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upon these points, and they need not be discussed in detail.

It is true, as counsel assert, that the case against the accused depends in a great measure upon the testimony of John Lynch, as a confessed accomplice and a man of bad character; but it is so strongly and fully corroborated upon all material points that we cannot hold that the jury did wrong in giving it credit. A conviction will be sustained upon the testimony of an ac. complice where it is satisfactorily corroborated, and that is the case here.

Felonious purpose or intent is seldom established by direct evidence, but in the very great majority of cases is inferred from circumstances. Padgett v. State, 103 Ind. 550; S. C., 3 N. E. Rep. 377. Circumstantial evidence is mainly relied on to prove this essential element in the crime of murder, but the character of the evidence is never deemed to impair or impeach the validity of the proof. It is likewise true of the element of conspiracy, which is not unfrequently a constituent element of murder, that it is not usually proved by direct evidence, but is inferred from circumstances. Dr. Wharton says: "The actual fact of conspiring may be inferred, as has been said, from circumstances, and the concurring conduct of the defend-stitute but a single crime. There are indeed few

ants need not be directly proved." "Any joint action ou a material point, or a collocation of independent but co-operative acts, by persons closely associated with each other, is held sufficient to enable the jury to infer concurrence of sentiment." 2 Whart. Crim. Law (9th ed.), § 1398; Whart. Crim. Ev., § 698; 2 Bish. Crim. Proc., § 227.

The circumstances developed by the evidence satisfactorily prove that the conspiracy which bound the defendants together, as well as the purpose to kill, which constituted the bond of union between them, was formed in the county of Martin; and these were undeniably parts, and very material parts, of the crime which was consummated in the adjoining county Suppose that two of the persons who assisted in the seizure of Bunch had not crossed the line dividing the two counties, is it not perfectly clear, upon principle and authority, that they would nevertheless have been guilty of murder? This conclusion cannot be successfully controverted; and yet it can only be true on the theory that part of the crime was committed in Martin county, for unless this be so, it is clear that it could not be justly said that they participated in the crime. If what took place in Martin county was no part of the crime, those who did no more than conspire with the persons who fired the fatal shots, and assist in placing deceased in their power, could not be guilty; but if those acts should constitute part of the crime, they are guilty, and the crime had its origin in Martin county, where the first steps toward the accomplishment of the common purpose was taken. Our deliberate conclusion is that the acts done in Martin county did constitute part of the crime, and that the court of that county had jurisdiction.

It is perhaps true that there is little direct testimony that the purpose to kill was formed in Martin county, or that the plan of seizing the deceased and conveying him to the cave in Orange county, was there agreed upon; but the circumstances so strongly and directly point to this conclusion as to free the minds of all impartial men who give it study from any doubt upon this point; and circumstantial evidence, as we have seen, is all that is required. The evidence supplied by the circumstances leads to no other reasonable conclusion, and we think that there was abundant support for the verdict of the jury upon this point, and consequently ample evidence warranting the instructions of the court. Few cases can be more strongly made out than is this one, for the evidence supplied by the circumstances and the testimony given by the witnesses all unite in proving that the purpose to kill was conceived in Martin county; that the plan was there agreed upon, and there partly executed by making a captive of the deceased. The night journey across the line to the cave, and the shooting there, were but steps in the crime conceived and partly carried into execution in Martin county, and the court of that county committed no error in assuming jurisdiction.

What we have said disposes of all questions as to the jurisdiction, and as to the instructions of the court

The first step in the offense of murder in the first degree, the intermediate steps, and the final act con

crimes that are not made up of many elements, or in which there are not many steps; but no matter how many elements or steps there are, there is but one crime. This is true of the present case. All the essential elements combined constitute but a single crime, and in legal contemplation that crime was perpetrated where any one of the substantive and material parts of it were committed. If it were otherwise a man in Martin county might deliberately conceive a felonious purpose to commit a crime, send another into Marion county to commit the overt act, and yet go free, because it would not be said that all the elements of the crime were present in either county. But it is unnecessary to pursue this discussion, for it is clear upon principle and authority that a crime is com. mitted in the county where an act constituting an essential element is done. Where the crime is composed of several elements, and a material one exists in either one of two counties, the courts of either county may, under our statute, rightfully take jurisdiction of the entire crime.

We conclude therefore that the venue was well laid in Martin county, and was satisfactorily proved. Judgment affirmed.

NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS ABSTRACT.

APPEAL-UNDERTAKING-DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT

-SUBSEQUENT REVERSAL-MISTAKE-AMENDMENT.(1) In an action of ejectment, defendants gave an undertaking that the plaintiff would account for and pay over the rent of the premises "as the court may direct in the above entitled action." The complaint was dismissed, but on appeal the General Term reversed the judgment. On the second trial defendant was again successful, and on appeal it was again reversed; and on the third trial, the undertaking having been corrected on motion, the plaintiff was successful, and judgment was given that the undertaking be amended, and for the rental value of the premises. Held, no error; that the undertaking was valid and binding until a final judgment was reached. The appellants claim that the undertaking was merged in and superseded by the first judgment which was rendered dismissing the complaint. It is true that if that judgment had never been disturbed it would have been final, and would have absolved the obligors in the undertaking from any liability. It was subsequently reversed, and finally in the action a judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, and then the undertaking by its terms became operative. This was not a statutory, but a common-law undertaking, founded upon a sufficient consideration. There was a final judgment in the action which directed the defendant Emmerich to pay to the plaintiff certain rents, and that judgment was a direction and order of the court within the meaning of the undertaking. It is quite true that the dismissal of the complaint dissolves an injunction, and vacates and annuls an order of arrest; but there is no analogy between such cases and

the case now before us. The undertaking bound Emmerich to account for and pay over the rent of the premises as the court might direct, by any order or judgment which might be obtained in the action, and when a final judgment was obtained directing such payment the condition had arisen which rendered the obligors liable upon the undertaking. (2) Where by mutual mistake the word " plaintiff" was inserted where "defendant" should have been, the court has power to amend and enforce it. June 1, 1886. v. Knies. Opinion by Earl, J.

Clute

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVATE OR LOCAL RAILROAD ACT.-Chapter 554 of the Laws of 1885, providing for a new experimental section of elevated railroad in the city of New York is a violation of the constitutional provision that the Legislature shall not pass a private or local bill "granting to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay down railroad tracks." The relator is authorized to build an experimental section of elevated railway, not less than a quarter of a mile in length, upon some duly authorized street of the city, with a view of inventing or discovering improvements in the system, which if adopted will make the existing structure less offensive or inconvenient. The section is to be not a model, but an actual operating railway, and yet is to be such wholly for experimental purposes; not transporting passengers or open for public use, but subject to the continuous changes and trials born of new ideas, and made to test their effectiveness and value. The length of this experimental section beyond one-quarter of a mile is in the discretion of the relator. He may, if he chooses, extend it to the exterior bounds of the city. Its size, character and mode of construction are in like manner largely in his discretion, and he may thus obstruct an avenue of travel, or take away the property rights of abutters without any provision for their compensation. No time is limited for its continuance. So long as the relator is alive to invent and experiment he may test his ideas upon the structure, build, or remodel, or change it, unless the Legislature shall put an end to the enterprise, or the relator determine that his improvement is complete. The law does not say to whom the improvements shall belong, nor even that they shall be introduced on any existing or future elevated railway, and the result of the whole enterprise as planned by the statute will only be that the city and the State will learn that some things in mechanical engineering can or cannot be successfully accomplished. Of course the relator did not propose to thus educate himself and the city, himself by experiment and the city by results, at his own expense or without compensation; but the expense was to be defrayed out of a certain city fund. That this arrangement was in fact an appropriation of the money of the city to the private benefit of the relator, at least so far as the portion now claimed to be payable is concerned, and that the appearance of a public purpose thrown about it is colorable merely, is contended by the city, and has much of probability to support it. The enactment violates section 18 of article 3 of the Constitution which prohibits the passing of a local or private bill "granting to any corporation, association or individual the right to lay down railroad tracks." The relator, if he be treated as a mere agent, the municipality itself, is authorized by a bill, which is certainly "local," if not "private," to build an elevated railroad in some street of the city. Is is not a sufficient answer to say that the track thus to be "laid down" is merely experimental and temporary, for the language of the fundamental law is purposely very broad, and draws no such distinction. But this track, although experimental, is not temporary. As we have seen, it is per

manent and durable, having no limitation except the future will of the Legislature. It will be a railroad not less than a quarter of a mile, and may be made much longer, and serve, under the guise of an experiment, to fasten in the end a new road upon the city. Wherever the road runs it must necessarily take either the fee of private owners or the property of abutters, for in all respects it is to be an elevated road. No provision is made for compensation to abutting owners or owners of the fee. For these reasons we are of the opinion that the act under which the relator claims is invalid. June 1, 1886. People v. Loew. Opinion by Finch, J.

STREET RAILROAD-APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS TO DECIDE AS TO NECESSITY OF.-The language of the Constitution that the court, upon application, may appoint commissioners to decide as to whether a street railroad shall be built where the propertyowners will not consent, does not confer upon the court a discretion to appoint or not as it shall deem just or discreet. It confers authority to appoint when a case is presented contemplated by the Constitution. The court has not the discretion to grant or deny the application upon the question of the utility or necessity of the proposed road. The determination as to whether the proposed road ought to be constructed shall in the first instance be decided by commissioners. Chapter 252, section 14, of the Laws of 1884, is not unconstitutional on the ground that it constitutes a delegation of legislative power in requiring the consent of roads already occupying the street, before a street railroad can be built on such street. The opposite view is urged upon two grounds: First, that the Constitution has prescribed the conditions upon which street railroads may be constructed, and by implication excludes the imposition by the Legislature of conditions other that those prescribed therein; and second, that a condition requiring the consent of existing railroad companies to the construction or operation of another road is a grant of legislative power to the company whose consent is required, and is therefore void. The first contention proceeds upon a misconception of the object of the constitutional provision, and of the rules governing the interpretation of constitutional restraints upon legislative power. The plain purpose of the Constitution requiring the consent of the local authorities and of propertyowners to the construction of a street railroad was the protection of public and private interests against hostile and injurious legislation, and to prevent the appropriation of highways to railroad uses by legislative grant without consulting the interests of the locality. The consent of the local authorities and of propertyowners was therefore made necessary; but to meet the contingency of an unreasonable opposition on the part of the property-owners, a tribunal was authorized to be created to determine whether the public interests required the construction of the proposed road, whose determination in its favor, when confirmed by the court, was to stand as a substitute for such consent. But the Constitution, neither by express language nor by implication, abridges the legislative power over the subject outside of the matters particularly enumerated. It needs no citation of authorities to sustain the postulate, that except as restrained by the Constitution, the legislative power is untrammelled and supreme, and that a constitutional provision which withdraws from the cognizance of the Legislature a particular subject, or which qualifies or regulates the exercise of legislative power in respect to a particular incident of that subject, leaves all other matters and incidents under its control. Nothing is subtracted from the sum of legislative power except that which is expressly or by necessary implication

withdrawn. The Legislature is prohibited from granting a franchise to construct a street railroad, except upon certain specified conditions. But it is not prohibited from annexing further conditions not inconsistent therewith, and whether other conditions are necessary or proper is a matter resting in the wisdom and discretion of the Legislature. The claim that the provision in the act of 1884, requiring a company organized thereunder, whose route is coincident with that of another road, to obtain the consent of the latter to the construction of the new road, before it can proceed to construct or operate the same, constitutes a delegation of legislative power, is not, we think, well founded. The act of 1884 was complete and operative from the moment of its passage. The franchise acquired by a company organized under its provisions is perfect, according to the nature of the franchise intended to be given from the moment the corporation comes into existence. The legislative grant was constitutional, and not absolute. The consent of another company in a case where such consent is required confers no franchise upon the company by whom it is obtained. The consent simply meets one of the conditions prescribed by the statute upon which the right of the company to construct and operate its road depends. If consent is refused the law is not defeated, but remains perfect and complete as before. The company, upon consent being refused, is not deprived of its franchise. A failure to obtain such consent simply puts in abeyance its right to proceed with the construction of the proposed road until the obstruction is removed; and this precise situation was within the contemplation of the Legislature when the act was passed. The Legislature imposed the condition in its discretion for the protection of existing companies. It may hereafter in its discretion remove the restriction and abrogate the condition. But its right to impose it is unquestionable. June 1, 1886. In re Application of Thirty-fourth Street Ry. Co. Andrews, J.

Opinion by

MUNICIPAL INDEBTEDNESS-STOCK OF NEW YORK CITY HELD BY COMMISSIONERS OF SINKING FUND.-Plaintiffs ask that the defendants be enjoined from issuing bonds of the city of New York for the purpose of raising money for the dock department, on the ground that the funded indebtedness of the city is in excess of that allowed by law; but it appears that $34,000,000 of this is held by the commissioners of the sinking fund for the redemption of New York city stock, making the balance of the indebtedness less than ten per cent of the value of real estate. Held, that the stock so held by the commissioners of the sinking fund was not a debt against the city within the meaning of the constitutional prohibition (Const., art. 8, § 11, as amended in 1884) forbidding a city of over 100,000 inhabitants from increasing its indebtedness to more than ten per cent of its taxable real estate. Held also, that the amount required to pay the city debt, if it all came presently to maturity, was so much as is equal to its bonds or stock, not including that held by the sinking fund. Laws of 1878, ch. 383, § 4, relates to the funds and revenues of the city, and to the management of the sinking fund itself, and not to the effect of purchase upon the city stock bought by its moneys. April 30, 1886. Bank for Savings in the City of New York v. Grace. Opinion by Danforth, J. MORTGAGE BY RAILROAD- CONSTRUCTION SINKING FUND- PROVISION. - The defendant, in order to gradually pay a first mortgage, included in it certain provisions by which twice a year, out of the net earnings of the road, $12,500 should be paid to trustees of the mortgage as a sinking fund for redemption of the bonds; this to be deposited in a trust company, and outstanding bonds bought so long as they

OF

were not higher than 110, but interest was to continue to be paid on such bonds by the company and added to the fund; but if the bonds could not be purchased at that price "no further payments shall be payable to said sinking fund" until it could be so used. Held, that when said bonds rose above 110 the semi-annual payments of $12,500 ceased, but the interest payments on the sinking fund must continue until the maturity of such bonds. June 1, 1886. Wilds v. St. Louis, A. & T. H. R. Co. Opinion by Finch, J.; Rapallo, J., dissenting.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT-CONSIDERATION-COMPOUNDING FELONY-DURESS.-The plaintiff seeks to recover back the amount of a promissory note, given upon the settlement of a claim by defendant that plaintiff's son, who was in defendant's employ, had at different times stolen his money. The complaint alleged that the note was given in order to compound and settle a supposed felony or misdemeanor, and that the said note was extorted from the plaintiff and his wife by threats of public charges against the character of their son, and that the note was executed in fear of the same. The plaintiff insists that .the facts in this case establish that the parties to this action did not stand in pari delicto; that the defendant took undue advantage of the plaintiff and his wife--advantage of the circumstances in which the plaintiff stood, surrounded as he was by his family; that this operated as duress and undue influence to coerce, and as the jury found, did coerce the plaintiff's will, and destroyed the equality between the parties and induced the plaintiff to give the note in question. While fraud, duress and undue influence, employed in procuring a contract for the payment of money, may vitiate and destroy the obligation created, and render it of no effect, and the party who has been compelled to pay money on account thereof may maintain an action to recover the same, such a right does not exist, and cannot be enforced where the consideration of the contract thus made arises entirely upon or is in any way affected by the compounding of a felony. When this element enters into the contract, it becomes tainted with a corrupt consideration, and cannot be enforced. The judge was requested to charge as follows: "That if the compounding of a felony entered into and formed a part of the consideration of the note, the plaintiff could not recover," and also “that if the motive of the plaintiff in giving the note was in part for the purpose of compounding a felony, he would not be entitled to recover." Both of these requests were refused. We think there was error in each of the refusals. Within the rule already laid down, if the consideration of the note was in any way affected by the compounding of a felony, or it entered into the same, or such a motive actuated the plaintiff in any respect, then the contract was illegal, and should not be upheld. In such a case the contract was vicious and corrupt, and in violation of law, as much as if compounding a felony had been the entire consideration. The element of illegality constituted a part of the contract, thus vitiating the whole, and it could not be rejected because duress, undue influence or threats were also blended with it. We cannot agree with the doctrine that if the plaintiff was influenced by the duress of the defendant, and at the same time both parties intended the compounding of a felony, that they were not in pari delicto. It is enough that the vice of compounding a felony was a part of the contract, operating upon the minds of both parties, and thus placing them upon an equality, to render the contract nugatory and of no effect. June 1, 1886. Haynes v. Rudd, Opinion by Miller, J.

PARTNERSHIP-FIRM OBLIGATION IN INDIVIDUAL TRANSACTION OF PARTNER-NOTICE OF PURPOSE-DEC

LARATIONS OF PARTNER.-(1) It was clearly established that the notes in suit were made by defendant Cheney in the name of the firm, without the knowledge or consent of his partner, and were delivered to plaintiff for the purpose of paying the individual debt of Cheney; that the plaintiff knew that Cheney was using his partnership paper to pay his individual debt, and it was bound to know that he had no right to use it for that purpose without the consent of his partner; and was chargeable with knowledge that the notes were wrongfully made and issued. Each member of a firm is the general agent of a firm in relation to all the business of the firm, and can bind the firm in what he says and does in such business; but when one partner has a transaction with a third person, which is neither apparently nor really within the scope of the partnership business, the partnership is not bound by his declarations or acts in the transaction. He cannot by his declarations make that a partnership transaction which does not appear to be such, and which is apparently and really an individual transaction. In such a case the third person has notice that the transaction is outside of the partnership business, and he cannot rely upon the partnership credit. Byles Bills (7th ed.), 48; Farmers', etc., Bank v. Butchers', etc., Bank, 16 N. Y. 125. Cheney, for some time prior to the giving of these notes, had been dealing with the plaintiff. He drew checks on the East River Bank of New York, and procured them to be cashed by the plaintiff, and these checks, for the security of the bank, were indorsed by Vail. At one of the times when he procured the plaintiff to cash a check, he said to its president: "My partner has, or should have, the money for this to-day; but he has not got it, or cannot get it, and we want this amount." Subsequently other checks were drawn by Cheney, and cashed by the plaintiff, and paid by the bank upon which they were drawn. Finally a check for upward of $5,000 was drawn by Cheney, indorsed by Vail, and cashed by the plaintiff, which was protested for non-payment, and these notes were given to take up that check. What was said by Cheney to the plaintiff's president did not under the circumstances authorize an inference that he was procuring the money for the firm or in its business. All of the checks were his individual checks, and not the firm checks, and the bank had no reason, to infer that he was drawing his individual checks in the firm business, or to procure money on the firm account or firm credit. The money was loaned on his individual check, and on the credit of Cheney and the indorser, and not on the credit of the firm. It was in form and in fact Chebey's check, and the president of the bank testified that he cashed the check on the responsibility of Vail, the indorser. We do not think that it is a just inference, from the language said to have been used by Cheney, that the checks were made in the business of the firm. But the declaration of Cheney, made in a transaction which was really as well as apparently his individual transaction, cutside of the firm business, could not make evidence against the firm or his partner. Hickman v. Reineking, 6 Blackf. 387; Thorn v. Smith, 21 Wend. 365. (2) During the trial Vail, called as a witness for the plaintiff, was asked this question: "Did you ever have any conversation with Mr. Cheney in reference to his partnership in connection with indorsing checks on paper?" Then this question was asked: "Was any representation made by Mr. Cheney to you that any of this money which was to be raised on checks indorsed by you was for the purpose of the business of the house?" It is now claimed that the rejection of this evidence is error. What Cheney said to Vail, not communicated to plaintiff, was not competent or material. The declarations sought to be proved were made when Cheney was engaged in a transaction, apparently and

really without the scope of the partnership business, and hence, for reasons already stated, were incompetent as against Underhill. (3) The plaintiff did not take these notes as assignee of Vail, or from Vail, in such a sense that it can stand in his shoes; but the notes were made and delivered to Vail, and by him delivered, for Cheney, to the bank, to satisfy Cheney's debt to the bank, and they had no inception until delivery to the bank. The mere fact that Cheney could not testify that some small portion of the money ob tained by him of the plaintiff was not used for the firm was of no importance. They debt was in form the debt of Cheney, and if plaintiff claimed that it, or any part of it, was created for the benefit of the firm, it was incumbent upon it to prove that. The mere inability of Cheney to testify that no part of the money was used for the firm proved nothing. June 1, 1886. Union Nat. Bank v. Underhill. Opinion by Earl, J.

RAILROAD-IN STREET-USED BY INDIVIDUAL FOR PRIVATE PURPOSE-NUISANCE.-Defendants, under a contract with a street railroad corporation, took a branch road abandoned by it, having flat rails, and reconstructed it with T rails, and used it exclusively for carrying their machines, etc., to their factory. Held, a nuisance for which plaintiff, an adjoining lot-owner, sustaining special injury, might restrain its use. The right to construct and operate a street railway is a franchise which must have its source in the sovereign power. The legislative power over the subject is also subject to the limitation that the franchise must be granted for public, and not for private purposes, or at least public considerations must enter into every valid grant of a right to appropriate a public street for railroad uses. The construction and maintenance of a street railway by any individual, or association of individuals, without legislative authority, would constitute a public nuisance, and subject the persons maintaining it not only to indictment, but also to a private action in favor of any person sustaining special injury. The contract furnishes no defense to this action. It was a scarcely undisguised attempt by the railroad company to transfer to an individual, or to the firm for which he was acting, its franchise as common carrier over the part of its route specified in its contract, with a view and for the purpose of enabling the grantee to operate the road thereon as private property, and exclusively for the purpose of his private business. The contract was void as against public policy; and assuming that the corporation defendant has succeeded to all the rights of D. M. Osborne, or the firm of D. M. Osborne & Co., nevertheless the contract constitutes no defense to the action. is plainly contrary to public policy that a franchise granted for public purposes should be used as a mere cover for a private enterprise. The defendant corpo ration is in the situation of assuming to maintain and operate a street railroad without legal authority, to the injury of the plaintiff; and the judgment below, enjoining and restraining such use, was proper. June 1, 1886. Fanning v. D. M. Osborne & Co. Opinion by Finch, J.

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BROKERS - COMPENSATION - WAGERING CONTRACTS-MARGINS.-In the buying and selling of stocks upon margins, the brokers employed to conduct such transactions (under the law of Pennsylvania) are regarded as being engaged in wagering contracts, which the law of that State does not recognize, and they cannot recover in assumpsit for services rendered, or excess over the margin. While the testi

mony of the plaintiffs tends to show that the dealings between them and defendant were bona fide, and that an actual delivery of the articles bought and sold by them for defendant was intended, and there were actual purchases and sales made, and actual delivery to the defendant was not made because waived by him, or an equivalent under the rules of exchange was accepted by him, the proof also shows that in the numerous transactions there was no actual delivery but in a single instance; and the defendant testifies explicitly that it was the express understanding between him and plaintiffs that the stocks and grain were not to be bought outright, and no delivery was to be made, but that he was simply to deal with them on margins. If the market was in his favor, he would gain if it went against him, he would lose. That the total amount of margins put up by him, outside of mere profits from the fluctuations of the market was $1,700. He further testified, that while the transactions carried on within his margins of 5 aud 10 per cent aggregated $800,000, some of the items of purchase and sale amounting to over $17,000, he was worth only $3,500; that he was a lawyer by occupation, and resided next door to plaintiffs, who knew him well. This and similar testimony from him was competent to go to the jury. In cases like this, it is competent to show that although in form the contract is perfectly legal, it is in fact a mere guise under which a gambling transaction may be conducted. The true nature of a fraud upon the law and public morals could not otherwise be exposed, and the evil of wagers under the guise of a legitimate enterprise be prevented. This principle is well settled, apart from what the law in Pennsylvania may be. Grizewood v. Blane, 11 C. B. 536; Benj. Sales, 542; Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499. The plaintiffs seem to assume that if the plaintiffs acted merely as defendant's broker in negotiating the contract, and as they are suing, not on the contracts themselves, but for services performed and money advanced for the defendant, they do not stand in the same position as if seeking to enforce the original agreement. But as laid down in Irwin v. Williar, 110 U. S. 499, "where a broker is privy to a wagering contract, and brings the parties together for the very purpose of entering into an illegal agreement, he is particeps criminis, and cannot recover for ser vices rendered or losses incurred by himself in forwarding the transaction." Md. Ct. App., May 14, 1886. Stewart v. Garrett. Opinion by Ritchie, J. [4 Atl. Rep. 399.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

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CURATIVE ACT-VESTED RIGHTS.- Where property, levied upon under an assessment irregularly made has been sold, and the rights of parties have become vested before any curative legislation took effect, such rights cannot be interfered with by a sale under the levy. This court has already held in this curative legislation to support tax proceedings, that if the Legislature has antecedent power to authorize a tax, it can cure, by a retroactive law, an irregularity or want of authority in leaving it intrusted to the officer to perform that duty; and that whatever the Legislature can dispense with in advance it can dispense with retroactively, by enacting that the omission shall not invalidate or prejudice. People v. Ingham Co. Sup'rs, 20 Mich. 95; Hart v. Henderson, 17 id. 218; Albany & Boston Min. Co. v. Auditor General, 37 id. 391; Sinclair v. Learned, 51 id. 335. It is claimed by counsel for the defendant that the decision of the Circuit judge is supported by the cases of Sinclair v. Learned, supra, and People v. Ingham Co. Sup'rs, supra; also by the late case of Anderson v. Santa Anna, 33 Alb. L. J. 267. We do not think those cases support the doctrine contended for, when applied to

the facts in this case. In the first case no vested rights were interfered with. In the second case the act of 1879, which was claimed to cure the defect complained of, was passed before the ejectment was brought. The last case only applies the doctrine held by this court, that unless prohibited by the Constitution, the Legislature has the power, when its action will interfere with no vested rights, to enact curative statutes retroactive in their effect, for the purpose of validating proceedings taken in this class of cases, which would be otherwise irregular, when it has antecedent power to authorize the tax. The difficulty in this case is, there has been a sale of property levied upon, and the rights of parties became vested before the curative legislation took effect, and such rights cannot be interfered with in this manner. Mich. Sup. Ct., June 10, 1886. Daniells v. Watertown Township. Opinion by Sherwood, J.

KNOWL

CORPORATION -LIBEL AND SLANDER OFFICERKNOWLEDGE - LIABILITY.- Where a newspaper is owned by a corporation, one who is merely an officer thereof cannot be held responsible individually for a libellous publication made without his knowledge or direction, but if he was engaged in the general management he would be liable. Penn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 1, 1886. Nevin v. Spieckemann. Opinion per Curiam. CRIMINAL CONVERSATION — - PLAINTIFF'S EDGE AND CONSENT.-A party may maintain an action for criminal conversation against one who has had illicit intercourse with his wife, though subsequently, and with full knowledge of that intercourse, and believing it would continue, he agreed with the defendant that his wife should remain with and keep house for him. N. H. Sup. Ct., March 12, 1886. Brown v. [4 Atl. Rep. Spaulding. Opinion by Doe, C. J. 394.]

CRIMINAL LAW-RAPE-DECLARATIONS — LETTER.In a prosecution for attempted rape, it is error to admit in evidence the letter of the prosecutrix in which she details the facts. In 3 Greenl. Ev., § 213, it is said: "Though the prosecutrix may be asked whether she made complaint of the injury, and when and to whom, and the person to whom she complained is usually called to prove that fact, yet the particular facts which she stated are not admissible in evidence, except when elicited on cross-examination, or by way of confirming her testimony after it has been impeached. On the direct examination the practice has been merely to ask her whether she has made complaint that such an outrage has been perpetrated upon her, and to receive only a

simple 'Yes' or 'No.' Indeed the complaint con

stitutes no part of the res gesta; it is only a fact corroborative of the testimony of the complainant; and where she is not a witness in the case, it is wholly inadmissible." This court has adopted the rule above announced. State v. Richards, 32 Iowa, 420. Iowa Sup. Ct., June 21, 1886. State v. Clarke. Opinion by Seevers, J.

DEED CONSIDERATION - ANTECEDENT INDEBTEDNESS-EVIDENCE TO CONTRADICT RECITALS-VENDOR'S LIEN-VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE-RIGHTS OF CREDIT

ORS.—(1) An antecedent indebtedness constitutes a valuable consideration for a deed of conveyance from a debtor to his creditor. Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 270; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 19. But it is a settled principle that when a sum of money is named as the consideration in a deed, proof of a consideration, different in kind, is inadmissible. Hurn's Lessee v. Soper, 6 H. & J. 276; Betts v. Union Bank of Maryland, H. & G. 175; Cole v. Albers, 1 Gill, 412; Thompson v. Corrie. 57 Md. 200. The doctrine enunciated by the Lord Chancellor in Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Wm. 204, and

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