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tickets, receive and count their change, if any, and prepare to board the train, without unneccssary interference with each other. But the language "before the departure of the train" does not require that the office shall remain open up to the instant the train moves off. The question is, might the passenger have procured a ticket within a reasonable time before the departure, and not up the very moment when the wheels began to move? Iowa Sup. Ct., June 9, 1886. Everett v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. R. Co. Opinion by Rothrock, J.

LEASING ROAD LIABILITY OF LESSOR.A railroad company cannot escape liability for an injury by negligence by a voluntary surrender of its road into the hands of lessees, unless there be some special statutory permission therefor. It is regarded as settled that where one railroad company is authorized by law to contract or lease its road to another company, it is not responsible for the torts committed by the other company in the running of its trains, or the management of the road. Mahoney v. Atlantic & St. L. R. Co., 63 Me. 68; Ditchett v. Spuyten Duyvil, etc., R. Co., 67 N. Y. 425. Unless however it is specially authorized by statute to make such lease of its road, it cannot, by doing it, defeat its obligations to the public, or escape the liability which the law imposes for torts, although committed by its lessee. Mr. Pierce says: "The company cannot, in the absence of special statute authority and exemption, divest itself of responsibility for the torts of persons operating its road, by transferring its corporate powers, or leasing the road to them. It cannot by its own act absolve itself from its public obligations without the consent of the Legislature. It is liable for injuries to its pas. sengers caused by the negligence of another which it allows to use its road." Pierce Railr. 283. And this view, by reference to the authorities cited in the notes, will be found to be supported by the weight of judic ial decisions. See also Thomas v. R. Co., 101 U. S. 72We must take it theu, as the accepted doctrine in this country that a railroad company cannot escape the performance of any duty or obligation, imposed by its charter or the general laws of the State, by a voluntary surrender of its road into the hands of lessees. Railroad Co. v. Brown, 17 Wall. 445; Freeman v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co., 28 Minu. 443; Chicage & St. P. R. Co. v. McCarthy, 20 Ill. 385; Ohio & M. R. Co. v. Dunbar, id. 623; Chicago & R. I. R. Co. v. Whipple, 22 id. 105; Nelson v. V. R. Co., 26 Vt. 717; McElroy v. Nashua, etc., R. Co., 4 Cush. 400; R. Co. v. Barron, 5 Wall. 104. The defendant may contract for the construction of its road, but it cannot escape liability for injuries to passengers caused by the negligence of another which it permits or allows to use its road for the purposes of traffic. In such case, as regards the public, those who operate the road must be regarded as the agents of the corporation. This doctrine is in accordance with sound public policy; for it would certainly be against the public interest to allow corporations, invested by the State with important frauchises and privileges, and incorporated to discharge a public duty as well as to subserve a private benefit, to shirk its responsibilities, or shift its duties ahd liabilities to other, perhaps irresponsible parties. Except as authorized by statute, it cannot relieve itself from responsibility for the exercise of its corporate powers and franchises. The case of Cunningham v. Railroad Co., 51 Tex. 503, principally relied upon by the defendant, does not meet the facts of the case here. There the trains under the control of the contractor were not being used for the purposes of traffic, but for the purposes of construction, when the injury occurred. Oregon Sup. Ct., May 24, 1886. Lakin v. Williamette Valley R. Co. Opinion by Lord, J

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SALE-CONDITIONAL-“SATISFACTORY."—If an article is delivered to a purchaser, to be retained and paid for by him if satisfactory, the purchaser may repudiate the sale if such article prove bona fide, and in fact unsatisfactory. The sale depends upon the mental condition or operation of the defendant as satisfied or dissatisfied with the manner in which the fans worked, not generally or anywhere, but in that particular shop. The plaintiff is subject to such condition or operation of the mind of the defendant only when induced or caused by the test prescribed, otherwise they might be feigned, capricious or mercenary. We think the true rule in such a case is that if the fans are not houestly and in good faith satisfactory to the defendant, and the defendant notified the plaintiff of that fact in a reasonable time, then, and in that case, there had been no sale, and the defendant is not liable for the price. Many respectable authorities hold that such a sale is strictly illusory, and the property passes only at the option of the buyer. But we think the more reasonable rule is the one above laid down, and is supported by better authority. A recent case in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of California, of Silsby Manufg. Co. v. Town of Chico, 24 Fed. Rep. 893, was closely analogous to this case. The steam engine was sold "if satisfactory" to the buyer. It was held by Sawyer, J., that where under a contract an article is made and delivered which shall be satisfactory to the purchaser, it must in fact be satisfactory to him or he is not bound to take it. But where the purchaser is in fact satisfied, but fraudulently and in bad faith declares that he is not satisfied, the contract has been fully performed by the vendor, and the purchaser is bound to accept the article. Indeed, to such import are really all of the authorities, which hold simply that to be satisfied in such a case is sufficient reason to refuse the purchase, for to be dissatisfied is a fact, and must be a verity, and not a pretext. It is not "I will not accept itwill not have it "but "it is not satisfactory," or "I am really and honestly dissatisfied with it." This is implied in the very statement of the principle. Sup. Ct. Wis., May 15, 1886. Exhaust Ventilator Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. Opinion by Orton, J.

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SHIP AND SHIPPING--COLLISION-COMPULSORY PILOTAGE. Although the pilot in charge of a ship by compulsion of law is under ordinary circumstances solely responsible for getting the ship under way, yet if the weather is so bad, by reason of fog or other circumstances, as to make navigation perilous and to give rise to a plain prospect of danger, it is the duty of the master to interfere, and he is to blame if he permits his vessel to get under way in such circumstances. Where a pilot in charge of a vessel by compulsion of law gives at the suggestion of the master an improper order which brings about a collision, such interference by the master does not transfer the responsibility of the pilot to the master so as to deprive the shipowners of the defense of compulsory pilotage to an action to recover the damages occasioned by the collision. In The Lochlibo, 3 W. R. 310, it was held that a suggestion made to the pilot by the master does not transfer the responsibility from him to the master. Though it would be the duty of the master to make suggestions to the pilot from time to time, it rests with the pilot to form his own opinion as to the value of the sugges. tion. It is only when the captain actually gives an order contrary to the pilot that he takes the responsibility for the manoeuvre on himself. Prob. Div. & Adm. Div., 54 L. T. Rep. 576. The Oakland. Opinion by Sir James Hanney.

AGREEMENT ΤΟ

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-ORAL
CONVEY LAND IN CONSIDERATION OF SUPPORT.-
An oral agreement to convey lands in consideration of

support will not be specifically enforced. It is one which involves personal service of such a character that in order to its proper execution relations of peculiar confidence and esteem, if not affection, should prevail between the parties concerned. To undertake to enforce such a contract between parties mutually distrustful of each other would be productive of nothing but confusion and mischief. Fry Spec. Perf. 44; Pom. Cont. par. 310. Speaking for this court at a very early period in its history, Holman, J., said: "A covenant for service, if performed at all, must be performed under the eye of the master, and might, as in the case before us. require a number of years. Such a performance, if enforced by law, would produce a state of servitude as degrading and demoralizing in its consequences as a state of absolute slavery." Case of Mary Clark, 1 Blackf. 122. The same might be said of a case, where one was compelled to be the involuntary recipient of the services or suport of another under a contract such as is here exhibited. That the services were to be performed under the guise of administering support, might not in any degree mitigate the condition of the recipient, nor render his situation less irritating than if subjected to a species of slavery. Whatever it may have been formerly in other States, it was always the rule here, and is now well settled everywhere, that specific performance of a contract involving personal service, special ability, or peculiar confidence, will not be enforced. The jurisdiction invoked in this case is manifestly impracticable. As well might the court be asked to regulate the domestic affairs of a family by its decree as to undertake the supervision of a contract such as that exhibited. Unless a contract can be specifically enforced as to both parties, a court will not interfere. Being unable to execute the contract against the plaintiffs, nothing remained for the court in this instance except to decline to compel the execution of a deed in their favor. So far as the agreement remains unperformed the appellee cannot be compelled to perform it. The appellants must be left to their remedy at law. That an adequate remedy is available to them affords an additional reason why a court of equity will refuse to enforce the contract. Among others, the following authorities illustrate the rules relating to the enforcement of agreements of the general character under consideration: Blanchard v. Detroit, etc., R. Co., 31 Mich. 43; Buck v. Smith, 29 id. 166; Marble Co. v. Ripley, 10 Wall. 339; Cooper v. Pena, 21 Cal. 404; Port Clinton R. Co. v. Cleveland, etc., R. Co., 13 Ohio St. 544; Johnson v. Shrewsbury, etc., R. Co., 3 De Gex, M. & G. 914; Blackett v. Bates, L. R., 1 Ch. 117; Pom. Eq. Jur. par. 1405. Ind. Sup. Ct., May 25, 1886. Ikerd v. Beavers. Opinion by Mitchell, J. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-ORAL AGREEMENT TO FORM PARTNERSHIP TO PURCHASE LAND.-An oral agreement to form a copartnership for the purchase of land, including a contract to sell land, is void under the statute of frauds. By the terms of the agreement the defendants were to negotiate for the purchase for the parties, take the title in their names, and pay the purchase money therefor; the defendants to be owners of two-thirds and the plaintiff one-third of the property, when thus purchased, and the plaintiff to reimburse the defendants for his one-third of the purchase price in his sawing and converting the timber into lumber for sale. Clearly, we think, the agreement sued upon included a contract for the sale of land which was not in writing, and void under the statute of frauds, above given. The contract for the purchase of the land was included in the agreement to engage in the copartnership, and is made the basis thereof, and the failure of the defendants to perform their undertakings relating thereto, as stated in the agreement sued upon, constitutes the plaintiff's sole ground for the

damages he claims to have sustained. In Levy v. Brush, 45 N. Y. 589, it was held, where an oral agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and defendant, by which the latter agreed to purchase land, and pay therefor from his own funds the necessary amount for that purpose, for the joint benefit of both, the plaintiff to reimburse one-half the money so paid, the deed to be taken in the name of both, the defendant having made the purchase, and taken the contract in his own name, and refused to convey one-half to the plaintiff, that no action would lie to compel the execution of the agreement; that the case was within the statute of frands, and that the defendant had a perfect right, both at law and in equity, to refuse performance. In Rawdon v. Dodge, 40. Mich. 697, the agreement was oral that Dodge should cause to be conveyed to Rawdon an interest in land held by one Sayles; and Mr. Justice Graves, in delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It is not claimed that written evidence was not necessary to show the agreement for the transfer of the equity of redemption, or that there was any such evidence, and the record imports that no proper writing was ever made. The agreement was that an interest held by Sayles in the land should be conveyed to Rawdon, and the transaction was within the words and policy of the statute. How. St., § 6179-6181. The fact that the interest to be transferred was not in Dodge, but was vested in Sayles, could make no difference. It was a contract for the sale of an interest in land, and it is not important that the title then resided in a third person." See also Wright v. De Groff, 14 Mich. 163; Scott v. Bush, 29 id. 523; Erben v. Lorillard, 19 N. Y. 299; Purcell v. Miner, 4 Wall 513. Mich. Sup. Ct., June 10, 1886. Raub v. Smith. Opinion by Campbell, C. J.

TRUSTEE-WRONGFUL PLEDGE OF TRUST FUNDS.— Fisher, the plaintiff, and Hill, as trustee of the estate of Ira C. Voorhees, held nine railroad coupon bonds, which were deposited by them for safe-keeping in the defendant bank. Hill was also cashier of the bank. Without the knowledge of the president or any direc tor of the bank, Hill took from the bank a sum of money, for which he put in the bank his own note, which he kept in his custody as cashier. The transaction did not appear on the books of the bank. The note purported to pledge as security for its payment nine bonds of the description of those deposited by the trustees. After Hill's death the note was found by the officers of the bank, but the bonds did not accompany it. They were found in a separate envelope, indorsed "C. S. Hill," with the name "Ira C. Voorhees" written on the bonds in his own hand. It did not appear that the president of the bank, or either of the directors, had ever seen or had any knowledge of the note or bonds in Hill's life-time. Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover the bonds from the bank in the absence of proof to establish an actual delivery of the bonds by Hill to the bank. It is conceded that railroad coupon bonds, payable to bearer, like commercial paper or bank bills, pass by delivery, and that the purchaser of such bonds in good faith for value, without actual notice of any defect in the title, can hold them against the true owner. The president and directors of the bank being without knowledge of the fraud perpetrated by Hill, it is insisted, under the authority of First National Bank v. Christopher, 11 Vroom, 435, that the title of the bank is untainted by the fact that the bank cashier misappropriated the bonds in breach of his trust. In the case cited it was properly held that a director offering for discount a note, of which he is the owner, to the bank of which he is a director, is regarded in the transaction as a stranger, and the bank is not chargeable with the knowledge of such director of an infirmity or de

fect in the consideration of the note. There the maker of the note put it in the power of the director to deceive his bank, and he did deceive the bank by procuring the board of directors to discount the note. The bank was the innocent party, and the maker of the note was required to bear the loss which his own imprudence enabled another to inflict. This case would be parallel if Hill had presented his note, with the collaterals, to the board of directors, and through them obtained from the bank the proceeds of the discount of it. But Hill, without the knowledge of the bank, committed the fraud. The bank was not deceived; it had no knowledge of the transaction. This is not a case where bonds were taken in good faith for valuable consideration without notice. The bank did not take them relying on the title of Hill; the bank did not even know of their existence. The trial judge properly submitted to the jury the question whether these bonds were delivered to the bank, so that they became the lawful holders of them, and that question was rightly decided under the evidence in the negative. N. J. Sup. Ct., June, 1886. Fisher v. National Bank of New Jersey. Opinion by Van Syckel, J.

WATERS AND WATER-COURSES-PRESCRIPTIVE USEGRADUAL DIMINUTION OF STREAM.-Where a riparian owner has acquired a prescriptive right to use the waters of a stream for the purpose of irrigation, a lower riparian proprietor cannot restrain him from so doing on the ground that the diversion of the water has become injurious through a gradual diminution in the natural volume of the stream. The general rule, as declared in Washb. Easem., § 49, is invoked, that the time from which the period is to be reckoned in computing the duration of a continuous enjoyment is when the injury or invasion of right begins, and not the time when the party causing it began that which finally creates the injury. The correctness of this rule may be conceded, yet it is not applicable to the facts of the present case. If the injury here was caused by a change of the dam or of the ditches, or by suffering the latter to become filled up or clogged (Polly v. McCall, 37 Ala. 20), or by applying the water to a different use, or if injury was caused by any late act, either of omission or of commission, on the part of the appel lees, it might be said they had previously only begun the work which caused the injury; but such is not this case. Here the whole action and work of the appellees is a continuance only of that which was done on the ground forty years ago, and the water continues to be used for the same purpose now as then. It is held in Strickler v. Todd, 10 Serg. & R. 63, to be wellsettled law, if there has been an uninterrupted and exclusive enjoyment for more than twenty-one years of water in any particular way, it affords a conclusive presumption of right in the party so enjoying it, equal to a right by prescription. The same rule is substantially declared in Hoy v. Sterrett, 2 Watts. 327; Darlington v. Painter, 7 Penn. St. 473; Wheatley v. Chrisman, 24 id. 303. The law presumes a grant of the easement, the extent of which is measured, not by the actual or average depth of the waters at any given point, but by the nature and extent of the obstruction itself. Gehman v. Erdman, 41 Leg. Int. 388. When one uses an easement whenever he sees fit, without asking leave or without objection, the use is adverse, and an adverse enjoyment for twenty-one years gives an indisputable title to the enjoyment. Garrett v. Jackson, 20 Penn. St. 331. The work on the ground was not only under a claim of right, but it was open, visible and notorious. The parties who owned the property below could foresee and anticipate the ultimate effect of the diversion of the water, as well as the parties who caused it. The fact that they may not have fore

seen the probable diminution of the quantity of water which would flow in the stream cannot deprive the appellees of any of their rights arising from their possession and enjoyment of the water for nearly twice the number of years necessary to give a right thereto by prescription. Penn Sup. Ct., Oct. 5, 1885. Messinger's Appeal. Opinion by Mercur, J.

WILL-DYING WITHOUT ISSUE. —. - A testator gave certain estate to his son, with a gift over if he should die during minority or without issue. Held, upon a construction of the whole will, that the word "or" should read "and," and that the son's estate became indefeasible on his attaining his majority. Conn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 5, 1886. Phelps v. Bates. Opinion by Carpenter, J.

THE PENALTY OF DEATH.

THE division on Sir Joseph Pease's proposal to abolish the penalty of death is satisfactory, as showing that in this particular, at all exents, the new House of Commons is not disposed to try rash experiments. It cannot be said that Sir Joseph Pease offered the House any great inducement to embark on his doubtful venture. His statistics may have been indisputable, but certainly they were not undisputed. Or rather to put it quite accurately, they were met by other statistics which pointed to the opposite conclusion. If in Belgium and the Netherlands no increase of murders has followed upon the disuse of capital punishment, a very great increase has followed upon a similar step in Switzerland and Würtemberg. The former country, indeed, has returned upon itself, and capital punishment is once more lawful. Moreover a part of Sir Joseph Pease's speech would have been made in support of Mr. Howard Vincent's amendment. The blundering executions of which so much has lately been heard reflect great discredit on the present haphazard method of appointing executioners, but they have no bearing on the question whether a murderer ought to be hanged or imprisoned for life. The number of applicatious show that the dislike generally felt toward the office is very far from being universal; and wherever there is competition, it ought not to be impossible to find a competent man for the post. So, too, it is quite true that the existing definition of murder is too wide. Now that certain classes of murderers are never executed, what is the use of passing sentence of death on them? The end the legislator should keep before him in the allotment of punishment to crime will be attained in proportion to the certainty with which the one is seen to follow upon the other. The difficulty of drawing a line between murders and murders may be great, but we refuse to believe that it is insuperable. Judges and crown counsel vie with one another in imploring juries not to find a prisoner guilty of murder unless the evidence is irresistible; and if occasionally a verdict is open to question, the home secretary is certain to advise a reprieve. The impression that innocent men are banged rests, we fancy, on the fact that men who have been sentenced to death and reprieved are sometimes proved to be innocent. There are two reasons for retaining capital punishment which have lost none of their force. It is a common, and on the whole, valid argument for limiting the penalty of death to murder, that if you inflict it for any other crime, however heinous, there will be a strong temptation to add murder to that other crime in order to get rid of a witness. The abolition of capital punishment would have precisely the same result. It would be directly to the in terest of a burglar to put to death a man who tried to

liam Gould. Another uncle of the deceased carried on the law book business in New York city, the second venture of the kind in the United States, the only other one being in Philadelphia. That was one hundred years ago, and one or another of the family has been engaged in it ever since. Afterward William Gould associated his brother Anthony with him, and the firm became William and A. Gould & Co. William died in 1846, and young William, was then admitted to the firm, as was David Banks, the father of ex-Mayor Banks, and the title became Gould, Banks & Gould. This continued until 1857, when the Goulds separated from Banks, and William established himself in the present location at No. 70 State street, where he subsequently associated with him his son William, and the firm became William Gould & Son. It is now known as William Gould, Jr., & Co. The business methods and unimpeachable integrity of the deceased and his uncle had given the house the very highest standing among the legal profession in this State and outside of it. In 1874, while in attendance at court, he had a stroke of paralysis, and from that time down to his death he had been an invalid. It was not until 1885 however that he resigned the conduct of his business to his sons. He had eleven chil

survive him. Mr. Gould's name was synonymous with honor and integrity, and he was president of one of our banks for twenty years. He was a remarkably earnest and active Christian, and his life was filled with good works.

defend his property, because to do so would subject him to no greater penalty, while by making identification difficult it would make conviction improbable. There are many cases in which the commission of a crime would be rendered easier by killing some one; and to all appearance, what mainly deters the criminal from thus doubling his guilt is his knowledge that in doing so he will much more than double his punishment. Death is something different in kind from perpetual imprisonment, and though he is ready to risk the one, he is not ready to risk the other. The whole force of this motive would disappear if he could double his guilt and yet leave his punishment what it was. The second of these still valid reasons is that the abolition of capital punishment would be a virtual gift of impunity to prisoners already under sentence of imprisonment for life. Whatever they may do, nothing worse can befall them than has befallen them already. It would be absurd to allot a lighter punish. ment to a second murder than has already been allotted to a first-to put a man on bread and water for a week for killing a prison warder, when he has been sentenced to penal servitude for life for killing his worst enemy. Yet the law would forbid the infliction of the only greater punishment, and from the nature of the case, the original punishment cannot be re-dren, eight of whom-five sons and three daughters peated. There is no way that we can see out of this dilemma; consequently, the one thing to be done is to retain capital punishment. At least, if we let it go, we shall have greatly to increase our prison staff, to instruct the men composing it to be on the watch for the first sign of disturbance, and then to shoot freely by way of prevention, since we must not hang by way of penalty. One of the speakers in the recent debate pleaded not for the life of a murderer, but for his less painful death. "There are other modes of taking life besides the barbarous way of hanging a man by the neck until he is dead." In this, no doubt, Mr. Cooke is right. The range of choice is no longer limited to the axe, the cord, the musket and the guillotine; a mask charged with prussic acid, a glass of pleasantly flavored liquid, a hermetically sealed chamber, would deprive death, if not of its terrors, at all events of its suffering. The murderer would be better off in this respect than the majority of his fellow men. There is physical agony-at times very great physical agony-attending upon their deaths; there would be none at all attending upon his. We agree with Mr. Cooke that when the law is taking life, it ought not to take it with unnecessary pain; but we do not see that we are bound to call in the help of science to make the death of a murderer less painful than it would probably have been if he had never been guilty of murder. There is no reason however to believe that hanging is more painful than any of the more ordinary forms of death. It might be long before the relatives of a man who had been killed by poison felt as much disgraced as they would had he been hanged. Moreover, frequent repetition has made this form of death sufficiently familiar to take hold of the popular imagination. Men who are tempted to murder can call up before their mental vision all the circumstances of the gallows; and where the imagination is sluggish, this is in itself a considerable advantage.-Spectator.

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NOTES.

Returning thanks at the same dinner for the bar, Sir Henry James, Q. C., said that "its members had nothing to be ashamed of, and they had ever done their duty to the best of their ability." No doubt, no doubt. No man is able to be in two places at once, so that when they fail to appear in a case for which they have been paid, they have done their duty to the best of their ability. They cannot be in two places at once.-Gibson's Law Notes.

THE WITNESS.

He calmly takes his place,
And stands with stately grace,
A smile upon his face,
Broad and bland.

I must affirm,-he said,
And proudly raised his head;
An oath to me is dead,
On the stand.

The lawyers daze his wits,
Literally give him fits,
And break him all to bits,
In their net.

Questions they shrewdly ply,
Till they make the witness lie;
And he wishes he may die,

You can bet.

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The Albany Law Journal.

THE

ALBANY, JULY 31, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HE ninth annual meeting of the American Bar Association will be held at Saratoga Springs on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday, August 18th, 19th and 20th, 1886. The sessions will be held at 10 o'clock, A. M., and 7.30 P. M., on Wednesday and Thursday, and at 10 o'clock, A. M., on Friday, at Putnam's Music Hall, at the corner of Broadway and Phila street, nearly opposite the United States Hotel. The following is the order of exercises: Wednesday morning —The president's address, by Wm. Allen Butler, of New York; nomination and election of members; election of the general council; reports of the secretary and treasurer; report of the executive committee. Wednesday eveningA paper by Johnson T. Platt, of Connecticut, on "The Opportunity for the Development of Jurisprudence in the United States; a paper by William P. Wells, of Michigan, on "The Dartmouth College Case and Private Corporations; " discussion upon the subjects of the papers read. Thursday morning - The annual address, by Thomas J. Semmes, of Louisiana; reports of standing committees; reports of special committees, including the special committee on "Delays in Judicial Administration,' by David Dudley Field, chairman; discussion of the reports. Thursday evening-A paper by George H. Bates, of Delaware, on "Legislative Control over Municipal Corporations; " discussion upon the subject of the paper read, and further discussion on the reports of the special committees. Friday morning-Nomination of officers; unfinished business; miscellaneous business; election of officers. The annual dinner will be given at the Grand Union Hotel at 8.30 o'clock on Friday evening.

well attended as that of Albany. They argue from the fact that young men from this State are found at the law schools of other States that the facilities here are deficient. We do not so regard the matter. These schools could easily and efficiently instruct many more students, and in former times they did so. But of late there has been a falling off in attendance. This is simply because students mitted to practice after a shorter term of study, and in other States, especially at the west, can be adin some States, we believe, on motion upon graduation. When such was the rule in this State the Albany Law School frequently had more than one hundred attendants at one term, instead of fifty as now. Young men of affluent means, who can afford bia, will naturally go there, but poor young men the long and expensive course of Harvard or Columwill naturally go where they can get admission the soonest and the most cheaply. This is human nature, and if the Cornell people expect any thing different they will learn their mistake. We do not believe that another law school in this State will pay expenses under the present rules of admission to practice. So we think the committee put it too strongly when they say: "These facts lead us irresistibly to the conclusion that the opportunities for legal education in the State of New York are either extremely meager," although it may be admitted, as desired by students seeking the legal profession." they further say, that they We wish the new law school success, but we do not expect it.

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We lately received a postal card asking us to prescribe a preventive of "carpet bugs." A little puzzled, we soon discovered that the inquiry was directed to the Albany Evening Journal, which professes to answer all sorts of questions, and sometimes lays down some very bad law. But there has been a recent "bug case" in the English courts, where a tenant of a furnished house tried to avoid his liability for rent on the ground that the premises were infested by bugs. This was on the authority of the old case of Smith v. Marrable, which has lost its authority. The court however steered around that case, as we infer from the following from the Law Times: "The daily press seems to have been unduly exercised about the 'bug case,'

Mr. Tyler's review of Professor Finch's book in another column comes to us at the same time with a report to Cornell University of a "special committee on the establishment of a department of law, together, with a preliminary announcement of the action of the trustees in establishing such a depart-in which Mr. Justice Mathew gave judgment last ment." The report is signed by Messrs. C. A. Adams, D. Boardman, Stewart L. Woodford, James F. Gluck and George R. Wiiliams. There is of course nothing to be said against the founding of such a department of university education as a luxury, or a charity, or as matter of pride, but in the conclusion of the committee that provisions for legal education in this State are not already ample, we regard the committee as in error, and we foresee that the university will be disappointed in the attendance upon this course. The committee speak of the Columbia College Law School and of the Albany Law School, but they do not mention that of the University of New York, which has been as VOL. 34 No. 5.

Saturday. The point decided was the simplest issue of fact. The defendant accepted the onus of the issue, and proved the discovery of six bugs in an attic on the third floor of the house in question. This was before she came into possession, which in point of fact was never taken. The six were not scattered about the room. They were a compact body, apparently caught in the act of marching either in or out of a hole in the wall. The defendant's case never got further than this, and the learned judge simply held that nothing had been shown on which he could find the house so unfit for habitation as to bring it within the doctrine of Smith v. Marrable. Whether he was right or wrong

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