1. That the act of Jan. 24, 1865, so far as it affected his status in the court, was unconstitutional and void; and

2. That if it were held to be constitutional, nevertheless, the pardon of the President removed any disabilities that the statute was intended to enforce.

Mr. Garland, exercising the common right of every citizen, filed a brief in his own behalf. He was ably seconded by his counsel, Reverdy Johnson. and M. H. Carpenter. Mr. R. H. Marr was in the same position as Mr. Garland. He also filed a brief in the case. Mr. Attorney-General Speed and Henry Stanbery, who was afterward Attorney-General, appeared for the government against the petitioners. The case was thoroughly argued. Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion. The act of July 2, 1862, is familiar.

The act of 1865 was a supplementary prohibition, applying to attorneys and counselors at law in the courts of the United States. Addressing himself to the case, Mr. Justice Field said: "The question is not as to the power of Congress to prescribe qualifications; but whether that power has been exercised for the infliction of punishment against the prohibition of the Constitution. That this result," said he, "cannot be effected directly by a state, under the form of creating qualifications, we have held in the case of Cummings vs. The State of Missouri, and the reasoning by which that conclusion was reached applies equally to similar actions on the part of Congress." The effect of the pardon was also considered; but the decision did not rest on the pardon. The pardon would blot out all the guilt of an offense, so that in the eye of the law no offense had ever been committed. It removed all penalties and disabilities. It restored all civil rights. The only limits on the operation of a pardon were that it could not restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in others by judicial proceedings. The court decided that the requirement to take the oath was void, although in form it was a regulation, which would have been valid, had not the intention been to have it operate as a punishment on those who could not subscribe to it. The rule of the court which required it was rescinded, it "having been unadvisedly adopted." Mr. Garland was thereupon admitted to practice in the court, where he now stands as the leader of its bar.

It is obvious from the reasoning of the court in these two cases, that the iron-clad oath was contrary to the Constitution of the United States, even in the matter of Federal offices. The American citizen could not, at that time, be disqualified for Federal office, as a penalty for past conduct or opinion. It was, in fact, proscriptive legislation. Such legislation has the effect of an attainder, or of an ex post facto crimination. Both are unconstitutional. Now, however, this is not altogether the case. After these decisions were made, a radical Congress, still intent on proscribing the best classes of the Southern people from all participation in the affairs of the Nation, forced

REPEAL OF THE IRON-CLAD OATH.

257 the Fourteenth Amendment into the Constitution. They made its adoption a condition for the restoration of Federal relations to states that were held under the arbitrary rule of semi-military governments. The third section of that amendment is clearly a bill of attainder, although in form a declaration of qualification for members of Congress, Presidential electors, and state and Federal officers. The second section is of the same character. It grants, or attempts to grant, power to the state to proscribe by ex post facto laws certain classes of citizens, and to deprive them of their elective franchise.

This amendment introduced into the organic law a principle so abhorrent to liberty and justice, that from time immemorial it had been regarded by the American people and their ancestors as one of the vilest which could be resorted to, under the worst forms of tyranny. It was thought that no free people could submit to it under any circumstances. But there it stands. It is to-day a monument to the satanic malice of the radical party. It is a warning to succeeding generations of the excesses of partisan lust. It is the highest glory that any party can claim, that it opposed with all its might, this amendment that is so obnoxious to every other feature of our government. It is to the glory of Mr. Speaker Randall and the Democrats who followed him, that he led them successfully in an encounter against the infamous Force bill which was intended to crystallize into acts of hate these codes of spite. The scope of this amendment has been curtailed by the recent partial repeal of the iron-clad oath. After long and repeated efforts to that end in Congress, this much was secured. It is one of the writer's gratifications that the fight he commenced almost single-handed years ago against that attainder oath, he carried on and on, until in the very last Congress he forced a repeal of some of its worst tests, under a suspension of the rules and by a two-thirds vote. But an account of those efforts will be given in another place.

The iron-clad oath was the worst and the most wide-reaching of all the unconstitutional proscriptions in the South. Property might be and was often seized and confiscated; but still there was left the talent and ability to replace the rapine. But in the case of the oath, the proscription lasted for all time. It excluded almost the whole talent and worth of nearly one-half the people of the Union. It forbade them any honorable participation in their own government. Was it any wonder that the Democratic party did all that it could to prevent such terrible outrages and violations of natural and constitutional rights? Yet, on the pretense of patriotic defense of the law and of cherished principles of government, the party of such tyrannical measures had, and still has, the unblushing audacity to charge that the Northern Democrats aided and sympathized with secession. Had it not been for the Democratic party there would not be to-day a Union of states. There would be only the unity of a government by the party of ostracism and tyranny.

CHAPTER XIII.

FOREIGN RELATIONS DURING THE CIVIL WAR.

GREAT BRITAIN RECOGNIZES THE CONFEDERACY—BELLIGERENT RIGHTS CONCEDED -JUDGE BLAÇK'S CIRCULAR LETTER-MR. BUCHANAN'S ADMINISTRATION VINDICATING NATIONAL JURISDICTION-MR. SEWARD SPEAKING FOR PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ADMINISTRATION-APPREHENSIONS-A FEATHER IN THE SCALE-THE SWITZERLAND CASE-EARLY TREATIES WITH EUROPE RECOGNIZING OUR INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN STATES-THE SPANISH AMERICAN STATES-FREEDOM OF THE STATES-MEDIÆVAL RULES OF MARITIME LAW-PIRACY-CONTRABAND OF WAR-TREATIES AS TO CONTRABAND-THE MARCY PROPOSITIONS-THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1856 AND ITS DECLARATION-THE UNITED STATES AMENDMENT OF THE DECLARATION—THE AUTHOR'S RESOLUTIONS AND SPEECH THE DEMOCRACY OF THE SEA-EARL RUSSELL'S PROPOSITION-MR. SEWARD'S DILEMMA AND RESPONSE THE CONFEDERATE RIGHTS AS BELLIGERENTS-CANADA REBELLION IN 1838-OUR BLOCKADE MUST BE RESPECTED-OUR NAVAL ARMAMENT-MR. SEWARD AS A STATESMAN.

Τ

HE most important question in regard to our foreign relations during the civil war period, was that of the status of the seceded states. This question received early attention. It was discussed not only

by the Federal and Confederate Cabinets, but also by the Cabinets of the leading European nations. By a tacit understanding with the other powers, England took the leading part in determining this and all other questions of an international character growing out of our war. The result was, that as early in the struggle as May 13, 1861, the Confederacy was recognized by Her Britannic Majesty, in a proclamation of neutrality, as a belligerent power. To prevent such a recognition, Mr. Black, Secretary of State in the administration of President Buchanan, had, on Feb. 28, 1861, addressed a circular letter to each of our ministers at the European courts. In this letter Mr. Black stated that it was not improbable "that persons claiming to represent the states which had attempted to throw off their Federal obligations, would seek a recognition of their independence" by the governments to which the ministers to whom the letter was addressed

FIRST VIEWS OF CONFEDERATE INDEPENDENCE.

259

were accredited. "In the event," he said, "of such an effort being made, you are expected by the President to use such means as may in your judgment be proper and necessary to prevent its success." He called attention to the reasons set forth in the President's message, then recently addressed to the Congress, showing that the states had no constitutional power to secede from the Union; and that the Southern States had no sufficient grounds "to justify the revolutionary act of severing the bond" which connected them with their sister states. "This government," he said, "has not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction within the territory of these states, and does not desire to do so." For this reason, said the secretary, "it must be very evident that it is the right of this government to ask of all foreign powers that the latter shall take no steps which may tend to encourage the revolutionary movement of the seceding states, or increase the danger of disaffection in those which still remain loyal." Attention was called to the facts that Mr. Lincoln had been elected as the candidate of the Republican or anti-slavery party; that the preceding discussion had been confined almost entirely to topics connected, directly or indirectly, with negro slavery; and that the electoral votes of the Northern states (excepting three in New Jersey) had been cast for the anti-slavery candidate, while the sentiment of the South was the other way. Our ministers were to hold out the hope that entire harmony would soon be restored. They were to point out to foreign governments that any acknowledgment by them of the so-called Confederate States. would tend to disturb the friendly relations, diplomatic and commercial, then existing between those governments and the United States, and prove adverse to their own interests. Thus early did the administration of President Buchanan take the important step of instructing our representatives abroad to use their best efforts against any recognition of the Confederate States. No uncertain grounds were taken. The secession movement was characterized as unjustifiable and revolutionary. National jurisdiction was asserted. The consequences of foreign recognition were plainly stated. It was still hoped that the seceding states would, in a short time, submit their grievances, if any, to peaceful arbitration. Yet this Administration was afterward denounced because it did not, at that time, destroy this hope by resorting to the sword at once.

Upon the 9th of March following, Mr. Seward, Secretary of State in President Lincoln's administration, addressed a circular letter to the same ministers. He called attention to Mr. Black's previous instructions. He reiterated them. He expressed the same hope of a speedy adjustment of our troubles, "by a firm, yet just and liberal bearing, co-operating with the deliberate and loyal action of the American people." Our ministers were to "truthfully urge" upon foreign governments that the "present disturbances" had "their origin only in popular passions, excited under novel circumstances of very transient character." In this vital matter, the Republican

Administration pursued throughout the war the policy of the last Democratic Administration. England, as stated, took the lead in ignoring all the friendly considerations urged by Mr. Seward and his predecessor against the recognition of the seceding states. Much had been expected from her supposed friendship for the United States and announced abhorrence of negro slavery. But this expectation was disappointed by Her Britannic Majesty. She announced by the proclamation that her government had assumed a neutral attitude in regard to our contest. Her Majesty's government thereby recognized the Confederate States as a belligerent power. This recognition gave great encouragement to the Confederates. It had a corresponding effect in prolonging the war, with its enormous outpouring of fraternal blood and com

mon treasure.

In perusing the diplomatic correspondence of this period, the reader can see prominent in its pages, a great apprehension of foreign intervention in our affairs. It seemed, at times, as if a feather would have cast the scales against us. Our form of government was not favored by those who created and directed the policies of the European nations. The mere existence of such a free and popular government was regarded as a standing menace to monarchical institutions. The advocates of these institutions had long been predicting, what they wished,- our downfall. There was, therefore, good reason to apprehend that nothing but discretion would restrain the anti-republican parties in England and other European powers from forcing their governments into ultra measures against the Union. It was discretion, more than regard for comity, that prevented intervention. In 1848, the republican movement which had long been fomenting in Europe had given a shock to monarchical institutions. This did not incline the ruling classes to look with disfavor on the dismemberment of our Union. Nevertheless, the supporters of monarchy must have seen the impolicy of giving countenance to the disruption of a great government by revolutionary measures. This consideration operated in our favor. It had a restraining influence on the powers which might have actively favored secession in the American Republic.

Fourteen years before our trouble there was secession in the Swiss Republic. There was an attempted intervention in its favor by the great European powers. At the opening of the Federal Tagsatzung (Swiss diet) on July 5, 1847, the presiding officer, Ulrich Ochsenbein, spoke in regard to the threatened recognition of the seceding cantons by England, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and other powers. He said on that trying occasion: "No foreign intervention in our domestic affairs should be tolerated. Switzerland never solicited any foreign power to guarantee the constitutional compact of her twenty-two cantons. The sovereignty of her government never has been questioned; it was her territory alone which the allied powers at Vienna declared inviolable. Should she be subjected to