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The judge pronounced the law "barbarous," and so it is. Then the Canada Law Journal gives an account of a police magistrate who holds that pigeon-shooting from traps is not "unnecessary cruel abuse or torture of a bird," although the proof showed that many of the birds were only wounded and crippled, and after a while had their necks wrung. Dr. Wicksteed, on behalf of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, made an able argument against the bird-killers, but the magistrate said: "The intention of the party was to kill the bird; if he failed it was an accident," and dismissed the case. This agrees with State v. Bogardus, 4 Mo. App. 215, but we do not believe it good law. Glass balls would answer every purpose. Paine v. Bergh, 1 City Ct. Rep. (N. Y.) 160, is on our side.

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It is fortunate for the college lads of the present time that Lord Protector Cromwell is not reigning over us, else they would be subject to indictments like the following: Kent,- Before the justices of the peace it was presented that at Maidstone, in the county aforesaid, John Bistrop, of Maidstone aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, apothecary, with force and arms, did willfully and in a violent manner run to and fro, and kicked up and down in the common highway and street within the said county and town, called the High street, a certain ball of leather commonly called a foot ball, unto the great annoyance and imcumbrance of the said highway, and to the great disquiet and disturbance of the good people of this Commonwealth passing in and travelling in and upon the same, and in contempt of the laws, etc. And to the evil example of others, and against the public peace." We almost wish old Noll were alive to kick these ruffian kickers out. Base ball is a game of skill and judgment and is comparatively gentlemanly; foot ball is only a little less rough and not half so entertaining as a prize fight.

The Chicago Law Times is a new and handsome quarterly of about one hundred pages, edited and published by Catherine V. Waite, with an interesting table of contents. The topics are fresh, labor, women jurors, the boycott, the Mormons, women as lawyers, etc. There is an excellent portrait of Chief Justice Chase with a biographical sketch. There is a medico-legal department edited by Mr. Ewell. The number is bright and readable, and shows scholarship without pedantry and thought without mysticism.

The arguments in the Court of Appeals of this State have been sensibly shortened during the last few years. This is probably due to the fact that such a large body of principles has been finally settled by the adjudications of that court. The librarian of the State library recently stated in our hearing that reports of other States are now very seldom sent for from the court room, and not more than one book now to where ten were called for a

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The American Law Record calls our attention to the fact that a dissenting opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Court has recently been published. The publication however is in a reporting periodical, and not in the official volume of reports as yet. Occasionally, but very rarely, the official reports promulgate a dissenting opinion. Sometimes the opinion published purports to be that of the majority of the court. We see nothing startling in the instance of which the Record speaks. It is an exception to a well settled practice. If the Record wants to see an example of the beauties of publishing dissenting opinions, it can find them in the case in the Federal Supreme Court, which we published last week and week before. That decision will always be resisted because it appears that three eminent judges dissented.

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life insurance was conditioned to be void for any "untrue representations." The applicant represented that he was not and had not been "engaged in or connected with the manufacture or sale of any beer, wine or other intoxicating liquors." In an action upon the policy it was shown that the insured had been engaged in the business of keeping hotel from May, 1874, until March, 1877, and that during that period he regularly and systematically sold wines and liquors in bottles of various sizes, bearing the name of his hotel blown in the glass, to such of his guests as desired them; that he kept a wine or liquor room in which was stored a large supply of wines and liquors, and each year while so engaged he applied, paid for and received from the representatives of both the State and National governments, licenses to sell at retail beer, wine and liquors. Held, that the misrepresentations in the application constituted a breach of the contract of insurance which avoided the policy, and that it was error to leave the question to the jury. The court, by Ruger, C. J., said: "The question called for no opinion, and was capable of a precise, definite and categorical answer. It was intentionally framed in broad and comprehensive terms appa

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rently to avoid any evasion of its object, but was, nevertheless, expressed in clear and unambiguous language. If an intention to inquire concerning the conduct of the regular or principal business of the assured could be implied from the use of the word 'engaged,' an idea that such was the only meaning of the question was negatived by the further words connected with the manufacture or sale of any beer,' etc., which pointed unmistakably to every transaction of the kind described, however limited its character or remote his connection with it might have been. The motive prompting the question was reasonable, natural and proper, and apparent even to the most careless reader. The inquiry could not have referred to the general business employment of the insured, because inquiries on that subject had previously been exhausted and the question had no office to perform in that respect. It carried upon its face the object which the insurer had in making it, and required an answer as to whether the applicant was, or had been, engaged in or connected with the manufacture or sale of liquors, etc., not in a limited or restricted capacity or employment, but in any and every way in which such acts could have been performed. The question itself assumes that persons engaged

in or connected with the manufacture or sale of liquors in any manner were more hazardous subjects for insurance than those employed in more reputable employments and that the insurer would regard such employment as an objection to the proposed contract. The extent to which the employment affected the character of the applicant, or his value as a risk, was a question solely for the insurer. The defendant had a right to a full and frank disclosure of any and all facts bearing upon the subject, and this confessedly it did not obtain. It was misinformed as to the precise facts which had been agreed upon as a fact material for it to know in determining the propriety of entering into the proposed contract, and by the party who had assented to the proposition that such information should invalidate any contract made. If the fair import of the language used indicates that the interrogator intended to include within its scope and meaning single transactions or incidental occupations, neither courts nor juries have authority to say that such transactions may properly be disregarded in the answer made. The defendant must be deemed to have meant what it said, and its express language embraces all transactions, and its express contract has made every transaction of the kind material to the risk. *

* It would seem

from the authorities herein before referred to that no questions affecting the interpretation of contracts can properly be submitted to a jury except those arising upon a conflicting evidence as to the terms of agreement, or when extrinsic evidence raises some doubt over the identity of the subjectmatter, or of the claimants thereunder. Add. Cont. 165. Instead of following the plain rule laid down in the authorities cited, the trial court assumed the existence of an ambiguity and referred the legal

questions involved in the construction of the contract to the jury for their speculations. The logical effect of such a disposition was the holding that contracts expressed in the same language and executed under the same circumstances might legally be held valid in one locality and invalid in another according to the capricious and often conflicting opinions of juries. The theory upon which the trial court submitted the case to the jury is implied from the circumstances pointed out in the charge for its consideration. Its attention was directed to the fact that Dwight kept no bar and did not sell liquor to people generally, but only to his guests and as an incident to the business of keeping a hotel, and from these facts it was impliedly advised that it was authorized to find upon this question for the plaintiff. In other words, the jury was instructed that because the assured had not been engaged in or connected with the manufacture or sale of liquor, etc., in a particular way he could truthfully represent that he had not been connected with it in any way, and if he did not sell to everybody, without limitation or exception, that he was justified in replying to the question that he did not sell to any one. The fallacy of such a charge is too plain for argument."

In the same case it was held that Dwight had not truthfully stated his business or occupation in the application. He represented himself to be a real estate and grain dealer, saying nothing about hotel keeping; but it was shown that he had only an occasional transaction of this sort, and his own testimony was produced showing that hotel keeping was his only regular business. The trial judge left this question to the jury. Held, error. The court said: "It is quite clear that these answers gave no information as to the actual employment and business of Dwight to the defendant, and would have been quite as correct and satisfactory if he had represented himself to be a geologist or professor of elocution. We think it was clearly the duty of the trial court upon this evidence to direct a verdict for the defendant. It is claimed by the plaintiffs that if there is a scintilla of evidence in support of a proposition, or if the evidence against it does not amount to a demonstration of its incorrectness, that a question is raised which must be left to the jury. We do not so understand the rule. If the proof of a fact is so preponderating that a verdict against it would be set aside by the court as contrary to the evidence, then it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict. People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; Wilds v. Hudson R. R. Co., 24 id. 433; Appleby v. Astor Ins. Co., 54 id. 253; Kelsey v. Northern Light Oil Co., 45 id. 509; Cagger v. Lansing, 64 id. 427; Neuendorf v. World Mut. Ins. Co., 69 id. 392. It was said in Baulec v. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 59 N. Y. 366, by Judge Allen, that it is not enough to authorize the submission of a question as one of fact to the jury that there is some evidence.' A scintilla of

evidence or a mere surmise that there may have been negligence on the part of the defendants would not justify the judge in leaving the case to the jury,' quoting from Williams, J., in Tooney v. Railway Co. 3 C. B. (N. S.) 146. See Culhane v. N. Y. Cent., etc., R. Co., 60 N. Y. 136; McKeever v. N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 88 id. 667. In Hyatt v. Johnson, 91 Penn St. 200, Justice Sharrett says: Since the scintilla doctrine has been exploded both in England and in this country, the preliminary question of law for the court is, not whether there is literally no evidence, or a mere scintilla, but whether there is any that ought reasonably to satisfy the jury that the fact sought to be proved is established,' citing Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R., 4 Exch. 39. The rule held by the Supreme Court of the United States is expressed by Mr. Justice Clifford in The Improvement Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, as follows: 'Nor are judges any longer required to submit a question to a jury merely because some evidence has been introduced by the party having the burden of proof, unless the evidence be of such a character that it would warrant the jury in finding a verdict in favor of that party. Formerly it was held that if there was what was called a scintilla of evidence in support of a case, the judge was bound to leave it to the jury; but recent decisions of high authority have established a more reasonable rule, that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof rests.' To the same effect are Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 120; Commissioner, etc., v. Clark, 94 U. S. 284; Griggs v. Houston, 104 id. 553; Bailey v. Cleveland Rolling Mill. 21 Fed. Rep'r, 159; Witherbee v. Wasson, 71 N. C. 451. We think this a case where the conclusive character of the proof required the application of the rule, and that the court should have intervened to prevent a verdict upon evidence so insufficient to support it." Danforth, J., dissented; Miller, J., did not vote, and Finch, J., took no part.

In Smith v. City of Waterbury, Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors, July 8, 1886, it was held that the provision of the State Constitution prohibiting the Legislature from increasing the compensation of any public officer during his continuance in the office, means continuance in office under one appointment. The court said: "When Mr. Kellogg was appointed in 1879 he continued to hold under that appointment until the judge's term of office expired, which was on the first Monday in July, 1881. On that day he was reappointed by the judge of the District Court. Afterward he held under that appointment and not under an appointment previously made. It follows that the Constitution does not prevent the operation of the statute of 1881 in respect to fees charged by Mr. Kellogg during his last term of office." The same decision gives a

definition of "case." "There are included, in the amount allowed to Mr. Kellogg, fees charged for the trial of certain matters before the railroad commissioners. Another objection is that the act of 1881 will not justify those charges. The language of the act is, "in cases tried for said city.' Bouvier defines a 'case' to be 'a contested question before a court of justice; a suit or action; a cause.' Webster defines it to be a state of facts involving a question for discussion or decision; especially a cause or suit in court.' These definitions are sufficiently comprehensive to include matters pending before railroad commissioners. They are a special tribunal authorized by statute to hear and determine certain matters pertaining to railroads. Towns and other communities and individuals often have important interests involved in such matters; and these interests are generally determined and the rights of the parties settled after formal and expensive trials. Such a matter may properly be called a case, and the tribunal before which the questions involved are discussed and by which they are decided may with equal propriety be called a court of justice; not an ordinary court, to be sure, but a special tribunal authorized to administer justice in a class of cases which experience proves cannot so conveniently and so satisfactorily be tried before the regular courts."

INSURANCE-INTEREST OF NEPHEW IN LIFE OF AUNT-CREDITOR-CESSATION OF INTEREST. PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT, OCT. 4, 1886.

APPEAL OF CORSON.

A nephew has not, by force of the mere relationship existing between them, an insurable interest in the life of his aunt.

But a creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor, and the policy does not become void by the payment of the debt.

A

PPEAL of Robert Corson, executor of Ellen McLean, deceased, from the decree of the Court of Common Pleas No. 4, Philadelphia county.

Bill in equity, wherein Robert Corson, executor, etc., is plaintiff, and the Provident Savings Life Assu rance Society of New York and James Garnier, defendants, the facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the Supreme Court. The master reported in favor of plaintiff. Exceptions filed thereto having been sustained by the court, plaintiff took this appeal.

John Sparhawk, Jr., and N. Du Bois Miller, for appellant.

J. H. Anders and William F. Johnson, for appellee.

CLARK, J. Although a policy of life insurance is not, like a fire or marine policy, a mere contract of indemnity, but a contract to pay a certain sum of money in the event of death (Scott v. Dickson, 16 Week. Notes Cases, 181), yet the assured is not entitled to his action on the policy, unless he had, as the basis of his contract, an interest in the subject-matter insured. This is a rule founded in public policy, and is of general application. Ruse v. Mutual Ben. Co., 23 N. Y. 516. If it were not so, the whole system of life insurance would become the mere cover for wicked speculation by wager in human life, and thus prove the occasion for the commission of the grossest crimes. An insur

able interest however is not necessarily a definite pecuniary interest, such as is recognized and protected at law. It may be contingent, restricted as to time, or indeterminate in amount, but it must be actual, such as will reasonably justify a well grounded expectation of advantage, dependent upon a life insured, so that the purpose of the party effecting the insurance may be to secure that advantage, and not merely to put a wager upon human life. Therefore a wife has an insurable interest in the life of her husband, or the husband in the life of his wife (Baker v. Union Mut. Life, 43 N. Y. 283); and a single woman, under contract to marry, in the life of her intended husband. Chisholm v. National Life Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 213. A parent has in like manner an insurable interest in the life of a child, and a child in the life of a parent. Loomis v. Eagle Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 396; Mitchell v. Union Life Ins. Co., 45 Me. 104; Reserve Mut. Co. v. Kane, 81 Penn. St. 154.

In the last case cited the court says: "It would be technical in the extreme to say that a son has no insurable interest in his father's life. Poverty may overtake the father in his life-time, and thus both father and mother be cast upon the son, or if the father die before her, the necessity may fall at once upon the son. Why then should he not be permitted to make a provision by insurance to reimburse himself for his outlays, past or future? What injury is done to the insurance company? They receive the full premium, and they know in such case from the very relationship of the parties that the contract is not a mere gambling adventure, but is founded in the best feelings of our nature, and on a legal duty which may arise at any time."

In Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115, a young, unmarried female, without property, who for several years had been supported and educated at the expense of her brother, who stood to her in loco parentis, was held to have an insurable interest in his life. So also a creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor. American Life Ins. Co. v. Robertshaw, 26 Penn. St. 189; Cunningham v. Smith's Ex'rs, 70 id. 450.

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ing the insurance, either as creditor of or surety for the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to him, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advantage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is not necessary that the expectation of advantage or benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estimation; for a parent has an insurable interest in the life of his child, and a child in the life of his parent; a husband in the life of his wife, and a wife in the life of her husband. The natural affection in cases of this kind is considered as more powerful-as operating efficaciously to protect the life of the insured-than any other consideration. But in all cases there must be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from the continuance of the life of the assured. Otherwise the contract is a mere wager, by which the party taking the policy is directly interested in the early death of the assured. Such policies have a tendency to create a desire for the event. They are therefore, independently of any statute on the subject, condemned as being against public policy."

It cannot be pretended that Garnier had an insurable interest in the life of his aunt by force of the mere relationship existing between them. No case has been brought to our notice which carries the rule to this extent. Between husband and wife and parent and child the relationship is so close and intimate, and the mutual dependence and legal liability for support so manifest, that nothing more is wanting to establish the insurable interest. Garnier however did not hold any such relation to Ellen McLean, either natural or assumed. He was simply her “friend and adviser." He was doubtless a valuable friend. He had advanced money to bring her to Philadelphia. He fitted up, stocked, and from time to time replenished the store at Tenth and Manilla. Having disposed of this for her benefit, he purchased the establishment on Fitzwater, and selling this, he bought for her a third, on Fifth below Christian. She repaid Garnier however for his outlays in her behalf, from time to time, from the ordinary receipts of the several stores, and from the proceeds of the sales.

The only relation existing between James Garnier and Ellen McLean which could give Garnier an insur

In Keystone Mut. Ass'n v. Beaverson, 16 Week. Notes Cases, 188, the assured, an unmarried lady, lived with her brother, who supported or maintained her in his family, under circumstances tending to constitute the relation of debtor and creditor between them,able interest in her life was that of debtor and credand it was held that he had such an insurable interest in her life as would support a policy of insurance taken out by him therein. "This case," says the court, "was not submitted to the jury under a ruling that the mere fact of a person on whose life the policy was taken, being a sister of the defendant in error, gave to the latter an insurable interest in her life, although reputable authorities have recognized such relationship to be sufficient. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. France, 94 U. S. 562. In the present case evidence was given that he was supporting and maintaining her in his family under circumstances tending to constitute the relation of debtor and creditor. It was under all the facts of the case that the court held he had an insurable interest in the life of his sister. It is very clear that the insurance was obtained in good faith, and not for the purpose of speculating upon the hazard of a life in which he had no interest. Scott v. Dickson, supra. The policy in question shows the willingness of the company to take the risk on the ground of relationship alone."

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itor, and upon this ground alone the case must be considered. It is not denied that at the date of the policy Mrs. McLean was indebted to Garnier for money advanced and expended in her behalf, in some amount between $500 and $750. It is said however that Garnier in his auswer disclaims as a creditor that he places his right to the proceeds of the policy on other grounds, and makes no claim whatever by reason of any indebtedness. We do not so understand either the answer or the evidence given by the defendant in the case. The bill charges in the first paragraph, in substance, that the policy was taken out and applied as a collateral security to the debt which Mrs. McLean then owed Garnier; and in the subsequent paragraphs that the debt having been fully paid in the life-time of the assured, the proceeds of the policy should pass into her estate. This fact is specifically denied. The defendant in his answer says it is not true that the policy of insurance, referred to in paragraph 1 of the complainant's bill, was applied for and issued upon the life of Ellen McLean for any such reason or purpose as therein stated."

It is undisputed however that at the issuing of the policy the relation of debtor and creditor did exist, and to the extent stated. The defendant having denied that the policy was taken as collateral security for that debt, a question of fact is thus raised to be determined by the evidence. Upon examination of

the proofs we find no evidence from which the fact might be fairly inferred. The insurance was not effected at the instance of Mrs. McLean, but at the suggestion of her son Samuel McClatch, in whose name a second policy in $1,000 was at the same time issued. The premiums were paid and the policy maintained by | Garnier. Indeed there is not the slightest proof in support of the plaintiff's hypothesis, and the policy was held in trust for the debtor, and in the absence of such proof the presumption is that the rights of the parties appear upon the face of the policy. Cunningham v. Smith, 70 Penn. St. 450.

It has been said however on the authority of Godsall v. Boldero, 9 East, 72, an insurance upon the life of a debtor, in behalf of a creditor, is in legal effect but a guaranty of the debt; and if the debt is paid the insurance is at an end. But it is now settled that this case is not the law. It was directly drawn in question and was expressly overruled in Dalby v. India & London Life Assur. Co. (decided in the Exchequer Chamber), 15 C. B. 365. The law seems to be well settled that it is wholly unnecessary to prove an insurable interest in the life of the assured at the maturity of the policy if it was valid at its inception; and in the absence of express stipulation to the contrary, the sum expressed on the face of the policy is the measure of recovery. Rawls v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N. Y. 282; Mowry v. Home Ins. Co., 9 R. I. 346 (1869); Hoyt v. New York Life Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 440; Phoenix Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616.

The doctrine of all the cases to which our attention has been called is that if the policy was originally valid, it does not cease to be so by cessation of interest in the subject of insurance unless such be the necessary effect of the provisions of the instrument itself. Therefore where a husband insured his life for the benefit of his wife, and was subsequently divorced, it was held that notwithstanding the relation of husband and wife no longer existed, and her insurable interest had thus ceased, yet she could recover the full amount of the policy. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457. "Supposing a fair and proper insurable interest of whatever kind," says the court in the case last cited, "to exist at the time of taking out the policy, and that it be taken out in good faith, the object and purpose of the rule which condemns wager policies is sufficiently attained; and there is then no good reason why the contract should not be carried out according to its terms."

To the same effect is McKee v. Phoenix Co., 28 Mo. 383. All the cases to which we have referred, it is true, arose from suits brought upon the policies of insurance; but the same principles apply where the company, admitting its liability, has paid the money into court to abide the result, and the controversy is between the remaining parties.

In our own case of Scott v. Dickson, 16 Week. Notes Cas. 181, our brother Paxson, upon a review of the cases, concludes that where one has an insurable interest at the time an insurance is effected upon the life of another for his benefit, the fact that his interest ceases to exist at or prior to the death of the insured will not, as against the personal representatives of the insured, deprive him of the right to receive the insurance money. Therefore it was held that a surety on an official bond has an insurable interest in the life of the obligor, and that his right to recover upon the policy was not affected by the fact that no breach of the condition of the bond had ever occurred. But a merely colorable, temporary, or disproportionate interest may present circumstances from which want of good faith. aud an intent to evade the rule, may be inferred, Therefore, although the relation of debtor and credits may in general be said to establish an insurable interest, the amount of the insurance placed upon the

life of the debtor cannot be grossly disproportionate to the benefit which might be reasonably supposed to ac crue from the continuance of the debtor's life, with out leaving the transaction open to the imputation of being a speculation or wager upon the hazard of a life. Wainwright v. Bland, 1 Moody & R. 481: Miller v. Eagle Life Co., 2 Smith (N. Y.) 268.

The case of Cammack v. Lewis, 15 Wall. 643, is exactly in point. The policy was taken out by Cammack, the creditor, upon the life of Lewis, his debtor. in the sum of $3,000-$2,000 for his own benefit, and $1,000 for the benefit of Lewis. Lewis in fact only owed Cammack $70, although he voluntarily and without consideration gave his obligation at the time for $3,000. "If the transaction," said Mr. Jus tice Miller, "as set up by Cammack be true, then so far as he was concerned, it was a sheer wagering policy, and probably a fraud on the insurance company. To procure a policy of $3,000 to cover a debt of $70 is of itself a mere wager. The disproportion between the real interest of the creditor and the amount to be received by him, deprives it of all pretense to be a bona fide effort to secure the debt, and the strength of this proposition is not diminished by the fact that Cammack was only to get $2.000 out of the $3,000; nor is it weakened by the fact that the policy was taken out in the name of Lewis, and assigned by him to Cammack. This view of the subject receives confirmation from the note executed by Lewis to Cammack for the precise amount of the risk in the policy, which if Cammack's account be true, was without consideration, and could only have been intended for some purpose of deception-probably to impose on the insurance company." See also Connec ticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U. S. 498.

In the case at bar the policy was $2,000. The amount of the indebtedness was at the time undetermined. and therefore uncertain. It has since been ascertained to have been between $500 and $750. Considering the character of their business relations, the unsettled condition of their affairs, the age of the subject of insurance, the probable amount of premiums which might accrue, the accumulation from interest, we could not say the transaction carries with it any inherent evidence of bad faith. The essential thing is, as stated by the learned judge of the court below, that the policy should be obtained in good faith, and not for the purposes of speculation upon the hazard of a life in which the insured has no interest.

The case is materially different from Gilbert v. Morse, 13 Week. Notes Cases, 489. The principles involved in that case are not drawn in question here.

We find no error in the decree of the court below and it is therefore affirmed.

The decree is affirmed, and the appeal dismissed, at the costs of the appellant.

DEED-BOUNDARY-ON STREAM.

ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL, JULY 22, 1886. MICKLETHWAIT V. NEWLAY BRIDGE COMPANY. LIMITED.*

And

On the grant of land adjoining a highway or a non-navigable
river, it is presumed that one moiety of the bed of the
river, or of the soil of the road, is intended to pass unless
there is something to rebut the presumption in the lan-
guage of the deed or in the nature of the subject-matter
of the grant, or in the surrounding circumstances
this rule is applicable, although the thing granted can be
satisfied, in respect of quantity. without including the
moiety of the bordering river or road, and although the
*55 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 336.

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