be best understood from an example-thus: "The words and expressions hereinafter mentioned, which in their ordinary signification have a more confined or a different meaning, shall, in this act (except where the nature of the provision or context of the act shall exclude such construction), be interpreted as follows: that is to say, the word Land shall extend to manors, advowsons, messuages, and all other hereditaments, whether corporeal or incorporeal, or of other tenure," &c. And again: "Every word importing the plural number, shall extend and be applied to a female as well as to a male," &c. &c.*

In England, the judicial inclination seems to be that interpretation clauses are by no means to be strictly construed. In a recent case, Lord Denman said, "A .difficulty is raised from the interpretation clause, which enumerates all such persons as shall be meant and included in the term overseers. And it is argued that the legislature could not intend the majority of this indefinite and fluctuating body to concur in giving a notice. The argument goes rather to show the inconvenience of requiring the majority to act, than to determine whether a church-warden is an overseer, the real question in these cases. But we apprehend that an interpretation clause is not to receive so rigid a construction, that it is not to be taken as substituting one set of words for another; nor as strictly defining what the meaning of a word must be under all circumstances. We rather think that it merely declares what persons may be comprehended within that term, where the circumstances require that they should. We can

* Dwarris, p. 508, 509.

+ Reg. vs. Justices of Cambridgeshire, Reg. vs. Justices of Shropshire, and Reg. vs. Justices of Gloucestershire, 7 A. and E. 480.

not, however, refrain from expressing a serious doubt, whether interpretation clauses of so extensive a range will not rather embarrass the courts in their decision than afford that assistance which they contemplate. For the principles on which they are themselves to be interpreted, may become matter of controversy; and the application of them to particular cases, may give rise to endless doubts."

The purview of an act may be qualified or restrained by a saving clause in the statute.* A saving in the statute is only an exemption of a special thing out of the general things mentioned in the law; but a saving clause in a statute where it is directly repugnant to the purview or body of the act, and cannot stand without the rendering the act inconsistent and destructive of itself, is to be rejected. This is inconsistent, as we. shall presently see, with the rule in regard to provisoes; and the inconsistency has been clearly pointed out by Mr. Chancellor Kent, who well says,§ "A proviso repugnant to the purview of the statute renders it equally nugatory and void as a repugnant saving clause; and it is difficult to see why the act should be destroyed by the one and not by the other, or why the proviso and the saving clause, when inconsistent with the body of the act, should not both of them be equally rejected." But apart from a direct repugnancy, the general words in one clause of a statute may, be restrained by the particular words in a subsequent clause of the same statute. When a general intention

*1 Jon. 339; 10 Mod. 155; Dwarris, p. 513.

+ Hollewell vs. Corporation of Bridgewater, 2 And. 192.

Plowden, 564; Dwarris, 513; Mitford vs. Elliott, 8 Taunt. 13.

§ Kent Com. i., 463.

| R. vs. Archbishop of Armagh, 8 Mod. 8.

is expressed, and the act also expresses a particular intention incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception.* But a particular thing given by the preceding part of statute, shall not be taken away or altered by any subsequent general words.†

Repealing Clause.-The next clause in order, in those cases in which it is used, should be the repealing clause, showing what prior acts are totally repealed, except so far as they repeal any other act or acts, or part or parts thereof, and what acts are partially repealed; and what statutes are recognized as being in full force, and as having immediate connection with the enactments of such former act. The object of this clause is to point out that either it is the only statute of force upon the subject, by the repeal of all others, or to show what other statutes are to be considered in connection with it, so that the student may be better prepared to enter on the consideration of the details. in the last statute. In this country, the repealing clause is too often omitted, owing to the multiplicity of our legislation and the haste consequent thereupon. It would undoubtedly lead to greater care and precision if it were practicable to make it necessary in every statute to refer at length to the prior enactments on the subjects, and to designate such provisions as it was intended to repeal.§

* Churchill vs. Crease, 5 Bing. 180; Terrington and Hargraves, ib. 492. + Stanton vs. University of Oxford, 1 Jon. 26.

Dwarris, p. 511.

§ In New York, this was much attended to by the Revisors of the general legislation of the State, and the Codifiers of the system of pleading. In the constitution of some of the new States, there is inserted a provision in regard to the revision and amendment of laws with reference to the title, the analogy of which might perhaps be followed in regard to the repeal of statutes. So

The remaining clauses in most general use, are, besides those already mentioned, an appeal clause; a clause showing to what places the operation of the act shall extend; a clause showing from what date the operation of the act is to commence, and how long it shall continue in force; and lastly, in England, the concluding clause of a public general act, the clause providing that the act may be altered and repealed in the same session of Parliament.

We come next to Provisoes.-"A proviso in deeds or laws," says the Supreme Court of the United States, "is a limitation or exception to a grant made or authority conferred, the effect of which is to declare that the one shall not operate or the other be exercised unless in the case provided."* A curious rule of a very arbitrary nature, to which I have already alluded, prevails with regard to provisoes. to provisoes. It is that when the proviso of an act of Parliament is directly repug nant to the main body of it, the proviso shall stand and be held a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers.t

Exceptions. There is a well-known distinction between an exception in the purview of the act and a proviso. If there be an exception in the enacting clause

the Constitutions of California [Art. iv. § 25] and Indiana [Art. iv. § 21], both declare that "no act shall be revised or amended by mere reference to its title, but the act revised or section amended, shall be re-enacted and published at full length;" and the same provision has been adopted in Texas. [Art. vii. § 25.]

* Voorhees vs. Bank of U. S., 10 Peters, 449, per Baldwin, J. "The proviso is generally intended to restrain the enacting clause, and to except something which would otherwise have been within it, or in some measure to modify the enacting clause." Wayman vs. Southard, 10 Wheaton, 1, 30.

† Attorney General vs. Chelsea Water Works Co., Fitzgibbon, 195; 2 Dwarris on Statutes, 515; Rex vs. Justices of Middlesex, 2 B. and Adol. 818; Supra, p. 60.

of a statute, it must be negatived in pleading, but a separate proviso need not; and, that although it is found in the same section of the act, if it be not referred to, and engrafted on the enacting clause. The rule is, said Mr. Justice Ashurst,* "that any man who will bring an action for a penalty on an act of Parliament, must show himself entitled under the enacting clause; but if there be a subsequent exemption, that is a matter of defence, and the other party must show it to exempt himself from the penalty." Mr. Justice Buller said, "I do not know any case for a penalty on a statute, where there is an exception in the enacting clause, that the plaintiff must not show that the party whom he sues, is not within it." So in a criminal case, Lord Mansfield said, "What comes by way of proviso in a statute, must be insisted on for the purposes of defense by the party accused; but where exceptions are in the enacting part of the law, it must in the indictment charge that the indictment is not within any of them."+ This rule as to prosecutions upon penal statutes, that it is necessary to show, by negative averments, that the defendant is not within any of the exceptions of the enacting part of the statute, has been frequently recognized in this country. So, if a statute provides that no person shall retail spirituous liquors except for sacramental, mechanical, chemical, medical, or culinary purposes, an indictment on the statute must negative that the liquor was sold for these purposes.

* Spiers vs. Parker, 1 Term, 141.

† Dwarris, p. 516; Rex vs. Jarvis, Burr, 148; Spiers vs. Parker, 1 T. R. 141; The King es. Jukes, 8 T. R. 542, Foster, 430; The King vs. Stone, and Rex vs. Jarvis, 1 East. 644; Kent Com. i. 462, and People vs Berberrich and Toynbee, 11 Howard Pr. R. p. 333.

Chit. Crim. Law, vol. i. p. 284; Brutton vs. the State, 4 Indiana, 602; People vs. Berberrich & Toynbee, 11 Howard Pr. R. p. 289, 333.