least of the leading journals, its voice resounded through the length and breadth of the land. Meetings and conferences then succeeded each other. From the manufacturing districts the movement spread to the metropolis, and with a clearly defined purpose in view, and with the highest economic authorities to appeal to in support of their principles, the Anti-Corn Law agitators made everywhere a profound and lasting impression.

On March 12, 1839, Mr. Villiers again brought the subject of the corn laws before the House of Commons, now, however, backed by a strong party both inside and outside the House. His motion was, That this House resolve itself into a committee of the whole House, to take into consideration the act 9 Geo. IV., regulating the importation of foreign grain.' Mr. Villiers showed that the corn laws were not beneficial to the agricultural interest, and that neither the agricultural labourer nor the farmer reaped from them any benefit. He asserted that the community at large suffered a loss through the corn laws, equal to a poll tax of 88. a head, or a tax of 21. on each family in the kingdom, and he demonstrated that commerce and shipping were greatly injured by them. Mr. Villiers's motion was seconded by Sir George Strickland, and on his side spoke Mr. Poulett Thomson, Sir William Molesworth, Mr. Grote, Mr. Clay, Lord Howick, Sir Henry Parnell, Mr. Ward, Lord John Russell, Mr. Hume, Mr. Fielden, and Mr. O'Connell; whilst against him were Sir James Graham, Sir Robert Peel, and a host of Conservatives. The discussion was animated and well sustained, and after five whole nights' debate the votes were taken and the motion was lost by 195 to 342. In the House of Lords, too, a discussion was commenced on the subject. On March 14 the Earl of Fitzwilliam moved, That the act 9 Geo. IV. c. 60, entitled "An Act to amend the law relating to the importation of corn," has failed to secure that steadiness in the price of grain which is essential to the best interest of the country;' but the motion was lost by 24 against 224. A day after Lord Brougham moved, 'That this House do immediately resolve itself into a committee of the whole House, to take into consideration the importation of foreign corn.' But the motion met a similar fate, only seven having voted for it, and sixty-one against it. Slow is the progress of any measure in the House of Commons when any substantial reform is contemplated, but slower still is its advance in the House of Lords. Coming less in contact with the mass of the people, comparatively strangers to their feelings and wants, conservative by interest and hereditary policy, the peers of the realm are necessarily the last to admit the need of change, and the last to make concessions to the altered exigencies of the times. Nevertheless there have never been wanting enlightened members in the Upper House who sought the maintenance and preservation of their order from that same law of progress on which all the institutions

The committee had no time to complete their enquiry that session, and only submitted the valuable evidence they had received, without any formal report. Yet many matters of moment date from that enquiry: such as the publication of the accounts of the Bank, the publication of the amount of bullion held by the Bank, and the partial adoption of the principle of currency by which the Bank of England, as well as the country banks' circulation, should be regulated by the state of foreign exchanges. These and many other points were brought out with great fulness in the evidence before the committee, and, upon the presentation of the report, Lord Althorpe proposed that the Bank of England should continue to have the monopoly of the circulation; that no bank, with power to issue notes, with more than six partners, should be allowed to be established within sixty-five miles of London; that the charter should be renewed for twenty-one years, terminable at the end of ten years; that weekly accounts of bullion and securities, and of paper in circulation and deposits, should be presented; that Bank of England notes should be legal tender except at the Bank; that the usury laws should be so far modified as to exempt from their operation bills of exchange not having more than three months to run; that a fourth of the debt due to the Bank should be paid; that in future the Bank should deduct 120,000l. a year from its charge on account of the management of the public debt; that bankers should be allowed to pay a composition duty in lieu of the stamp duty; and that facilities should be given for the establishment of joint-stock banks at a certain distance from London. These proposals of the Government had been accepted by the Bank, but the House of Commons strongly demurred to the principle of making Bank of England notes legal tender.

Why were Bank of England notes thus exceptionally treated? Was it not introducing a species of inconvertible paper money? The reasons alleged for the proposal were, that in 1825 the danger of exhaustion did not so much occur from the demand for gold to meet the notes as from the necessity of enabling country bankers to pay their deposits. That in most of the country districts the amount of notes issued by the bankers bore but a small proportion to the amount of their deposits and engagements, for which they were obliged to provide in times of pressure; yet that it was to meet these that they applied to the Bank for bullion. It was, therefore, to guard against such a danger that it was thought desirable to make Bank of England notes legal tender. The measure was not intended for the benefit of the country bankers; its object was to keep in circulation as much paper as possible, and to prevent any unusual demand for gold upon the Bank of England. And upon such pleas, though very weak in themselves, after much discussion, the clause to that effect passed, as well as the main proposition, for the renewal of the Bank Charter."

3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 98. By this statute bills of exchange not having more

Yet the bill was not allowed to pass without the insertion of one more clause, which, whatever was the design of its framer, exercised considerable influence on the future monetary institutions of the country. When the bill was passing its last stages through the House, a clause was introduced, to the effect that any company or partnership might carry on the business of banking in London, or within sixty miles thereof, provided such body did not borrow, or take up in England any sum of money either on bills payable on demand, or at any less time than six months from the borrowing thereof. By introducing this clause, the governors of the Bank of England believed that they would effectively prevent the establishment of any bank in London, and that they might thus enjoy for many years an undisputed monopoly; but they were wholly deceived. This clause proved soon after to be the open door by which joint-stock banks were permitted in the metropolis, and, on the strength of that very act, in 1834, the London and Westminster Bank commenced business.

That this unexpected event should disconcert the Bank of England we might well imagine. It was a bold attempt. For the first time since its formation the Bank had to realise the fact of having a competitor in the field, and, whether from fear of the possible results, or out of spite at such an intrusion, the Bank decided to offer all the opposition in its power to the same, and the occasion soon presented itself. The London and Westminster Bank requiring legal sanction to sue and be sued in the name of its officers, Mr. Clay introduced a bill on the subject in the House of Commons; but the Bank determined to oppose it in all its stages. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, espousing the cause of the Bank of England, opposed the bill, on the plea that it was a breach of the undertaking with the Bank on the renewal of its charter, yet the bill was read a second time by a majority of 141 to 25, and the third time by a majority of 137 to 16. Yet the Bank never relaxed its efforts to defeat it, and when the bill was presented to the Lords it was rejected by a large majority. The London and Westminster Bank, however, was not to be foiled by such manœuvres. Undismayed by the powerful opposition, it advanced towards completion, and only avoided the difficulty of the mode of suing or being sued by putting forward its trustees instead of its officers. The Bank of England refused to keep a drawing account for the London and Westminster Bank, and soon after, in 1838, the Bank of England commenced legal proceedings to prevent the London and Westminster Bank accepting bills drawn at six months' date. For two years the suit was carried on, and it ended by the Master of the Rolls granting an injunction to

than three months to run were exempt from the operation of the usury laws; and three years after, by the 7 Wm. IV. and 1 Vict., the act was extended to bills of twelve months and under.

P

of the realm depend, and who, far from regarding their interests as antagonistic to those of other classes of society, had the wisdom to discern that we are all subject to the same laws, influenced by the same circumstances, and alike bound to obey those laws of nature, which, more than any human contrivance, determine the progress and prosperity of states.

The result of Mr. Villiers's motion in the House of Commons was not likely to discourage the Anti-Corn Law Association. On the contrary, it imparted to it a new life and a fresh impulse. Determined to persevere till the end, the agitators saw in the strength of their opponents only an additional cause for more energetic labours. A meeting was accordingly organised in London, and the same voice which first gave strength and vivacity to the Manchester gathering, was now heard exclaiming, 'We are the representatives of three millions of people, a far greater number of constituents than the House ever could boast of. We well know that no great principle was ever indebted to Parliament for success-the victory must be gained out of doors. The great towns of Britain have extended the right hand of fellowship to each other, and their alliance will be a Hanseatic league against the feudal corn law plunderers.' The Anti-Corn Law League was never a political organisation. For years its members went on lecturing, distributing tracts, and acting as a peripatetic university in instructing the people on the evil of commercial monopoly. Never did they allow themselves to be tempted to other political topics. The League did not even wish to interfere with the system of taxation, further than extinguishing, at once and for ever, the principle of maintaining taxes for the benefit of a particular class. If it be asked,' said Mr. Cobden, why it is that we, professing to be free traders in everything, should restrict the title of our association to that of the "National Anti-Corn Law League," I will explain the reason. We advocate the abolition of the corn law because we believe that to be the foster-parent of all other monopolies; and if we destroy thatthe parent, the monster monopoly-it will save us the trouble of destroying all the rest.'

CHAPTER IX.

THE COMMERCIAL CRISES OF 1836 AND 1839.

Prospects of Commerce.-Committee on Trade and Navigation.-Commercial Excitement in 1836.-Number of Joint-Stock Companies.-The Bank of England and the Circulation.-The Banks of the United States.-The Crisis. Great Distress in Trade and Manufactures.-Causes of the Crisis. -State of Trade in 1838.-Lord Overstone on the Currency.

THOUGH banking facilities had increased, it cannot be said that trade had yet become over-prosperous. After the crisis of 1825-26 some improvement had been experienced, but a series of deficient harvests from 1828 to 1831, when the price of wheat averaged 60s. to 668. a quarter, the revolution in France, and a war between Russia and Poland, checked any substantial progress. The prices of produce were so low, that many India houses succumbed; and although there was all the while a considerable development of the productive power of the country, consumption never seemed to overtake production, and complete stagnation characterised every branch of business.

The complaints of trade found utterance in the House of Commons, and a committee was appointed in 1833 to enquire into the state of trade, manufactures, and shipping in the United Kingdom; but the evidence given before the committee was to the effect that there was no real distress among traders; that, on the contrary, the commerce and manufacture of the country were in a remarkably sound and healthy state; that they were carried on with adequate capital and reasonable returns, and that there was a general confidence in the prospect of improving markets for all the great staples both of imports and exports. Nor was it long ere this improvement manifested itself. By degrees the great depression of prices which prevailed for several years, gave place to considerable animation. Greater confidence began to be felt, a bonâ fide demand sprang up both at home and abroad, and the stock of raw materials and colonial produce, instead of accumulating, underwent a sensible reduction. An abundant harvest in 1834 considerably strengthened the general tone, and added firmness to the value of all descriptions of property. In short, the state of trade decidedly improved, though, down to 1835, there was no sign of undue excitement, and prices of commodities, although in many cases at advanced rates, were not in any striking instance under the influence of speculation.