with the philosophy of empty deception of the world, which is secularism, or according to the tradition of men, which is humanism. Christians are obligated to follow God's instructions concerning the education of their children. This leads us to the next question, "What do we do if Caesar or civil government demands that we educate our children contrary to our faith, contrary to biblical principles, in accordance with the philosophy and empty deception of the world? Clearly if man gives us an instruction contrary to that of God, we must obey God rather than man. But also, we must draw the line at principle, not at the point of excessive violation of principle. The principle is that Christ is Lord or sovereign over His believers who cannot yield the responsibilities God has given them to the humanistic state. We must draw the line when the state steps out of its legitimate biblical bounds and asks that we accept its sovereignty rather than Christ's sovereignty over that which God has commanded us to do. The point at which the person is asked to go over his faith is a matter of individual conscience. Those Christians that do not see a challenge to their faith by the exercise of governmental control over the education of their children must make decisions in accordance with their conscience. Those of us who have seen God's clear commandment to us to raise our children in a way not generally done in the world, but in a way peculiar to those who adhere to His Word, must be willing to carry out God's instructions regardless of the cost. In fact, we must be willing to die for such convictions. In the next section of this paper I will address in more precise terms why the levying of a tax is equivalent to an extension of government control over a religious ministry. If we grant, however, that both reason and history proves that taxation is in fact a means of control, then quite clearly, Christians cannot accept the imposition of a tax on a religious ministry. For Caesar to claim sovereignty over Christ is unacceptable to the Christian. We can see this issue in Christ's conduct before Caesar's representatives in John, Chapters 18 & 19. Assuming that the reader is familiar with those passages, let me simply point out a couple of key verses. In Chapter 19, verse 11, we find Christ's words to Pilate, "You would have no authority over Me, unless it had been given you from above; for this reason he who delivered Me up to you has the greater sin." Christ here is confirming God's sovereignty over all authorities and places a responsibility on Pilate for his exercise of authority. Those who delivered Him up, of course, are also political authorities. He points out to him that their sin was even greater. In verse 12 we read, "As a result of this Pilate made efforts to release Him, but the Jews cried out, saying, 'If you release this Man, you are no friend of Caesar; every one who makes himself out to be a king opposes Caesar."" And then we find the accusers' declaration of their sovereign in verse 15. "They 'Away with Him, away with Him, crucify Him!' 'Shall I crucify your King?' The chief priests king but Caesar.'" therefore cried out, Pilate said to them, answered, 'We have no What is the issue in Christ's crucifixion? The issue is, "Who is Lord?" Why were believers sent to the lions in the first century? The issue is the same. They were unwilling to grant to Caesar sovereign authority over their religious exercise. They would not make a confession that Caesar is Lord. They insisted that Jesus is Lord. It would have been so easy for the principle of Roman religious toleration to grant them the liberty to worship Christ under the umbrella of Caesar's sovereignty. But they could not do that. They had to make a stand on the principle. And many were crucified or thrown to the lions for the stand they took. We should also take note of Paul's conflict with Jewish authority in Acts 19-27. Paul made his defense before Caesar's representatives and appealed to Caesar himself. He sought justice from Caesar for God has given to Caesar the responsibility to protect liberty and maintain justice. The definition of liberty and the criteria of justice of course must be God's. As Paul stood before civil authority asking for justice, so do we today. CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES: It is not the purpose of this section to exhaustively deal with all the constitutional considerations involved in this case. We could, for example, discuss equal protection of the laws and due process of law considerations from the 14th Amendment, as well as a number of First Amendment considerations. We could also deal with the Florida Constitution. The purpose here, however, is simply to trace the main thread of the First Amendment argument that works with our biblical stand to provide a sufficient case that taxation of the RBCS ministry is contrary to the supreme law of the land. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." This simple statement, composed of two clauses, is to prevent government from exercising control over religious affairs. If government exercises the tax power over religious ministries or activity, it operates on the principle that government may exercise control over religious ministries or activities. That this is true has been clearly established in history as well as in constitutional law. The court clearly sees the power to tax as the power to control and destroy. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Marshall clearly recognized this principle in M'Culloch vs. Maryland, 4 Wheaton 316 (1819). In that case the State of Maryland attempted to tax an instrumentality (a national bank) of the federal government. The first question Marshall dealt with in that case was, "Does Congress have the power to incorporate a bank?" Using the implied powers doctrine, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that the federal government did indeed have the power to establish or incorporate a bank. He then proceeded to inquire: "Whether the State of Maryland may, without violating the constitution, tax that branch?" In his consideration of that question, we get principles relevant to the tax power of any civil government. In M'Culloch, the Court held that the constitution sustains the claim that the bank is exempt from the power of a state to tax its operations. Let me quote a couple of excerpts from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion. He first points to a "great principle" that "the constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof are supreme," and deduces from that principle three corollaries. These are: First, "that a power to create implies a power to preserve." Applying this to our RBCS case, that corollary would indicate that if citizens of the United States under religious freedom principles were at liberty to create religious institutions, then they have the power to preserve those institutions. The second corollary is "that a power to destroy, if wielded by a different hand, is hostile to, and incompatible with these powers to create and to preserve." Applying that corollary to the RBCS case, obviously if a power to destroy a legitimate religious ministry were exercised it would be incompatible with the First Amendment. The third corollary is "that where this repugnancy exists, that authority which is supreme must control, not yield to that over which it is supreme." He then observes: "That the power of taxing it [the bank] by the states may be exercised so as to destroy it, is too obvious to be denied." Clearly, this observation applies to religious ministries as well as banks. Chief Justice Marshall is telling us that the power to tax is an obvious power that can be used to destroy. His view has been confirmed by court decisions to this day. For example, in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, 319 US 105, the court held a state license tax levied on religious colporteurs unconstitutional and said, "The power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment." Is religious instruction a matter for control by civil government? As expressed by Mr. Justice Jackson, a state "cannot make public business of religious worship or instruction, or of attendance at religious institutions of any character." Everson vs. Board of Education, 330 US 1, at 26. In M'Culloch, Chief Justice Marshall considered one of the objections that could be used to blunt a challenge to denying the tax power on such grounds. He states, "Taxation, it is said, does not necessarily and unavoidably destroy. To carry it to the excess of destruction would be an abuse, to presume which, would banish that confidence which is essential to all government." Marshall's rejection of such argument is clear. He says, "But is this a case of confidence? Would the people of any one state trust those of another with a power to control the most insignificant operations of their state government? We know they would not." Applying this principle to our own case, we must admit that although a particular tax levied on a religious ministry may not in fact act to destroy that ministry is not argument to deny the tax power on the principle. A document quoted by Mr. Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion, Waltz vs. Tax Commission, 397 US 664, at 721, reveals the attitude of our founding fathers on such issues. Some Virginians, objecting to a bill to tax the general public to support Christian teachers, said, It is proper to take alarm at the first experiment on our liberties. We Have we forgotten this lesson? Many who have learned very little of America's Christian heritage may not have learned this lesson at all. Statist-humanist education has attempted to replace the principles of religious liberty and limited government with the old Roman concepts of religious toleration and the omnipotent state. So far, however, the court has continued to favor religious freedom from state control. In Waltz vs. Tax Commission, for example, the court upheld the State of New York's exemption of religious ministries from the property tax. In the course of Chief Justice Burger's opinion of the Court, he states: The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has Governments have not always been tolerant of religious activity, and hos- We must also be sure that the end result--the effect--is not an excessive Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an in- Our constitutional argument can now be easily summarized. American equivalent to Caesar is the Constitution of the United States. All laws must be consistent with that constitution. The constitution commands federal officials that they cannot The constitutionally tax or otherwise exercise control over religious affairs. Notice that the First Amendment does not specify a church. In fact, if government were to restrict religious exercise to that performed by defined or approved churches, that would itself be a violation of the establishment clause. Should the government, for example, state that to truly enjoy free exercise in a Christian school, you must organize it in a certain approved way, government would be involved in establishing religion. Once the federal government says that only churches are legitimate institutions from which free exercise of religion may be made, they can define away any objectionable religious activity that doesn't meet the test of popular public policy. This is precisely what the establishment clause was written to prevent. Since the education of our children is a religious matter, carried out by a religious ministry, it is unlawful for civil government to entangle itself in the affairs of that ministry through the tax power or any other means. Therefore, in our particular case, both the Social Security Tax Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, if drawn constitutionally, must exempt any legitimate religious ministry, to include conventionally organized churches and religious educational ministries such as our own. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY The Uneasy Case Against Reverend Moon JOHN MCCLAUGHRY ESPITE THE protests of the Rea Dgan Administration that it sup ports freedom of religion against government intrusion, the Internal Revenue Service is once again launching an assault on the independence of the nation's churches. In the 1983 Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian Schools cases, the Supreme Court upheld the IRS position by decreeing that church-sponsored schools could not enjoy the benefits of tax exemption and deductibility if they practiced any form of racial discrimination. These cases dealt with schools, not with churches per se. Now, however, there is litigation under way designed to inject the government into the internal workings of bona-fide churches. The case, brought by the Internal Revenue Service in 1981, is that of Reverend Sun Myung Moon,the Korean founder of the controversial Holy Spirit Association for the Unification of World Christianity, commonly known as the Unification Church, or the "Moonies." The IRS charged Reverend Moon with tax fraud. The District Court of New York convicted him, and he was sentenced to pay a $25,000 fine and serve 18 months in jail. A three-judge panel of the Second Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals recently affirmed the conviction on appeal, by a 2 to 1 vote. (Reverend Moon's lawyers have appealed for an en banc rehearing before the Second Circuit. If that is denied, they will seek review by the Supreme Court.) It is unfortunate that the defendant in this case is such a controversial figure, for the public's feelings about the Moonies tend to override recognition of the key issue involved in the case. That key issue has nothing to do with Reverend Moon himself, or the theology of his church, or its fundraising and recruitment practices. It is, simply, the extent to which a bona-fide religious body can be penalized for refusing to adopt internal practices acceptable to the government. In addition, the circumstances surround ing the Moon prosecution strongly suggest a government vendetta against a church that politically powerful people find repugnant to their own brand of religion. Roger Williams, trudging south from Massachusetts Bay in 1635, would have understood. Moon's Pilgrimage Sun Myung Moon was born in 1920, in a rural part of what is now North Korea. His family converted to Presbyterianism when he was ten years old. When he was 16, he says, Jesus Christ appeared to him on Easter morning, telling him to go forth and complete Jesus's mission of reconciling humanity to God's word and His love. At the end of World War II, Moon, at age 26, founded what became the Unification Church. He went to Pyongyang, then under Soviet occupation and now the capital of Communist North Korea. For his preaching the Communists had the usual respect. They threw him into a forced labor camp and tortured him to the point of death. American forces arrived at Hungnam in October 1950, and freed the young preacher from captivity. He made his way to Pusan, South Korea, six hundred miles away, pushing a bicycle carrying a comrade with a broken leg. From humble beginnings there the Unification Church took hold in Korea and Japan. By 1971 Reverend Moon, regarded by his followers as the embodiment of the faith and a new world prophet, was ready to go to America. Now we come to the matter that led to Reverend Moon's prosecution. It is customary for new religions—and, indeed, many well established religions-to view their founders or clergymen as both spiritual and temporal trustees for the faithful. Adherents of the faith make their contributions to the leader of the church, who receives the assets in trust for the support and propagation of the faith. In March 1972 Japanese church members contributed a substantial amount of money to Reverend Moon in support of the church's new missionary crusade to America. Reverend Moon deposited these funds in an account in his name in the Chase Manhattan Bank. His accountants duly reported funds withdrawn by him for personal living expenses as taxable income to him. But the interest earned on the money in the bank-totaling $106,500 over three years-was not reported as taxable income. The crux of the matter is whether Reverend Moon accepted the contributions as trustee for the church and used them for traditional religious purposes. If so, the interest was not taxable. If not -if Reverend Moon simply pocketed the funds for his personal use then the interest was indeed taxable, and Reverend Moon committed tax fraud in failing to report it. Before examining this question further, it is worth noting the circumstances surrounding the prosecution of Reverend Moon, seven years after his failure to report the interest income. (In 1976 the Church incorporated in order to avoid further problems.) There was in 1981 considerable public resentment against the Moonies. The National Council of Churches refused to accept the Unification Church's doctrines as compatible with traditional Christianity. There was widespread disapproval of the Church's fundraising methods, which included street solicitation. And there were frequent uproars over young people who had allegedly been seduced into Mooniehood by various brainwashing techniques. In this atmosphere of public hostility the government brought its case for tax fraud. Reverend Moon, who had voluntarily returned from Korea to New York to stand trial, stated publicly his belief that the prosecution was motivated by racial and religious factors. His lawyers asked for a trial without a jury, fearing that no objective jury could be empaneled. Surprisingly, the government, which usually prefers court trials to jury trials, demanded a jury trial. Judge Goettel accepted the government's position. At first the case seemed simple. It was clear that Reverend Moon had received the funds, put them into the bank, earned Mr. McClaughry was Senior Policy Advisor in the White House during the first year of the Reagan Administration. He has no connection with the Unification Church. December 23, 1983/ NATIONAL REVIEW |