and miserable; for they that have not a cloak, may have a sword: and by how much you make them the less considerable in peace, they are the more dangerous in war. And therefore covetous princes are to themselves the greatest enemies, excepting only their more covetous exactors. CHAPTER III. OF KINGS, PRINCES, AND ALL SUPREME CIVIL POWERS, AND THEIR LAWS IN SPECIAL. RULE I. The supreme Power in every Republic is universal, absolute, and unlimited. 1. THAT in every commonwealth there is a supreme power, is without all question: there is no government without superiority; and where there is a superior, there is a supreme; for he is so, that hath none above him. It matters not, whether this supreme power be subjected in one or many, whether it be parted or united: the consideration of these is material as to the goodness or badness of a government, but nothing to the power and absoluteness of it, nothing to the present rule. And therefore it is but a weak and useless distinction, when we speak of kings and princes (by them meaning the supreme power), to say that some are absolute, some are limited in their power: For it is true, that some princes are so; but then they are not the supreme power. It is a contradiction to say, that the supreme power is limited, or restrained; for that which restrains it, is superior to it, and therefore the other is not supreme. And therefore Albericus Gentilis said well, that he doubted concerning the kings of France and Spain, whether they were supreme princes, because in the affairs of religion they are subject to the pope.' He that hath the supreme power, is only under God; and to inquire concerning a king, whether he be tied to laws or conditions, is not properly an inquiry after his power, but after the exercise and dispensation of it. For though he may not always use it, yet the supreme power always is absolute and unlimited, and can do what he please. The difference of a tyrant and a king or a gentle prince being only this, that a tyrant uses his absolute power unreasonably and unjustly and ordinarily; but a king uses it not but in cases extraordinary, for just and good ends: and if the prince does not, some else must, who, in that case, is the supreme. Sometimes the consuls, sometimes the dictators, sometimes the senate, did do extraordinary acts of power; but still they who did it, had the supreme power: and that is necessary, and inseparable from government, that, I mean, which is supreme: ἄκραν ἐξουσίαν, κυρίαν ἀρχὴν, κύριον πολίτευμα, the Greeks call it; majestatem,' the Latins: and be it in whom or in how many it happens, that power can do every thing of government, and disposes of all things in order to it, and is accountable to no man. For suppose a king that hath power of the militia, and his senate of making laws, and his people by their committees of raising money; this power of making war, and laws, and levies, is the supreme power, and is that which can do all things: and although one be accountable for money, and the other subject to laws, and two of them under the power of the sword, yet this is but the majesty or supremacy parted, and whether well or ill, I dispute not, yet when it is parted and when it is united, it is supreme, and it is all. That government which Aristotle calls λακωνική, δοκεῖ εἶναι βασιλεία τῶν κατὰ νόμων, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ κυρία πάντων, σε seems (says he) to be a kingdom, but yet subject to laws, but is not the mistress of all;" and this is true in many European governments: but there is another government where the governor is πávτwv xúpios εis wv, "lord of all, and but one person;" that is the perfect monarchy: but yet that is no greater power than is in every kind of government: for be it where it will, somewhere or other, in all government, there must be a supreme power, and that power is absolute and unlimited. For suppose a king that could be questioned by his senate, deposed, judged, condemned, as Diodorus Siculus tells of the kings of Egypt; yet they that judge the king, cannot be judged themselves, if they have right to judge him or at least they must stand at a judicatory, that cannot be judged, and there is the supremacy placed. Now this being thus stated, the rule is clear, and the Jews expressed it . Lib. 2. S by an odd device of theirs; for when their king died, they tied his thumb so in the palm of his hand, that the wrinkles of the fist should, in a manner that might be fancied, represent which signifies almighty:' to denote that he was God's vicegerent, and under him had the whole power of government. He had in his right hand a power like the power of God; but the other hand was open and had let it go. 2. Now that this is true, is apparent by all the same reasons, by which the necessity of government is proved. It is necessary, that it should be so; for there are some states of things, for which nothing can provide but this absoluta potestas,'' supreme and unlimited power;' as at Rome, when the Gauls had almost possessed themselves of all, and in many cases of their appointing dictators, and in sudden invasions, and in the inundation of tumults, and in all cases where laws are disabled to speak or act,-" ne respublica aliquid detrimenti patiatur," that the public should by all means be preserved,' is the greatest necessity they can have, and that is the great end of power; and either the commonwealth is like a helpless orphan, exposed to chance and violence, and left without guards: or else she hath so much power as to use all means for her safety. If she have not a right to do all that she naturally can, and is naturally necessary, she is deficient in the great end of government: and therefore it must be certain, she hath absolute power: now wherever this is subjected, there it is habitually, there it is always. I do not say it is always there, where it is sometimes actually administered; but there it is habitually from whence it is concredited actually, and put into delegation and ministry and this is the power, that can do all things of government, and because it is supreme, and it is so always, it cannot be at any time less in judgment, because it is greater power; that is, it is accountable to no man whatsoever it does. in Qui rex est, regem, Maxime, non habeatt. 3. This supreme power is commonly expressed by 'potestas regia,' or 'kingly power,' or power imperial; though when the emperor was lord of the world, to be a king in most places went much less: but because most kings have t Martial. ii. 18. Mattaire, pag. 37. been and are supreme in their own dominions, by this word we commonly mean the supremacy or the majesty. So Suetonius" speaking of Caligula, says he was very near 66 speciem principatus in regni formam convertere," "to change the government into a kingdom," that is, to make it absolute and supreme :—and this distinction Pisox used concerning Germanicus, " Principis Romani, non Parthi regis esse filium," meaning, that the Parthian kings were absolute, but the Roman princes ruled with the senate: and Cæsar tells that Vercingetorix was put to death, because he, being but the prince of the Gauls, affected the kingdom. Bartheus auTOTERYS ÖVTWS καὶ αὐτοκράτωρ καὶ τῶν νόμων, πάντά τε οἷα βούλοιτο ποιῇ, καὶ πάνθ' ὅσα ἂν μὴ βούλοιτο μὴ πράττῃ. So Diony described the power of a king, for that which they understood to be the supreme power. Σύ τοι πόλις, σὺ δὲ τὸ δήμιον, Κρατύνεις βωμὸν ἑστίαν χθονός. 66 "Thou art So the people in Eschylusz speak to their king: our city, our commonwealth, above all judicatories, thy throne is sacred and immured as an altar, and by thy suffrage, by thy own will, thou governest all things.”—This is thejus regium,' this the supreme power can do, it can be no less than this in its own nature and appointment. So the power is described in Theophilusa: Πᾶσαν βασιλεῖ δέδωκε κατὰ τοῦ δήμον ἐξουσίαν, “ He hath given to the king all power over the people.”—So it is described by Livyb: “ Reges, non liberi solum impedimentis omnibus, sed domini rerum temporumque, trahunt consiliis cuncta, non sequuntur;" "Kings are not only free from all lets and encumbrances, but are lords of times and things; they by their counsels draw all things after them, but follow not." The Greeks call this supremacy, ἐπιτάττειν ἀνυπεύθυνον ὄντα, 6 a power to rule with out danger of being called to account by men;" St. Ambrose calls it, "non ullis ad pænam vocari legibus, tutos imperii potestate;" "a power that is safe in its own circles, and can by no laws be called to punishment:" τὴν น Caligul. cap. 22. ed. B. Crus. vol. 1. pag. 509. x Tacit. Annal. 2. cap. 57. Oberlin. Lond. ed. vol. 1. pag. 155. y Lib. 53. a Decad. 1. lib. 9. Z Supplic. 375. ed. Butler, vol. 2. pag. 18. prŋy dx, that is Galen's word, "it is the chief or prime principality.”—“ The king alone" (or he or they, who have the kingly power)" is free ;" all others are under compulsories and judges. But St. Peter's phrase is better than all of them, Υποτάσσετε τῷ βασιλεῖ ὡς ὑπερέχοντι. The king is the most eminent, the defender of all: and above all, repέxe, ὑπερμαχεῖ, ὑπερασπίζει, saith Suidas. The king or the supreme hath the power of defence, the power of the sword, and that commands all the rest: for υπερέχων, ὑπερνικών, it signifies to be more than conqueror. So the grammarians. 4. But in order to conscience, kings and princes, I mean all supreme powers, must distinguish " potestatem imperii ab officio imperantis ;" that is to be considered by subjects, -and this, by princes; supreme princes always have an absolute power, but they may not always use it. He that hath a sword by him, is not always tied to use it, and he must cut his meat with a knife. Κατὰ τάξιν τινὰ βασιλεία, ἡ δὲ ἀόριστος Túgavs, says Aristotle; " It is a kingdom when it is by rule and measure, but if it be unlimited, it is a tyranny:" that is, when affairs are capable of a law and order, the supreme power must so conduct them; he must go in that path where they stand; but if they grow wild and irregular, he must go out of his way to fetch them in again. 5. But then it is also to be considered, that the absolute power of the prince is but an absolute power of government, not of possession; it is a power of doing right, but not a power of doing wrong: and at the worst, is but a power of doing private violences for the security of the public. This power is excellently expressed in the tables of the royal law written to Vespasian; "Uti quæcunque ex usu reipublicæ et ex majestate divinarum, humanarum, publicarum, privatarumque rerum esse censebit, ei agere, facere, jus potestasque, sit, uti Augusto fuit." Augustus Cæsar was the most absolute prince that ever ruled the Roman people; to him was granted, saith Alciat, to be free from laws, and all the necessity of laws, to be obnoxious to no law written, and to have all the power c De Magistrat. b Lucan. ii. 280. Oudendorp. pag. 127. |