tween those whom it is their duty to serve impartially. And the courts are especially solicitous to discountenance all contracts or arrangements by these public servants which savor of a purpose to stifle competion or repress rivalry in the departments of business in which they ply their vocation. Illustrations are found in the cases of State v. Hartford & N. H. R. Co., 29 Conn. 538; Hooker v. Vandewater, 4 Denio, 349; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Chicago & P. R. Co., 86 Ill. 246; Coe v. Louisville & M. R. Co., 3 Fed. Rep. 775. The vice of the discrimination here is that it is calculated to coerce all those who have occasion to employ common carriers between New York and Cuba from employing such agencies as may offer. Its tendency is to deprive the public of their legitimate opportunities to obtain carriage on the best terms they can. If it is tolerated, it will result practically in giving the defendants a monopoly of the carrying trade between these places. Manifestly it is enforced by the defendants in order to discourage all others from attempting to serve the public as carriers between these places. Such discrimination is not only unreasonable, but is odious. Ordinarily the remedy against a carrier is at law for damages for a refusal to carry, or to recover the excess of charges paid to obtain the delivery of goods. The special circumstances in this case indicate that such a remedy would not afford complete and adequate redress, "as practical and efficient to the ends of justice" as the remedy in equity. Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74. The motion for an injunction is granted. [See Johnson v. Pensacola, etc., R. Co., 16 Fla. 623; S. C., 26 Ain. Rep. 731; Ragan v. Aiken, 9 Lea, 609; S. C., 42 Am. Rep. 684; Ex parte Benson, 18 S. C. 38; S. C., 44 Am. Rep. 564.-ED.] LANDLORD AND TENANT-COVENANT FOR NEW LEASE LIKE OLD ONE. NEW YORK SUPREME COURT MUHLENBRINCK V. POOLER.* In 1854 the owner of premises leased them for fourteen years from November 1, 1854. The lease provided that the lessee should erect upon the premises four brick dwelling-houses, and that upon the expiration of the term the lessor should either pay to him, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, the just and full value of the buildings, or such of them as should remain on the premtses, or should grant to him or them a new lease for a further term of fourteen years at a rent to be agreed upon by the parties or determined by appraisers. It then declared that the "new lease shall contain covenants, conditions and agreements, the same as those herein contained." Held, that but one renewal was provided for, and that the new lease need not contain the covenant for renewal. APPEAL from an interlocutory judgment, di rected by the court upon a trial of this action at the Special Term. Nelson Smith. for appellants. George Bliss and J. M. Hunt, for respondents. DANIELS, J. The testator brought this action to secure a lease for a second term of the premises situated on the corner of Elizabeth and Spring streets, in the city of New York. At the time when the action was brought the premises were owned by the defendants Peter McDonough, Marie Therese Furey and Lewis J. Furey. The original lease was executed by Mary Davey, who was at the time the owner of the *To appear in 40 Hun, 526. leasehold premises, and it was given for the term of fourteen years from the 1st of November, 1854. The lessee occupied the premises under the lease for that term, and since then for a succeeding term of fourteen years, and deeming himself to be also entitled to a third term for a like period this action was brought to secure the execution of a lease for the second term, with the same covenants contained in the lease of the first term. During its pendency McDonough departed this life, and upon his decease the defendant Lewis Furey became entitled to the lot devised to McDonough for life, as well as another lot in which he was previously vested with the title, and the third was devised to Marie Therese Furey for her life. During the action the name of the defendant Lewis Furey was changed to Lewis J. Pooler, and Marie Therese intermarried with Georg. Uppington. Neither of the defendants except Lewis Z. answered the complaint; but he being an infant an answer was served in his behalf by his guardian ad litem. This answer was in the ordinary form, submitting his rights and interests to the protection of the court. A reference was thereupon ordered to a referee in the first instance to examine and report the facts to the court, with his opinion thereon. This was afterward supplemented by a succeeding order, directing the referee to report all the evidence already taken and such as he might take pursuant to the second order, with his opinion. The referee accordingly took the evidence offered by the parties, and with his opinion reported it to court. Exceptions were filed to his conclusions on behalf of the two defendants, Lewis J. and Marie Therese. These exceptions were so far sustained that judgment was ordered in their favor, and a further reference directed to ascertain the value of the use and occupation of the property since the 1st of November, 1882, and directing the plaintiff also to account for the rent unpaid at that time. [Omitting a question of practice.] The court considered the evidence, as well as the facts established by it, and concluded that the plaintiff was not entitled to another lease of the property with all the covenants contained in the first. And it is this determination by which the rights of the parties were disposed of at the hearing. Whether the plaintiffs, as the executors of the lessee, were entitled to a lease containing all the same covenants for another term, must depend entirely upon the construction to be given to the first lease. By this lease the lessee was obligated to erect upon the leasehold premises, within two years from its commencement, four or more good and substantial brick dwelling-houses, and the evidence proved that obligation to have been fully performed by him. Upon the expiration of the term, it was then provided that the lessor would either pay to him, his heirs, executors, administrators or assigns, the just and full value of the buildings, or such of them as should remain on the premises, or would grant to him or them a new lease for a further term of fourteen years. The rental for the new lease was to be ascertained and determined either by the agreement of the parties, or the decision of appraisers selected for the purpose of appraising the valuation of the property, and the rent was to be six per cent upon that valuation, provided however that it should not be less in any event than the rout reserved for the first term. It was then declared in the lease that the "new lease shall contain covenants, conditions and agreements, the same as those herein contained." And it is upon this stipulation that the tenant predicated his right to a new lease, identical with the first, for a second leasehold term in the property. And authorities have been relied upon, which if they could at the present time be followed, would sustain this claim. For in Bridges v. Hitchcock, 5 Brown Parl. in the lease. But it does not, for the lease in that case contained no obligation requiring the second to include the right of renewal mentioned in the first. And the same is true of Harnett v. Yielding, 2 Sch. & Lefr. 549. The case of Iggulden v. May, 7 East, 237, is very decisive authority against the construction required to maintain the plaintiff's action. So is that of Tritton v. Foote, 2 Brown C. C. 636, where the stipulation for the new lease provided that it should be subject to the same rents, covenants, reservations, conditions and agreements in all respects. The language in that more comprehensive than in the present lease, and still it was held to entitle the lessee to no more than one additional term. case was Cas. 6, it was held that such a stipulation or covenant In Hyde v. Skinner, 2 P. Wms. 196, which proceeded upon a similar lease, the ruling was the same, and that of Baynham v. Guy's Hospital, 3 Ves. 295, is equally as decisive against the rule of construction relied upon by the plaintiffs. This, it is true, was decided not by the chancellor, but by the master of the rolls. But the same view was approved by the chancellor in Moore v. Foley, 6 Ves. 234. The lease however in that case was much broader in its language, providing for successive renewals as often as any of the lives mentioned in the first lease dropped out. And that was entirely consistent with the right to re In Browne v. Tighe, 8 Bligh, 286; Piggot v. Mason, 1 Paige, 412; Rutgers v. Hunter, 6 Johns. Ch. 215; Curr v. Ellison, 20 Wend. 178; Abeel v. Radcliff, 13 Johns. 296; Banker v. Braker, 9 Abb. N. C. 411; Cunningham v. Pattee, 99 Mass. 248, the same subject was considered, but under leases not as broad in their covenants as this lease, or as the leases in many of the other authorities. But in all of them the courts referred to the rule as established, which has been maintained by the modern authorities, excluding the right to more than one renewal under language similar to that contained in this lease. These authorities indicate the disposition of the courts to have been to depart from the rule of construction adopted and followed in the earlier cases, and to restrict the right of the tenant to one additional term, unless the lease itself contains the express stipulation that the second lease shall contain a covenant for a further renewal, or the creation of one or more succeeding terms. The In the case of Willan v. Willan, 16 Ves. 72, the lease covenanted for a renewal lease for a further term, and so on forever, or so long as the tostator or his assigns, etc., should hold the property, and this was considered by the chancellor, as it certainly was, to be sufficient to require repeated renewals. But there the language of the lease was such as plainly to express that obligation, while in this case it failed to declare the intention of the parties in the same or any other equivalent manner. For what was agreed upon in the lease in suit was, that a new lease of the premises should be granted, and that it should contain covenants, conditions and agreements, the same as those contained in the first lease. What the parties | principle sustained by these authorities is obligatory appear to have contemplated was one additional term in the premises, and the language which they used to express their intention was not enlarged by the obligation to which the tenant was subjected, of rebuilding the buildings in case of their destruction by fire or otherwise. For the portions of the lease providing for a renewal, or the creation of another term, were in no manner referred to or enlarged by that part of it which was inserted to create this obligation. But the right to the additional lease or term remained dependent upon what had been before inserted in the lease. And it has been the policy of the courts since the earlier decisions, to which reference has been made, were pronounced, to consider stipulations or covenants of this description in such a manner as to limit them to one additional term. The rule of construction became settled at an early date that a covenant for renewal, or for an additional term, should not be held to create a right to repeated grants in perpetuity, unless some sufficient consideration for such grant was made to appear, and the parties had expressed themselves upon this subject in language devoid of all ambiguity. The case of Shepard v. Dulan, 3 Drury & Warr. 1, has been cited as another authority requiring a more enlarged principle of construction to be applied to the language contained upon the plaintiffs in this action, and excludes the right to another lease with covenants for a third term in the leasehold property; and for that reason this action so far cannot be sustained. There are, as has already been stated, certain attributes in the present case that did not enter into many of those sanctioning this restriction of the law. But they are not such as would, in view of the strong expressions made use of by the courts in the decisions in the latter cases, justify a departure from the principle upon which they have proceeded. In no manner was the claim brought into the case that the plaintiff or the lessee had become liable for rent for the occupancy of the premises during a portion of the second term, or since the expiration of that term. No defense or claim of that description was, in any form, brought into the case by the pleadings, and there was no foundation for the reference ordered to ascertain the extent of the obligatious of the plaintiffs for rent in arrear. As to that part of the judgment it was unauthorized and it should be reversed, but as to the residue, as the second term had already expired, the judgment should be affirmed, but without costs of the appeal. Brady, J., concurred. Judgment affirmed, without costs. MITCHELL, J. This was a suit by William S. Lamar against the Phenix Insurance Company to recover for an alleged loss by fire under a policy of insurance issued upon the property of the former. The policy contained this condition: "If the assured shall have, or shall hereafter make, any other insurance, whether valid or not, on the property herein described, or any part thereof, without the consent of this company written hereon," this policy shall be void. The insurance company answered that the condition above set out had been violated in this: "that the insured had, prior to the receipt of the policy on which suit was brought, accepted a policy of insurance for $500, covering a part of the property insured, which policy so accepted had been issued by the Germania Insurance Company of New York, and which remained in force at the time that in suit was taken out, and that no consent to this latter policy was indorsed on the policy in suit, or was otherwise given. To this it was replied that the Germania policy contained a provision avoiding it in case of the existence of subsequent procurement of other insurance upon the property therein described, unless specially agreed to in writing in or upon such policy; that at the date the Germania policy was received the assured held a policy for $2,000 issued by the Home Insurance Company of New York covering the same property; and that no consent by the Germania had been given to the policy which the assured held in the Home, and that for that reason the policy held in the Germania was, and had been at all times invalid and void. Upon demurrer this was held a sufficient reply. A recovery was accordingly had for the amount stipulated in the policy. The reply, it will be observed, seeks to avoid the effeet of the condition against other insurance, by the assumption that only such other insurance as is valid and enforceable is within the inhibition of the contract. Since however there is put forward no claim of mistake, surprise or other circumstance which would authorize a modification of the condition, or relieve the insured from its effect, the contract, as the parties have deliberately chosen to make it for themselves, must furnish the measure of their rights. The inquiry must be, what have the parties agreed to? In determining the liability of insurance companies stipulations similar to that above set out have been the subject of much discussion, and not a little contrariety of opinion. There are cases in which the condition in respect to further insurance is general, and the conventional phrase, whether valid or not," being absent, which proceed upon such a construction of the contract as brings within its probihition only such other insurance as is valid and enforceable. That other insurance has been taken by the insured, which at the time of the loss is inoperative or voidable, so that no action could be successfully maintained for its recovery, is held in the cases referred to not to operate in avoidance of a policy containing the ordinary stipulation against such further insurance. Conspicuous among the later cases which adopt this view are the following: Sutherland v. Old Dominion Ins. Co., 31 Gratt. 176; Insurance Co. v. Holt, 35 Ohio St. 189; S. C., 35 Am. Rep. 601; Dahlberg v. St. Louis, etc., Co., 6 Mo. App. 121; Gee v. Cheshire, etc., Co., 55 N. H. 65; S. C., 20 Am. Rep. 171. To the foregoing may be added Hubbard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 33 Iowa, 325; S. C., 11 Am. Rep. 125, which in a modified form holds the same general doctrine. On the other hand, cases which seem well supported in reason proceed upon the theory that the only purpose for which provisions of the character under consideration are inserted in policies is to protect the insurer against the hazard of overinsurance, by taking away the motive which the insured might otherwise have for the destruction of his own property. Other insurance taken without consent, whether valid or not, is held to avoid the policy in violation of which it has been taken. The assumption is that the vigilance of the property owner will be stimulated to guard against loss, by requiring him to maintain such relation to the property insured or that its destruction by fire shall not inure to his pecuniary benefit. Such being confessedly the purpose of the contract, it is not perceived how its object is in any degree promoted by the conclusion, that notwithstanding the insured may have intended to secure overinsurance, and may have firmly believed that he had succeeded in doing so, it is only when the attempt is actually successful that the prohibitory condition is operative. It might be said with much reason that such a construction defeats the purpose of the provision, and renders it practically nugatory. Moreover to hold that only such other insurance as is not void, and cannot be avoided by extraneous facts, is within the prohibition of the contract, affords the opportunity for the anomalous spectacle of an insured avoiding the effect of apparent overinsurance, and compelling payment of oue policy by exhibiting his own turpitude in obtaining another. It is held in some cases that subsequent to further insurance, created by policies which are totally void, is no obstacle in the way of a recovery on the policy on which the claim is made. Rising Sun Ins. Co. v. Slaughter, 20 Ind. 520. If however such policies are voidable only for some breach of condition for which the insurer might avoid them, they are within the prohibition against further insurance. Funke v. Minnesota, etc., Ins. Ass'n, 29 Minn. 347; S. C., 43 Am. Rep. 216; Baer v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 4 Bush, 242; Suggs v. Liverpool, etc., Co., 9 Ins. L. J. 657; Landers v. Watertown Ins. Co., 86 N. Y. 414; S. C., 40 Am. Rep. 554; Bigler v. Ins. Co., 22 N. Y. 402; Lackey v. Georgia Ins. Co., 42 Ga. 459; David v. Hartford, etc., Co., 13 Iowa, 69; Carpenter v. Providence, etc., Co., 16 Pet. 495. It is however not necessary for us to determine or further intimate an opinion upon the proper construction of a policy which simply stipulates that other insurance taken without the consent of the insurer shall render the policy void. It may well be assumed that the prevailing uncertainty and contrariety of opinion on that subject was the efficient cause for introducing into the policy sued on the phrase which distinguishes it from the policies involved in the cases referred to. The contract is that other insurance, "whether valid or not," taken without the written consent of the insurance company, shall render the policy void. It was thus agreed that the validity or invalidity of other insurance, taken without the written consent of the insurer, should not be the subject of future contest. Any contract of insurance so held or accepted was to render the policy in suit void. This agreement was not against public policy nor prohibited by law. So far as appears, it was, with a full comprehension of its terms, deliberately entered into. It is therefore to have effect according to its plain and obvious meaning. Northwestern, etc., Co. v. Hazlett, 105 Ind. -: Continental Ins. Co. v. Hulman, 92 Ill. 145; S. C., 34 Am. Rep. 122; Liverpool, etc., Co. v. Verdier, 35 Mich. 395. So far as appears, the policy in the Germania Insurance Company was regarded both by the insurance company which issued it and the insured, as being valid and in force at the time when the policy in suit was accepted, as well as when the loss occurred. Whatever we might conclude in respect to the ordinary condition concerning further insurance, we are clear that where the parties, as in the case before us, had stipulated in their contract that other insurance, whether valid or not, shall avoid the policy, the effect of such a stipulation cannot be avoided by showing that the prohibited insurance was invalid. As applicable to a policy embracing a condition of that description, this general principle may be stated: If the prohibited policy held or received by the insured is in and of itself invalid and void, so that it in fact constitutes no contract of insurance, it will not affect the validity of that under which the claim for indemnity is made; but if to avoid it requires the production of facts extraneous to the policy, it will be within the condition against further insurance, and unless consented to, will render the other voidable. We are thus led to the conclusion that the court erred iu overruling the demurrer to the reply. A further question arising upon the evidence is suggested; but as upon the facts disclosed it cannot be material, in view of future considerations, that we decide it, without considering that question, the judgment is reversed with costs, with directions to the court below to sustain the demurrer to the second paragraph of reply, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Moser & Houghton, for appellants. ELLIOTT, J. The appellant was jointly indicted with eight others for the murder of Samuel A. Bunch. The State elected to try the appellant separately, and the trial resulted in a judgment declaring him guilty of murder in the first degree, and adjudging that he suffer the penalty of death. The indictment was returned by the grand jury of Martin county, the trial was had in that county, and judgment was there pronounced. The facts, as we gather them from the evidence, are these: Martin Archer, a kinsman of the appellant and five of the persons indicted with him, was killed, as they believed, by Samuel Marley. Marley fled the country shortly after the death of Martin Archer, but the appellant and his kinsman believed that Bunch, the deceased, harbored him and assisted him to escape. They watched the house of Bunch for several days and nights, and received information which led them to believe that he assisted Marley to flee, and this excited in them angry and revengeful feelings. They ascertained that Bunch, on the afternoon before his death, had gone to a secluded place to secure some of his hogs which had broken into the field of a neighbor named Ryan. There they forcibly seized and bound him with hickory withes. The place where he was seized and bound was in Martin county. He was detained in this place for some hours, and then taken to a cave in Orange county called "Saltpeter Cave." This cave was about two miles distant from the Martin county line. The men who captured and bound him were armed with guns and pistols, and with these in hand, and ready for instant use, they took him to the cave, where they shot him many times, each emptying the contents of his gun or pistol into his body. His body was left lying in the cave for some days, when it was taken out and burned. From these circumstances and from the declarations of the appellant and those who united with him in the murder of Bunch, it is evident that the capture was made pursuant to a preconceived plan to take his life. This conclusion is fully warranted by the evidence, and is undoubtedly that reached by the jury. The circumstances unite with great strength in proof of the fact that the seizure and binding of the deceased were part of a previously arranged plan, and that the appellants, with at least four others, joined in arranging and executing this plan. It is true that Lynch, who was present and assisted in killing Bunch in the cave, testified when called as a witness by the State, that the purpose to kill the captive was not communicated to him until the cave was reached; but nevertheless the circumstances conclusively prove that the capture was made with the intention and purpose of taking the life of the captured man. Forcibly seizing and binding a man without legal excuse or justification is an assault, and if done for the purpose of carrying into execution a preconceived plan to murder the person so seized and bound, is an initial step in the crime. An assault is an element in the crime of murder, and the assault first made in this instance constituted an important step in the crime, for it kept the victim within the power of his captors until the cave was reached on the night of his death. The crime which culminated in the death of Bunch in the cave in Orange county was a single one, although composed of several elements, and the acts done in Martin county were not distinct criminal acts, but were parts of one crime consummated in the adjoining county. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that a man is seized, bound and gagged in one county, pursuant to a preconcerted plan; that while he is thus helpless he is taken to a cave in another county, and there left to die: would it be doubted that the first act-the seizure and binding-was but a part of the crime of murder? There is no difference in principle between the supposed case and the real one; for of the act is a material part of the crime, then no matter where death results, the place of the crime, according to the weight of authority, is at common law in the county where the first material act was committed. There is some conflict in the old common-law authorities as to whether the jurisdiction is in the courts of the place where death occurred or in those of the place where the fatal blow was given; and in order to remove all doubt, the body was sometimes taken to the county where the blow was struck. Riley v. State, 9 Humph. 657; People v. Gill, 6 Cal. 637; State v. Ges sert, 21 Minn. 369; Com. v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1; Com. v. Parker, 2 Pick. 550; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Green v. State, 66 Ala. 40; S. C., 41 Am. Rep. 744; Steerman v. State, 10 Mo. 503; Hunter v. State, 40 N.J. L. 495. If however the crime was committed in part in one county and consummated in another, jurisdiction at common law would seem to be in the county where the first material step in the crime was taken. Mr. Bishop says: "In reason, and according to the better authorities, when a crime is really committed in part in one county, and in part in another, the tribunals of either may properly punish it, provided that what is done in the county which takes the jurisdiction is a substantial act of wrong, and not merely some incidental thing innocent in itself alone." 1 Bish. Crim. Law (7th ed.), § 116. There were not only preparations in Martin county to commit the specific crime finally consummated in Orange, but there was an overt act, forming a material part of the crime committed in the former county and the parties would be indictable at common law in that county. 44 Dynamiting and Extraterritorial | Crime," 16 Crim. Law Mag. 155. The acts done by the appellant and his associates were, we repeat, part of the crime; they were material, and they were substantial wrongs, so that it would seem that even at common law jurisdiction would vest in the county where those acts were committed. We are not however to decide this case upon the rules of the common law, but upon the provision of our statute which reads thus: "Where a public offense has been committed partly in one county and partly in another, or the acts or effects constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more counties, the jurisdiction is in either." The case before us comes within this statute, for the purpose to kill was formed in Martin county, the seizure and binding of the deceased took place there, the plan of carrying it into execution was there resolved upon, and was there so far executed as to deprive the deceased of his liberty, and bring him within the power of those who designed to slay him. These were acts of a criminal character, constituting a part of the offense. Not only were they acts constituting a part of the crime, but they were also acts "requisite to the consummation of the offense," for it was the seizure of the deceased, and the power obtained over him by that seizure, that enabled the appellant and his associates to conduct him to the cave in Orange county, and there kill him. If it had not been for the capture in Martin county the enemies of Bunch could not have taken him to the place where he met his death at their hands, and it was therefore the unlawful seizure that enabled them to consummate the crime of murder, according to the plan conceived by them. The capture in Martin county was as material to the consummation of the crime as almost any other step taken by the criminals, since it was the act which made it possible for them to take him to the place selected for slaying him. It was the act which put him in their power, and enabled them to take him from the county where he lived to the place chosen, in another county, and there take his life; for if the capture had not been effected, the felonious purpose must have been consummated, if at all, in the county of which he was a resident. In construing and sustaining the validity of a statute similar to ours, it was said by the Supreme Court of Alabama that "if then we consider the fatal shooting of the deceased as the commencement merely of the crime of murder charged in the indictment, and that the death of the injured person was the consummation of the offense in Georgia, the statute conferring jurisdiction on the Circuit Court of Colbert county, the alleged venue was valid, and not obnoxious to legal objections." Green v. State, supra. So here, if we consider the seizure and binding of the deceased at the commencement of the crime, the case is within the statute; but here we have the further element that the criminal assault upon the person of the deceased was essential to the consummation of the crime in the case in Orange county, to which he was carried a captive by those who slew him. If it be true that the unlawful seizure of the deceased in Martin county was part of the crime, then the constitutionality of the statute is clear, for there is no substantial diversity of opinion as to the power of the Legislature to provide what county shall have jurisdiction where a crime is committed in two counties, part being committed in each jurisdiction. There is perhaps some diversity of opinion as to whether a statute is constitutional which provides for the punishment of a crime in a county where no material part of the crime was committed; but even upon this question the very decided weight of authority is that the Legislature may provide for the punishment of the crime in either of the two counties where any part of the crime is committed. Tippins v. State, 14 Ga. 422; Steerman v. State, 10 Mo. 503; State v. Pauley, 12 Wis. 537; Com. v. Parker, 2 Pick. 558; Tyler v. People, 8 Mich. 320; Com. v. Macloon, 101 Mass. 1; State v.Johnson, 38 Ark. 568; Green v. State, supra; Hanks v. State, 13 Tex. App. 289; Ham v. State, 4 id. 645; Ex parte Rogers, 10 id. 655; Adams v. People, 1 N. Y. 173. In the case before us we regard the assult upon the deceased in Martin county as an essential part of the crime, and as “an act requisite to its consummation," and we do not doubt that the Legislature had power to provide for the punishment of the crime, either in the county where it was commenced or in the county where the last act was done. This power is often necessary in order to prevent an absolute failure of justice; nor is its existence doubtful, for it has ever been the law, illustrated and declared by a great number of cases, that a crime committed partly in one jurisdiction and partly in another may be punished in either jurisdiction. I Hale P. C. 430, 431, 615-617; Regina v. Michael, 9 Car. & P. 356; People v. Adams, 3 Den. 207; Bulwer's case, 7 Coke, 2b, 3b; King v. Burdett, 4 Barn. & Ald. 175; Com. v. Andrews, 2 Mass. 14; Com. v. Holder, 9 Gray, 7; Simmons v. Com., 5 Bin. 619; Simpson v. State, 4 Humph. 461. We have had for many years a statute founded upon this principle, and its validity was sustained in Beal v. State, 15 Ind. 378. In a still more emphatic way is this principle recognized in Kizer v. Woods, 60 Ind. 538, where it was held, that although the felonious intent, constituting, as is well known, an essential element of the crime of larceny, was formed in Ohio, yet as it was not consummated by a taking until the property and the thief came into this State, the crime might be punished here. The decided cases fully support this doctrine. State v. Underwood, 49 Me. 181; State v. Bartlett, 11 Vt. 650. There is, as we understand the authorities, no real conflict of opinion as to the power of the Legislature to provide for the punishment of a crime partly committed in one jurisdiction and partly in another in either jurisdiction; but there is a sharp conflict as to whether death can be said to be a part of the crime of murder; many of the authorities maintaining that death is merely the consequence of the crime; many of the authorities, on the other hand, maintaining with much reason that death is a part of the crime, for unless it results within a year and a day the offense cannot be murder. "Jurisdiction in Guiteau's Case," 2 Crim. Law Mag. 804. But we have no reason to enter upon this contested ground, as the acts committed in Martin county were substantive criminal wrongs, forming essential parts of the crime. |