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subscribe to an oath designed to awaken his conscience and alert him to the necessity of stating the truth. This fact was confirmed by Mr. Sasagawa during his August 25, 1984 interview, after reviewing the English oath and Mr. Mochizuki's interpretation:
this is Mr. Mochizuki's way of talking, and in this particular case, he was probably not taking notes . . in this case, it was too much rhetoric. .
At any rate, if the word, "will you swear" is not included
A: That's right, without it, it would be difficult as a translation I think. The Japanese do not understand the meaning of "oath" very well, but, of course its important in American courts.
it would not be an oath if one is told, I would like you to kindly convey only the truth."
43/ A: Yes, that's right.
On the second day of his testimony, moreover,
Mr. Kamiyama did not subscribe to an oath of any kind.
Grand Jury tapes show that Mr. Kamiyama made no response to
the interpreter's summarization of the oath.
the interpreter indicated to the prosecutor and the Grand
Jury that he responded "yes."
In the absence of any
response, Mr. Kamiyama could not be considered a sworn
More fundamentally though, this incident
See, Exhibit L, supra at 19, 30.
demonstrates the Grand Jury interpreter's willingness to
improvise or embellish responses to the detriment of
Also significant in this regard is the fact that
the audio tapes of Mr. Kamiyama's third day of testimony reveal no oath whatsoever. This is so despite the fact that
the written transcript indicates that an oath was
administered and that the recording machine was started
prior to the alleged administration of the oath. Again, in the absence of a valid oath, Mr. Kamiyama could not properly have been subjected to prosecution for perjury.
You are entitled to certain rights, and let me
The interpreter, however, conveyed this to Mr. Kamiyama as:
there are several rights granted to you. I will have the pleasure of explaining these to you. First, you are able to refuse answers to questions which may cause you to fall into crime.
Do we have your kind understanding?
For a person unfamiliar with American culture and legal
procedures, such as Mr. Kamiyama, this interpretation does
not adequately describe the protections afforded by the
This same pattern of misinterpretation was
followed during Mr. Kamiyama's subsequent Grand Jury
On July 16, 1981, for example, the prosecutor
At any time, Mr. Kamiyama, that I ask you a
The interpreter, however, stated:
And, uh, whenever I ask you a question, well,
Similarly, on July 21, 1981, Mr.
I am asking you questions, Mr. Kamiyama.
This statement was interpreted as follows:
Now, I am directing my questions to you, but, if
uh the Fifth Article, you know,
well something like an amended law, is it?
According to that, you have the right to refuse. However, uh, we think we'd like you to answer the questions we have asked you as much as possible.
lack of familiarity with basic legal expressions and principles. On this ground alone, the interpreter was unqualified to participate in formal Grand Jury pro
The Grand Jury interpreter's inexcusable lack of familiarity with elementary legal terms was again
In a related matter, Mrs. Sato's review of the Grand Jury tapes revealed yet another prejudicial interpretation
During his July 16, 1981 Grand Jury appearance,
I have done . . preparations in order to answer
Mr. Mochizuki, however, interpreted this language as follows:
I am prepared to answer questions dealing with
privileges with respect to other questions. (Emphasis added.) The interpretation obviously distorts Mr. Kamiyama's principal intention. Rather than emphasizing his desire to retain his Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to questions dealing with the affidavit, the interpretation implies that Mr. Kamiyama wishes to waive his Fifth Amendment rights as they pertain to the affidavit. See Exhibit M, supra.
demonstrated during the prosecutor's futile effort to warn
Mr. Kamiyama of the consequences of perjurious testimony.
Such warnings are not constitutionally compelled, but are
standard practice in the United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York and various other courts
as a matter of essential fairness.
Thus, on July 9, 1981,
the first day of Mr. Kamiyama's testimony, the following
(MR. FLUMENBAUM) : Finally, Mr. Kamiyama, if you should give a false answer or fail to testify completely and truthfully in response to a question that I ask you, you could be charged with a separate criminal, uh, violation for perjury or for obstruction of justice.
Do you understand that?
(MR. MOCHIZUKI): And and, uh, with today's questions and answers, uh, if there are any false answers or to neglect to testify, separately, eee there is a possibility that you will be criticized according to criminal law.
That means not the tax
A: (MR. KAMI YAMA) : law, but .
(MR. MOCHIZUKI): Does that mean that on top of or apart from the tax laws?
A: (MR. KAMIYAMA): That means (that I shall be) charged with criminal perjury?
(MR. MOCHIZUKI): Does that mean, once again, that I shall be charged for . . I am trying to find the word. (Mr. Flumenbaum whispers: *perjury") fraudulent answers or fraudulent, well, negligence of testimony or.