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This instrument is more than a mere receipt, for it embodies an agreement. The terms of the agreement are not, it is true, expressly stated in the instrument, but they are clearly implied in the language employed by the parties. The law is a silent factor in every contract, and it is a factor in this one. Foulke v. Falls, 91 Ind. 315; see p. 320.

There are indeed very few contracts that would be intelligible if they were considered as destitute of the legal element, for the law gives vitality and force to all contracts, and makes them intelligible and enforceable. Men are presumed to contract with reference to the law, and to employ language that has a legal meaning, and to which the courts may give just effect. In the instrument before us the parties have employed words that have a definite legal meaning, and the court cannot treat as meaningless any of the words which the parties have employed, for the long-settled rule is that no word shall be disregarded unless the context clearly demands it. There ie no such demand here, as there is entire harmony in all the parts of the instrument. It plainly declared that the writers of the instrument have received, on deposit, $1,600 of the payee's money. The words "on deposit" import a contract, and the context shows that the money received by the persons with whom it was deposited was that of the depositor. The instrument would not, in legal contemplation, have been one whit clearer if the parties had stated at full length all the details of their agreement. The language used creates a contract, and the law implies as part of the contract that on reasonable demand the depositor is entitled to receive back that which belongs to him. The deposit of money is a transaction well known to the law, and is one out of which well-defined legal rights emerge. Chief among these rights is that of the depositor to receive his own again, and a correlative of this right is the implied promise of the person who receives money on deposit to return it to the depositor. It needs no express words to create this obligation to return the money; the law makes it an attribute of the contract. It would shock every one's to desense of justice affirm that a positor could not get back his money unless there is an express contract to return it to him; but this cannot be affirmed without doing violence to the wellsettled principles of jurisprudence. In affirming as we do that the law enters into every contract unless expressly excluded, we do no more than restate one among the oldest rules in the law of contracts. "Every agreement and promise," says Mr. Pollock, "enforceable by law, is a contract." Poll. Cont. 1. We have here an agreement enforceable by law, and therefore a contract. The promise of the signers is, to be sure, an implied one, but it is none the less a legal promise, involved in the language employed by the contracting parties. To deny that the law will, where justice requires it, imply a contract that may be enforced, would be to dispute a doctrine that runs back to the earliest years of the common law, and surely there can be no case where justice more imperatively requires that such a promise should be implied than one where money is recvived on deposit, for it is inconceivable that the person so receiving money should be under no obligation to return or repay it to the depositor. The promise here however is part of the contract itself, for to the language used in the instrument the law affixes a definite meaning.

If there were no adjudged cases we should have no hesitation in deciding on principle that the instrument set forth in the complaint is a contract for the payment of money, but there are decisions which very fully sustain this conclusion.

In Payne v. Gardiner, 29 N. Y. 146, the question was thoroughly discussed, and an iustsument in all mate

rial aspects the same as the one here under discussion was held to be a contract of bailment.

The instrument under examination in Tisloe v. Graeter, 1 Blackf. 353, was in legal effect the same as the one before us. The only difference in the phraseology of the two instruments is that the one in the case cited used the words for "safe-keeping," while the one we are dealing with uses the words "on deposit," and it was held that the instrument constituted a contract which could not be varied by parol evidenee. A like ruling upon a very similar instrument was made in Dale v. Evans, 14 Ind. 288. Upon the same general principle was decided the case of Foulks v. Falls, 91 Ind. 315, where it was held that an instrument in form of a receipt, but containing a recital that the note described was received for collection, was a written contract. These cases, to which many more might be added, establish the doctrine that such an instrument as the one declared on constitutes a contract, and if it is a contract it can be none other than a written contract. It is not the less a written contract because the law annexes to it certain attributes, for this the law does to every contract. In proof of the validity of our conclusion we need adduce only one instance, that of a promissory note, to which the law annexes three days of grace, and yet we suppose no one would dream of affirming that a promissory note was not a written contract.

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Assuming, as we have no hesitation in affirming that the authorities cited and the principle referred to entitle us to do, that the instrument executed by the appellees is a written contract, all that remains is to ascertain its character, and this the authorities enable us to do without difficulty. It is a written acknowledgment of the receipt of money, and a promise to repay it on reasonable demand. Dan. Neg. Inst., § 37. "Money on deposit," says the Court of Appeals of New York, means ex vi termini money placed where the owner can command it at any time." Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 9, see p. 265. It is the money of the dopositor due him on a written contract, for the law affixes to the words "on deposit" such a meaning as makes the contract perfect and complete. 1 Story Cont. 16; Pom. Cont., § 155; Story Bailm., § 88; Payne v. Gardiner, supra. It may perhaps be true that the instrument signed by the appellees is not what is known in the commercial world as a certificate of deposit, but it is nevertheless a contract in writing, evidencing the receipt of money on deposit, and to it all the legal incidents attach. If it is a contract, and an enforceable one, then this action is well brought, and that it is such a contract we have no doubt.

Appellee's counsel refer us to the cases of Harmon v. James, 7 Ind. 263; Johnston v. Gries, 85 id. 504; Caviness v. Rushton, 101 id. 500; S. C., 51 Am. Rep. 759; but there is slight, if indeed any, similarity between those cases and the present. It is sufficient to note one of the important points of difference, and that is this: here the instrument shows on its face full consideration for the promise, while in those cases no valuable consideration was shown; for this instrument discloses that the money received on deposit belonged to the person to whom the instrument was ex ecuted.

Our conclusion is that the instrument declared on is a written contract for the payment of money, and that the complaint is sufficient.

The plea of six years' statute of limitations is bad, and the court erred in overruling the appellant's demurrer to it. We do not deem it necessary to further discuss the question; for in deciding that the contract is a written one, we necessarily decide that the action is not barred by the six years' statute.

Judgment reversed.

Mitchell, J., did not participate in the decision of this case.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

MANDAMUS-NEW YORK POLICE FUND-CONTRIBUTION MUST BE VOLUNTARY.-Section 2, act of 1885, ch. 486, which provides that "the said fund shall consist of a sum of money equal to $2 a month for each member of the police force of said department, and also for each member or employee of said department other than the police force, who shall desire to avail himself of the privileges and provisions of this act," * * * does not authorize compulsory deductions of the sum named from the wages of policemen, but all contributions to the fund must be voluntary. June 1, 1886. People v. McClave. Opinion by Danforth, J.

MORTGAGE-FORECLOSURE-DEFAULT IN PAYMENT OF INTEREST.-In an action brought to foreclose a mortgage because of default in the payment of interest, it appeared that on May 27, 1880, the mortgagor, at an interview he had with plaintiff's agent, expressed his regret that he only had with him $70 of the six months' interest due the first then instant, and also said to him, that if the rest must be paid then, he would go and procure the balance, and pay it; that the agent said that he might let the balance go, and take his time to pay it. In September, 1880, action was brought. Held, that plaintiff was entitled to a decree of foreclosure. June 1, 1886. House v. Eisenlord. Opinion by Earl, J.

exclusion of the other partner, the latter can maintain an action to compel his copartner to carry out the agreement. It must be assumed that the inventions covered by these patents were the joint inventions of the joint patentees. This is the inference from the patents themselves, and it is claimed that the inference is conclusive and incontestable upon a collateral inquiry. Assuming this to be true, nevertheless it does not, we think, furnish an answer to the claim of the plaintiff to an interest in these patents under his arrangement with the defendant. The referee finds, and the evidence justified the finding, that the most material part of the invention were Mixer's. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that the patents embraced the original idea of Mixer, existing when the original negotiation commenced between him and the defendant, but adapted and perfected by experiment until the invention took its final form. Assuming, as perhaps must be assumed, that in the course of these experiments the defendant contributed original suggestions, which were adopted, and entitled him to claim the inventions as the joint inventions of himself and Mixer, nevertheless we are of opinion, that as between himself and plaintiff, they must be regarded for the purposes of this action as the inventions of Mixer alone, and that any contribution on the part of the defendant thereto must be considered as having been made in aid of Mixer while proceeding under the original agreement. Any other conclusion would work a fraud upon the plaintiff. (2) We are also of opinion that no error was committed in adjudging that the plaintiff was entitled to share in all the advantages derived or derivable by the defendant from the inventious, past or future, which are within the contract between the parties. The profits heretofore received by the defendant from licenses or sales of the right to use the invention are assumed by the defendant to be reached and covered by the judgment. We think the defendant is justly accountable to the plaintiff for his share, according to his interest under the contract. It is not the case of oue joint owner and patentee exercising the right to license the use of the invention, which he has a right to do without accountability to the other joint owners or patentees. The defendant denied the title of the plaintiff, and refused to clothe him with a legal title to his interest in the patents, thereby practically precluding him from availing himself of their use by granting licenses to others. His situation is analogous to that of a tenant in common of land, who has been ousted by a cotenant, who has appropriated the rents and profits exclusively to his own use. The plaintiff cannot have the full benefit of his agreement unless the defendant is held to account for the profits received by him. (3) The claim that the agreement, being by parol, was void under the statute of the United States, is not well founded. The agree ment related to an inchoate invention, not perfected or patentable at the time the agreement was made, and was not therefore, within section 4898 of the United States Revised Statutes, which declares that 'every patent, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing." In the case of a perfected invention the statute does not prevent the obtaining of an equitable title thereto or interest therein by parol (Walk. Pat., § 284), nor does it apply to a parol executory agreement to transfer an interest in an invention contemplated, but not perfected, and not cognizable under the patent laws when the agree ment was made. The plaintiff by the agreement acquired an equitable right, which attached to the interest of the defendant in the patents subsequently issued, and he is entitled to demand a legal title corresponding with his equitable interest. June 1, 1886. Burr v. De La Vergne. Opinion by Andrews, J.

NEGLIGENCE-BOAT SETTLED AT DOCK-LIABILITY OF DOCK OWNER.-Plaintiff's boat, loaded with sand consigned to defendants, arrived at defendants' dock in the night-time, at high tide. When the tide fell the boat rested on the bottom, which was bare at both ends of the boat, but a depression in the center caused the boat to settle, and she was injured. Held, that defendants were liable. In Sawyer v. Oakman, 1 Sawy. 134, the rule was laid down that the owners of a dock are responsible for all damage suffered by a vessel lawfully using the dock, caused by a defect in the bottom known to the owners of the dock, and not known to the masters of the vessel. This decision was affirmed in 7 Blatchf. 290. The same rule was applied in Carleton v. Franconia Iron, etc., Co., 99 Mass. 216, where the owner of a private wharf procured a vessel to bring a cargo to it, to be there discharged, and suffered her to be placed at high water at a place apparently safe, but in fact unsafe, there being a sunken rock at the adjoining wharf of which defendant had knowledge. The plaintiff might have moored safely at defendant's wharf, but did not know of the rock. See also Leary v. Woodruff, 4 Hun, 99; affirmed, 76 N. Y. 617. In the present case the defendant had authorized the cargo of sand to be sent to it to be delivered at the wharf in question, and knew that it was coming, although it did not know at what precise time. It was bound to know however that it could only be delivered at high tide, which would on the day in question be either about noon or about midnight, the bottom being bare at low tide. June 1, 1886. Barber v. Abendroth. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS — -PARTNERSHIP-ORAL AGREEMENT TO SHARE PATENT TO BE PERFECTED

WITH FIRM MONEYS. (1) Where a partner persuades his copartner to agree to pay expenses of experiments in perfecting an invention made by a third person, in consideration of a share in the results, and the firm pays such expenses, and afterward the said partner and the inventor take out a patent for the invention in their joint names, to the

PRACTICE-GENERAL TERM REVERSING JUDGMENT OF COUNTY COURT-EXCESSIVE DAMAGES.-It has been several times decided by this court that the General Term of the Supreme Court had no power under the Code of Civil Procedure to reverse the judgment of an inferior court on the ground of excessive damages, but could only review questions of law decided by those courts. Thurber v. Townsend, 22 N. Y. 517. It was said in that case that it was only errors of the court, and not of the jury, which the Supreme Court had the power to correct, and that the only way in which such error could be corrected was by motion in the inferior court for a new trial, and that the decision of that court upon the subject would be final, the setting aside of a verdict on account of excessive damages being discretionary. To the same effect is the case of Baker v. Remington, 45 N. Y. 323, where an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court from an order of the City Court of Brooklyn granting a new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence (see also Wavel v. Wiles, 24 N. Y. 635; Smith v. Platt, 96 id. 636), and the general rule is well settled that the decisions of one court, resting in discretion, are not reviewable in another unless such review is specially authorized by law. The respondent contends however that the rules laid down in the cases cited are changed by section 1342 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that "an appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from an order affecting a substantial right, made by the court or a judge in an action brought in a court specified in the last section but one," which includes a County Court. Even if this provision could be held to authorize a review by the Supreme Court of an order of the County Court denying a motion for a new trial on the ground of excessiveness of damages, it would not avail the respondent on this appeal, because no order was entered in the County Court denying the motion for a new trial (In re N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 60 N. Y. 112; Bradley v. Vanzant, 3 Code Rep. 217; Code Civ. Proc., § 1343), and the exception taken to the decision denying the motion on the minutes was not an exception to a ruling upon the trial, and presented no point for review. The judgment of the General Term now appealed from purports to reverse the judgment of the County Court and grant a trial. June 1, 1886. Reilly v. Delaware & Hudson Canal Co. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-ACTION TO RECOVER ILLEGAL TAX.-In 1874 defendant was indebted to plaintiff in the sum of $5,000, for grading Hoseco avenue. Plaintiff was apparently liable to contribute to work on village streets, and had been assessed about $3,000 therefor, and the village threatened to sell his property to satisfy the claim. He demanded his money, and the village treasurer refused to pay, and finally plaintiff accepted the balance, about $2,000, and it was paid him, and the assessment cancelled. In 1880 plaintiff brought this action to recover back the amount deducted from his claim, as for money had and received by defendant for plaintiff's use, on the ground that the assessment was illegal and void. Held, that the cause of action was bound by the statute of limitation. No money was paid by the plaintiff to the defendant upon the assessment in question. The defendant has simply neglected to pay the plaintiff the amount due from it, and remains liable to him for the balance. This liability has not been converted into another cause of action by its refusal to pay the debt. An action to recover for money paid, or had and received, will not lie generally, except upon the payment of money. National Trust Co. v. Gleason, 77 N. Y. 400; Cummings v. Hackley, 8 Johns. 202; Moyer v. Shoemaker, 5 Barb. 319. It has been held

however, that the action may be maintained when its equivalent has been actually accepted as money by the party receiving it, as where an agent has discharged his principal's debt by applying thereon a debt owing by himself (Beardsley v. Root, 11 Johns. 464), or where a surety has transferred property to the creditor, who received it in payment of a judgment. In such cases the principal has been held liable for the amount of his debt discharged by the payment, as for money paid by the surety for him. Bonney v. Seeley, 2 Wend. 481. But here nothing has been received by the defendant, and its legal situation remained unaffected by the attempted application of the illegal assessment upon its legal indebtedness. No money or its equivalent has been received by the defendant, and the effort to sustain this action is an attempt to convert a simple contract liability into one to recover for money illegally held by the debtor for the use of the creditor. We do not find any case going far enough to uphold such a claim. June 1, 1886. Brun lage v. Village of Portchester. Opinion by Ruger, C. J.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

HIGHWAY-IMPROPER ERECTION ON, BY TOWN.Taking and laying out land for a highway does not give a town a right to erect and maintain a watchhouse thereon. When land is taken for public use as a highway the land-owner is entitled to receive a sum in damages, which in theory of law is an indemnity for the use for which his land is taken. The land being taken for a highway, and for no other public use, the easement acquired by the public is limited to the right to travel over the same. Makepeace v. Warden, 1 N. H. 16. The soil and freehold belong to the land-owner, subject only to the public easement for travel, and he may use the land in any manner not inconsistent with the public convenience. How far the use of a highway for the laying down of water and gas pipes, the construction and running of tramways-Attorney-General v. Metropolitan Railroad, 125 Mass. 515-the erection of telegraph poles and stringing of telegraph wiresPierce v. Drew, 136 Mass. 75-and other similar uses, is permissible as being a use for which the land was originally taken, we are not called upon at this time to consider. But no new servitude not in the nature of public travel can be imposed upon the land, against the consent of the land-owner, without a further condemnation of his land under the right of eminent domain, and the award of adequate compensation therefor. The erection of a watch or tramp-house, jail, pest-house or other public building within the limits of a highway is not a use of the way in the nature of public travel. If such structures may be lawfully located within the limits of a highway, without a taking of the land for that purpose, they may be placed in such position, with reference to the landowner's adjoining premises, as to darken his windows, block his passage-ways, obstruct the prospect from his dwelling, and in other ways seriously impair or destroy the value of his property. Such structures might, in fact, become private nuisances of the most objectionable description, for which the land-owner would have no legal redress, and from which he might not escape except by removing to some other place. No such use of the highway was contemplated when his land was taken and his damages assessed. N. H. Sup. Ct., December, 1885. Winchester v. Capron. Opinion by Smith, J.

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mont, and payable to a citizen of that State, cannot be charged in this State as his trustee. Jones v. Ryder, 60 N. H. 452; Gen. Laws, chap. 249, §§ 15, 16, 17; Chadbourne v.Gilman, 63 N. H. 353. (2) The insolvent law of one State has no effect in another as against its citizens, holding claims that follow the person of the creditor, unless such citizens submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the State where the law is enacted. Baldwin v. Hale, 1 Wall. 223; Dunlap v. Rogers, 47 N. H. 281, 288; Bank v. Butler, 45 id. 236; In Matter of Waite, 99 N. Y. 433, 448, 449; Lellog v. Durey, 9 Allen, 27. The claimaut residing here, appearing and prosecuting his claim in this court, all parties must be bound by the judgment. N. H. Sup. Ct., March 12, 1886. Carbee v. Mason. Opinion by Bingham, J.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-RENT-DEVISEE of unexPIRED TERM.-When one becomes assignee of a lessee by operation of law he is not in general chargeable with the performance of the covenants of the lease, until he enters or does some act showing his acceptance. He may accept without entry, but is not compelled to take the assignment. Taylor Landl. and Ten., § 451; Williams v. Bosanquet, 1 Brod. & Bing. 238. A devisee is an assignee in law. The defendants never having entered upon the demised premises, nor done any act to siguify acceptance of the lease, are not liable as assignees. Moreover, the defendants, Mrs. Howard and Mrs. Fletcher, were never devisees of the term. The testator devised to his widow the unexpired term of the lease, contingent upon her living, or remaining his widow, until its expiration. He devised to the other defendants the remainder of the term after the death or remarriage of Mrs. Starkey, in case she should die or remarry before the expiration of the term. As neither of these events took place during the term, the other defendants took nothing in the demised premises under the will. Nor are the defendants liable as devisees generally under the will, or because they have received assets which are required to pay the plaintiff's claim. A demand depending upon a contingency which has not happened, and which can not be allowed by a commissioner of insolvency, it has been held, is one which exists where a debt or duty may arise upon the happening of some event, but where there is no debt or duty until the event happens. Alexander v. Follet, 5 N. H. 499, 501. If the plaintiff's claim for the rent accruing after the death of the testator depended upon a contingency, it was a claim which might have been presented to the commissioner, or filed in the probate office with a petition to the judge of probate to require the excutrix to retain in her hands such sum as might be necessary to pay it. Gen. Laws, chap. 198, § 6; Hall v. Martin, 46 N. H. 337; Wheeler v. Joslin, 63 id. 164. The amount that would accrue to the end of the term was capable of exact mathematical computation. The contingency upon which it is claimed payment depended was the non-destruction by fire or other unavoidable casualty of the buildings upon the demised premises; also the non-assignment of the lease by the executrix or devisees. If the liability of Starkey's estate to pay rent has been terminated by the happening of either of those events, the amount allowed might have been corrected by the commissioner at any time before final distribution, by leave of the probate court. Gen. Laws, chap. 199, § 15; Wheeler v. Joslin, 63 N. H. 164. Sup. Ct. of N. H., March 12, 1886. Witcomb v. Starkey. Opinion by Smith, J.

MAILING OBSCENE WRITING-SEALED LETTER.-An obscene letter, sealed, is within the meaning of section 3893 of the Revised Statutes, which prohibits the mailing of every obscene writing, print, or other publication of an indecent character. Considering the pur

pose of the statute, which evidently is to prevent the United States mail from becoming a vehicle for the transmission of obscene and lewd books, pictures, and writings, I am satisfied that such a writing as the one described in the indictment is embraced in the statute, though inclosed in a letter envelope and mailed, and would so hold if the statute were now to be construed for the first time; but it has been passed upon a number of times by judges of high character and long experience, and some diversity of opinion. The decision of Judge Turner of the Westeru district of Texas, in the case of U. S. v. Comerford, reported in the Criminal Law Magazine, 465; S. C., 25 Fed. Rep. 902, is mainly relied upon to sustain the motion. This decision is in direct conflict with that made in the case of U. S. v. Gaylord, 17 Fed. Rep. 438. The opinion of Judge Drummond in this case, to my mind, is unanswerable. This case arose in the Southern District Court of Illinois. Judge Treat of that court, one among the oldest as well as ablest of our district judges, held that the statute referred to embraced letters or writings inclosed in letter envelopes addressed in the usual way with other letters. On writ of error from the Circuit Court, this ruling was sustained by Judge Drummond, the circuit judge, whose opinions on all questions command the highest respect from the profession throughout the United States, and in which Justice Harlan of the Supreme Court, assigned to that circuit, concurs. If I had any doubt on the question the concurrent opinion of three of such learned and eminent jurists ought to have more weight than that of a single judge, though of equal learning and experience; so that in addition to my own convictions I must hold that the weight of authority is in favor of the sufficiency of the indictment. U. S. Dist. Ct., S. D. Miss., May 20, 1886. United States v. Thomas. Opinion by Hill, J.

SERVANT

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MASTER AND NEGLIGENCE SERVANT LEAVING TEAM--HORSE RUNNING AWAY.-The plaintiff's servant in charge of his mowing machine and horses attached, abandoned them to engage in an unlawful personal combat with the defendant. The horses being frightened by the noise of the encounter, ran away and injured the machine. Held, that the plaintiff was affected with the negligence of his servant in leaving the horses, and could not recover for the damage to the machine. By intrusting his team to the servant for the purpose of driving it home, the plaintiff put it in the servant's power to manage the team negligently, and must be deemed to have assumed the risk of the servant's negligence in the execution of the trust so committed to him. And moreover as in contemplation of the law he who does a thing by the agency of another person, does it himself, the case further stands in respect of the servant's negligent act, in leaving the team unhitched and unattended in the public highway, precisely as it would if that act had been done by the plaintiff himself. This being so, it is immaterial that the conduct of the defendant may have contributed to the injury. A party cannot be heard to complain because others have failed to exercise a higher degree of care than he himself has exercised. Between two wrong-doers, the law will leave the consequences where they have chanced to fall. N. H. Sup. Ct., March 12, 1886. Page v. Hodge. Opinion by Blodgett, J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-BRIDGE-CANAL-OBLIGATION TO GUARD STREETS.-In a borough traversed by a canal, the tow-path ran immediately along the edge of the canal. Adjoining the tow-path, and without any fence between, was a narrow street, upon which mill properties fronted. A public street of the borough ran at right angles to the street and tow-path, and crossed the canal by a bridge, the sides of which

were sufficiently protected. There were no guards on the edge of the tow-path or elsewhere except directly on the bridge. A night hand in the factory fronting | on the street running parallel to the tow-path, started shortly after midnight to cross the bridge in order to procure water, and fell from the edge of the tow-path into the canal at a point seven or eight feet from the bridge, and was drowned. In action by his widow to recover damages from the borough, held, that the defendant was under no duty to guard the canal, and that the nonsuit entered by the court below was properly entered. Penu. Sup. Ct., March 23, 1886. Reinhardt v. Borough of South Easton. Opinion per Curiam.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT — ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION-INTOXICATING LIQUOR.-Where the sale of intoxicating liquor is an illegal consideration, it is no defense to a promissory note that the maker bought intoxicating liquor of one who was indebted to the payee for rent, and in payment for the liquor, assumed the debt for rent and executed the note therefor. Brandt's debt to plaintiff was the consideration. That consideration was not illegal, and if defendant agreed to pay that debt, even though the consideration for his agreement to pay it was the illegal sale of liquors, it does not enter into the consideration of the notes. If Brandt were attempting to enforce defendant's agreement to pay the debt, the defense of the illegality of the consideration could be pleaded. But plaintiff gave a legal consideration for the notes, namely, the discharge of a valid debt owed by Brandt. He cannot be made to suffer for the violation of law by Brandt and defendant in the sale and purchase of liquors for unlawful purposes, of which he had no knowledge. There was evidence tending to show that plaintiff had no information of the transaction between Brandt and defendant. See in support of our conclusion on this point, 1 Pars. Notes & Bills, 217; 2 id. 50; Pars. Cont. 187, et seq. Iowa Sup. Ct., June 21, 1886. Bowen v. Webber. Opinion by Beck, J.

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-CONTRACT.-The following writing, "Two years from date, for value received, I promise to pay J. S. King, or bearer, one ounce of gold," is not a negotiable note, but a simple contract for the delivery of merchandise. Although it has long been settled in this State that a written contract having the usual form of a promissory note, but payable in some specific article, may be treated as a promissory note as to the form of declaring upon it, and the necessity of proof of consideration, and in some other respects (Rob. Dig. 92), yet such an instrument is not negotiable because not payable in money. Collins v. Lincoln, 11 Vt. 268; 1 Dan. Neg. Inst. 42. The instrument declared upon was not even a promise to pay a given sum in specific articles. It stands, for consideration, upon the question of the sufficiency of the declaration, under the demurrer thereto, as though it were a promise to pay one bushel of wheat. It is but a promise to pay, that is, deliver, a certain article of merchandise definite in amount. Because gold enters into the composition of money we cannot assume that "an ounce of gold" is money, or that it has a fixed and unvarying value. The contract in question lacks, not only the quality of negotiability, but certainty and precision as to the amount to be paid. Upon failure to perform, there would be no definite specified sum due, as in case of a promissory note. Vt. Sup. Ct., June 24, 1886. Roberts v. Smith. Opinion by Veazey, J.

PARENT AND CHILD-WAGES PAID TO MINOR."Where a minor son makes a contract for his services on his own account, and the father knows of it, and makes no objection, there is an implied assent that the

son shall have his earnings." Whiting v. Earle, 3 Pick. 201. We think this proposition is sound, and merits emphatic approval. It is simple justice, without danger of working injustice. It does not interfere with the right of the father, or in case of his death, the mother, to the earnings, provided he seasonably demauds them. It does prevent the wrong attempted here, and likely to occur under a different rule. It is abundantly sustained by the authorities cited in the defendant's brief. Nightingale v. Withington, 15 Mass. 272; Wodell v. Coggeshall, 2 Metc 89; Morse v. Welton, 6 Coun. 547; Armstrong v. McDonald, 10 Barb. 300; Farrell v. Farrell, 3 Houst. 633; Cloud v. Hamilton, 11 Humph. 104. We do not think it necessary that the employer should have made the contract with and payment to the son upon knowledge of his total or partial emancipation by the father, in order to be entitled to make this defense. The point of the proposition is that the father knows of the contract and makes no objection. Vt. Sup. Ct., June 22, 1886. Atkins v. Sherbine. Opinion by Veazey, J.

RAILROADS-REASONABLE TIME TO PROCURE TICKETS.-It is provided by statute that "a charge of ten cents may be added to the fare of any passenger, where the same is paid upon the cars, if a ticket might have been procured within a reasonable time before the departure of the train." The ground upon which the plaintiff based his refusal to pay the ten cents demanded by the conductor was that he was prevented from procuring a ticket because the ticket office at Weston was closed when he presented himself for the purpose of purchasing a ticket. Weston is a small and unimportant station at which an inconsiderable amount of business is done by the railroad company, either in freight or passenger traffic. As is usual at such places, the company keeps no assistant for the agent; and when a train arrives the agent leaves the ticket office, and goes upon the platform of the station to transact his business with the train; such as seeing to the loading of the mail on the train, the receipt aud delivery of baggage and express packages, and the like. They claim, that under a proper construction of the statute above cited, it was the duty of the railroad company to keep its ticket office open up to the time of the departure of the train; in other words, they claim that by the very terms of the statute the office must be kept open for the sale of tickets just so long as it is possible for passengers to purchase tickets, and board the train. Assuming this to be the meaning and intent of the statute, they contend that it was error for the court to submit to the jury the question whether, under the facts, the office was kept open a reasonable time in which passengers might procure tickets. We do not think this position is sound. In our opinion it was proper to allow the defendant to introduce evidence of the character of the station, and whether the facilities extended to the travelling public to purchase tickets were such as were required for the convenience of the public. It would be a most unreasonable requirement to impose upon the defendant the burden of employing two persons to attend to the station in order that the ticket office may be kept open for the one or two minutes which a train is required to stop at such a station, in order to accommodate the exceptional cases of passengers who may for any reason arrive at the station after the arrival of the train. Regard must be had to the orderly transactions of the business of the station, taking into consideration the necessary and proper facilities extended to persons having occasion to travel on the trains or transact other business with the company. It is absolutely necessary that the office should be open for business a sufficient time before the departure of the train, in order to enable passengers to procure their

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