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No treaty has been produced, no act of Parliament or ordinance other than those above cited, has been brought to the notice of this court. In the absence of any such we are driven back to the international law, as laid down by Chancellor Kent, page 51, that the consul of the United States is not a judicial officer, that they have no judicial power' and, page 53, that there is no treaty with the United States which authorizes consuls to exercise a species of jurisdiction by determining disputes concerning wages between masters and crews belonging to their own country in this colony. We conclude, therefore, that the consul of the United States has no judicial powers or authority whatever in this colony as to wages or damages for wrongs, between United States masters and seamen, which the judicial authorities here can recognize, but that this court must decide such questions when brought before it.

"What we have said as to the consul of the United States applies to consuls from all other foreign states. No such claim is, we believe, set up in any other part of the British dominions. In China, every consul of every foreign power has judicial authority over its own subjects; but this extra-territorial jurisdiction is the result of express treaty, and is conferred on them by the enactments of the legislative authority of each foreign state. The exaggerated notion as to consular authority here has probably arisen from the powers conceded to them in China, but which are not conceded here.

"In a colony so distant as Hong-Kong is from London, convenience has rendered direct communication between the colonial government and consuls here on many subjects properly diplomatic, convenient for all parties. This has probably tended to induce an overestimate of the position of consuls here in reference to judicial authority. We feel great respect for the consuls in this colony, both officially and personally, but we must see that the authority of this court is not curtailed beyond what the law permits. If circumstances render it proper or convenient that judicial authority should in this colony vest in consuls, it must be obtained by treaty and legislation. This court has no power to concede it."

THE "CREOLE," 1841.

(Wheaton's International Law, 8th Ed., 165, Note.)

"The brig Creole, an American merchant vessel, sailed from a port in Virginia in 1841, bound to New Orleans, having on board one hundred and thirty-five slaves. A portion of the slaves rose against

the officers and got complete possession of the vessel, killing one passenger and severely wounding the captain and others of the crew, in the struggle. They compelled the mate, under threat of death, to navigate the vessel to Nassau, where she arrived and came to anchor. At the request of the United States consul at Nassau, nineteen of the slaves, who were identified as having taken part in the acts of violence, were arrested by the local authorities, and held to await the decision of the British Government. As to the rest of the slaves, there was a question whether they got on shore and gained their liberty by their own act, or through the positive and officious interference of the colonial authorities, while the vessel was under the control of the consul and master. Mr. Webster, Secretary of State, addressed a letter to Lord Ashburton on this subject. His position is, that if a vessel of the United States, pursuing lawful voyages from port to port along their own shore, are driven by stress of weather, or carried by unlawful force, into British ports, the government of the United States cannot consent that the local authorities in those ports shall take advantage of such misfortunes, and enter them for the purpose of interfering with the condition of persons or things on board, as established by their own laws. If slaves, the property of citizens of the United States, escape into British territories, it is not expected that they will be restored. In that case, the territorial jurisdiction of England will have become exclusive over them, and must decide their condition. But slaves on board of American vessels lying in British waters are not within the exclusive jurisdiction of England, or under the exclusive operation of English law; and this founds the broad distinction between the cases. *** In the opinion of the government of the United States, such vessels, so driven and so detained by necessity in a friendly port, ought to be regarded as still pursuing their original voyage, and turned out of their direct course by disaster or by wrongful violence; that they ought to receive all assistance necessary to enable them to resume that direct course, etc. * * *›

"The United States Government demanded the restoration of the slaves, which was refused by the British Government, on the ground, that, being in fact at liberty within the British dominions, they could not be seized there when charged with no crime against British law, and while there was no treaty of extradition. This case was then submitted, as a private claim for pecuniary indemnity, to the commission under the convention of Feb. 8, 1853. The commissioners being unable to agree, it was by the terms of the convention, referred to an umpire, Mr. Joshua Bates, of London.

"In deciding the case, Mr. Bates stated two propositions of law:

"1. That, as the slaves were perfectly quiet, and on board an American ship under the command of the captain, the authorities should have seen that the captain was protected in his rights over them.

"2. That, 'the municipal law of England cannot authorize a magistrate to violate the law of nations, by invading with an armed force the vessel of a friendly nation that has committed no offense, and forcibly dissolving the relations which, by the laws of his country, the master is bound to preserve and enforce on board.'" 1

1 Mr. Dana criticises the decision of Mr. Bates in this case. "It may be conceded, as a general statement," he says, "that local authorities ought to give active aid to a master in defending and enforcing, against the inmates of his vessel, the rights with which his own nation has intrusted him, if these rights are of a character generally recognized among all nations, and not prohibited by the law of the place. But it may well admit of doubt, whether the local authorities must give active aid to the master against persons on board his vessel who are doing no more than peacefully and quietly dissolving, or refusing to recognize a relation which exists only by force of the law of the nation to which the vessel belongs, if the law is peculiar to that nation, and one which the law of the other country regards as against common right and public morals. The local authorities might not interfere to dissolve such relations, where the peace of the port or the public morals are not put in peril; but they might, it would seem, decline to lend force to compel their continuance. See also the adverse criticism of Hall (Int. Law., 3d Ed., p. 199). In the case of the Fortuna, 1803 (5 C. Rob., 27), the ship was proceeded against for a violation of the blockade of the Weser. The master of the captured vessel gave as an excuse for entering the blockaded place, the want of provisions, and a strong westerly wind. Sir W. Scott held that "want of provisions" was not such an "imperative and over-ruling compulsion" as to excuse a breach of blockade. But on the other ground, after further proof, the vessel was restored.

In the case of United States v. Dickelman, 1875, 92 U. S., 520, the Supreme Court emphatically affirmed the rule that merchant vessels are subject to the local jurisdiction when in foreign ports.

WAITE, C. J., in giving the opinion of the court said: "As to the general law of nations, the merchant vessels of one country visiting the ports of another for the purposes of trade subject themselves to the laws which govern the port they visit, so long as they remain; and this as well in war as in peace, unless it is otherwise provided by treaty."

SECTION 13.-RIGHT OF ASYLUM.

(a) In Legations.

DUKE OF RIPPERDA'S CASE, 1726.

(Martens: Causes Célèbres, I., 178.)

Right of asylum in the British legation in Madrid denied by the government of Spain.

Baron Ripperda had been a colonel in the service of the StatesGeneral of the United Provinces, and had been sent by them as minister plenipotentiary to the court of Madrid. After two years of residence at this court, he had so captivated the mind of Philip V., that that monarch took him into his service, made him minister of finance and of foreign affairs, and conferred upon him the title of Duke. Accused by the Imperial Ambassador at Madrid of secretly favoring the interests of Holland and England, he was finally deprived of his offices, though granted a pension by the King. Fearing, as he said, the enmity of the populace, he took refuge in the hotel of the English Ambassador, Lord Stanhope. The Spanish government would seem at first to have acquiesced in this arrangement, but learning that the Duke had important state papers in his possession, it demanded his delivery. Not meeting with a compliance to this demand, the question was referred to the Council of Castile, whether, without violating the law of nations, the Duke of Ripperda could be forcibly taken from the house of the English Ambassador. The Council replied in the affirmative: "To act otherwise would be to employ a system which had been adopted to facilitate the intercourse of sovereigns, for the destruction and ruin of their authority. To extend the privileges accorded to the hotels of ambassadors in favor of merely ordinary offenses to persons intrusted with the finances, the powers, and the secrets of a state, when they have betrayed the duties of their office, would be to introduce into the world a principle most injurious to all nations. If this maxim were to become the rule, sovereigns would be obliged to see maintained at their own courts those persons most actively engaged in machinations for their ruin."

Lord Stanhope's house had already been under strict surveillance; and, on the receipt of the opinion of the council, the Spanish govern

ment, without further notice to the ambassador, forced an entrance and arrested the Duke of Ripperda. The English government protested vigorously, and particularly as to the manner of the proceedings; and the incident aggravating the already strained relations between the two countries, finally resulted in war the next year.1

UNITED STATES v. JEFFERS.

U. S. CIRCUIT COURT FOR DIST. OF WASHINGTON, 1836.

(4 Cranch, C. C. Rep., 704.)

A slave who had escaped from his master, had taken service in the house of the Secretary of the British Legation in Washington.

An officer of the District of Columbia, who removed the slave and restored him to his master, was, by order of the Court, dismissed from office.

Francis S. Key, Attorney of the United States for the District of Columbia, having laid before the court a letter to him from the Secretary of State, wherein it appeared that a constable, Madison Jeffers, had removed from the house of Mr. Bankhead, the British Secretary of Legation, a colored lad employed for hire in his family in order to restore the said lad to his master; it was, on the motion of said attorney of the United States, ordered, that the said Madison Jeffers be removed from the office of constable of the County of Washington, unless he show cause to the contrary on the thirty-first day of May instant, provided, etc. By order of the court, May 30th, 1836.” The rule having been duly served, the said Madison Jeffers appeared on the 31st of May and, by way of showing cause, filed his affidavit admitting the facts, but alleging his ignorance of the diplomatic

1 Vattel, writing thirty years later, says of the opinion of the Council of Castile, "On ne peut rien dire de plus vrai et de plus judicieux sur cette matière."

Merlin said, "On voit par ces détails, que le droit d'asyle est, à l'égard des hôtels des ambassadeurs, une source perpétuelle de dissensions et de querelles. Le bien des nations demanderait, sans doute, qu'on l'abolît tout-à-fait : et cela paraît d'autant plus raisonable, qu'il y a plusieurs états dans lesquels il n'est point connu."

In 1747, a Swedish merchant of the name of Springer, accused of high-treason, took refuge in the hotel of the English Ambassador, Colonel Guideckens, at Stockholm. The ambassador refused to surrender him; the Swedish government surrounded his house with troops, searched everybody who entered it, and caused the carriage of the ambassador, when he left the hotel, to be followed by a guard. Guideckens surrendered Springer under a protest as to the violence done to his ambassadorial privilege. England demanded reparation, and Sweden steadily refused to give it, and the ambassadors from the two courts were mutually withdrawn.