ute against the directors of an insolvent bank, it was held that no action would lie against them at common law, on the same ground that where a new right is given or a new duty imposed by statute, and a remedy provided to enforce such duty or for the violation of such right, the remedy given must be pursued.* So, too, in the same State an action of debt does not lie upon an award of damages of a committee of the sessions for locating a highway; a remedy by distress warrant being provided by the statute. "Where a statute gives a right and furnishes the remedy, that remedy must be pursued."+ And so, as at common law and before the statutes of 18 Eliz. and 6 Geo. II. the putative father of an illegitimate child was under no legal liability to maintain his illegitimate offspring, and as that liability has been created wholly by statute, the remedy prescribed must be followed: the father is liable under the filiation order, but no action of assumpsit for the support of the child will lie. So too, in Indiana where the exclusive privileges of ferries were not known till they were created by statute, the owners of ferries must rely on the provisions of the act for their security.§ So, too, it has been said in Michigan, that where a statute gives a new right and prescribes a particular remedy, such remedy must be strictly pursued and the party is confined to that remedy only, as to recover threefold the amount * Hinsdale vs. Larned, et al. 16 Mass. 65. Gedney vs. Inhabitants of Tewksbury, 3 Mass. 307, 309, per Sedgwick, J. vide ante, p. 94. Monerief vs. Ely, 19 Wend. 405. Cameron vs. Baker, 1 Carr & Payne, 268. Furillio vs. Crowther, 7 Dowl. & Ryl., 612. § Lang vs. Scott, 1 Blackford; 405; approved Almy ts. Harris, 5 John. R. 175. of usurious interest paid.* In New Hampshire it has been said that where a statute authorizes the doing of certain acts (such as the destruction of a highway by a railway company), the necessary consequence of which will be to injure the property of another, and at the same time provides a remedy for the recovery of the damages, the party injured is confined to the statute remedy for such damages, and no remedy can be had upon a common-law declaration.† In Maine, it has been said that if a statute gives merely a new remedy where one before existed at common law, it is cumulative, and the party injured is at liberty to pursue either. If a statute give the same remedy which the common law does, it is merely affirmative, and the party has his election which to pursue. But if a statute withhold the remedy which before existed at common law, the common-law right ceases to exist.. The analogy of these rules holds good in the criminal law. Thus, where an offense intended to be guarded against by a statute, is punishable before the making of any statute prescribing a particular method of punishing it, then such particular remedy is merely cumulative, and does not take away the former remedy; but where the statute enacts that the doing of any act not punishable before shall for the future be punishable in such and such a particular manner, there it is necessary that the particular method prescribed by the act be specifically pursued, and not the common-law mode of an indictment.§ *Thurston vs. Prentiss, et al. 1 Michigan, 193. + Henniker vs. Contoocook Valley R. R., 9 Foster, 147. Gooch vs. Stephenson, 13 Maine (1 Shepley) 371. § By Lord Mansfield, in Rex vs. Robinson, 2 Burr. 799, where held that an indictment would lie for disobedience to a filiation order of the quarter It has been said, however, to be a clear and established principle, that when a new offense is created by act of Parliament, and a penalty is annexed to it by a separate and substantive clause, it is not necessary for the prosecutor to sue for the penalty, but he may proceed on the prior clause, upon the ground of its being a misdemeanor.* It is no objection in this country to an indictment for an offense against a statute of a State, that the defendant is liable to punishment for the same act under a law of the United States. A State may.pass laws declaring acts criminal, and may punish the violation of the law, although the offender may be again prosecuted by the Federal Government for violating her laws by the same act which violated the law of the State. In other words, a party in committing a wrongful act, may by one act violate the laws of the two governments, and render himself amenable to both.† Retroactive effect of laws.-We have already spoken of laws in this aspect; and we have stated the general rules to be, that retrospective laws which conflict with a State constitution,§ which violate the sessions, though a particular forfeiture of twenty shillings per month was affixed to any disobedience of the statute under which the order was made. See Castle's Case, Cro. Jac., 644. In Stephens vs. Watson, 1 Salk. 45, it was held that an indictment would not lie for keeping an ale-house without a license, because it was no offense at common law, and the statute making it an offense had made it punishable in another manner. See Rex vs. Robinson, approved in Sturgeon vs. The State, 1 Blackf., Ind. 89. * The King vs. Harris, 4 T. R., 205. See this case cited and commented on in the Hartford & N. H. R. R. Co. vs. Kennedy, 12 Conn., 499, 527. The State vs. Moore, 6 Indiana, 436. ↑ Ante, p. 188. The Constitution of Tennessee, art. xi., § 20, contains a positive declaration, "That no retrospective law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be made." provisions of the Constitution of the United States by impairing the inviolability of the obligation of contracts, or which tend to divest vested rights of property, are absolutely void, as not being within the scope of the legislative power; and that the courts will always struggle to give laws a prospective construction or interpretation. But in cases which do not come within the foregoing exceptions, it is in the power of the legislature to pass retroactive laws; and the judiciary will not interfere with them. The question is of so much practical importance, that the following decisions ought not to be overlooked. "It is not in the power of the legislature," says the Supreme Court of Maryland, "to give a statute a retrospective operation, so as to divest vested rights acquired under a will."* Says the Supreme Court of Louisiana,-"However repugnant to logic and sound policy retrospective laws may be, retrospective laws in civil matters do not violate the constitution unless they tend to divest vested rights, or to impair the obligation of contracts.+ In Pennsylvania, it has been held that no statute should be held to operate retrospectively, unless its language admits of no other construction; and so it was decided that the act of 26th of April, 1850, in regard to the lien of judgments on the estates of decedents, was not retrospective. * Wilderman vs. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 8 Maryland, 551. + Municipality No. 1 vs. Wheeler, 10 La. Ann. R. 745, 746. And the court cites Marçadé, § 62: "Mais enfin, tant qu'une loi existe, si mauvaise, si peu logique qu'elle puisse être sous tel ou tel rapport, le pouvoir judiciaire ne peut pas ne point l'appliquer. Dura lex, sed est lex. En fait, donc, le législateur peut porter une disposition rétroactive; et toute irrationnelle que sera cette disposition, elle n'en devra pas moins s'appliquer." Neff's Appeal, 21 Penn., 243. In Michigan, this language has been held: "In these United States, it is said that in a private case between individuals, the court will struggle hard against a construction which, by a retroactive operation, will affect the rights of parties; and statutes are generally to be construed to operate in future, unless a retrospective effect be clearly intended;" but the mere fact of a statute being clearly retrospective does not of itself make it unconstitutional.* In Connecticut, an act authorizing a sale by the courts of equity of real estate, and of any rights corporeal or incorporeal existing or growing out of the same, which are held in joint tenancy or coparcenary, whenever partition cannot be made in any other way, has been held "not to be retroactive within the legal import of that term, but to be purely a remedial law acting upon existing rights, and providing a remedy for existing evils;" and it was added, "if this were in fact a retroactive law it would not for such reason be an unconstitutional one."+ In Massachusetts, where a statute was passed giving towns a remedy against paupers for expenses incurred for their support, it was held that, as prior to the act no such suit could be maintained, the act must be construed to have a prospective operation only, on the ground that the legislature could not have entertained the opinion that a citizen free from debt by the laws of the land, could be made a debtor merely by a legislative act declaring him one.‡ The subject of the retroactive effect of statutes * Scott vs. Smarts' Exrs., 1 Mich., 295. |