« AnteriorContinuar »
ment thus entered to the General Term. The defend- annuity tables, showing, at any age, the probable duants attorney noticed the appeal for argument, and ration of life and present value of a life annuity, are also gave notice of a motion that he would move for competent evidence, the rules derived therefrom are an order dismissing the appeal, and that the cause be not the absolute guides of the judgment and conscience stricken from the calendar, and his judgment be af- of the jury; and an instruction directing the jury firmed, with costs, on the ground that no case had to ascertain the loss of income by the use of such been made and served. The motion was opposed rules, the charge nowhere suggesting that the jury are upon affidavits of plaintiff's attorney, that the decis- at liberty to ascertain such loss according to their own ion, consisting of findings of fact and conclusions of judgment, is erroneous. In Phillips v. London & S. law made by the judge presiding at the Special Term, W. Ry. above cited, the judges strongly approved the had been filed with the clerk, but that a copy thereof usual practice of instructing the jury in general terms had never been served upon him, and that thus plain- to award a fair and reasonable compensation, taking tiff's time to serve a case had not expired. The Gen- into consideration what the plaintiff's income would eral Term granted the motion dismissing the appeal probably have been, how long it would have lasted, with costs of motion, and ordered that the judgment and all the contingencies to which it was liable; and be offirmed, with costs of appeal, unless within twenty as strongly deprecated undertaking to bind them by days thereafter the appellant should apply to the Spec- precise mathematical rules in deciding a question inial Term for leave to make and serve a case on appeal, volving so many contingencies incapable of exact esand that it such application should be granted, the timate or proof. See especially the opinions of Lord appeal should not be dismissed, but the cause should Justice Brett and Lord Justice Cotton as reported in go over the term and be argued at the next General 49 Law J. (Q. B.) 237, 238, and less fully in 5 C. P. Div. Term. We are of opinion that the learned General 291, 293. The natural, if not the necessary, effect of Term misapprehended the practice. The notice of the peremptory instructions at the beginning and end the entry of judgment which the defendant's attorney of dealing with this matter would be to lead the jury served upon the plaintiff's attorney limited tho right to understand that they must accept the tables as afto appeal to thirty days, under section 1351 of the fording the rule for the principal elements of their Code, which provides that an appeal to the General computation, and to create an impression on their Term “must be taken within thirty days after service minds, which would not be removed by the incidenupon the attorney for the appellant of a copy of the tal observation of the judge, when speaking of the judgment or order appealed from, and a written no- possibility of the plaintiff's getting well. “This is tice of the entry thereof," and it had no other effect; only one mode of arriving at it;” especially, as it was and within the time limited the appeal was brought. nowhere, throughout the charge, suggested to the jury The plaintiff was not obliged to prepare a case to be that they would be at liberty, if they found difficulty settled, as required by section 997 of the Code, but he in following the mathematical rules prescribed to could file exceptions under section 994 of the Code to them, to estimate the loss of income according to their the findings of the trial judge upon questions of law, own judgment. Life and annuity tables are framed and could have his appeal heard upon those exceptions upon the basis of the average duration of the lives of without any case, as provided by section 998 of the a great number of persons. But what the jury in this Code. At the time plaintiff's appeal was dismissed at case had to consider was the probable duration of this the General Term, the time for filing exceptions to
plaintiff's life, and of the injury to his capacity to earn the findings of law had not expired. According to
his livelihood. Upon the evidence before them, it was section 994, those exceptions could be taken and filed a controverted question whether that injury would be any time before the expiration of ten days after ser- temporary or permanent. The instruction excepted vice upon plaintiff's attorney of a copy of the decision to, either taken by itself or in connection with of the court, and a written notice of the entry of judg.
the whole charge, tended to mislead the jury, by ment thereupon. A copy of the decision has never
obliging them to ascertain the average injury to the been served upon plaintiff's attorney, and hence his plaintiff's capacity by the year, whether the extent of time for filing exceptions to the filings of the judge
that injury would be constant or varying, and by givhas not been limited, and has not expired. The court
ing them to understand that the tables were not at General Term therefore bad no right to dismiss his merely competent evidence of the average duration of appeal, conditionally or otherwise. The defendant human life, and of the present value of life annuities, must serve upon the plaintiff's attorney a copy of the
but furnished absolute rules which the law required decision of the court, and then, unless plaintiff's at- them to apply in estimating the probable duration of torney files and serves his exceptions within the time the plaintiff's life, an the extent of the injury which limited by law, his appeal may be dismissed. Nor has he had suffered. Oct. 25, 1886. Vicksburg & M. R. Co. the plaintiff's time to make a case been limited as re
v. Putnam. Opinion by Gray, J. quired by rule 32 of the Supreme Court. That rule pro- JURISDICTION-DISTRICT COURT UNITED STATESvides that if the trial is before the court or a referee
LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OF SHIP-OWNERS- PROHIBa case may be made and a copy thereof served upon ITION.-(1) The District Court of the United States the opposite party, “ within ten days after the service
cannot take jurisdiction in admiralty of a petition for of a copy of the decision or report, and written notice
limitation of liability under the Revised Statutes of of the entry of judgment thereon.” It would there
the United States, where it would not have had cogfore appear that at the time plaintiff's appeal was dis
nizance in admiralty, originally of the cause of action missed he was not in default for not filing his excep- involved. Nothing is clearer than that, by the extions or making a case. Oct. 26, 1886. Schwartz v.
press adjudication of this court, the District Court, as Weber. Opinion by Earl, J.
a court of admiralty, would have no jurisdiction of a suit, either in rem or in personam, by any one of the
Bufferers by the fire, to recover damages from the vesUNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AB
sel or her owner. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20. As there STRACT.
is no foundation in the general admiralty jurisdiction
of the District Court for its assumption of jurisdiction EVIDENCE-LIFE AND ANNUITY TABLES IN ACTIONS in this case, aud uone in the special provisions of the FOR PERSONAL INJURY - MEASURE OF DAMAGES.-In statute for the limitation of liability, it is sought to an action for personal injuries, while standard life and uphold the jurisdiction under the rules in admiralty
promulgated by this court in reference to the limitation of liability. The provisions of the Revised Statutes on the subject of the limitation of liability were taken from the act of March 3, 1851. 9 St. 635. There is nothing in that act, nor in the corresponding enactments in the Revised Statutes, in regard to the promulgation of any rules by this court for procedure in the matter, The rules it has made (Rules 54-57) are rules in admiralty, promulgated May 6, 1872. 13 Wall. xiii. They were announced as “supplementary rules of practice in admiralty under the act of March 3, 1851, entitled 'An act to limit the liability of ship-owners, and for other purposes.'
.'" They are authoritatively embodied in, and numbered as part of the "rules of practice for the courts of the United States in admirally and maritime jurisdiction, on the instance side of the court, in pursuance of the act of the twenty-third of August. 1842, chapter 188." The authority given to this court by the act of 1842 was in section 6 (5 St. 518). In view of the decision made by this court at December Term, 1865, in the case of The Plymouth, it is pot to be presumed that the six of the judges upon the bench when it was made who were also upon the bench when the Rules of May 6. 1872, were promulgated, intended that those rules should contain any thing in conflict with the decision in the case of The Plymouth: nor are those rules capable of any such construction. There is nothing in any of these rules which purports to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Dis. trict Courts of the United States as to subject-matter. On the contrary, they exclude any such construction, and leave that jurisdiction in admiralty within the bounds set for it by the Constitution and statutes, and the judicial decisions under them. There is nothing in these rules which sanctions the taking of juris. diction by a District Court on a petition under the rules, where that court could not have had original cognizance in admiralty of a suit in rem or in per
to recover for the loss or damage involved. Nor do we find any thing in any of the decisions of this court on the subject of the limitation of liability which supports the view that a District Court can take jurisdiction in admiralty of a petition for a limi. tation of liability where it would not have had cognizance in admiralty originally of the cause of action involved. In Norwich (o v. Wright, 13 Wall. 104, the case which furnished the occasion for the making of the rules, and which came before this court again in The City of Norwich. 118 U. S. 468; S. C., 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1150, the damage was occasioned by a collision ou navigable water between two vessels, and a fire result. ing from it on board of one of them. In all the other cases in which this court has upheld proceedings for limitation in a District Court. there was original admiralty jurisdiction of the cause of action In The Benefactor, 103 U. S. 239, the cause of damage was a collision on the high seas, and the petition for limitation was filed in the same District Court in which the offending vessel was ljbeled. In The Scotland. 105 U S. 25; S. C., 118 V. S. 507. and 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1174, there was a like cause of action, and the limitation was claimed by an answer to a libel in personam in a District Court. In Ex parte Slayton, 105 U. S. 451. the petition for limitation was filed in a District Court, by the owner of a vessel which had foundered, to limit his liability for the loss of goods carried, and for damage to another vessel by a prior colligion, he not having been first sued. He transferred to a trustee appointed by the court his interest in the vessel, and in the freight pending. See The Alpena, 10 Biss. 436. This court, being applied to for a writ of probibition, refused to grant it. It held that the owner of a vessel may, before he is sued, institute appropriate proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain a limitation of liability; that the words "any court,'' in
section 4284, mean "any court of competent jurisdiction;" and that as the transfer had been made, and the freight money paid over to the trustee, the District Court had jurisdiction to apportion the fund. But it is to be noted that the causes of action were in fact of admiralty jurisdiction. In Providence & N. Y. S. S. Co. v. Hill Manuf'g Co., 109 U. S. 578; S. C., 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 379, 617, the cause of action was a loss, by the burning of a vessel, of goods carried by ber, and the petition for limitation was filed in the District Court of the district where the fire occurred. and where the remnants of the vessel remained, and the contract of affreightment was of admiralty cognizance. In The Great Western. 118 U. S. 520, the cause of dam. age was a collisiou on the high seas, and the claim of limitation was made in the answer in a suit in personam in a District Court in admiralty to recover for the damage. (2) It is contended that the mistake of the District Court must be corrected by appeal, and that the case is not one for a writ of prohibition. Where the case is within admiralty cognizance, the District Court may decide whether the party is entitled to the benefit of the statute, and a writ of probibition will not lie. But where, as here, the tort is not a maritime tort, there can be no jurisdiction in the admiralty to determine the issue of liability, or that of limitation of liability. This court refused a writ of prohibition where a suit in rem was brought against a vessel, in admiralty, in a District Court, to enforce an alleged lien for wharfage, on the ground that a contract for the use of a wharf by a vessel was a maritime contract, and cognizable in the admiralty, and that as a lien arose in certain cases, the admiralty court was competent to decide in the given case whether there was a lien. Ex parte Easton, 95 U. S. 68. So also a writ of prohibition was refused where a suit in admiralty was brought in a District Court to recover damages for the loss of life by a collision between two vessels, on the ground that damages from collision were within admiralty jurisdiction, and the admiralty court could therefore lawfully decide whether such damages enbraced damages for the loss of life. Ex parte Gordou, 101 U. S. 515. But in the present case the District (ourt is called upon by tbe petition of the owner of the vessel, to first determine the questiou of any liability when it has no jurisdiction of the cause of action, and then to determine whet ber the statute cor. ers the case. The case is clearly one for a writ of prohibition, as the want of jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings. U. S. v. Peters, 3 Dall. 121. Nov. 1, 1886. Ex parle Phenix Ins. Co. of Brooklyn, N. Y. Opinion by Bradley, J.
REMOVAL OF CAUSE-CONSPIRATORS TO DEFRAUDCOLLUSION - ESTOPPEL - STIPULATION.-(1) The bill charged the defendants as co-conspirators in a scheme to raise a cloud on the title of the complainants, and to defraud them of their property. According to the al. legations of the bill, the deed to Giles was a link in the chain of fraudulent acts charged. We have repeatedly held that a suit brought against several defeudauts, some of whom are citizens of the same State with the plaintiff,charging them all as joint contractors or joint trespassers,cannot be removed into the United States court by those who are citizens of another State. although they allege in their petition for removai tbat they are not jointly interested or liable with the other defendants, and that their controversy with the plaintiff is a separate one. We think that the present case is one of that kind. The bill, as we have said, charges the defendants jointly. Giles could not, by merely making contrary averments in his petition for removal, and setting up a case inconsistent with the allegations of the bill, segregate himself from the other defendants, and thus entitle himself to remove the
case into the United States court. This matter has been fully considered in the following cases. Louisville & N. R Co. v. Ide, 114 U. S. 52; Farmington v. Pillsbury, id. 138; Pirie v. Tvedt, 115 id. 41; Crump v. Thurber, id. 56; Starin v. New York, id. 248; Sloane v. Anderson, 117 id. 278; Ins. Co. v. Huntington, id. 280; Core v Vinal, id. 317; Mining Co. v. Canal Co., 118 id. 264. (2) But we are also satisfied that the other ground is well taken, that the deed to Giles was collusively made for the mere purpose of giving jurisdiction to the courts of the United States, and that for this reason the case should bave been remanded to the State court. Of course where the interest of the nominal party is real, the fact that others are interested who are not necessary parties, and are not made parties, will not affect the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court; but when it is simulated and collusive, and created for the very purpose of giving jurisdiction, the court should not hesitate to apply the wholesome provisions of the law. Farmington v. Pittsburg, 114 U. S. 138. (3) It is contended by the appellees however that the decision of the judge in the case at law of Giles v. Owens, upon the plea in abatement in that case, in which the issue was whether the deed to Giles was collusively made for the purpose of bringing suit in the United States Court, concludes the appellants on that point. A stipulation was entered into between the parties in this case that the 188ue on said plea in abatement should be tried and that the decision thereon should be taken and entered of record as the decision upon the pleas filed in four other actions at law against other parties, and also of the issues in this suit as far as they are the same. All that this stipulation amounts to, so far as it affects this case, is that the trial and decision in the law case sbould be regarded as the decision in this. It is the same as if an issue had been directed by the Circuit Court, and a verdict had been rendered. The decision of the judge was adverse to the appellants and in favor of Giles; and so far as this case is concerned, that decision, by virtue of the stipulation, is to be considered as the decision of the Circuit Court, and nothing more. But all the evidence taken on that trial is incorporated into this case, and is now before us. If we are satisfied that the whole evidence in the case, taken together, including that before the judge, does not support the decision, we are not bound by it. Nov. 1, 1886. Little v. Giles. Opinion by Bradley, J.
assignment, and the books assigned, does not operate as an executed assignment, and will be defeated by a general assignment executed before the particular assignment comes into the hands of the creditor for whose benefit it was made. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 20, 1886. Gage v. Parry. Opinion by Reed, J.
ATTORNEY-LIABILITY THIRD-OBEYING INSTRUCTIONS.-An attorney who simply obeys instructions of his client, and in obedience thereto communicates directions for the seizure of property, is not liable therefor. He need have neither belief vor suspicion that the defendant owns the property, nor need he seek information that would warrant a belief. He is simply a medium for the communication of his client's directions, and is required by his duty to make no inquiry in such a case as to the ownership of the property. The client assumes the responsibility of determining such question. The party injured by the levy suffers nothing from the individual act of the attorney. His act was done in the capacity of an agent, and amounted to nothing more than the communication of the client's direction to the officer serving the process. We answer the fourth question negatively. In support of these views, see the following cases: Lyon v. Tevis, 8 Iowa, 79: Paton v. Lancaster, 38 id. 494; Hardy v. Keeler, 56 Ill. 152; Cook v. Hopper, 23 Mich. 511; Burnap v. Marsh, 13 Ill. 535; Schalk v. Kingsley, 42 N. J. L. 32; Hunter v. Burtis, 10 Wend. 358; Ford v. Williams, 13 N. Y. 577; S. C., 24 id. 359. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 20, 1886. Dawson v. Buford. Opinion by Beck, J.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – EX POST FACTO CHANGE OF PROCEDURE. - Where the law in force at the time of the commission of the alleged offense provided that juries should be the judges of the law, but which law was repealed before the trial, held, that it was competent for the Legislature to make such change, and no error for the trial court to refuse to instruct the jury in the language of the prior law. The procedure only has been changed. The degree of punishment, the character of the offeuse, and the rules of evidence, remain as under the former law. It may be observed.that the only change in the law is to provide another tribunal to pass upon the law of the case. Prior to the change, if the words in the former Code are to be taken at their full meaning and import, the jury were the judges as to the law of the case on trial. After the change the court sits in that capacity, and is the judge of the law. No vested right of plaintiff in error is affected. A new tribunal may be erected, or a new jurisdiction given to try hiin, and no right is abridged. Com. v. Phillips, 11 Pick. 28. In People v. Mortimer, 46 Cal. 114, it is said: “It is clear therefore that no constitutional difficulty would be encountered in requiring past offenses to be tried under new forms of procedure; and it is equally clear that if such offeuses are to be tried only under the old forms, and later offenses under the new, it would or might 'oreate endless confusion in legal proceedings.' Cooley, in Constitutional Limitations (4th ed.), at page 331, says: “But so far as mere modes of procedure are concerned, a party has no more right in a criminal than in a civil action, to insist that his case shall be disposed of under the law in force when the act to be investigated is charged to have taken place. Remedies must always be under the control of the Legislature, and it would create endless confusion in legal proceedings if every case was to be conducted only in accordance with the rules of practice, and heard only by the courts in existence when its facts arose The Legiala. ture may abolish courts and create new ones, and it may prescribe altogether different modes of procedure in its discretion, though it cannot lawfully, we think,
ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-CHATTEL MORTGAGE - ASSIGNING BOOK-ACCOUNTS - PREFERENCES AND ASSIGNMENT NOT ONE TRANSACTION.-(1) Executing chattel mortgages, aud making an assignment of book-accounts by an insolvent firm, with the bona fide intention of securiug particular creditors, does not operate as a general assignment for the benefit of creditors, but is a valid transaction for the purposes intended. (2) The execution of a general assignment for the benefit of creditors within an hour after executing instruments to secure particular creditors cannot be considered a part of the transaction so as to make the whole operate as & general assignment, where it is shown that the general assignment was made because of the fear that the recording of the instruments first executed would cause the unsecured creditors to institute attachment suits. (3) An assignment of the book-accounts of a firm to a creditor at the suggestion of a third party having no authority from the creditor to act for him, and the delivery to such third party of the
time to time at the pleasure of the Legislature: Now The following decisions were handed down Tuer
in so doing, dispense with any of those substantial tween the parties to this controversy. Ky. Ct. App. protections with which the existing law surrounds the Oct. 30, 1886. Seive v. Steinreide. Opinion by Pryor
, person accused of crime." In 1 Bish. Crim. Proc., $ 115, C. J. it is said: “It is a doctrine, extending through every department of the law, that rights, when vested in individuals, are unchangeable, while the remedies by
COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. which those rights are enforced may be varied from
THE this , day especially the constitutional ones, in respect to their Decision of board of claims reversed and a new defense, cannot be taken away. But they can be modi. hearing ordered, costs to abide the event-J. Smith fied as to time, place and manner of their enforce- McMaster, applt., v. State of New York, respt.ment. Only the substance of them must be pre- Judgment affirmed with costs--Leopold Wise et. al. served. We therefore conclude that the law is not ex applts., v. Andrew W. Morgan, respt; In re Will of post facto and within the inhibition of the Constitu- | James Dennin, deceased. Mary Reniban, applt., V. tion of the United States, or of this State, and that Martha A. Dennin et al, respt. ; Stepben Brown, exr.. plaintiff in error has been deprived of no substantial respt., v. George M. Crippen, applt. ; Lewis Roberts, right by the refusal of the trial court to instruct as re- respt., v. Edward B. Cobb,exr.,applt.; Bridget Cooper, quested. Neb. Sup. Ct., Oct. 27, 1886. Marion v. admrx., respt., v. Central Stock Yard, etc., Co., applt. State. Opinion by Reese, J.
-Judgment'affirmed-People, respt., v. Helen Mo
Callam, applt.- -Order of General Term affirmed, CONTRACT --COMPROMISE AGREEMENT BETWEEN
with costs-Charles Schwartz et al, applts., v. William HUSBAND AND WIFE AS TO PROPERTY JOINTLY AC
K. Soutter, et al. respts.-Judgment reversed, new QUIRED-CLAIM OF NEXT-OF-KIN.-Where husband and
trial granted, costs to abide the event - Eugene A. wife,vatives ofGermany, by their equal labor and thrift,
Brewster, exr., applt., v. Spencer Carnes. impld.. accumulate property in real estate, and the husband deeds it to the wife, and on her death, never having | Co., respt.; George W. Conselyea, et al. respts., V.
respt. ; Agnes E. Abel, exrx., applt., v. D. & 8. Canal had children, her lands to go to her pext-of-kin, who
Francis Swift, applt.- Order of General Term relives in Germany, and who upon demanding the lands
versed: judgment of Special Term affirmed without of the husband, are met by his statement tbat there
costs--Isaac L. Kip et al. admr., applts. v. Edward was an agreement between him and his wife that the Hoisch, respt. -Appeal dismissed with costs-Peo. property should go to the survivor of them, to be by ple ex rel. Mary R. Brush, et al., respts., v. John R. said survivor devised equally among the relatives of Brown, applt.- Motion for reargument. Ordered. each, and the parties finally settled by deeding a
that the remittitur be amended so as to read as fol moiety to each other, this settlement, in the absence, lows: Judgment modified by declaring that the same of any overreaching by the husband, will be upheld. is without prejudice to any action or proceeding It is manifest that the appellants knew their rights, founded on the contract of August, 13, 1875, and as so and had prepared to enforce them when the compro- modified, judgment affirmed with costs-Munson v. mise was effected. The appellee was claiming that
Syracuse and Corning R. Co. (Magee). -Motion for the wife held this property in trust, to pass to him as
reargument denied-Sweet v. Morrison. the survivor, and whether this fact existed, or could have been established, it is not necessary to inquire. It is suficient that this was the character of his claim
NOTES. to property-the results of the labor of a life-time on his part-that he may have inadvertently conveyed to his wife without securing to himself any interest, in Lawyers in trouble-the “ Coke operators " in Pittsthe event he survived her. The execution of the deed burgh. under the circumstances must strike the mind of
The Boston Advertiser man says: “Judge Holmes the chancellor as remarkable, in the absence of some
oration was punctuated with hearty applausé.' He understanding between the husband and the wife as
means the applause stopped it. to the nature of the husband's title, in the event the latter should survive her. If he made this deed with
We ought to have had the following to append to out some such agreement, the presumption is much
our recent remarks on Mr. ('onkling s defense of betstronger that he did it in ignorance of his rights thau ting: The leading lawyers of Nashville have subscribed that these appellants, from the facts before us, entered $1,000 for a stake to be run at the Nashville spring into this compromise with the nature of their interest meeting. It will be known as the lawyers stake for concealed from them by the appellee. There was cer
three-year-olds, one mile and a sixteenth. tainly a high moral obligation on these appellants to Some ten years ago a young lawyer made his debut make some provision for the appellee. The result of at the Troy bar. in the defense of a criminal, at a besthe thrist, labor and economy on the part of the appel. sion presided over by the late Judge H-The writer lee, that enabled him to accumulate this estate, had said to the judge: “I understand young So-and-So all gone into the pockets of the appellants without any produced a very good impression." Why, y-1-8," valuable consideration whatever, and there the drawled the judge, who was a great stickler for forenconveyance of the one-half of his property to bio etiquette, “but he had one habit that amoyed me him was but an act of justice, and we might add duty, very much. He had a lemon, and was continually ou the part of the appellants, excluding from the con- sucking it. I didn't like the looks of it, but I didn't troversy any consideration of the impending litiga- want to hurt the young man's feelings by a public rep. tion between the parties. Here however was a fair rimand, and so I 'addressed him a little note, intimatand just compromise of the right of property asserted ing that unless the lemon was essential to his health, by the one party and denied by the other, with no it would be more in acoordance with the received eticertainty as to what would have been the final result of quette of courts to desist from the exercise, or posta law-suit: and a court of equity, being always ready pone it until recess. The lemon disappeared; but to aid in enforcing family settlements based upon a they told me afterward, "continued the judge with a just and fair compromiso, will not hesitate to further grin and an indescribable squeal, “ that it contaiued consummate, by its judgment, this just settlement be- / w-h-i-s-k-e-y."
The Albany Law Journal.
Mr. Banks has been awarded the contract for publishing the reports of the New York Court of
Appeals by virtue of not being the lowest responsiALBANY, DECEMBER 18, 1886.
ble bidder. His bid was for volumes over the counter, 98 cents; for volumes otherwise delivered,
$1.10. The bid of Weed, Parsons & Co. for the CURRENT TOPICS.
same was $1 and $1.05 respectively, or three cents
cheaper in the aggregate. Inasmuch as the bulk of THE HE Ohio Weekly Law Bulletin says of the first the volumes are not delivered over the counter the trial in the boodle aldermen
" The latter bid must be esteemed much the lower. Perjury that sat upon his case in the first trial threw haps Mr. Sickels will now arise and explain the mysout the testimony of Fullgraff and Duffy, because tery which seemed to him and others so great when they were self-confessed accomplices in the crime. the contract was last awarded. Now that Mr. Banks This is the dangerous process advocated by the has got the contract at a living price, it is to be defense in the Columbus trials for the tally-sheet | hoped that he will conform to its requirements in forgery. It strikes deeply at the very foundations spirit as well as in letter, and generously throw in of the administration of justice, and if it were once paper and twine when he sells a single volume, and to be recognized by the courts, would put an end to not exact the precise change, etc., and thus confirm all subsequent trials for bribery, election frauds and the intense love and respect in which he is held by other similar crimes. These crimes are never com- the legal profession of this State. mitted in the presence of honorable men who are opposed to them. If brought to light at all it must be through the evidence of one or more of
The industry and ingenuity of counsel are strikthe participants, and the rule is that such evidence, President, etc., of D. & H. Canal Co., recently de
ingly illustrated in Mr. Moak's brief in Abel v. if sufficiently corroborated by the testimony of others or by circumstances, is as strong as any upon
cided in our Court of Appeals, where he succeeded which justice ever relies. If crime of this kind is
in establishing the proposition that railroad com
panies are bound to establish reasonable rules for only to be established on the testimony of nonparticipants who saw it perpetrated, then it might Mr. Moak fortifies and illustrates this position by
the action of their employees toward co-employees. as well be understood at once that crimes against
some six pages of extracts from Dredge's History of the public safety and in violation of official duty
Pennsylvania Railroads, Kirkman's Railway Service, may be committed with impunity, and a large pro
and Huntington's Road Master's Assistant. portion of the most atrocious crimes against life or property would have to go unpunished where conviction cannot be brought about except on the We were pained to see in the columns of the confession of accomplices." This is very sound Rochester Democrat and Chronicle some very intemsense. There is nothing inherently improbable in
perate and unfounded abuse of the Lord Chief the story of Duffy and Fullgraff. On the contrary Justice of England in connection with his recent almost everybody believes it to be true. McQuade family difficulties. The editor is a person for whom himself does not take the stand to deny it. Why
we bave the highest esteem, but when he essays to then should a jury refuse to give it credit? It is
write on a subject with which he cannot possibly true that the accomplice witnesses confess their have the slightest acquaintance he naturally makes own guilt and their own repeated perjuries, but a mistakes. It will be seen from the extracts in our court would not hesitate to convict them on their
columns that the jury have absolved Lord Coleridge own plea of guilty, and we see no reason why their
from blame, and that the influential law journals of accomplices should not be convicted on their un
London approve the verdict. We long since formed contradicted testimony. If these scoundrels are own opinion in the matter -- partly from not punished the city of New York may as well go direct information — that the Lord Chief Justice is to the dogs.
quite incapable of wronging his child, and that he
has an eccentric and erratic daughter and an The mental back of “our own and only Sher- adventurous and scheming son-in-law. Lord Colewood, J.," of Missouri, seems to have assumed the ridge deserves the respect and admiration of all form of a permanent water-shed. Here is one of his Americans not only for his personal conduct when last deliverances, iv 87 Missouri Reports: “Re- he was here, but for his long and unswerving friendgarding the majority opinion in respect of the ship for our country in times of trial as well as in inadmissibility of the deposition of Mrs. Way, as times of peace. There is nothing to be gained radically wrong, at war with reason, precedent and among fair-minded republicans by railing at him as one of the plainest and most fundamental rules of an unnatural father and hard-hearted aristocrat. evidence, I dissent." This is all superfluous ex- Such abuse is very cheap and vulgar, and utterly cept the last two words. If a man cannot convince unworthy the scholarly and accomplished editor of his fellows by reasoning he cannot by denunciation. the Democrat and Chronicle. Probably it was the Such language simply hardens the eleven obstinate work of some indiscreet and hot-headed young writer jurymen.
who will know better when he knows more. VOL. 34 -- No. 25.