property be described as bounded by the river or road, notwithstanding that a map or plan referred to in the deed does not purport to include such moiety of the road or river. THE opinion states the case. Macnaghten, Q. C., and W. P. Beale, for appellant company. Byrne, for directors. Marten, Q. C., Romer, Q. C.. and E. S. Ford, for plaintiffs. COTTON, L. J. This is an appeal by the defendants from an order made by Bacon, V. C., granting an injunction restraining both the company and the directors of the company from erecting a bridge, and also from committing a trespass on a road, claimed to belong to the plaintiffs, on which the northern approach to the defendants' bridge abuts, by opening a way on it for the purpose of that approach. Now the principal question in dispute is that relating to the construction of the bridge, and that was the main point of interest to the plaintiffs, because they have a bridge close to the place on which it is intended to put the bridge of the defendants, and the plaintiffs charge a toll both for foot passengers, and I suppose for carts which pass over their bridge, but the bridge to be erected by the defendants is to be a free bridge. Four points were urged on behalf of the plaintiffs. The first point was, and the vice-chancellor decided, that a portion of the bed of the river which adjoins the land of the defendants (the other half of the river belonging to Lady Cardigan's trustees) belonged to the plaintiffs and was vested in them, and therefore that putting the bridge over that portion of the bridge was an act of trespass. That really turns on the true construction and effect of the conveyance of the 7th of March, 1854. Up to the date of that conveyance the plaintiffs, or their predecessors in title, were the owners of the land comprised in it, and of part of the land lying opposite to it on the other side of the river. They had a good deal of other property in the neighborhood, and in that year they made a grant or conveyance to Joseph Lowden, who was the predecessor in title of the defendants. That conveyance followed up a leasc which had been previously granted to Lowden, and which gave the lessee an option to buy the land which was comprised in the lease, and certain additional land. One great point made on behalf of the plaintiffs was that the lease specifically described the quantity of land to be bought, which was not to be more than an acre, and gave the price very definitely. The property conveyed was described in the conveyance, and shown in the annexed plan, as bounded on the west by a new road leading to the plaintiffs' bridge. The defendants propose to put their bridge a little to the eastward of the bridge of the plaintiffs, but with an approach starting from the new road, and made upon the land of the defendants, and then the new bridge is to cross the river to the land of the Cardigan trustees. Now there is no doubt that the piece of land conveyed to the defendants' predecessor, Lowden, did comprise the bank of the river at the spot in question. The conveyance, which is a conveyance of what was demised by the lease, comprises the land specified and marked out by metes and bounds, but it described it as bounded on the north by this river, and then there are large general words. I do not myself place reliance on those general words, but they are certainly as wide as the general words which had been used in one of the cases cited to us, and on which reliance was placed. The question is whether this conveyance of a piece of land described by quantity of yards, and as being bounded on the north by the river, does carry with it, as part of that which was conveyed, the right to the soil ad medium filum aquæ. In my opinion, the rule of construction is now well settled, that where there is a conveyance of land, even although it is described by reference to a plan, and by color, and by quantity, if it is said to be bounded on one side either by a river or by a public thoroughfare, there, on the true construction of the instrument, the half of the bed of the river or of the road passes, unless there is sufficient in the surrounding circumstances, or in the expressions in the instrument, to show that that was not the intention of the parties. It is a presumption only that the words do include, not only the land so described by metes and bounds, but also half of that by which it is said to be bounded-half the soil of the road, or the public thoroughfare, or half the bed of the river and that presumption may be rebutted. Now, in my opinion, you may look at the surrounding circumstances, but only to see whether there were known to both parties facts existing at the time of the conveyance which showed that it was the intention of the vendors to do something, as regards the half of the road or the half of the bed of the river, which rendered it necessary that he should retain in himself the soil which would otherwise pass to the purchaser of the piece of land abutting on the river or the road. Of course there may be many circumstances --whether appearing on the face of the conveyance or otherwise-which show that it was not the intention of the parties that the general presumption should apply. In my opinion, it is not sufficient that circumstances which afterward occur show that it is very injurious to the grantor that the conveyance should include half the bed of the river or half the soil of the road. Circumstances may arise which show how prejudicial snch a construction is to the vendors, and it may be that if the vendor and purchaser had thought of those circumstances, or the possibility of those circumstances, they might have introduced into the conveyance words which would have shown that the soil was not pass; but the mere fact that if the vendor had been prudent, or if he had known that what would hereafter arise would render it to his disadvantage that the soil of half of the river should pass, in my opinion, is not a circumstance which prevents the presumption from arising. Now, before considering the circumstances of the case, I will just refer to one or two of the cases cited to show that what I have said is really a correct statement of the law. I think the authorities show that conclusively. In Lord v. Commissioners of Sydney there was a grant from the crown of a piece of land described as bounded on one side by a creek, and it was held that even as against the crown the grant must be taken to pass the soil of the creek up to the middle. Berridge v. Ward is a very important case indeed, because there the map annexed to the conveyance colored the land down to the edge, but did not include any portion of the highway, one-half of which was nevertheless held to pass by the conveyance. That case lays down the rule as to presumptions generally, and is a very strong instance of its application. Then Leigh v. Jack was referred to, in which the Court of Appeal held that the rule did not apply. That case is an illustration of the circumstances which may show that the presumption is not intended to apply to the particular conveyance. There the property was laid out for building, and there was an intended road which adjoined and bounded the plot which was conveyed to one of the parties. It was obviously necessary that the vendor should retain the soil of that intended road in order that he might make it into a road and then dedicate it to the public. This object was shown by the conveyance, which described the road as an in tended road, and the purchaser must have known that That is really the explanation of these cases. There is nothing in the circumstances which occurred here to rebut the presumption, because at the time when this conveyance was executed nobody was wishing to make another bridge across the river. It was not anybody's interest to do it, apparently till the railway company, or somebody for them, got the piece of land, and wanted a toll-less bridge opened to their railway, and then it could not have been done unless the Cardigan trustees, who were the owners of the other half of the bed, had been quite willing that they should build the bridge. At the time of the conveyance nothing was contemplated by the plaintiffs' predecessors which would render it necessary for them to retain half the bed of the river. Now what is there in the language of the deed to help the plaintiffs? In my opinion, there is nothing. It was urged that they ought to have the soil of this portion of the river in order that they might repair the bridge; but they carefully provided by the conveyance that they should have a right of way over whatever passes by the conveyance, in order that they might repair the bridge; and although they have stipulated that nothing in the deed shall interfere with their taking tolls, they have not inserted in the deed any prohibition against the erection of a bridge. If it had been contemplated then that they should have this piece of land in order to prevent another bridge being erected, they would have put in some provision to show that another bridge was not to be made. I am not for one moment saying that it is shown that the parties really intended that the half bed should pass; but no contrary intention is expressed or made manifest in such a way as to exclude the presumption. In my opinion therefore the presumption must apply, aud this deed must be held to pass, not only that which is described and colored, but the adjoining half of the soil of the river. It is said that this is a very extraordinary result, because the half bed is a third or a fourth of the whole quantity of the land, and the purchasers will get it for nothing. The price was really paid for that part of the land which was not covered by water; that which was covered by water was not available for what was then in contemplation, and it does not seem to have been intended that any price should be given for it. In fact, it was not within the contemplation of the parties then that any thing was going to be done on this strip of soil. And although it does add considerably to what vests in the purchasers, it must be remembered that it is vested in them subject to all the rights of upper and lower riparian proprietors, which render the value of the soil of a stream like this unimportant unless some such extraordinary case as this arises, when the value simply depends on the fact that the purchaser wishes to erect a bridge, and the vendor wishes to prevent him, and also on the concurrence of the owner of the moiety of the bed of the river oppo site to that about which the question arises. The vice-chancellor seems to have considered that it was an admitted fact that half of the bed of the river belonged to the plaintiffs; and if that had been so. I should have agreed with him that an injunction should be granted; but I take a different view of the facts, and in my opinion the erection of the bridge cannot be prevented on the ground that the half bed of the river adjoining the defendants' land belongs to the plaintiffs. Then there were some covenants in the deed on which reliance was placed by the plaintiffs. the bridge of the plaintiffs might want repair, and in the conveyance to Lowden there was a reservation to the plaintiffs' predecessors of a right and privilege "with or without workmen, agents and others, horses and carts, and with all suitable and requisite materials and implements, of entering from time to time into and upon the said hereditaments and premises expressed to be hereby conveyed, or any part thereof, for the purpose of renewing, altering, repairing and amending the said iron bridge." Well, the plaintiffs said that the approach to this pro posed and intended bridge on the south side of the river-that is, on the land conveyed by the plaintiffs to Lowden-was of such a character that it would interfere with that right of way. As far as one understood the plaintiffs' argument, it would lead to this, that nothing whatever could be done on this land which would in any way prevent a right of way over the whole of it. That is wrong. In my opinion, all that this reservation will give the plaintiffs is a right to require that there shall be a reasonable access left to the bridge, and that the defendants must not entirely obstruct the way. Now the access to the new bridge is on pillars, which stand apart at a distance of thirteen feet. In the interval between the pillars nearest the river Aire there is now not a very great headway, be cause there is some rubbish under it, but when that rubbish is removed there will be a headway of from uine to ten feet. In my opinion it cannot be said, that whilst there is that headway and that width left, reasonable access is not left by the defendants to the plaintiffs for the repair of this bridge; but the defeudants must not assume that they can by their operations so incumber the land as to prevent the plaintiffs from having a reasonable access to the bridge for these purposes. Then it is said that what the defendants are doing is a breach of the proviso at the end of the deed that "nothing in these presents contained shall affect, prejudice or interfere with any right of the said John Micklethwait, his heirs and assigns, at present existing, to take rent or toll in respect of and as compensation for all or any person or persons, horses and other animals, carts and other carriages, having occasion to pass or repass on, over and along the said bridge." It is said that the erection of this new toll-less bridge will take away the passengers, and therefore deprive the plaintiffs of their tolls; but it does not in any way affect, prejudice or interfere with their right to take tolls. That is a very different thing. I think this clause was meant to provide, ex abundanti cautela, that the provision with reference to the passing of the bridge by Lowden should not be construed as in any way interfering with the right to take tolls and regulate the tolls as the plaintiffs' predecessors thought fit. But what is being done, even if it does, within the meaning of this clause, interfere with or prejudice the right to take tolls, is not something contained in these presents, but something outside the deed. The defendants propose to do that which is not in any way prevented by the provisions of the deed. In my opin- Their right to toll, as it is called, is simply this, that being the owners of that bridge, they can prevent any body from going over it except on such terms as he can arrange with them. They are not like the owner of a ferry or of a bridge having a monopoly. People are not bound to go over the bridge at all. They may ferry across if they can get acccess. The plaintiffs' right is simply to say to people who want to go over the bridge, "You shall not cross except on our terms, because the land is ours." How far are the defendants infringing those rights? It appears to me that they are not infringing them in the slightest degree, assuming, as of course I do for the present purpose, that the defendants will erect a free bridge, which will practically-of course one sees that-diverge a great part of the traffic from the plaintiffs' bridge. If the plaintiffs had a right to have that traffic, if they had a right to exclude people from crossing the river except by this bridge, then the defendants would, in my judgment, be interfering with the plaintiffs' right to toll; but with such right to tolls as the plaintiffs have the defendants are in no way interfering. That part of the injunction appears to me therefore to be utterly unsupportable. The third thing which the vice-chancellor has restrained the defendants from doing is "from erecting or causing, or permitting to be erected or to remain, any bridge or other building, chain, wire or other obstruction upon or over the bed of the said river extending along the boundary of the hereditaments comprised in the indenture of the 7th of March, 1854." It appears to me that this part of the injunction can only be supported upon the ground that the plaintiffs are the owners of a portion of that part of the bed of the river over which the defendants' bridge will stand. If they were - and the vice-chancellor evidently thought they were-then this part of the injunction would be a matter of course, for the defendants in that state of things would be infringing the rights of the plaintiffs, and of course the plaintiffs would be entitled to restrain them from so doing. But the question is, whether the plaintiffs are or are not the owners of the southern half of the bed of this river. That de LINDLEY, L. J. I am of the same opinion. Bacon, It appears to me therefore that this part of the injunction cannot be sustained. The second thing which the vice-chancellor has restrained the defendants from doing is from interfering with or obstructing the rights of the plaintiffs of taking toll in respect of any person passing and repassing along any part of the road of the plaintiffs over the bridge. The predecessors in title of the plaintiffs, by their deed of conveyance, granted to the purchaser and persons claiming under him a right to use this iron bridge on paying the tolls theretofore taken. There was also a grant to the same persons of a right to use a new road leading to the bridge. Then there is, at the end of the conveyance, a proviso preserving the plaintiffs' right to take the tolls. Let us see what the plaintiffs' right is in that respect, and how far the defendants are infringing it or will infringe it. The plaintiffs' right is not to insist that people should go over their bridge. veyance; and in order to determine what is the true construction of that deed, we must look at the terms of it, and at those circumstances which are legitimate evidence for the purpose of construing it, such as the position of the property, and the circumstances in which the deed was executed, and so on. Now, it is obvious to any body who looks at the deed, that there is nothing on the face of it which shows an intention to reserve to the grantor any portion of the bed of this river. The grant is of land delineated in a plan, therein colored pink, and described by quantity, and as abutting on the north on the river Aire, and neither the coloring on the plan nor the quantity named includes the half bed of the river. When we come to apply the ordinary and well-settled rules of law to that conveyance we find it settled by authority which it is impossible for us to ignore or overrule, that those circumstances as to coloring and quantity do not alone prevent a moiety of the bed of the river from passing. The earliest authority, which I have found by turning to Mr. Elphinstone's very useful book on the Interpretation of Deeds, is a passage in Rolle's Abridgement (Grant P., pl. 6): "Si home grant un messange vocatum Falstolfe Place prout undegue includitur aquis; per ceux parolles le soile d'el motes en que le ewe est passera (P. 9 Car. B. R. Enter Stint v. Morgan per Curiam resolve sur un trial al barr)." From that time down to this the rule has been laid down and acted upon as au ordinary rule of conveyance and a well-settled law of real property. It has been expressed in various ways by the courts when necessity has arisen to discuss it, and nowhere that I know of better than in Berridge v. Ward and Dwyer v. Rich. Other cases at which I have looked are collected by Mr. Elphinstone, but I think it is needless to refer to them, because they all go one way, and they all show this, that by such a conveyance as we have to deal with here half of the bed of the river passes to the grantor unless circumstances can be shown which will exclude the application of that rule. The burden lies on the grantor, or his successors in title, to show those circumstances, and it appears to me that in this case the plaintiffs, as such successors, entirely fail to show any circumstances sufficient to exclude the operation of the general rule. In certain reported cases to which our attention has been called the circumstances have been held sufficient. One was the case of the market place at Leeds. Beckett v. Corporation of Leeds. There was also the case of Marquis of Salisbury v. Great Northern Railway Company,32 L. T. Rep. (O. 8.) 175; 5 C. B. (N. S.) 174, where the road was described in a map with a separate number, and it was quite obvious, when you looked at it, that it was not intended to pass. Then there was Leigh v. Jack, a case about the dedication of an intended highway, where, as it was pointed out by Cotton, L. J., in his judgment, it would have defeated the intention of both parties if it had been held to pass. Of course if the grantor could show in this case any such circumstances, the rule would be excluded, but it is for him to show circumstances sufficient to exclude it, and it appears to me that there are no circumstances here which are sufficient for the purpose. What are the circumstances on which the plaintiffs rely? They rely on their ownership of the bridge, on the fact that the grantor was the owner of the opposite bank of the river, and upon the absence of any intention to pass half of the bed of the river, and on the coloring of the map and the quantities. Now I have considered those circumstances by the light of course of the authorities; and it appears to me, that whether you take thein separately or in combination, they are not sufficient for the purpose, for one cannot help seeing perfectly well that this point about the bed of the river never occurred to either party. It did not appear to either of them to be of the slightest importance. There was not intention therefore to exclude the operation of the general rule, and the general rule applies because it was not intended to exclude it. That the grantor would have excluded it if he had seen what was going to happen is possible enough. It is probable enough, that if he had seen what was going to happen. he would have insisted on the introduction of a covenant not to set up a free bridge. But that is all pure speculation, and in my opinion it would be unsettling a perfectly well-known rule of real property law if we held that upon the materials before us half of the bed of this river did not pass to the grantee. That being the case, the foundation of the vice-chancellor's judgment when he granted the injunction against erecting this bridge fails altogether, and there is no other ground upon which that injunction can be supported. Then we come to the last point. The vice-chancellor has restrained the defendants "from trespassing upon or otherwise interfering with the enjoyment of the plaintiffs and their tenants of Fleeta lane situate at Horsworth, in the county of York." Whether that part of the injunction can be maintained or not depends upon circumstances which possibly may hereafter be made more clear than they are now. plaintiffs say that Fleeta lane is their property. There is a very considerable amount of evidence to show that it is a public highway. The defendants are about to make an opening into that highway, and the right being in dispute-aud I think I may say the balance The of the evidence at present being rather against the plaintiffs than in their favor-it is not a case for an injunction. It is possible that the plaintiffs may prove at the hearing that they are right, and that the defendants may find they have erected their bridge with out being able to get an outlet from it, and that they have expended their money on a bridge which cannot be used, but I think there is no sufficient case made out in favor of the plaintiffs to justify the injunction on that ground. It appears to me therefore that the appeal must be allowed, and the injunction dissolved. LOPES, L. J. It is said that an injunction ought to be granted in this case, in the first place, because a moiety of the bed of the river belongs to the plaintiffs, and the defendants are trespassers in erecting a bridge over it. I take it, that if that was made out, it would be good ground for granting this injunction, and it seems to me that the vice-chancellor proceeded upon that ground. The matter does not seem to have been argued before him. He seems to have assumed that a moiety of the bed of the river did belong to the plaintiffs. An important question arises with regard to this part of the case as to the true construction of the grant to Lowden. Did a moiety of the bed of the river pass to Lowden, or did that moiety remain in the grantor? I am clearly of opinion that a moiety of the river passed to Lowden. I do not propose to go through the authorities which have already been so fully referred to by Cotton and Lindley, L. JJ. I will satisfy myself by stating what I believe, after a careful examination, to be the result of those authorities. It appears to me to be this, that if land adjoining a highway or a river is granted, the half of the road or the half of the river is presumed to pass, unless there is something in the language of the deed or in the nature of the subject-matter of the grant, or in the surrounding circumstances, sufficient to rebut that presumption, and this, though the measurement of the property, or that which is granted, can be satisfied without including the half of the road or the half of the bed of the river, and although the land is described as bounded by a river or road, and notwithstanding that the map which is referred to in the grant does not include the half of the river or the road. That appears to me to be the result of the authorities, and I will shortly apply it to the present case. In the first place, is there any thing in the language of the deed to exclude this presumption? It appears to me there is nothing. There are special reservations to which reference has been made, and I rather infer from them that there was no intention of excluding the presumption, because it appears that the grantor was fully alive to his rights and what he desired to retain; but notwithstanding that, he makes no reservation whatever with regard to the bed of the river. I think therefore there is nothing in the language of the deed to exclude the presumption. Then is there any thing in the nature of the subject-matter to exclude the presumption? I think not. This is a grant of a piece of land. I can see nothing in such a grant to exclude this presumption. Is there any thing in the surrounding circumstances to exclude this presumption? It is said that the existence of the toll-bridge of the plaintiffs excludes the presumption, because it was valuable property which belonged to the grantor at that time, which would make it likely that he intended to reserve and keep in his hands the bed of the river. I cannot draw that conclusion. The true state of things appears to me to be that it never occurred to the mind either of the grantor or grantee that any bridge of this kind would be ever erected; nor indeed could this bridge have been erected unless there had been a concurrence on the part of the Car digan trustees. Therefore I think on all these grounds, that this part of the case fails, and that half of the bed of the river passed to Lowden. Then it is said that the injunction ought to be granted, because there is a reservation of the right of entry to do certain repairs to the toll-bridge. That raises the question as to what the true construction of that reservation is. I read it as a reservation of reasonable facilities, as occasion might arise, to do the necessary repairs to the bridge-a reservation of a fairly commodious access to the bridge. Now, according to the evidence, it appears to me that there is still, and will be after the new bridge is made, a fairly commodious access to the old bridge, quite sufficient to enable any repairs to be done which may be necessary. I think therefore on this ground that the claim to the injunction fails. Then another ground has been taken. It is said that when this bridge is erected, foot passengers will be discharged upon certain land called Fleeta lane, said to be the property of the plaintiffs, and that the lane will be trespassed upon. It appears to me that the plaintiffs' rights to that lane are most doubtful. I am rather inclined myself to think that the weight of the evidence before us at this time is against any private road way, and rather in favor of its being a highway, but I desire to express no definite opinion on that. It is sufficient to say that the rights are so doubtful that it would not be right to grant an injunction on that ground. The only other matter is with regard to the proviso at the end of the deed; and I entirely agree with what has been already said with regard to that, namely, that what the defendants are doing is no infringement of the plaintiffs' rights. I think therefore that the appeal ought to be allowed. Appeal allowed. NUISANCE-RAILROAD-LEGISLATIVE AUTHOR ITY. NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS, OCT. 5, 1886. COGSWELL V. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN AND HARTFORD RY. Co. An engine house erected by a railroad company adjacent to plaintiff's dwelling-house, and so used as practically to deprive plaintiff of the use of the house as a residence, and by filling it with smoke and dust, and corrupting and tainting the air with offensive gases, make life therein uncomfortable and unsafe, is a palpable nuisance for which an action for damages will lie, and a court of equity will enjoin the same. The statutory sanction which will justify an injury to private property must be express, or must be given by clear and unquestionable implication from the powers expresssly conferred, so that it can fairly be said that the Legislature contemplated the doing of the very act which occasioned the injury. It cannot be presumed, from a general grant of authority, that the Legislature intended to authorize acts to the injury of third persons, where no compensation is provided except upon condition of obtaining their consent. The construction applies with peculiar force to grants of corporate powers to private corporations, which are set up as a justification for acts to the detriment of private property. used by the defendant, constitutes, under the general rule of law, a private nuisance to the property of the plaintiff. The compromise exacted by the necessities of the social state, and the fact that some inconvenience to others must of necessity often attend the ordinary use of property, without permitting which there could in many cases be no valuable use at all, have compelled the recognition in all systems of jurisprudence of the principle that each member of society must submit to annoyances consequent upon the ordinary and common use of property, provided such use is reasonable, both as respects the owner of the property and those immediately affected by the use, in view of time, place and other circumstances. It is in many cases difficult to draw the line and to determine whether a particular use is consistent with the duties and burdens arising from vicinage, or whether it inflicts any injury for which the law affords a remedy. There is however upon the evidence and findings in this case no room for doubt. The plaintiff, from 1870, has been the owner of a house on East Forty-sixth street, in the city of New York, used as a private residence, of the vale at that time of at least the sum of $20,000. In 1872, the defendant, the New York and New Haven Railroad Company, purchased a lot adjacent to the lot of the plaintiff, extending from Fortysixth to Forty-seventh streets, and bounded on the west by Fourth avenue, and erected thereon an engine-house and coal-bins for the use of its road, and since the year 1872, has used the engine-house for the reception, sheltering, storing, cleaning, oiling, dumping, repairing and firing its locomotives, and the coalbins for coaling the same. The engine-house was designed to accommodate eleven locomotives, and has eleven smoke-stacks, extending above the roof to about the height of the third-story window of the plaintiff's house. The court found that the engine-house and coal-bins were so constructed and used by the defendant as necessarily to cause damage from the use thereof to the plaintiff's dwelling-house, and that the coal-bins were unprovided with sufficient covering to prevent the dust of the coal from time to time stored therein and removed therefrom by defendant, from passing into and upon the plaintiff's land and dwelling-house. The court further found that there is now, and at all times since 1872, has been emitted from the enginehouse and smoke-stacks, and from the defendant's engines in the engine-house, hurtful and offensive gases, smoke, soot and cinders, and coal-dust from the coal-bins, and that the same pour down upon, and are borne by the winds into and upon the plaintiff's dwellhouse and premises, filling the house with smoke, soot and cinders, injuring the furniture and clothing therein, rendering the air offensive and unwholesome, and the house uncomfortable and unhealthy as a babitation, and greatly reducing the rental value of the premises. The evidence fully justified the findings of the court. It was shown that the house was rendered untenantable, and could not be rented, although before the erection of the engine-house, it had been rented for $2,500 a year; that the plaintiff's son became ill in consequence of the unwholesome atmosphere, and that she was compelled to remove him from the house on that account, and that the value of the house had diminished one-half, a depreciation caused in great part at least by the maintenance and use of the engine-house. In short, the engine-house as used practically deprived the plaintiff of the use of the house as a residence. The defendant did not physically eject her therefrom, but by filling it with smoke and dust, and by corrupting and tainting the atmosphere with offensive gases, made life therein uncom fortable and unsafe. |