have combined to form a new confederacy, claiming to be acknowledged by the world as a sovereign state. Their right to do so is now being decided by wager of battle.

"The ports and territory of each of these states are held in hostility. to the general government. It is no loose, unorganized insurrection, having no defined boundary or possession. It has a boundary marked by lines of bayonets, and which can be crossed only by force,-south of this line is enemies' territory, because it is claimed and held in possession by an organized, hostile and belligerent power.

"All persons residing within this territory whose property may be used to increase the revenues of the hostile power are, in this contest, liable to be treated as enemies, though not foreigners. They have cast off their allegiance and made war on their government, and are none the less enemies because they are traitors.

"But in defining the meaning of the term 'enemies' property,' we shall be led into error if we refer to Fleta and Lord Coke for their definition of the word 'enemy'. It is a technical phrase peculiar to prize courts, and depends upon principles of public policy as distinguished from the common law.

"Whether property be liable to capture as 'enemies' property' does not in any manner depend on the personal allegiance of the owner. 'It is the illegal traffic that stamps it as "enemies' property." It is of no consequence whether it belongs to an ally or a citizen. 8 Cr., 384. The owner, pro hac vice, is an enemy.' 3 Wash. C. C. R., 183.

"The produce of the soil of the hostile territory, as well as other property engaged in the commerce of the hostile power, as the source of its wealth and strength, are always regarded as legitimate prize, without regard to the domicil of the owner, and much more so if he reside and trade within their territory.” 1

For the first part of this case see § 28, supra. Domicil.-" -" A commercial domicil," says Mr. DICEY, "is such a residence in a country for the purpose of trading there as makes a person's trade or business contribute to or form part of the resources of such country, and renders it, therefore, reasonable that his hostile, friendly, or neutral character should be determined by reference to the character of such country. When a person's civil domicil is in question, the matter to be determined is whether he has or has not so settled in a given country as to have made it his home. When a person's commercial domicil is in question, the matter to be determined is whether he is or is not residing in a given country with the intention of continuing to trade there." (Dicey on Domicil, 345.)

In the case of the Antonia Jchanna, 1 Wheaton, 159, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the share of a partner in a neutral house is, jure belli, sub

"LE HARDY" contre "LA VOLTIGEANTE."

CONSEIL DES PRISES, AN IX.

(Pistoye et Duverdy, I., 321.)

A neutral merchant domiciled in a belligerent country does not acquire a belligerent character; and his property at sea is neutral property.

Le navire neutre le Hardy, chargé pour le compte de Coste Lanfreda, citoyen ragusais, consul de Raguse à Messine, avait été arrêté par la Voltigeante. La France était alors en guerre avec le roi des Deux-Siciles; il s'agissait de savoir si Coste Lanfreda, citoyen et consul d'une nation neutre, devait être considéré comme ennemi ou comme neutre.

Le CONSEIL, Oui le rapport du citoyen Lacoste, membre du Conseil ;

Au moyen de ce qu'il résulte principalement des pièces qu'il n'a point existé de contravention sérieuse sur la régularité des pièces relatives au navire, qui a été emmené aussitôt après le jugement du tribunal de commerce;—Qu'à l'égard de la cargaison, Coste Lanfreda, qui en est propriétaire, exerçant à Messine les fonctions de consul de Raguse, a prouvé, devant le tribunal d'appel, qu'il était originaire de Raguse, ce qui ne permet pas de s'arrêter à l'assertion vague du capitaine, portant qu'il le croyait sujet de Naples ;-Qu'il n'y a point eu de double destination constatée, et que, lors même qu'elle l'eût été, les deux ports indiqués étant également l'un neutre, l'autre allié, il ne pouvait y avoir lieu à aucune suspicion raisonnable ;—Que la loi du 29 nivôse an VI, ne concernant que les marchandises du cru anglais,

ject to confiscation where his own domicil is in a hostile country. (3 Wharton's Digest, 343.)

In the case of the Friendschaft, 4 Wheaton, 105, the court held, that the property of a house of trade established in the enemy's country is condemnable as prize, whatever may be the personal domicil of the partners. (3 Wharton's Digest, 343.)

Other cases on Commercial Domicil are: Bell v. Reid, 1 Maul. & Selw., 726 (1813); Wilson v. Maryat, 8 T. R., 45 (1798); The San Jose Indiano, 2 Gall., 268 (1814); The Junge Klassina, 5 C. Rob., 302–304 (1804); The Herman, 4 C. Rob., 228 (1802); Sparenburg v. Bannatyne, 1 Bos. & Pul., 163 (1797); The Abo, 1 Spinks, 349 (1854); The Gerasimo, 11 Moo. P. C. C., 88 (1857); The Baltica, 11 Moo. P. C. C., 141 (1857); Mrs. Alexander's Cotton, 2 Wall., 404 (1864); The Flying Scud, 6 Wall., 263 (1867).

ne pouvait s'appliquer à celles du cru des Deux-Siciles, qui n'ont pas été occupées à titre de conquête par les troupes de la Grande-Bretagne; Qu'alors, pour décider la qualité de la cargaison du navire le Hardy, il suffit d'examiner si elle peut être considérée comme ennemie, sur le rapport que Coste Lanfreda, originaire de Raguse et consul, résidait en cette qualité et faisait le commerce à Messine, pays alors en guerre avec la République française ;-Que cette question de droit public se résoudra facilement pour la négative, en faisant attention que la résidence en pays étranger n'empêche pas un individu d'appartenir au pays qui l'a vu naître ;-Que, pour ne plus tenir à sa patrie, il faut qu'il ait volontairement choisi une patrie nouvelle, et qu'elle l'ait régulièrement adopté;-Que sans cette renonciation de sa part à son ancienne patrie, sans cette adoption nécessaire, il est toujours ce qu'il était originairement, ami des amis, ennemi des ennemis de sa patrie native; que, lorsque cette patrie est neutre, il reste neutre lui-même, et doit jouir, pour sa personne comme pour ses biens, de tous les avantages de la neutralité, parce que les biens n'ont pas par eux-mêmes de caractère neutre ou hostile, mais prenant toujours celui dont se trouve revêtu leur propriétaire;-Que d'ailleurs la guerre n'étant point une relation d'homme à homme, ni des sociétés aux individus, mais bien des Etats entre eux, on ne peut forcer à y prendre part celui qui n'a pas manifesté la volonté expresse de s'incorporer à la puissance belligérante chez laquelle il habite ;Que les inconvénients, les abus que peut entraîner le système contraire, quelque graves qu'ils soient, sont plus que balancés par l'avantage que retire le monde commerçant de la protection et de la faveur accordées par les belligérants au commerce neutre, quelque part qu'il s'exerce;-Que les ennemis d'origine, quoique établis dans un pays neutre et y faisant le commerce sous la protection et le pavillon neutre, ne perdant point le caractère ennemi, il serait tout à la fois déloyal et contradictoire d'assimiler, suivant l'occurence et les chances variables de la guerre, les neutres d'origine à des ennemis, uniquement parce qu'ils résideraient et commerceraient en pays ennemis ;-Que les publicistes, dans des temps déjà reculés, où la force tenait encore. plus ou moins lieu du droit, ont bien pu énoncer des faits contraires et professer des principes opposés; mais que les progrès successifs de la civilisation, le besoin, universellement senti, de l'accroissement et de la liberté des relations commerciales entre les peuples, en amenant des idées plus saines, ont fait prévaloir des idées plus libérales que le gouvernement s'empresse de proclamer aujourd'hui, comme le type de sa politique et le gage de son amour de l'humanité;-Qu'en reportant ces considérations sur l'espèce actuelle, on voit un propriétaire neutre d'origine, qui, par sa résidence en pays devenu momen

tanément ennemi, et par ses spéculations commerciales, n'a pu perdre les avantages de sa neutralité, avec d'autant plus de raison, qu'y exerçant les fonctions de consul de sa patrie originaire, il n'a pas cessé de lui appartenir de fait et de droit, et, dans aucun cas, ni pour sa personne ni pour son commerce, qui en est inséparable, n'a pu être considéré comme ennemi;

DECIDE que la prise faite par le corsaire français la Voltigeante, du navire ragusais le Hardy, est nulle et illégale, en fait pleine entière mainlevée aux propriétaires tant du navire que de la cargaison.

SECTION 34.-OWNERSHIP OF GOODS IN TRANSIT.

THE PACKET "DE BILBOA."

HIGH COURT OF ADMIRALTY, 1799.

(2 C. Robinson, 133.)

In time of war, or in contemplation of war, goods in transitu on the ocean are held to belong to the consignee.

This was a case of a claim of an English house for goods shipped on the order of a Spanish merchant, before hostilities with Spain, and captured December, 1796, on a voyage from London to Corunna. Held, that the contract was valid and the goods were restored.

Judgment, Sir W. SCOTT:

"This is a claim of a peculiar nature for goods sent by British subjects to Spain, shipped before hostilities, during the time of that situation of the two countries, of which it was unknown, even to our government, what would be the issue between them. There appears to be no ground to say that this contract was influenced by speculations on the prospect of a war, or that anything has been specially done to avoid the risks of war. It is shown in the affidavit of the claimant that this is the constant habit and practice of this trade;' whether it is the practice of the Spanish trade generally, or only the particular mode of these individuals in carrying on commerce together is not material, as the latter would be quite sufficient to raise the subject of this claim. The question is, in whom is the legal title? Because, if I should find that the interest was in the Spanish consignee, I must then condemn, and leave the British party to apply to the Crown for that grace and favor which it is always ready to shew; the property being condemnable to the Crown as taken before hostilities.

"The statement of the claim sets forth that these goods have not been paid for by the Spaniard ;—that would go but little way,—that alone would not do; there must be many cases in which British merchants suffer from capture, by our own cruisers, of goods shipped for foreign account before the breaking out of hostilities. It goes on to state, 'that, according to the custom of the trade, a credit of six, nine, or twelve months is usually given, and that it is not the custom to draw on the consignee till the arrival of the goods; that the sea risk in peace as well as war is on the consignor; that he insures, and has no remedy against the consignee for any accident that happens during the voyage.' Under these circumstances, in whom does the property reside? The ordinary state of commerce is, that goods ordered and delivered to the master are considered as delivered to the consignee, whose agent the master is in this respect; but that general contract of the law may be varied by special agreement or by a particular prevailing practice, that presupposes an agreement amongst such a description of merchants. In time of profound peace, when there is no prospect of approaching war, there would unquestionably be nothing illegal in contracting, that the whole risk should fall on the consignor, till the goods came into possession of the consignee. In time of peace they may divide their risk as they please, and nobody has a right to say they shall not; it would not be at all illegal, that goods not shipped in time of war, or in contemplation of war, should be at the risk of the shipper. In time of war this cannot be permitted, for it would at once put an end to all captures at sea; the risk would in all cases be laid on the consignor, where it suited the purpose of protection; on every contemplation of a war, this contrivance would be practiced in all consignments from neutral ports to the enemy's country, to the manifest defrauding of all rights of capture; it is therefore considered to be an invalid contract in time of war; or, to express it more accurately, it is a contract which, if made in war, has this ef fect; that the captor has a right to seize it and convert the property to his own use; for he having all the rights that belong to his enemy, is authorized to have his taking possession considered as equivalent to an actual delivery to his enemy; and the shipper who put it on board during a time of war, must be presumed to know the rule, and to secure himself in his agreement with the consignee against the contingence of any loss to himself that can arise from capture. In other words, he is a mere insurer against sea risk, and he has nothing to do with the case of capture, the loss of which falls. entirely on the consignee. If the consignee refuses payment and throws it upon the shipper, the shipper must be supposed to have