In a case on the English Bankrupt Act, Lord Tenterden said, "The intention of this act certainly was to prevent voluntary preferences; the words may, probably, go beyond the intention; but if they do, it rests with the legislature to make an alteration; the duty of the Court is only to construe and give effect to the provision."* In another case where an effort was made to include a writ of pone or distringas under the term execution, which is confined to executions on judgments, the application was denied; and Lord Tenterden said, "Speaking for myself alone, I cannot forbear observing, that I think there is always danger in giving effect to what is called the equity of a statute, and that it is much safer and better to rely on and abide by the plain words, although the legislature might possibly have provided for other cases had their attention been directed to them."+ Where an English statute provided, that no indenture of apprenticeship should be "valid and effectual" unless "approved of by two justices of the peace, under their hands and seals," an indenture executed by the justices under their hands only was held void; and the King's Bench, per Bagley, J., said, "I do not know how to get rid of the words of this section of the act of Parliament, and where the legislature, in a very modern act of Parliament, have used words of a plain and definite import, it is very dangerous to put upon them a construction, the effect of which will be to hold that the legislature did not mean that which they have expressed."+ *Notley vs. Buck, 8 Barn. & Cres. 160, 164. + Brandling vs. Barrington, 6 Barn. & Cres., 467, 475. The King vs. Inhabs. of Stoke Damerel, 7 Barn. & Cres., 563, 568, 569. In a case upon the English poor laws, which provided that, in order to gain a settlement, the rent of a tenement "should be paid for one whole year at least," it was insisted, with reference to the great inequality of rents, that this was very absurd and unjust; but the act was strictly construed, and the King's Bench said, "It is very desirable in all cases to adhere to the words of an act of Parliament, giving to them that sense which is their natural import in the order in which they are placed."* "We are bound," said Lord Denman, " to give to the words of the legislature all possible meaning which is consistent with the clear language used. But, if we find language used which is incapable of a meaning, we cannot supply one. It is extremely probable that the alteration suggested would express what the legislature meant, but we, looking at the word as judges, are no more justified to introduce that meaning than we should be if we added any other provision."+ "The court," said Coleridge, J., "should decline to mold the language of an act for the sake of an alleged convenience, or an alleged equity, upon doubtful evidence of intention." And again, the same learned and experienced judge said "If I thought the construction we are adopting put any force on the meaning of the act, I should be the last to concur in it; for the longer I sit here the more I feel the importance of seeking only the meaning of a statute according to a fair interpretation of its words, and King vs. Inhabs. of Ramsgate, 6 Barn. & Cres., 712, 715. See also King vs. Inhabs. of Barham, 8 Barn. & Cres., 99. + Green vs. Wood, 7 Q. B., 178, 185. The King vs. Poor Law Commissioners, 6 A. & E. 1, 7. resting upon that."* Says Patteson, J.,-"I see the necessity of not importing into statutes words which are not to be found there. Such a mode of interpretation only gives occasion to endless difficulty."+ "We are required," says Lord Denman, "to add some arbitrary words to the section. We cannot introduce any such qualification; and I cannot help thinking that the introduction of qualifying words in the interpretation of statutes, is frequently a great reproach to the law."‡ Tindal, C. J., says, "It is the duty of all courts to confine themselves to the words of the legislaturenothing adding thereto, nothing diminishing."§ The Court of Appeals in New York says, "Whether we are considering an agreement between parties, statute, or a constitution, with a view to its interpretation, the thing we are to seek is, the thought which it expresses. To ascertain this, the first resort in all cases is to the natural signification of the words employed, in the order and grammatical arrangement in which the framers of the instrument have placed them. If thus regarded the words embody a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, and no contradiction between different parts of the same writing, then that meaning apparent on the face of the instrument is the one which alone we are at liberty to say was intended to be conveyed. In such a case there is no room for construction. That which the words declare, is the meaning of the instrument; and neither courts nor legislatures have the right to add to or take away from that meaning." * 6 A. & E. p. 7. Lamond vs. Eiffe, 3 Q. B., 910. + King vs. Burrell, 12 A. & E., 468. § Everett vs. Wells, 2 Scott N. C. 531. | Newell vs. The People. 3 Seld. 97. See the subject also discussed in M'Cluskey vs. Cromwell, 1 Kernan, 593. In Michigan it has been said, "It is only where a statute is ambiguous in its terms, that courts exercise the power of so controlling its language as to give effect to what they may suppose to have been the intention of the lawmaker. In the statute before us, the language admits of but one construction. No doubt can arise as to its meaning. It must, therefore, be its own interpreter."* The result of this investigation then, is, that for the purpose of ascertaining the intention of the legislature, no extrinsic fact, prior to the passage of the bill, which is not itself a rule of law or an act of legislation, can be inquired into or in any way taken into view. We now proceed with the inquiry, what are the means outside of the statute which we may legitimately employ to arrive at the desired result, viz. the legislative intent. Statutes in pari materia, to be taken together. It is well settled, that in construing a doubtful statute, and for the purpose of arriving at the legislative intent, all acts on the same subject-matter are to be taken together and examined, in order to arrive at the true result. "All acts in pari materia," said Lord Mansfield,+ "are to be taken together, as if they were one law." "Where," he said, on another occasion, "there are different statutes in pari materia, though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together as one system, and as explanatory of each other." And in various cases before him, Lord * Bidwell et al. vs. Whitaker et al., 1 Mich. 469, 479. Mansfield applied this doctrine to the laws concerning church leases, bankrupts, and the poor. This sound rule has been frequently recognized in this country. On this principle, " in many instances," say the Court of Errors of the State of New York, “a remedy provided by one statute will be extended to cases arising on the same matter under a subsequent statute." And so it was held, that a provision for compensation embraced in an original act of 1817, extended to cases arising under an act passed in 1820, conferring additional powers on canal commissioners. The subject has been considered and explained in Connecticut; and it was there said, "Statutes are in pari materia, which relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things. The word par must not be confounded with the word similis. It is used in opposition to it, as in the expression, magis pares sunt quam similes; intimating not likeness merely, but identity. It is a phrase applicable to public statutes or general laws, made at different times and in reference to the same subject. Thus, the English laws concerning paupers, and their bankrupt acts, are construed together, as if they were one statute, and as forming a united system; otherwise the system might, and probably would, be inharmonious and inconsistent. Such laws are in pari materia. But private acts of the legislature, conferring distinct rights on different individuals, which never can be considered as being one statute, or the parts of a general system, are not to be interpreted by a mutual * Rex v8. Loxdale, 1 Burr., 445; Duck vs. Addington, 4 Term R., 447. + Rogers vs. Bradshaw, 20 J. R., 735, 744. |