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in Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 626, has been fully recognized in this State. It therefore follows that when a sum of money is named as the consideration in the recital of a deed, it is not competent to adduce evidence tending to show that the real consideration was a gift from the grantor to the grantee. (2) As the purchase-money was not paid, the appellee had a vendor's lien on the property which she sold and conveyed to her son. But there has been an alienation of the estate, and it is now in the hands of the son's grantee. In some of the States no vendor's lien could, under such circumstances, be enforced; and in others the whole doctrine, in regard to such liens has been repudiated, as being opposed to the prevailing policy which tends to make all matters of title to real estate open to inspection and subject to be established by record evidence. Hepburn v. Snyder, 3 Penn. St. 72; Womble v. Battle, 3 Ired. Eq. 182; Philbrook v. Delano, 29 Me. 410; Arlin v. Brown, 44 N. H. 102; Atwood v. Vincent, 17 Conn. 571; Perry v. Grant, 10 R. I. 334. But in England and in most of the American States, including Maryland, a different principle has been maintained, and a vendor's lien, for the unpaid purchase-money, will be enforced, not only against the vendor, but against all persous claiming under him, except bona fide purchasers, for a valuable consideration, without notice. Markrett v. Lymmen, 15 Ves. 329; Stafford v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Cow. 316; Ross v. Whitson, 6 Yerg. 50; Gilman v. Brown, 4 Wheat. 256; Carr v. Hobbs, 11 Md. 285. (3) A single creditor, who has obtained a pecific lien on real estate, can invoke the interposition of a court of equity by a bill asking for the annulment of a deed alleged to be fraudulent. Show v. Duright, 27 N. Y. 244; Sheafe v. Sheafe, 40 id. 116; Roberts v. Hodges, 13 N. J. 299. (4) Anterior to legislation altering the law in this respect, a creditor in this State was required to exhaust his legal remedy before he could institute proceedings in equity. But now such a course of procedure is no longer necessary, and without having merged his claim in a judgment creating a lien, a creditor can file his bill for the purpose of obtaining a decree to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. Md. Code, art. 16, § 35: Flack v. Charron, 29 Md. 311. But it has been decided that a voluntary conveyance rests on absolute title in the grantee subject only to the rights of creditors, and that when sufficient property is left in the hands of the debtor to pay the claims of existing creditors, the conveyance is valid even as against them. Providence Savings Bank v. Huntingdon, 1 Fed. Rep. 871; Atwater v. Seely, 1 McCrary, 264; Sherman v. Hogland, 54 Md. 578; Wiley v. Brodley, 67 Ind. 560; Zimmerman v. Fitch, 28 La. Ann. 454. By the courts in this State it has been held that it must be show by affirmative proof that the debtor has sufficient property, independent of that conveyed, to satisfy the claims of all his creditors. Birely v. Staley, 5 G. & I. 433; Worthington & Anderson v. Shipley, 5 Gill, 460; Bullit v. Worthington, 3 Md. Ch. Dec. 99. Md: Ct. App., March 10, 1886. Christopher v. Christopher. Opinion by Yellott, J.

EVIDENCE-EXPERT-REASON FOR OPINION.-An expert who has given his opinion in evidence may give his reasons for it in his examination in chief. The plaintiff's only objection urged at the argument was that it is not competent in the examination in chief to call out the reasons for the opinion of an expert. The opinion only is all that he who asks for it is eutitled to, though the reasons or grounds of it may or may not be inquired into on cross-examination. We are of opinion that the answer was admissible and should not have been excluded. The mere naked opinion of the witness, notwithstanding his large experience and extensive opportunity for observing the

facts connected with the driving of that river, might or might not, unexplained, be considered of much weight by the jury; while the grounds of his opinion, though involving simple facts of general notoriety, would enable the jury to "perceive the force of his reasoning, the soundness of his logic, and therefore judge of his capacity to give an opinion on the subject, the correctness of his conclusions and consequently the weight due to his opinion." Keith v. Lothrop, 10 Cush. 453; Dickinson v. Fitchburg, 13 Gray, 546; Lincoln v. Taunton Cop. Co., 9 Allen, 181; Sexton v. Bridgewater, 116 Mass. 200; Hawkins v. Fall River, 119 id. 94. If the reasons on which the intelligent opinion of an expert is founded can only be furnished to the jury by cross-examination, this case makes it evident that as wise a counsellor as the plaintiff's would never "give aid and comfort" to his adversary by such cross-examination. Me. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 7, 1886. Lewiston Steam Mill Co. v. Androscoggin Water Power Co. Opinion by Virgin, J.

LANDLORD AND TENANT-RENTING ON SHARES-ATTACHMENT OF LANDLORD'S INTEREST IN GROWING CROPS.-Where land is rented on shares, the tenant is the exclusive owner of the entire crop while growing, and the landlord's share of the crops reserved as rent cannot be levied upon by attachment until the same is set apart to him. Rees v. Baker, 4 G. Greene, 461; Townsend v. Isenberger, 45 Iowa, 670; Atkins v. Womeldorf, 53 id. 150. It is true that the landlord has a lien for the rent reserved, but he has neither title nor right of possession of the crop while growing. In such case a sheriff or other officer who attempts to levy an attachment or execution can make no valid levy because he has no right to take possession of the crop. He has no more authority to do so than the landlord has. The rent reserved, being a share of the crop, is the same as when the rent is reserved in money, so far as the rights of the landlord or his creditors to take possession are involved, and the tenant is in no manner in default until he refuses to deliver the share of the grain in compliance with his contract. That the right of the landlord to the rent is required to be attached by garnishment is plainly implied from the provisions of section 2975 of the Code. Iowa Sup. Ct., June 21, 1886. County of Howard v. Kyte. Opinion by Rothrock, J.

LIBEL AND SLANDER ACTIONABLE WORDS PRIVILEGED PUBLICATION.-In an action for libel it is not necessary for the plaintiff either to allege or to prove, in making out his prima facie case, that the publication complained of was not privileged. This is a matter of defense, to show absence of legal malice in the publication. The publication in a newspaper, by a teacher in a school for education of teachers, concerning a pupil therein, that "by her conduct in class, by her behavior in and around the building, and by her spirit as exhibited in numberless personal interviews, she has shown herself tricky and unreliable, and almost destitute of those womanly and honorable characteristics that should be the first requisites in a teacher," constitutes a libel, and the words used are unambiguous and actionable. Cal. Sup. Ct., May 18, 1886. Dixon v. Allen. Opinion by McKinstry, J.

MARRIAGE-DOWER-ORAL RELEASE ESTOPPEL.Where a wife did not join in a deed by her husband, but orally promised never to assert her right of dower if the money was paid to her personally, and it was so paid, she is estopped from asserting any right to property thus conveyed. Having accepted the money as a consideration for the promise, it would be equally inequitable now to permit the enforcement of the claim in violation of it. The heirs are now seeking, in a court of equity, to enforce a right which the ances

tor promised, for a consideration, never should be enforced. It would be against equity and good conscience to permit them to enforce it. It is contended that the promise was void because (1) the inchoate right of dower is not the subject of contract, and (2) being in parol, it is void under the statute of frauds, and that therefore it does not create an estoppel. That a void promise will not create an estoppel will be conceded. It will also be conceded that a doweress cannot, while her right is contingent, separate it from the property to which it attaches, and sell it as an independent interest, McKee v. Reynolds, 26 Iowa, 578. But the promise in this case was made to the purchaser of the real estate, and was made at the time of the purchase, and we know of no reason why she might not at that time make a separate contract with him for the sale of her inchoate right or interest in it. Married women are empowered by the statute (Code, § 1935) to convey or incumber any real estate or interest therein belonging to them. The doctrine that they cannot sell or convey their dower interest while it remains inchoate as an independent interest rests upon the peculiar nature of the right, and not upon any legal incapacity in them to contract with reference to it. Under this section we think it was competent for Mrs. Dunlap to contract with Counts for the sale of her dower interest in the property. Her promise that she would not assert the right was therefore not void on the first ground suggested. Neither was it void on the other ground urged. Our statute of frauds has relation, not to the contract, but to the evidence by which the contract is to be established. It provides (Code, § 3664) that no evidence of any contract for the creation or transfer of any interest in real estate, except leases for a term not exceeding one year, shall be competent, except it be in writing Under section 3665 however this provision does not apply when the vendor has received the purchasemoney, or any portion of it. When Mrs. Dunlap received the full value of the land, and promised that in consideration of the payment of the money to her, she would make no claim of dower in the land, she in effect contracted for the sale of her dower interest therein to Counts, and she also in effect received the money paid her as the price of that interest. Iowa Sup. Ct., June 22, 1886. Dunlap v. Thomas. by Reed, J., Adams, C. J., dissenting.

Opinion

MASTER AND SERVANT-CONTRACT OF HIRING-CONSTRUCTION.-A. addressed a letter to B., offering him $100 per month for his services, and "if you give me satisfaction at the end of the first year, I will increase your wages accordingly." The offer was accepted. Held, a contract of hiring for one year. As will be observed, there is no express limitation in the letters as to the term of service, though the wages were to be at the rate of $100 per month. But stipulations for the payment of wages quarterly, monthly, or even weekly, are not inconsistent with a yearly hiring. Fawcett v. Cash, 5 Barn. & Adol. 908. For, as said by Lord Kenyon, C. J., in the case of King v. Birdbrooke, 4 Term R. 245: "Whether the wages be to be paid by the week or the year can make no alteration in the duration of the service, if the contract were for a year." Here the written agreement furnishes a clew to the real intention of the parties, when it says: "If you (the appellee) give me satisfaction, at the end of the first year I will increase your salary accordingly." Why at the end of the year, rather than at any other time, if the contract was monthly, or only at will, as contended by the appellant? This passage of the letter, taken in connection with the situation of the parties, and the nature of the service to be performed, would seem to leave no room for doubt as to what was really contemplated by the contract of employment.

It would not be reasonable to suppose that it was intended that the appellee should have the right to terminate the contract at will, and thus to imperil the interests of his absent principal; and if such right was not designed to be possessed by the appellee, there is no principle that would justify the court in holding that such right could be exercised by the appellant with impunity, as there is nothing in the contract, or the nature of the employment, to indicate such want of mutuality. Md. Ct. App. Norton v. Cowell. Opinion by Alvey, C. J.

— LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR TRESPASS BY

CONTRACTOR.-An employer is responsible for the wrong done by a contractor or his servants in the execution of a wrongful or illegal act, though not of a legal act. Numerous cases are cited by the learned counsel for the defendants to the effect, as he claims, that they cannot be held responsible for the acts of those who cut and removed the timber, inasmuch as those parties sustained the relation of contractors, rather than that of servants or agents of these defendants. Undoubtedly that position might be tenable in a case where the defendants were sought to be held for the negligence of such persons in the performance of a legal act. Such is the doctrine of the cases cited. And the case of Eaton v. European & N. A. Ry. Co., 59 Me. 520, to which our attention has been particularly called, recognizes the distinction in this class of cases between the performance of a legal and an illegal act; holding in accordance with the authorities, that in the execution of a wrongful or illegal act, the employer is not exempt from liability, but is responsible for the wrong done by the contractor or his servants. In that opinion Appleton, C. J., says: "Though a person employing a contractor is not responsible for the negligence or misconduct of the contractor or his servants in executing the act, yet if the act is wrongful the employer is responsible for the wrong so done by the contractor or his servants, and is liable to third persons for damages sustained by such wrong doing. Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., 75 E. C. L. 767. So if in the present case the contract was to do a wrongful act, the defendants must be held liable for damages occasioned thereby; or if the defendant's engineer directed the contractors to do what was illegal and unauthorized, as by working outside of the limits of the true location, the defendants must be held liable for any trespass thus committed." So one who directs or authorizes a trespass to be done is liable. Bacheller v. Pinkham, 68 Me. 255. The general rule is that in actions of tort all persons concerned in the wrong are liable to be charged as principals." Tindal, C. J., in Cranch v. White, 1 Bing, N. C. 414; S. C., 27 E. C. L. 700; Cram v. Thissell, 35 Me. 88. The defendants in this case, whatever may be their legal relation to the parties actually cutting and removing the timber, must be considered as having authorized those wrongful and illegal acts which were but the natural and ordinary consequences of their own doings. Me. Sup. Jud. Ct., May 25, 1886. State v. Smith. Opinion by Foster, J.

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-CONTRACT WITH-ULTRA VIRES. Among the appropriations for the year 1881 to the guardians of the poor of Philadelphia was one for tea, coffee, rye, sugar and molasses, $33,000. The board of guardians, in advertising for proposals, included in the advertisement a call for proposals for coffee and also one for Ottoman cahvey, a substance partly composed of coffee, and used for mixing with it. Among the bids presented was that of A. for Ottoman cahvey. A contract to supply fifty barrels of the material was awarded to him, which award was Held, that as cahvey was not an item mentioned in approved by the proper committee of city councils.

the appropriation, it could not be treated afterward by the committee as having been included, and thus create any liability upon the part of the municipality to pay for same when furnished. Penn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 8, 1886. Ottoman Cahvey Co. v. City of Philadelphia. Opinion per Curiam.

ORDINANCES-READING BEFORE ADOPTION— VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY RULE.-(1) Section 489 of the Code, providing that city ordinances of a general or permanent nature shall be fully and distinctly read on three different days, held not to require that the three readings shall all be before the same city council. The third reading was after the annual elec tion and entrance upon office of a new mayor and four new aldermen, and the first two readings were before such election. All that the statute prescribes is three readings. The position that all the readings should be before the same persons is based upon an inference drawn from the supposed object of the provision. It is contended by the plaintiff that if three readings are desirable, it is just as desirable that all who are to vote upon the ordinance should hear the three readings. But the council consists of but one body, and the statute contemplates that there shall be, at all times, one-half of the aldermen who are not unfamiliar with the business of the council. We cannot think that it was intended that all unfinished business should be dropped at each council election, and taken up again entirely anew, if at all. To justify us in so holding, we think that we should have something stronger than a mere inference. It is true that one general assembly cannot join its action on to the action of the preceding general assembly, but we do not regard the analogy between a Legislature and city council sufficiently strong to be of controlling importance. If there be a sense in which there is a succession of city councils (which we do not determine), there is such immediate succession as to involve a substantial continuity, when taken with the fact that half of the aldermen hold over; and we have no doubt that a continuity was contemplated by the Legislature. We believe that the proper conduct of municipal affairs demands it. (2) The city council of Clinton adopted for its parliamentary governance Robert's Rules of Order. It is contended that according to one of the rules all unfinished business fell to the ground when the term of service of the outgoing aldermen expired. But if we should concede that the rule in question became applicable, the most that could be said is that the council violated one of its own parliamentary rules. But if the statute was complied with, as we hold it was, in the passage of the ordinance, we think it was valid. Iowa Sup. Ct., June 22, 1886. McGraw v. Whitson. Opinion by Adams, C. J. NEGLIGENCE-BAILMENT-LANDLORD AND TENANT. -Defendant was the owner and proprietor of a building which was let in flats to families for housekeeping. The proprietor furnished heat, hot and cold water, and janitor services to each suite of rooms; but he did not accommodate transients, or furnish food or board. Plaintiff rented a suite of rooms in the building, and not having sufficient room for his trunks he was permitted by defendant to store them in a general store-room in which the janitor slept. Nothing was paid or agreed to be paid for this extra accommodation. The trunks were broken open and their coutents stolen. In an action against the proprietor for the value of the goods, held, that the action could not be maintained; that the defendant was not an innholder, and in the absence of gross negligence or carelessness on his part he could not be held liable for the loss. Mass. Sup. Ct., May 7, 1886. Davis v. Gay. Opinion by W. Allen, J.

FRENCH AND ENGLISH LAW AND PRACTICE.

To the Editor of the Evening Post:

SIR: Why is it that we who are, or fancy we are, in the vanguard of civilization; who are known as an eminently practical nation; who think, talk, and work more rapidly than others, are as regards the foundation of all life and civilization-the law-in a state of mediæval darkness? Our judicial system, as compared with that of France, Italy, Germany, etc., is as barbarous, as obsolete as that of China could be in comparison with ours. Gigantic transactions take place with marvellous facility on the Stock, Produce, and other Exchanges; vast sums of money are invested, reinvested, and change hands in a short space of time, by a few words, with a few lines. But when a suit arises, the minutes of the original transaction become years of litigation; the few words or lines develop into interminable arguments, harassing and idle examination and cross-examination, and the suit is so involved in technicalities, trivialities, exceptions, etc., that the real issue becomes inundated with such a flood that Justice herself could scarcely pluck up drowned Truth by the locks.

Unfortunately the efforts at reform have been little encouraging. Take the Code of Civil Procedure. In volume it is larger than all the French Codes together. In incoherence, ambiguity, and triviality it stands an incomparable and melancholy monument to our intelligence. How would such paragraphs as 116-that a prisoner may send for and have beer, ale, cider, tea, coffee, and other necessaries by paying, etc., and the other numerous paragraphs of prison regulations strike one who was not inured to its absurdities-an impartial stranger who supposed that a Code of Procedure was what its name indicated? Why should so many pages of the Code be devoted to the salaries of stenographers, clerks, deputies in all the various counties? Why should questions of pure law, court, prison and municipal regulations be inextricably mingled and confused with rules of procedure, in a vast undigested mass which defies knowledge?

The French Code of Procedure is a model of clearness and precision, averaging three to four lines each, scarcely filling, with notes, annotations, etc., 150 clearly printed, large-typed pages. The order of arrangement is simple and methodic, and a fair knowledge of French procedure can be obtained by a few days' study. I can imagine no contrast greater than a comparative study of the French and our Code of Procedure, the one lucid, concise, and to the point, the other confused, prolix, and rambling, quite innocent of any method or arrangement whatever.

Still, with all its faults and absurdities, the Code of Civil Procedure is a step toward reform, an effort in the right direction. Had it proved more successful we should have been in possession of a Civil Code now, instead of struggling in a meshwork of the conflicting decisions of more or less capable judges during this and preceding centuries. I have heard aud read many arguments, or so-called arguments, against a Code, but I cannot recollect any except that the law would be rendered too simple, too readily accessible to the public, and that lawyers as a class would suffer. It seems incredible that so narrow, so medieval an argument could be put forth, but it is, and there can be no doubt that it underlies all other arguments and reasons which have prevented us from enjoying a Code.

So long as the Code Napoleon exists there can be no valid argument against a Code. We hear the cry of precedents of common law as the slow and consecrated result of time and liberty, of something that must be sacred, intact as the Constitution. But common

law is no corollary of liberty--France during the absolute monarchy was governed by common law. It was only when the great revolution had overthrown the tyranny of centuries, and the republic, with its doctrines of liberty, equality, and fraternity, was established, that the Code was compiled. It is the creation of liberty and enlightenment. It was the compilation, the codification, and expurgation of the laws and customs of different French provinces and the Royal Parliamentary edicts. It gave freedom to all, abolished primogeniture, entail, trusts, the invidious discrimination against foreigners, and stands as one of the greatest monuments of a great race. It has been adopted and imitated by all European nations except England-even by a nation so radically different in origin, customs, and law as Prussia.

And now, almost alone of the civilized world, monarchical and aristocratic England and some of the United States are governed by obsolete and shifting customs and contradictory precedents.

I believe that the vast majority of the people of New York desire a Code, but think that the Code so often presented to the Legislature and so often defeated is not a good one. This is undoubtedly true, but it has many merits, the greatest being that it is a Code, and we have certainly eminent jurisconsults to compile one that will be complete and systematic.

It has been my fortune to practice several years in Paris, acting as counsel to the U. S. Legation and Consulate-General, besides various American corporations and individuals, and I have acquired some knowledge of French law; probably as great as I should acquire of our law here in a life-time. The greater knowledge 1 acquired the more I was convinced of the completeness, the precision, the science of the law and practice in France.

The 2,281 concise and clear paragraphs of the Code constitute the law of the land. Master these and you know the law theoretically.

To know it practically is still an easier task; founded as all practice is on common sense. The papers in a suit should be drawn up clearly and intelligently, as any educated man would present a statement of facts. There are no absurd formalities and technicalities to be observed, requiring six or eight volumes each of "Waite's Practice and Actions and Defences," and such or other form and text books. And then before trial the lawyers on each side communicate their briefs so that incontrovertible facts and issues on either side are dropped, and the real issue is tried.

But the greatest contrast between the French practice and ours is in the introduction of evidence and examination of witnesses. There are no arbitrary and technical rules of evidence, which more than any one cause impede and delay our administration of justice. No exceptions, and objections, and rulings; no confusing, and coaxing, and bullying the witness by the different counsel, but a simple, quiet examination by the judge himself. It has been thought more conducive to the ends of justice, more likely to elicit the facts, for the judge, rather than the contending counsel, to examine the witness. And very justly, to my mind. The judge is impartial, the counsel are not. And if the witness is allowed to tell his own story to the judge, to submit only to his interrogations, he is far more likely to tell the truth than when alternately brow-beaten, confused, entangled, and coaxed by the opposing counsel.

W. MORTON GRINNELL.

[We reprint the above, not because we agree with the writer's opinion of our proposed Civil Code, but because it is an intelligent and powerful testimony to the practicability of codification.- ED.]

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

DEERING ON NEGLIGENCE.

This is a new number of the Pony Series, by Mr. James H. Deering, and published by the new house of Bancroft, Whitney & Co., of San Francisco, formed by the consolidation of A.S. Bancroft & Co. and Sumner, Whitney & Co: It is written on the plan of the preceding volumes, of which we have spoken on their publication, and is apparently admirably executed. It is a really remarkably complete and condensed digest of the law of this great subject-the most fruitful in litigation in modern times. It is obvious that the same labor would have produced a much larger work, but the strong point of these little coat-pocket volumes is that it is so easy to find any thing in them. After codification, it would be a good thing to have all the law authoritatively digested in this manner.

WADE ON ATTACHMENT.

A Treatise on the Law of Attachment and Garnishment, with an appendix containing a compilation of the statutes of the different States and Territories now in force governing suits by attachment. By W. P. Wade. San Francisco: Bancroft, Whitney & Co. 2 vols.

At last Mr. Drake's standard treatise has a rival in these portly and well-printed volumes. Although the author has extended the subject to two volumes, we do not discover any signs of padding. Much of the increase of space is due to the remarkably complete and well-arranged appendix of statutes. The indexes are remarkably ample. The first volume is devoted to direct levy; the second to garnishment. We shall not venture to compare this work with Mr. Drake's. "Comparisons are odorous," said a wise man. Nothing can be better than Mr. Drake's treatment of the subject, and yet Mr. Wade has given a peculiar practical value to his own work. The practitioner will find either useful and trustworthy. We notice that Mr. Wade in his preface apologizes for expressing his opinion here and there. This we deem superfluous. It is almost impossible for any well-qualified text-writer to refrain from expressing his opinions, and they frequently grow to have weight and to be cited as authority.

A bad boy-boycott.

NOTES.

The law establishing divorces in France came into force on July 27, 1884, and the statistics relating to the administration of justice in that year, which have recently been published, show to what extent the new law was taken advantage of for the first five months of its being in force. During that period 1,773 petitions for a divorce were lodged; but out of this total all but 124 were for converting a separation into a divorce. The total number of petitions for a separation was 3,666, or forty-nine fewer than in 1883; but of these petitions 386 were based upon an allegation of adultery as against only 198 attributed to the same cause in the previous year. In 84 cases out of 100 the petition was lodged by the wife. In more than half the petitions for divorce there was no issue by the marriage. No definite information is furnished as to the professions of the different petitioners. But 2,821 separations were granted, while 1,657 of the pe titions for divorce were successful. Out of this total 601 divorces and 723 separations were granted in Paris, while of the other departments in France five (the Ariège, the Cantal, the Corrèze, the Lozère, and the Savoie) had not a single divorce case in the first

year.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, JULY 24, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

Canadian Law Times, remarking upon our

Te Canadian Ents on the impolicy of putting

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it is the following phrases adulatory of the common law: "its free spirit, its pliant nature, its robust life, its boundless and buoyant hopefulness." Hopefulness" in law is surely a singular attribute. Mr. Chamberlain makes the most of the stock and only practical argument of his schoolwe had almost said, of his law school- the statute of frauds. But he is surely rather unhappy in comparing with it the law of mortgages, of which he says that "there is not, and never was, in any system of law, an instance of more perfect adaptation of law to the wants of the people, to the demands of daily business life -the security of property and the safe expansion and development of our material interests than is presented in the history and character of our law of mortgages. It is both wellmortgages has been the subject of two recent volsettled and well-expressed." And yet the law of uminous treatises by Mr. Herman and Mr. Jones, and the head in the digests is one of the largest. But why would it not be wise to express in a few sentences what has been decided about the Statute of Frauds? By the way, why does not Prof. Dwight give us code "fanatics ”– — as Mr. Chamberlain calls a chance at his youth?

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the admission and discipline of attorneys within the exclusive jurisdiction of committees of the State Bar Association, says: "Speaking with some experience in this matter, for a very similar system has prevailed in this province for years, we think that the provision with regard to admission will be found unobjectionable; but we are not so confident as to the disciplinary clause. The first probably works but little change in the prevailing system the appointment of examiners, as we understand it, being transferred from the court to the association. We regard the disciplinary provisions as wrong in principle. A judge should be further removed from the person upon whose conduct he is called to pronounce than such a system permits. Although the tribunal contemplated may be strictly 'of one's peers,' yet considering the important issue at stake upon every inquiry in which its jurisdiction is invoked no less than a man's reputation and means of livelihood - the accused's right to access to the ordinary tribunals, and to the very highest of them, should he wish to approach it, ought not to be restricted or hampered. It is possible that the right stricted or hampered. It is possible that the right of appeal is not denied by the bill, but this is not the same thing. On the other hand, a most embarrassing and oft-times painful responsibility is thrust upon members of the bar. They may be called upon to determine disputes between, or affecting, professional friends and intimates, and the fulfillment of their duty is apt to result in misunderstandings, or ill feeling, or the rupture of valued friendships. In cases of doubt, whatever their decision, it is sure to be impugned by friends of the accused, and their motives questioned. From such imputated you to college; if you cannot then boast that you tions a member of the court is removed; the recognized duty of his office is to decide disputes, and have 'forgotten the Greek alphabet; ' above all, if you his position is such that partiality is seldom likely dides, or construe an ode of Horace, be prepared to are then actually able to read a chapter of Thucyto be charged against him, and professional jeal-hear yourself taunted with having a superabunousy never. Altogether, we consider that it would be the part of wisdom if the profession in New York declined the honor of having this jurisdiction conferred upon any of their number. They will be happier without it."

Mr. Daniel H. Chamberlain sends us his recent address to the graduating class of Columbia College Law School. Of course Mr. Chamberlain would not have been invited to make this address unless he had been opposed to codification, and he has improved the opportunity by demonstrating to his own satisfaction at least, that codification is impracticable, He advances nothing new, however, unless VOL. 34-No. 4.

We like better the following advice about culture: "But your profession will, in most cases, claim your constant devotion, and I am moved to remind you that Burke was not wrong when he said of the practice of our profession, that 'while it sharpens, it narrows.' I know of but one defense against this tendency, against the carking cares, the sordid influences, the mean jealousies, that will surround you and tempt you. It is a life-long cultivation of those arts which have prepared you to be lawyers — the studies, the literary tastes, which the whole cultivated world has stamped as the means of mental health and growth. But while I urge you to continue to be scholars as you value your happiness and usefulness, I must caution you of the penalty it will bring. If your lot should be cast in this city, and if at the end of twenty years of your professional life you can still pass the examinations which admit

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dance of leisure,' and while you are stealing a few stray moments which most men worse than waste, to give to those ennobling studies, be not surprised to see your enemies, and sometimes even your friends, pointing you out and bewailing your literary dissipation, and your lack of devotion to professional work! Still I cannot advise you to abandon your literary tastes and studies, but only to hide them, as some men are said to hide their charities."

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