notes, the day of the date is excluded."* In the same State, where a statute requires fourteen days, notice of trial; fourteen days are required exclusive of the first day of the court. And in the same State, the day on which the Revised Statutes took effect was excluded, in computing the time in regard to the statute of limitations.

In Alabama, it has been held that, in the computation of time from an act done, the day of performance is to be excluded; the court saying that the law refuses to recognize the parts or fractions of a day. So, where a statute provided that the lien acquired by an execution should not be lost if an alias execution should issue without interval of more than ninety days, an original execution was returned on the 14th April, and an alias issued on the 14th July next thereafter, or on the ninety-first day, held that the lien was not lost; § the court saying that the statute must be construed as if it had said that the lien should not be lost if an execution issued to the sheriff without interval of more days than ninety days. But this rule as to disregarding fractions of a day, does not apply to statutes which as between different acts, give a preference or priority to the one which is first done.] In the same State it is said to be the practice of the courts in the computation of time, to include one day and exclude the other, except where the statute requires

* Wilcox vs. Wood, 9 Wend. 348, per Savage, C. J.

+ Columbia Turnpike Road vs. Haywood, 10 Wend. 422.

Fairbanks vs. Wood, 17 Wend. 329.

§ Lang vs. Phillips, 27 Ala., 311. Judd vs. Fulton, 10 Barb. 117. Lang vs. Phillips, 27 Ala., 311.

specially a given number of entire days to intervene, in which case both are excluded.*

When the last day for the performance of a given act falls on a Sunday, the act must be done on the preceding day.t

It was early settled in England, that in all acts of Parliament where "months" were spoken of without the word "calendar," and nothing added from which a clear inference could be drawn that the legislature intended calendar months, they should be understood to mean lunar months, or a month of twenty-eight days. Lord Kenyon regretted this; but the rule was early adopted, though with equal reluctance, in New York. "The courts," it was said in one case, "have taken the rule as they found it settled, that where there is nothing in a statute from which they can infer that calendar time was intended, the month must be considered a lunar one." But as the legislature never in fact intended a lunar month, the courts have relied on any circumstances inducing the belief, that calendar time was in fact in their contemplation.§ All doubt has now been removed in New York, by a statutory provision, which declares, that wherever the word

* Owen vs. Slatter et al., 26 Alaba. 547. Sce, in N. Y. Fairbanks vs. Woods, 17 Wend. 329; Snyder vs. Warren, 2 Cow. 518.

Broome vs. Wellington, 1 Sandf. Sup. Ct. Rep. 664; Ex parte Dodge, 7 Cowen, 147; Anon. 2 Hill, 376.

Bishop of Peterborough vs. Catesby, Cro. Jac. 167, 168. Barksdale vs. Morgan, 4 Mod. 185. Sir Wollaston Dixie's Case, 1 Leon. 96. The King vs. Peckham, Carth. 406. The King vs. Adderley, Doug. 462. Castle vs. Burditt, 3 T. R., 623. Lacon vs. Hooper, 6 T. R. 224, per Lord Kenyon. § Loring vs. Halling, 15 J. R. 119. Snyder vs. Warren, 2 Cowen, 518. Parsons vs. Chamberlin, 4 Wend. 512. People vs. Mayor, &c. of New York, 10 Wend. 393. In the last three cases the statute was interpreted to mean calendar months. See also Jackson vs. Van Valkenburgh, 8 Cow.

1 R. S. 606, § 4.

month is used in a statute, it shall mean a calendar month. In Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the rule appears to be, that where the word month is used generally in a statute or contract, it will be considered to mean a calendar month.*

A year is the time in which the sun completes his circuit through the twelve signs of the zodiac, viz. 365 days and about six hours; but in leap-year, the statute 24 Geo. II. c. 25 enacts that the year shall consist of 366 days, the intercalary day being accounted with the day preceding it as one day; and in New York, the same provision has been adopted.+

Waiver. Under this head we have already noticed the general rule that statutory provisions designed for the benefit of a party may be waived; but that where the enactment is to secure general objects of policy or morals, no consent will render a non-compliance with the statute effectual. In Connecticut, a law of 1850 provided, that auditors might be appointed in actions of assumpsit, if the cause of action embraced matters of account. An auditor was appointed by consent, in an action brought by a declaration embracing a count on a note and the common counts. No other claim was in fact made than on the note, but the parties went to trial before the auditor, without objection; after a report by the auditor, the defendant opposed its acceptance by the court, on the ground

* Hunt vs. Holden, 2 Mass. 170; Avery et al. vs. Pixley, 4 Mass. 460; Churchill vs. Merchants' Bank, 19 Pick. 532; Brudenell vs. Vaux, 2 Dall. 302; Commonwealth vs. Chambre, 4 Dall. 143; Moore vs. Houston, 3 S. & R. 144.

† 2 R. S. part i. chap. xix. tit. 1, § 3; See The King vs. Inhabitants of Worminghall, 6 Maule & Selw. 350, a case on a yearly hiring.

Ante, chap. iv. p. 109.

that the case did not come within the act of 1850; but the objection was considered bad, and it was said to be like the cases where parties are held by their acts to waive objections to judges, commissioners, to a juror, or the panel of jurors.*

In the same State it has been held under a statute declaring a contract made on a usurious consideration to be utterly void, that the statute was made for the benefit of the party liable upon the contract, and that he might at his option avoid the security or waive the benefit of the law. So, the provisions of a statute requiring a bond with surety to be given by the party appealing from the judgment of a justice of the peace, is made solely for the benefit of the obligee, who may waive a strict compliance therewith.

Consent, however, will never give jurisdiction. Thus, where an appeal is taken in a cause not appealable, or to a court not having jurisdiction, it is not in the power of the parties to confer jurisdiction by waiving all objections.§

Subject-matter. It is a general and very sound rule, applicable to the construction of every statute, that it is to be taken in reference to its subject-matter. In this way often the operation of general words may be limited. So, the stock-jobbing acts are general, and their terms would apply to transactions in foreign

* Andrews vs. Wheeton, 23 Conn. 142. See also, King vs. Lacey, 8 Conn. R. 499; Selleck vs. Sugar Hollow T. P. Co. 13 Conn. 453; Smith vs. The State, 19 Conn. 493; Crone vs. Daniels, 20 Conn. 331; Quinebaug Bank vs. Leavens, 20 Conn. 87; Groton and Ledyard vs. Hurlburt et al. 22 Conn. 178.

Wales vs. Webb, 5 Conn. R. 154.

Ives vs. Finch, 22 Conn. 101.

Ives vs. Finch, 22 Conn. 101.

stock; a construction, however, which the courts have rejected, in obedience to the obvious intention of the legislature that the provisions of these enactments are to apply only to British stocks.*

General words how qualified by particular words.— It is a rule of right reason that general words may be qualified by particular clauses of a statute, but that on the other hand a thing which is given in particular shall not be taken away by general words. This in the civil law is expressed by the phrase, In toto jure generi per speciem derogatur, et illud potissimum habitum quod ad speciem directum est. In the less classical Latin of the early English law, the same idea is conveyed in the words, generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quæ specialiter sint comprehensa. In conformity to this doctrine it is held that where a general intention is expressed in a statute, and the act also expresses a particular intention, incompatible with the general intention, the particular intention shall be considered as an exception.+ Where general words follow particular words, the rule is to construe the former as applicable to the things or persons particularly mentioned. So, a statute treating of persons or things of an inferior rank, cannot by general words be extended to those of a superior.§

Statutes in regard to wagers.-At common law, wagers are not unlawful, unless immoral or against public policy; but the tendency of legislation in this

* Salkeld vs. Johnston, 1 Hare, 196; Henderson vs. Bise, 3 Starkie, 158; Wells vs. Porter, 2 Bing. N. C. 722; Elsworth vs. Cole, 2 M. & W. 31. + Churchill vs. Crease, 5 Bing. 180-492-3.

Sandiman vs. Breach, 7 B. & C. 100.

§ 4 Rep. 4; 2 Rep. 46; 2 Inst. 478; Dwarris, 656. But see, contra, 2 Inst. 136.