so in the general; that is, when the case is special, by privilege, or exemption, or the ceasing of the reason, or by any other special case he may think himself acquitted, when yet the action is culpable in its whole kind.

But by a speculative doubt sometimes is meant not the general, but the question abstracted from circumstances; and in this it sometimes happens, that though the conscience doubt concerning the question, yet it does not doubt concerning the practice. Titius is possessed of a field on which he entered by inheritance, and wholly without fraud and violence: but yet upon some supervening notices, he afterwards doubts whether the field be his own by a just title; but because he is informed by his confessor and others on whom he does and may rely, that possession is a collateral title, and that what he so possesses he may still dwell upon, till it be certain that it is not his own; he rests at quiet in his mind, because possession is stronger than his doubt, though it cannot prevail against demonstration.

:

Mary of Rheims, the wife of a soldier, is told by his captain that her husband was killed at the battle of Pavia; after her year of mourning was expired she marries again to a citizen of Rheims, and cohabits with him two years: after which she is told that her first husband escaped to Tarentum, and there lives in obscurity. Upon this she doubts whether the citizen be really her husband or no; yet living with him, he demands her to pay her conjugal duty she inquires whether during this doubt she may or no, and is answered affirmatively upon the same grounds: the citizen is in possession of the marriage, and this is not to be disturbed by a doubt, but by a certainty, especially since the doubt is but a speculative doubt, not a practical. For it is no good argument to say, I doubt whether this man my husband or no, therefore if I consent to him, I commit adultery; for the presumption lying upon the possessor, though his title be dubious, yet his possession is not, and either of them both are to have a portion in the effect, and therefore the certain possession in a dubious title is to be preferred before a dubious title without possession, and therefore this kind of doubt ought not to hinder the effect of the present duty. For in this case it is not true; the antecedent is doubtful, therefore so is the consequent. For

be

as out of falsehood truth may come, so out of doubts may come certainty. I see, a great way off, Father Grimaldi moving his lips; I suppose he is disputing, whom yet I was told not to be alive. I argue thus: He disputes, therefore he is not dead.' The consequent is certain, but the antecedent doubtful; so it is in the present case. I doubt whether this woman be and ought to be my wife, but because she is legally so, and so reputed and in possession, I do infer that therefore I must pay my duty to her, till it be certain that she is not my wife. For though I doubt of the person whether or no she be my wife,-yet I am certain, or I may be certain of this, that he that approaches to her who is in possession of marriage, may do it lawfully; he only does fornicate who approaches to her, of whom I am certain that she is not my wife. But if of this proposition also I doubt, the doubt is practical,—and I may not do it, till by some means the doubt be resolved or laid aside. But so long as it is a question speculative, the action may be determinate and lawful, and introduced upon many

accounts.

For the fuller manifestation of which secret, because it is of great concernment, and hath influence upon the conscience in many great actions and intercourse of human society, it is remarkable that we cannot argue thus; this man is not bonæ fidei possessor,' a possessor by a just faith, therefore he possesses it' mala fide,' by an unjust: so neither does this follow,-this man possesses it not with an evil faith, therefore he possesses it with a good faith. It does neither way follow negatively. But this consequence is good; he is a possessor by a good faith, therefore he does not possess it by an evil. Or, he is a possessor by an evil faith, therefore he does not possess it by a good; it follows either way affirmatively. The reason of the difference is this; if it be good, it cannot be bad,-and if it be bad, it cannot be good; if it be one, it cannot be the other; but it may happen that it may be neither good nor bad, for there is a medium or a third between good and bad faith or honesty of possession; and this consists in a speculative doubt, by which the possessor doubts whether that which is in his hands be in his right,, or belongs to him or to another; and that he

who so doubts, hath neither good nor bad faith, is expressed by the gloss.b

The consequent of which is this, that because that he who so doubts, is not "bonæ fidei possessor," therefore he cannot from thence begin to prescribe or to acquire a just title, because of the rule of the law, "Quod ab initio non valuit, progressu temporis valere non debet ;" and it cannot by time get strength to walk, which enters into the world without feet; now the doubting conscience is but a lame supporter. But yet because such a conscience, which only hath this speculative doubt, is not "malæ fidei possessor,"therefore he may lawfully still retain the possession, till the contrary be evicted.

There is this only to be added, that although prescription or other ways of just title cannot begin with a doubting conscience, yet if it entered with a thoroughly persuaded conscience, it may go on, though it be disquieted by a supervening doubt. The reason is, because it having lawful parents of its birth and first production, cannot be killed and destroyed by a suit at law; it began well, and therefore had just principles of its progression; and whatsoever hath the first advantage of just and reasonable, is always to be so presumed till the contrary be proved; a doubt, therefore, may make the man unquiet, and tie him to inquire, but cannot interrupt the possession or the beginning and growing title. Besides the reason, this sentence is confirmed by the concurring testimonies of Bartolus, Imola, Sylvester, Felinus, Balbus, and Johannes Hannibal, under their titles, " de Præscriptionibus et Usucaptionibus.”

There are some accidental hardnesses to the conscience which are innocent, and because, besides the even measures of good and evil by lawful and unlawful, there are some paths chalked out to us by necessities, by conveniences, by presumptions, by securities, and other indefinite aims at things, which can sometimes weigh down the best of our imperfect conjectures in some obscure cases, we may as well walk by the light of the stars, and better too, than to walk quite in the dark: and not only the sun is appointed to

b In lib. i. C. de acq. poss. gl. in lib. ii. ff. pro solut. et gl. in lib. iii. sect. generaliter ff. de acq. poss.

rule the day, but there are the moon and the stars to govern the night: plain and easy rules make a sure conscience, but the doubtful and the dark must be content with a less light.

For, unlearned men are oftentimes beset with the arguments of a talking man, which they cannot answer, but create a speculative doubt, and such as destroys all the certainty of evidence which they had; but if they should not stick to their own conclusion in despite of all the objections, by a certainty of adhesion, they might be disturbed in every thing, and confident in nothing, and might, if they met with a heretic, be fooled out of their religion, and quit the most material parts of their belief. And even the learned have, in many articles, a presumptive assent to their propositions ; and if they be made to doubt in their understanding by the opposition of an adversary, they are not instantly to change their practice, but to inquire further. For if after every such doubting, their practice must be insecure or criminal, they might be forced to a lightness greater than that of Egyptian priests and some men can believe well and dispute ill, but yet their faith must not change at the argument of every sophister. In these cases the practice is made secure by a collateral light, and he is defended from change by reputation and custom, by fear of scandal and the tie of laws, and by many other indirect instruments of determination, which although they cannot outwit the contrary arguments, yet they ought to outweigh the doubt, and guide the will, and rule the conscience in such cases.

There is nothing but a weak man may doubt of; but if he be well, he must not change his foot, till it be made certain to him that he is deceived; let him consider what he please, and determine at leisure; let him be swift to hear, but slow to speak, and slower yet in declaring, by his action and changed course, that his doubt hath prevailed upon him. I knew a scholar once, who was a man of a quick apprehension, and easy to receive an objection; who, when he read the Roman doctors, was very much of their opinion, and as much against them when he read their adversaries, but kept himself to the religion of his country, concerning which at all times he remembered that there were rare arguments and answers respectively, though he could not then think upon them. There are temptations of faith and opinion, and they

are to be resisted sometimes by indirect ways of proceeding, and artifices of the spirit; and sometimes men in sickness are afflicted with doubting and trembling consciences, but yet are supported only with general remembrances; they consider that there are comforts, and excellent promises, and instruments of hope, and wise and holy sayings by which they were nursed up to that height of strength, that they are now able to fight in the dark: if the speculative doubting conscience should always prevail in practice, the ignorant might be abused and miserable in all things, and the learned in most.

RULE VII.

Every Dictate and Judgment of the Conscience, though it be little and less material, is sufficient, and may be made use of for the Deposition of a Doubt.

EVERY little reason is not sufficient to guide the will, or to make an honest or a probable conscience, as I have proved in the foregoing chapter; but in a doubting conscience, that is, where there are seemingly great reasons of either side, and the conscience not able to determine between them, but hangs like a needle between two loadstones, and can go to neither, because it equally inclines to both; there it is, that any little dictate, that can come on one side and turn the scale, is to be admitted to counsel and to action; for a doubt is a disease in conscience, like an irresolution in action, and is therefore to be removed at any just rate, and any excuse taken rather than have it permitted. For even to wash in Jordan may cure a leprosy, and a glass of wine may ease the infirmities of the stomach; and he is too ceremonious in the matter of life and death that stands upon punctilios with nature, and will not be cured but by rich medicines. For in a doubting conscience the immediate cure is not to choose right, that is the remedy in an erring conscience; but when the disease or evil is doubting or suspension, the remedy is determination; and to effect this, whatsoever is sufficient may be chosen and used.

a Rule vii.