is charity, that we do carefully and wisely, and follow the best we can.

4. Let it be considered that to incline to the scruple, and neglect the stronger reason that stands against it, is to take the worse end, it is to do that which must seem worse; and then it may be remembered, that if the man is afraid and troubled with the trifle, with the scruple, when he hath stronger reason to secure him, if he yields to the scruple and neglects the stronger reason, the neglect of that will run upon him like a torrent and a whirlwind,-and the scruple, or the bulrush, will not support his building.