« AnteriorContinuar »
in Bridgmau v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 626, has been fully facts connected with the driving of that river, might recognized in this State. It therefore follows that or might not, unexplained, be considered of much when a sum of money is named as the consideration weight by the jury; while the grounds of his opinion, in the recital of a deed, it is not competent to adduce though involving simple facts of general notoriety, evidence tending to show that the real consideration would enable the jury to “perceive the force of his was a gift from the grantor to the grantee. (2) As | reasoning, the sounduess of his logic, and therefore the purchase-money was not paid, the appellee had a judge of his capacity to give an opinion on the subvendor's lien on the property which she sold and con- ject, the correctness of his conclusions and conseveyed to her son. But there has been an alienation quently the weight due to his opinion." Keith v. of the estate, and it is now in the hands of the son's | Lothrop, 10 Cush. 453; Dickinson v. Fitchburg, 13 grantee. In some of the States no vendor's lien could, Gray, 546; Lincoln v. Tauuton Cop. Co., 9 Allen, 181; under such circumstances, be enforced; and in others | Sexton v. Bridgewater, 116 Mass. 200; Hawkins v. the whole doctrine, in regard to such liens has been Fall River, 119 id. 94. If the reasons on which the repudiated, as being opposed to the prevailing policy intelligent opinion of an expert is founded can only be which tends to make all matters of title to real estate furnished to the jury by cross-examination, this case open to inspection and subject to be established by | makes it evident that as wise a counsellor as the plainrecord evidence. Hepburn v. Suyder, 3 Pend. St. 72; tiff's would never "give aid and comfort" to his adWomble v. Battle, 3 Ired. Eq. 182; Philbrook v. De versary by such cross-examination. Me. Sup. Jud. lano, 29 Me. 410; Arlin v. Brown, 44 N. II. 102; Atwood Ct., June 7, 1886. Lewiston Steam Hill Co. v. Androsv. Vincent, 17 Conn. 571; Perry v. Grant, 10 R. I. 334. | coggin Water Power Co. Opinion by Virgin, J. But in England and in most of the American States, including Maryland, a different principle has been
LANDLORD AND TENANT-RENTING ON SHARES-ATmaintained, and a vendor's lien, for the unpaid pur
TACHMENT OF LANDLORD'S INTEREST IN GROWING chase-money, will be enforced, not only against the
CROPS. --Where land is rented on shares, the tenant is vendor, but against all persons claiming under him,
the exclusive owner of the entire crop while growing, except bona fide purchasers, for a valuable consider
and the landlord's share of the crops reserved as rent ation, without notice. Markrett v. Lymmen, 15 Ves.
cannot be levied upon by attachment until the same 329; Stafford v. Van Rensselaer, 9 Cow. 316; Ross v.
is set apart to him. Rees v. Baker, 4 G. Greene, 461; Whitson, 6 Yerg. 50; Gilman v. Brown, 4 Wheat. 2:36; }
Townsend v. Isenberger, 45 Iowa, 670; Atkins v. Carr v. Hobbs, 11 Md. 285. (3) A single creditor, who
Womeldorf, 53 id. 150. It is true that the landlord bas obtained a pecific lien on real estate, can invoke
has a lien for the rent reserved, but he has neither the interposition of a court of equity by a bill asking
title nor right of possession of the crop while growing. for the annulment of a deed alleged to be fraudulent.
In such case a sheriff or other officer who attempts to Show v. Duright, 27 N. Y. 244; Sheafe y. Sheafe, 40 id.
levy an attachment or execution can make no valid 116; Roberts v. Hodges, 13 N. J. 299. (4) Anterior to
levy because he has no right to take possession of the legislation altering the law in this respect, a creditor
crop. He has no more authority to do so than the
landlord has. The rent reserved, being a share of the in this State was required to exhaust his legal remedy before he could instituto proceedings in equity. But
crop, is the same as when the rent is reserved in now such a course of procedure is no longer necessary,
money, so far as the rights of the landlord or his credand without having merged his claim in a judgment
itors to take possession are involved, and the tenant creating a lien, a creditor can file his bill for the pur
is in no manier in default until he refuses to deliver pose of obtaining a decree to set aside a fraudulent
the share of the grain in compliance with his contract. conveyance. Md, Code, art. 16, $ 35; Flack v. Char
That the right of the landlord to the rent is required ron, 29 Md. 311. But it has been decided that a vol.
to be attached by garnishment is plainly implied from untary conveyance rests on absolute title in the grantee
the provisions of section 2975 of the ('ode. Iowa Sup, subject only to the rights of creditors, and that
Ct., June 21, 1886. County of Howard v. Kyte. Opinwhen sufficient property is left in the hands of the
ion by Rothrock, J. debtor to pay the claims of existing creditors, the LIBEL AND SLANDER -- ACTIONABLE WORDS — PRIVconveyance is valid even as against them. Providence | ILEGED) PUBLICATION.-In an action for libel it is not Savings Bank v. Huntingdon, 1 Fed. Rep. 871; At necessary for the plaintiff either to allege or to prove, water v. Seely, 1 McCrary, 264; Sherman v. Hogland, in making out his prima facie case, that the publica54 Md. 578; Wiley v. Brodley, 07 Ind. 560; Zimmer tion complained of was not privileged. This is a matman v. Fitch, 28 La. Ann. 454. By the courts in this ter of defense, to show absence of legal malice in the State it has been held that it must be show by affirma publication. The publication in a newspaper, by a tire proof that the debtor has sufficient property, in teacher in a school for education of teachers, concerndependent of that conveyed, to satisfy the claims of | ing a pupil therein, that “by her conduct in class, by all his creditors. Birely v. Staley, 5 G. & I. 4.33; Worth her behavior in and around the building, and by ington & Anderson v. Shipley, 5 Gill, 460; Bullit v. her spirit as exhibited in numberless personal interWorthington, 3 Md. Ch. Dec. 99. Md: Ct. App., views, she has shown herself tricky and unreliable, March 10, 1886. Christopher v. Christopher. Opinion and almost destitute of those womanly and honorable by Yellott, J.
characteristics that should be the first requisites in a
teacher," constitutes a libel, and the words used are EVIDENCE-EXPERT-REASON FOR OPINION.--An ex
unambiguous and actionable. ('al. Sup. Ct., May 18, pert who has given his opinion in evidence may give
1886. Dixon v. Allen. Opinion by McKinstry, J. his reasons for it in his examination in chief. The plaintiff's only objection urged at the argument was MARRIAGE-DOWER-ORAL RELEASE - ESTOPPEL.that it is not competent in the examination in chief | Where a wife did not join in a deed by her husband, to call out the reasons for the opinion of an expert. but orally promised never to assert her right of dower The opinion only is all that he who asks for it is eu- if the money was paid to her personally, and it was so titled to, though the reasons or grounds of it may or paid, she is estopped from asserting any right to propmay not be inquired into on cross-examination. We erty thus conveyed. Having accepted the money as are of opinion that the answer was admissible and 1 a consideration for the promise, it would be equally should not have been excluded. The mere naked inequitable now to permit the enforcement of the opinion of the witness, notwithstanding his large ex
anding his large esa , claim in violation of it. The heirs are now seeking, in perience and extensive opportunity for observing the a court of equity, to enforce a right which the auces
tor promised, for a consideration, never should be en It would not be reasonable to suppose that it was inforced. It would be against equity and good con
tended that the appellee should have the right to terscience to permit them to enforce it. It is contended
minate the contract at will, and thus to imperil the that the promise was void because (1) the inchoate interests of his absent principal; and if such right was right of dower is not the subject of contract, and (2) not designed to be possessed by the appellee, there being in parol, it is void under the statute of frauds, is no principle that would justify the court in holdand that therefore it does not create an estoppel. That ing that such right could be exercised by the appela void promise will not create an estoppel will be con
lant with impunity, as there is nothing in the conceded. It will also be conceded that a doweress can tract, or the nature of the employment, to indicate not, while her right is contingent, separate it from the such want of mutuality. Md. Ct. App. Norton v. property to which it attaches, and sell it as an inde Cowell. Opinion by Alvey, C. J. pendent interest, McKee v. Reynolds, 26 Iowa, 578.
-- LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER FOR TRESPASS BY But the promise in this case was made to the pur
CONTRACTOR.–An employer is responsible for the chaser of the real estate, and was made at the time of
wrong done by a contractor or his servants in the exethe purchase, and we know of no reason why she might
cution of a wrongful or illegal act, though not of a uot at that time make a separate contract with him
legal act. Numerous cases are cited by the learned for the sale of her inchoate right or interest in it.
counsel for the defendants to the effect, as he claims, Married women are empowered by the statute (Code,
that they cannot be held responsible for the acts of $ 1935) to couvey or incumber any real estate or in- ||
those who cut and removed the timber, inasmuch as terest therein belonging to them. The doctrine that
those parties sustained the relation of contractors, they cannot sell or convey their dower interest while
me rather than that of servants or agents of these defendit remains inchoate as an independent interest rests
ants. Undoubtedly that position might be tenable in upon the peculiar nature of the right, and not upon
a case where the defendants were sought to be held any legal incapacity in them to contract with reference
for the negligence of such persons in the performance to it. Under this section we think it was competent of a legal act. Such is the doctrine of the cases cited. for Mrs. Dunlap to contract with Counts for the
And the case of Eaton v. European & N. A. Ry. Co., sale of her dower interest in the property. Her prom
59 M9. 520, to which our attention has been particuise that she would not assert the right was therefore
larly called, recognizes the distinction in this class of not void on the first ground suggested. Neither was
cases between the performance of a legal and an illeit void on the other ground urged. Our statute of
gal act; holding in accordance with the authorities, frauds has relation, not to the contract, but to the
that in the execution of a wrongful or illegal act, the evidence by which the contract is to be established. It
employer is not exempt from liability, but is responprovides (Code, $ 3664) that no evidence of any con
sible for the wrong done by the contractor or his sertract for the creation or transfer of any interest in vants. In that opinion Appleton, C. J., says: real estate, except leases for a term not exceeding one | Though a person employing a contractor is not reyear, shall be competent, except it be in writing.
sponsible for the negligence or misconduct of the conUnder section 3665 however this provision does not
tractor or his servants in executing the act, yet if the apply when the vendor has received the purchase
act is wrongful the employer is responsible for the money, or any portion of it. When Mrs. Dunlap re
wrong so done by the contractor or his servants, and is ceived the full value of the land, and promised that in
liable to third persons for damages sustained by such consideration of the payment of the money to her,
wrong doing. Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Consumers Co., she would make no claim of dower in the land, she in
75 E. C. L. 767. So if in the present case the contract effect contracted for the sale of her dower interest
was to do a wrongful act, the defendants must be held therein to Counts, and she also in effect received the
liable for damages occasioned thereby; or if the demoney paid her as the price of that interest. Iowa
fendant's engineer directed the contractors to do Sup. Ct., June 22, 1886. Dunlap v. Thomas. Opinion
what was illegal and unauthorized, as by working outby Reed, J., Adams, C. J., dissenting.
side of the limits of the true location, the defendants MASTER AND SERVANT-CONTRACT OF HIRING- CON must be held liable for any trespass thus committed." STRUCTION.-A. addressed a letter to B., offering him
So one who directs or authorizes a trespass to be done $100 per month for his services, and “if you give me
iş liable. Bacheller v. Pinkham, 68 Me. 255. The geusatisfaction at the end of the first year, I will increase eral rule is that in actions of tort all persons concerned your wages accordingly." The offer was accepted. , in the wrong are liable to be charged as principals." Held, a contract of hiring for one year. As will be
Tindal, C. J., in Cranch v. White, 1 Bing, N. C. 414; observed, there is no express limitation in the letters
S. C., 27 E. C. L. 700; Cram v. Thissell, 35 Me. 88. The as to the term of service, though the wages were to be
defendants in this case, whatever may be their legal at the rate of $100 per month. But stipulations for
relation to the parties actually cutting and removing the payment of wages quarterly, monthly, or even
the timber, must be considered as having authorized weekly, are not inconsistent with a yearly hiring. those wrongful and illegal acts which were but the Fawcett v. Cash, 5 Barn. & Adol. 908. For, as said by
natural and ordinary consequences of their own doLord Kenyon, C. J., in the case of King v. Birdbrooke,
iugs. Me. Sup. Jud. Ct., May 25, 1886. State v. Smith. 4 Term R. 245: “Whether the wages be to be paid by | Opinion by Foster, J. the week or the year can make no alteration in the MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-CONTRACT WITH-ULTRA duration of the service, if the contract were for a | VIRES.-. Among the appropriations for the year 1881 year." Here the written agreement furnishes a clew to the guardians of the poor of Philadelphia was one to the real intention of the parties, when it says: “If for tea, coffee, rye, sugar and molasses, $33,000. The you (the appellee) give me satisfaction, at the end of | the first year I will increase your salary accordingly.”
board of guardians, in advertising for proposals, inWhy at the end of the year, rather than at any other
cluded in the advertisement a call for proposals for time, if the contract was monthly, or only at will, as
coffee and also one for Ottoman cahvey, a substance contended by the appellant? This passage of the let
partly composed of coffee, and used for mixing with ter, taken in connection with the situation of the
it. Among the bids presented was that of A. for Otparties, and the nature of the service to be performed,
toman cahvey. A contract to supply fifty barrels of would seem to leave no room for doubt as to what was approved by the proper committee of city councils.
the material was awarded to him, which award was really contemplated by the contract of employment. Held, that as cahvey was not an item mentioned in
the appropriation, it could not be treated afterward | FRENCH AND ENGLISH LAW AND PRACTICE. by the committee as having been included, and thus create any liability upon the part of the municipality To the Editor of the Evening Post: to pay for same when furnished. Peun. Sup. Ct., Feb.
SIR: Why is it that we who are, or fancy we are, in 8. 1886. Ottoman Cahvey Co. y. City of Philadelphia.
the vanguard of civilization; who are known as an emOpinion per Curiam.
inently practical nation; who thiuk, talk, and work - ORDINANCES-READING BEFORE ADOPTION more rapidly than others, are as regards the foundaVIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY RULE.--(1) Section 489 tion of all life and civilization—the law-in a state of of the Code, providing that city ordinances of a gen
mediæval darkness? Our judicial system, as comeral or permanent nature shall be fully and distinctly | pared with that of France, Italy, Germany, etc., is as read on three different days, held not to require that barbarous, as obsolete as tbat of China could be in the three readings shall all be before the same city
comparison with ours. Gigantic transactions take council. The third reading was after the annual eleco
place with marvellons facility on the Stock, Produce, tion and entrance upon office of a new mayor and
and other Exchanges; vast sums of money are infour new aldermen, and the first two readings were
vested, reinvested, and change hands in a short space before such election. All that the statute prescribes of time, by a few words, with a few lines. But when is three readings. The position that all the readings
a suit arises, the minutes of the original transaction should be before the same persons is based upon an become years of litigation; the few words or lives deinference drawn from the supposed object of the pro
velop into interminable arguments, harassing and idlo vision. It is contended by the plaintiff that if three
examination and cross-examination, and the suit is so readings are desirable, it is just as desirable that all
involved in technicalities, trivialities, exceptions, etc., who are to vote upon the ordinance should hear the
that the real issue becomes inundated with such a three readings. But the council consists of but one
flood that Justice herself could scarcely pluck up body,and the statute contemplates that there shall be,
drowned Truth by the locks. at all times, one-half of the aldermen who are not un
Unfortunately the efforts at reform have been little familiar with the business of the council. We cannot
encouraging. Take the Code of Civil Procedure. In think that it was intended that all unfinished business
volume it is larger than all the French Codes together. should be dropped at each council election, and taken
In incoherence, ambiguity, and triviality it stands an up again entirely anew, if at all. To justify us in so
incomparable and melancholy monument to our inholding, we think that we should have something
telligence. How would such paragraphs as 116—that a stronger than a mere inference. It is true that one
prisoner may send for and have beer, ale, cider, tea, general assembly cannot join its action on to the ac
coffee, and other necessaries by paying, etc., and the tion of the preceding general assembly, but we do not
other numerous paragraphs of prison regulations regard the analogy between a Legislature and city
strike one who was not inured to its absurdities-an council sufficiently strong to be of controlling import
impartial stranger who supposed that a Code of Proance. If there be a sense in which there is a succes
cedure was what its name indicated? Why should so sion of city councils (which we do not determine),
many pages of the Code be devoted to the salaries of there is such immediate succession as to involve a
stenographers, clerks, deputies in all the various counsubstantial continuity, when taken with the fact that
ties? Why should questions of pure law, court, prison half of the aldermen hold over; and we have no doubt
and municipal regulations be inextricably mingled and that a continuity was contemplated by the Legisla
confused with rules of procedure, in a vast undigested ture. We believe that the proper conduct of munici
mass which defies knowledge ? pal affairs demands it. (2) The city council of Clinton
The French Code of Procedure is a model of clearadopted for its parliamentary governance Robert's
ness and precision, averaging three to four lines each, Rules of Order. It is contended that according to one
scarcely filling, with Botes, annotations, etc., 150 of the rules all unfinished business fell to the ground
clearly printed, large-typed pages. The order of arwhen the term of service of the outgoing aldermen ex
rangement is simple and methodic, and a fair knowledge pired. But if we should concede that the rule in
of Freuch procedure can be obtained by a few days' question became applicable, the most that could be
study. I can imagine no contrast greater than a comsaid is that the council violated one of its own par
parative study of the French and our Code of Proceliamentary rules. But if the statute was complied
dure, the one lucid, concise, and to the point, the with, as we hold it was, in the passage of the ordine
other confused, prolix, and rambling, quite innocent ance, we think it was valid. Iowa Sup. Ct., June 22,
of any method or arrangement whatever. 1886. McGraw v. Whitson. Opinion by Adams, C. J.
Still, with all its faults and absurdities, the Code of
Civil Procedure is a step toward reform, an effort in NEGLIGENCE-BAILMENT-LANDLORD AND TENANT. the right direction. Had it proved more successful -Defendant was the owner and proprietor of a build we should have been in possession of a Civil Code ing which was let in flats to families for housekeeping. now, instead of struggling in a mesh work of the conThe proprietor furnished heat, hot and cold water, flicting decisions of more or less capable judges durand janitor services to each suite of rooms; but he ing this and preceding centuries. I have heard aud did not accommodate transients, or furnish food or read many arguments, or so-called arguments, against board. Plaintiff rented a suite of rooms in the build a Code, but I cannot recollect any except that the law ing, and not having sufficient room for his truuks he would be rendered too simple, too readily accessible was permitted by defendant to store then in a general to the public, and that lawyers as a class would suffer, store-room in which the janitor slept. Nothing was It seems incredible that so narrow, so mediaval an paid or agreed to be paid for this extra accommoda argument could be put forth, but it is, and there can tion. The trunks were broken open and their con be no doubt that it underlies all other arguments and tents stolen. In an action against the proprietor for reasons which have prevented us from enjoying a the value of the goods, held, that the action could not Code. be maintained; that the defendant was not an inn So long as the Code Napoleon exists there can be no holder, and in the absence of gross negligence or care
valid argument against a Code. Wo hear the cry of lessness on his part he could not be held liable for the precedents of common law as the slow and consecraloss. Mass. Sup. Ct., May 7, 1886. Davis v. Gay. Opin ted result of time and liberty, of something that must ion by W. Alleu, J.
be sacred, intact as the Constitution. But common
law is no corollary of liberty--France during the ab NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.
DEERING ON NEGLIGENCE.
umes is that it is so easy to find any thing in them. And now, almost alone of the civilized world, mon. After codification, it would be a good thing to have all archical and aristocratic England and some of the the law authoritatively digested in this manner. United States are governed by obsolete and shifting customs and contradictory precedents. I believe that the vast majority of the people of
WADE ON ATTACHMENT. New York desire a Code, but think that the Code so A Treatise on the Law of Attachment and Garnishment, often presented to the Legislature and so often de with an appendix containing a compilation of the statfeated is not a good one. This is undoubtedly true, utes of the different States and Territories now in force but it has many merits, the greatest being that it is a governing suits by attachment. By W. P. Wade. San Code, and we have certainly eminent jurisconsults to Francisco: Bancroft, Whitney & Co. 2 vols. compile one that will be complete and systematic. At last Mr. Drake's standard treatise has a rival in
It has been my fortune to practice several years in these portly and well-printed volumes. Although the Paris, acting as counsel to the U. S. Legation and Con author has extended the subject to two volumes, we sulate-General, besides various American corporations do not discover any signs of padding. Much of the and individuals, and I have acquired some knowledge increase of space is due to the remarkably complete of French law; probably as great as I should acquire and well-arranged appendix of statutes. The indexes of our law here in a life-time. The greater knowledge are remarkably ample. The first volume is devoted 1 acquired the more I was convinced of the complete- to direct levy; the second to garnishment. We shall ness, the precision, the science of the law and practice not venture to compare this work with Mr. Drake's. in France.
"Comparisons are odorous," said a wise man. NothThe 2,281 concise and clear paragraphs of the Code | ing can be better than Mr. Drake's treatment of the constitute the law of the land. Master these and you subject, and yet Mr. Wade has given a peculiar practiknow the law theoretically.
cal value to his own work. The practitioner will find To know it practically is stillan easier task; founded either useful and trustworthy. We notice that Mr. as all practice is on common sense. The papers in a Wade in his preface apologizes for expressing his opinsuit should be drawn up clearly and intelligently, as ion here and there. This we deem superfluous. It is any educated man would present a statement of facts. almost impossible for any well-qualified text-writer to There are no absurd formalities and technicalities to refrain from expressing his opinions, and they frebe observed, requiring six or eight volumes each of quently grow to have weight and to be cited as au" Waite's Practice and Actions and Defences," and
thority. such or other form and text books. And then before trial the lawyers on each side communicate their
NOTES. briefs so that incontrovertible facts and issues on either side are dropped, and the real issue is tried. A bad boy-boycott.
But the greatest contrast between the French prac The law establishing divorces in France came into tice and ours is in the introduction of evidence and force on July 27, 1884, and the statistics relating to the examination of witnesses. There are no arbitrary and administration of justice in that year, which have retechnical rules of evidence, which more than any one
cently been published, show to what extent the new cause impede and delay our administration of justice,
law was taken advantage of for the first five montbs No exceptions, and objections, and rulings; no con of its being in force. During that period 1,773 pen. fusing, and coaxing, and bullying the witness by
tions for a divorce were lodged; but out of this total the different counsel, but a simple, quiet examination
all but 124 were for converting a separation into a dlby the judge himself. It has been thought more con vorce. The total number of petitions for a separation ducive to the ends of justice, more likely to elicit the
was 3,666, or forty-nine fewer than in 1883; but of facts, for the judge, rather than the contending coun
these petitions 386 were based upon an allegation of gel, to examine the witness. And very justly, to my adultery as against only 198 attributed to the same mind. The judge is impartial, the counsel are not. I cause in the previous year. In 84 cases out of 100 the And if the witness is allowed to tell his own story to petition was lodged by the wife. In more than hali the judge, to submit only to his interrogations, he is the petitions for divorce there was no issine by the far more likely to tell the truth than when alternately
kely to tell the truth than when alternately, marriage. No definite information is fu'fuished as brow-beaten, confused, entangled, and coaxed by the to the professions of the different petitioners. But opposing counsel.
2,821 separations were granted, while 1,657 be the pe: W. MORTON GRINNELL.
titions for divorce were successful. Out of this total [We reprint the above, not because we agree with
601 divorces and 723 separations were granted in
Paris, while of the other departments in Irance five the writer's opinion of our proposed Civil Code,
(the Ariège, the Cantal, the Corrèze, the Lozère, and but because it is an intelligent and powerful testi- the Savoie) had not a single divorce case iil the first mony to the practicability of codification. - ED.) year.
The Albany Law Journal.
it is the following phrases adulatory of the common law: “its free spirit, its pliant nature, its robust life, its boundless and buoyant bopefulness."
“ Hopefulness" in law is surely a singular attribute. - Albany, July 24, 1886. Mr. Chamberlain makes the most of the stock and
only practical argument of his school - we had
almost 'said, of his law school — the statute of CURRENT TOPICS.
frauds. But he is surely rather unhappy in com
paring with it the law of mortgages, of which he THE Canadian Law Times, remarking upon our |
says that “there is not, and never was, in any sysI recent comments on the impolicy of putting
tem of law, an instance of more perfect adaptation the admission and discipline of attorneys within the l of law to the wants of the people, to the demands exclusive jurisdiction of committees of the State of daily business life - the security of property and Bar Association, says: “Speaking with some ex
the safe expansion and development of our material perience in this matter, for a very similar system
interests — than is presented in the history and has prevailed in this province for years, we think
character of our law of mortgages. It is both wellthat the provision with regard to admission will be
settled and well-expressed.” And yet the law of found unobjectionable; but we are not so confident | mortgages has been the subject of two recent volas to the disciplinary clause. The first probably luminous treatises by Mr. Herman and Mr. Jones. works but little change in the prevailing system - and the head in the digests is one of the largest. the appointment of examiners, as we understand it, 1 But why would it not be wise to express in a few being transferred from the court to the association.
sentences what has been decided about the Statute We regard the disciplinary provisions as wrong in of Frauds? By the way, why does not Prof. Dwight principle. A judge should be further removed from
give us code “fanatics ”_ as Mr. Chamberlain calls the person upon whose conduct he is called to pro
us — a chance at his youth?
We like better the following advice about culture:
“But your profession will, in most cases, claim your voked - no less than a man's reputation and means
constant devotion, and I am moved to remind you
that Burke was not wrong when he said of the prac. of livelihood -- the accused's right to access to the
tice of our profession, that while it sharpens, it ordinary tribunals, and to the very highest of them,
narrows.' I know of but one defense against this should he wish to approach it, ought not to be restricted or hampered. It is possible that the right
tendency, against the carking cares, the sordid in. of appeal is not denied by the bill, but this is not
fluences, the mean jealousies, that will surround you the same thing. On the other hand, a most embar
and tempt you. It is a life-long cultivation of those rassing and oft-times painful responsibility is thrust
arts which have prepared you to be lawyers — the upon members of the bar. They may be called
studies, the literary tastes, which the whole culti
vated world has stamped as the means of mental upon to determine disputes between, or affecting,
health and growth. But while I urge you to conprofessional friends and intimates, and the fulfillment of their duty is apt to result in misunderstand
tinue to be scholars as you value your happiness
and usefulness, I must caution you of the penalty it ings, or ill feeling, or the rupture of valued friend
will bring. If your lot should be cast in this city, ships. In cases of doubt, whatever their decision,
and if at the end of twenty years of your professional it is sure to be impugned by friends of the accused, and their motives questioned. From such imputa
| life you can still pass the examinations which admittions a member of the court is removed; the recog
ted you to college; if you cannot then boast that you
have forgotten the Greek alphabet; 'above all, if you nized duty of his office is to decide disputes, and his position is such that partiality is seldom likely
are then actually able to read a chapter of Thucy.
dides, or construe an ode of Horace, be prepared to to be charged against him, and professional jeal
hear yourself taunted with having 'a superabunousy never. Altogether, we consider that it would
dance of leisure,' and while you are stealing a few be the part of wisdom if the profession in New York declined the honor of having this jurisdiction con
stray moments which most men worse than waste,
to give to those ennobling studies, be not surprised ferred upon any of their number. They will be happier without it."
to see your enemies, and sometimes even your friends, pointing you out and bewailing your liter
ary dissipation, and your lack of devotion to proMr. Daniel H. Chamberlain sends us his recentfessional work! Still I cannot advise you to abanaddress to the graduating class of Columbia College don your literary tastes and studies, but only to Law School. Of course Mr. Chamberlain would not hide them, as some men are said to hide their have been invited to make this address unless he | charities." had been opposed to codification, and he has improved the opportunity by demonstrating to his own The United States Supreme Court are worse than satisfaction at least, that codification is impractic- ever in the lurch -- hopelessly behind the calendar, able, He advances nothing new, however, unless and getting more behindhand every year. What a
VOL. 34 — No. 4.