government from which he held them while the land remained a part of its territory and subject to its laws. It was public domain when it came to the possession of the United States, and he had then no rights in it.
In this view of the case it is not necessary to examine the other questions which appear in the exception or have been raised in the argument. The treaty is the supreme law, and the stipulations in it dispose of the case. The judgment of the District Court must therefore be affirmed.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of Florida, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is now here ordered and adjudged by this court that the judgment of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs.
1. There were two trustees of real and personal estate for the benefit of a minor.
One of the trustees was also administrator de bonis non upon the estate of the
father of the minor, and the other trustee was appointed guardian to the
minor.
2. When the minor arrived at the proper age, and the accounts came to be settled,
the following rules ought to have been applied.
3. The trustees ought not to have been charged with an amount of money, which
the administrator trustee had paid himself as commission. That item was
allowed by the Orphans' Court, and its correctness cannot be reviewed, collate-
rally, by another court. Barney v. Saunders et al. 535.
4. Nor ought the trustees to have been charged with allowances made to the guard-
ian trustee. The guardian's accounts also were cognizable by the Orphans'
Court. Having power under the will to receive a portion of the income, the
guardian's receipts were valid to the trustees. Ibid.
5. The trustees were properly allowed and credited by five per cent. on the princi-
pal of the personal estate, and ten per cent. on the income. Ibid.
6. Under the circumstances of this case, the trustees ought not to have been charged
upon the principle of six months rests and compound interest. Ibid.
7. The trustees ought to have been charged with all gains, as with those arising
from usurious loans, unknown friends, or otherwise. Ibid.
8. The trustees ought not to have been credited with the amount of a sum of mo-
ney, deposited with a private banking house, and lost by its failure, so far as
related to the capital of the estate, but ought to have been credited for so
auch of the loss as arose from the deposit of current collections of income.
Ibid.
Where a libel was filed, claiming compensation for injuries sustained by a passen-
ger in a steamboat, proceeding from Sacramento to San Francisco, in Califor-
nia, the case is within the admiralty jurisdiction of the courts of the United
States. Steamboat New World et al. v. King, 469.
1. A contract is void, as against public policy, and can have no standing in court by
which one party stipulates to employ a number of secret agents in order to
obtain the passage of a particular law by the legislature of a State, and the
other party promises to pay a large sum of money in case the law should pass
Marshall v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, 314.
2. It was also void if, when it was made, the parties agreed to conceal from the
members of the legislature the fact that the one party was the agent of the
other, and was to receive a compensation for his services in case of the passage
3. And if there was no agreement to that effect, there can be no recovery upon the
contract, if in fact the agent did conceal from the members of the legislature
that he was an agent who was to receive compensation for his services in case
of the passage of the law. Ibid.
4. Where there is a special contract between principal and agent, by which the entire
compensation is regulated and made contingent, there can be no recovery on
a count for quantum meruit. Ibid.
5. The circumstance that a passenger was a "steamboat man," and as such carried
gratuitously, does not deprive him of the right of redress enjoyed by other
passengers. It was the custom to carry such persons free.
6. The master had power to bind the boat by giving such a free passage. Steamboat
New World et al. v. King, 469.
7. The principle asserted in 14 How. 486, reaffirmed, namely, that "when carriers
undertake to convey persons by the agency of steam, public policy and safety
require that they should be held to the greatest possible care and diligence.
Ibid.
8. The theory and cases examined relative to the three degrees of negligence,
namely, slight, ordinary, and gross. Ibid.
9. Skill is required for the proper management of the boilers and machinery of a
steamboat; and the failure to exert that skill, either because it is not possessed,
or from inattention, is gross negligence. Ibid.
10. The 13th section of the act of Congress, passed on the 7th of July, 1838, (5 Stat.
at Large, 306,) makes the injurious escape of steam primâ facie evidence of negli-
gence; and the owners of the boat, in order to escape from responsibility,
must prove that there was no negligence. Ibid.
See PRACTICE AND CHANCERY.
APPRAISERS.
See DUTIES.
ATTACHMENT.
1. Where the debtor alleged that process of attachment had been laid in his hands
as garnishee, attaching the debt which he owed to the creditor in question;
and moved the court to stay execution until the rights of the parties could be
settled in the State Court which had issued the attachment, and the court re-
fused so to do, this refusal is not the subject of review by this court. The
motion was addressed to the discretion of the court below, which will take
care that no injustice shall be done to any party. Early v. Rogers et al. 599.
2. This court expresses no opinion, at present, upon the point whether an attach-
ment from a State Court can obstruct the collection of a debt by the process
of the courts of the United States. Ibid.
A distinction is to be made between cases which decide the precise point in ques-
tion and those in which an opinion is expressed upon it, incidentally. Carroli
v. Lessee of Carroll et al. 275.
BANKS.
1. In 1845, the Legislature of Ohio passed a general banking law, the fifty-ninth
section of which required the officers o make semiannual dividends, and the
sixtieth required them to set off six per cent. of such dividends for the use
of the State, which sum or amount so set off should be in lieu of all taxes to
which the company, or the stockholders therein, would otherwise be subject.
2. This was a contract fixing the amount of taxation, and not a law prescribing a
rule of taxation until changed by the legislature. State Bank of Ohio v.
Knoop, 369.
3. In 1851, an act was passed entitled, "An act to tax banks, and bank and other
stocks, the same as property is now taxable by the laws of this State." The
operation of this law being to increase the tax, the banks were not bound to
pay that increase. Ibid.
4. A municipal corporation, in which is vested some portion of the administration of
the government, may be changed at the will of the legislature. But a bank,
where the stock is owned by individuals, is a private corporation. Its charter
is a legislative contract, and cannot be changed without its assent. Ibid.
5. The preceding case upon this subject, examined, and the case of the Providence
Bank v. Billing, 4 Peters, 561, explained. Ibid.
It is not necessary that the bill of exceptions should be formally drawn and signed,
before the trial is at an end. But the exception must be noted then, and must
purport on its face so to have been, although signed afterwards nunc pro tune.
Turner v. Yutes, 14.
FOR SURETY BONDS, see SURETIES.
1. The circumstance that a passenger was a "steamboat man," and as such carried
gratuitously, does not deprive him of the right of redress enjoyed by other
passengers. It was the custom to carry such persons free. Steamboat New
World v. King, 469.
2. The master had power to bind the boat by giving such a free passage. Ibid.
3. The principle asserted in 14 How. 486, reaffirmed, namely, that "when carriers
undertake to convey persons by the agency of steam, public policy and safety
require that they should be held to the greatest possible care and diligence.
Ibid.
4. The theory and cases examined relative to the three degrees of negligence,
namely, slight, ordinary, and gross. Ibid.
5. Skill is required for the proper management of the boilers and machinery of a
steamboat; and the failure to exert that skill, either because it is not possessed.
or from inattention, is gross negligence. Ibid.
6. The 13th section of the act of Congress, passed on the 7th of July, 1838, (5 Stats.
at Large, 306,) makes the injurious escape of steam primâ facie evidence of
negligence and the owners of the boat, in order to escape from responsibility,
must prove that there was no negligence. Ibid.
1. Where a bill in chancery was filed by a legatee against the person who had mar-
ried the daughter and residuary devisee of the testator, (there having been no
administration in the United States upon the estate,) this daughter or her
representatives if she were dead, ought to have been made a party defendant.
Lewis v. Darling, 1.
2. But if the complainant appears to be entitled to relief, the court will allow the
bill to be amended, and even if it be an appeal, will remand the case for this
purpose.
3. Where the will, by construction, shows an intention to charge the real estate with
the payment of a legacy, it is not necessary to aver in the bill a deficiency of
personal assets.
4. The real estate will be charged with the payment of legacies where a testator
gives several legacies, and then, without creating an express trust to pay them,
makes a general residuary disposition of the whole estate, blending the realty
and personalty together in one fund. This is an exception to the general rule
that the personal estate is the first fund for the payment of debts and legacies.
1bid.
5. Where it appears, by the admissions and proofs, that the defendant has substan-
tially under his control a large property of the testator which he intended to
charge with the payment of the legacy in question, the complainant is entitled
to relief although the land lies beyond the limits of the State in which the suit
is brought. Ibid.
6. Where a person who was acting as guardian to a minor, but without any legal
authority, being indebted to the minor, contracted to purchase real estate for
the benefit of his ward, and transferred his own property in part payment
therefor, the ward cannot claim to receive from the vendor the amount of pro-
perty so transferred. Yerger v. Jones, 30.
7. He can neither complete the purchase by paying the balance of the purchase-
money, or set aside the contract and look to his guardian for reimbursement;
but in the absence of fraud, he cannot compel the vendor to return such part
of the purchase-money as had been paid by the guardian. Ibid.
8. Whenever the parties to a suit and the subject in controversy between them are
within the regular jurisdiction of a court of equity, the decree of that court
is to every intent as binding as would be the judgment of a court of law.
Pennington v. Gibson, 65.
9. Whenever, therefore, an action of debt can be maintained upon à judgment at law
for a sum of money awarded by such judgment, the like action can be main-
tained upon a decree in equity which is for a specific amount; and the records
of the two courts are of equal dignity and binding obligation. Ibid.
10. A declaration was sufficient which averred that "at a general term of the Su-
preme Court in Equity for the State of New York," &c. &c. Being thus aver-
red to be a court of general jurisdiction, no averment was necessary that the
subject-matter in question was within its jurisdiction. And the courts of the
United States will take notice of the judicial decisions in the several States,
in the same manner as the courts of those States. Ibid.
11. Where a case in equity was referred to a Master, which came again before the
court upon exceptions to the Master's report, the court had a right to change
its opinion from that which it had expressed upon the interlocutory order, and
to dismiss the bill. All previous interlocutory orders were open for revision.
Fourniquet v. Perkins, 82.
12. The decree of dismissal was right in itself, because it conformed to a decision of
this court in a branch of the same case, which decision was given in the in-
terval between the interlocutory order and final decree of the Circuit Court.
Ibid.
13. Where an appeal was taken from a decree in chancery, which decree was made
by the court below during the sitting of this court in term time, the appellant
is allowed until the next term to file the record; and a motion to dismiss the
appeal, made at the present term, before the case has been regularly entered
upon the docket, cannot be entertained, nor can a motion to award a proce-
dendo. Stafford v. Union Bank of Louisiana, 135.
14. This court, however, having a knowledge of the case, will express its views upon
an important point of practice. Ibid.
15. Where the appeal is intended to operate as a supersedeas, the security given in the
appeal bond must be equal to the amount of the decree, as it is in the case of
a judgment at common law. Ibid.
16. The two facts, namely, first that the receiver appointed by the court below had
given bond to a large amount, and second, that the persons to whom the pro-
perty had been hired had given security for its safe keeping and delivery, do
not affect the above result. Ibid.
17. The security must, notwithstanding, be equal to the amount of the decrce. Ibid.
18. A mode of relief suggested. Ibid.
19. In order to act as a supersedeas upon a decree in chancery, the appeal bond must
be filed within ten days after the rendition of the decree. In the present case,
where the bond was not filed in time, a motion for a supersedeas is not sus-
tained by sufficient reasons, and consequently must be overruled. Adams v.
Law, 144.
20. So, also, a motion is overruled to dismiss the appeal, upon the ground that the
real parties in the case, were not made parties to the appeal. The error is a
mere clerical omission of certain words. Ibid.
21. A bill of review, in a chancery case, cannot be maintained where the newly dis-
covered evidence, upon which the bill purports to be founded, goes to impeach
the character of witnesses examined in the original suit. Southard et al. v.
Russell, 547.
22. Nor can it be maintained where the newly discovered evidence is merely cumula-
tive, and relates to a collateral fact in the issue, not of itself, if admitted, by
any means decisive or controlling such as the question of adequacy of price,
when the main question was, whether a deed was a deed of sale or a mortgage.
23. Where a case is decided by an appellate court, and a mandate is sent down to the
court below to carry out the decree, a bill of review will not lie in the court
below to correct errors of law alleged on the face of the decree. Resort must
be had to the appellate court. I bid.
24. Nor will a bill of review lie founded on newly discovered evidence, after the
publication or decree below, where a decision has taken place on an appeal,
unless the right is reserved in the decree of the appellate court, or permission
be given on an application to that court directly for the purpose. Ibid.
CHURCH, METHODIST EPISCOPAL.
1. In 1844, the Methodist Episcopal Church of the United States, at a General Con-
ference, passed sundry resolutions providing for a distinct, ecclesiastical organ-
ization in the slaveholding States, in case the annual conferences of those States
should deem the measure expedient. Smith et al. v. Swormstedt et al. 288.
2. In 1845, these conferences did deem it expedient and organized a separate cccle-
siastical community, under the appellation of the Methodist Episcopal Church
South Ibid.
3. At this time there existed property, known as the Book Concern, belonging to
the General Church, which was the result of the labors and accumulation of
all the ministers. Ibid.
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