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The judge pronounced the law “barbarous," and so few years ago. This fact alone shows how the law it is. Then the Canada Law Journal gives an has been so far simplified by repeated decisions, account of a police magistrate who holds that and how the process would be forwarded by an aupigeon-shooting from traps is not “unnecessary cruel thoritative and condensed statement of those adjuabuse or torture of a bird," although the proofdications. showed that many of the birds were only wounded and crippled, and after a while had their necks Judge T. B. McFarland, of Sacramento, Califor. wrung. Dr. Wicksteed, on behalf of the Society nia, whose sensible views on the abuses of new for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, made an trials we commented on some time ago, has been able argument against the bird-killers, but the elected a judge of the Supreme Court of that State. magistrate said: “The intention of the party was The Democrats elected most of the State ticket, to kill the bird; if he failed it was an accident,” | but Judge McFarland and Judge A. Van R. Paterand dismissed the case. This agrees with State v. son, both Republicans, were elected. Bogardus, 4 Mo. App. 215, but we do not believe it good law. Glass balls would answer every purpose. Paine v. Bergh, 1, City Ct. Rep. (N. Y.) 160, is on

The American Law Record calls our attention to our side.

the fact that a dissenting opinion of the Massachu

setts Supreme Court has recently been published. It is fortunate for the college lads of the present | The publication however is in a reporting perioditime that Lord Protector Cromwell is not reigning cal

, and not in the official volume of reports as yet, over us, else they would be subject to indictments Occasionally, but very rarely, the official reports like the following: “Kent, — Before the justices promulgate a dissenting opinion. Sometimes the of the peace it was presented that at Maidstone, in opinion published purports to be that of the majorthe county aforesaid, John Bistrop, of Maidstone ity of the court. We see nothing startling in the aforesaid, in the county aforesaid, apothecary, with instance of which the Record speaks. It is an exforce and arms, did willfully and in a violent man- ception to a well settled practice. If the Record ner run to and fro, and kicked up and down in the wants to see an example of the beauties of publishcommon highway and street within the said county ing dissenting opinions, it can find them in the case and town, called the Iligh street, a certain ball of

in the Federal Supreme Court, which we published leather commonly called a foot ball, unto the great | last weck and week before. That decision will alannoyance and imcumbrance of the said highway,

ways be resisted because it appears that three emiand to the great disquiet and disturbance of the nent judges dissented. good people of this Commonwealth passing in and travelling in and upon the same, and in contempt of the laws, etc. And to the evil example of others,

NOTES OF CASES. and against the public peace.” We almost wish

N . Base ball is a game of skill and

Court of Appeals, Oct. 12, 1886, a policy of and is comparatively gentlemanly; foot ball is only life insurance was conditioned to be void for any a little less rough and not half so entertaining as a "untrue representations." The applicant repreprize fight.

sented that he was not and had not been ** engaged

in or connected with the manufacture or sale of The Chicago Law Times is a new and handsome any beer, wine or other intoxicating liquors." In quarterly of about one hundred pages, edited and an action upon the policy it was shown that the inpublished by Catherine V. Waite, with an interest- sured had been engaged in the business of keeping ing table of contents. The topics are fresh, labor, hotel from May, 1874, until March, 1877, and that women jurors, the boycott, the Mormons, women during that period he regularly and systematically as lawyers, etc. There is an excellent portrait of sold wines and liquors in bottles of various sizes, Chief Justice Chase with a biographical sketch. bearing the name of his hotel blown in the glass, There is a medico-legal department edited by Mr. to such of his guests as desired them; that he kept Ewell. The number is bright and readable, and a wine or liquor room in which was stored a large shows scholarship without pedantry and thought supply of wines and liquors, and each year while so without mysticism.

engaged he applied, paid for and received from the

representatives of both the State and National The arguments in the Court of Appeals of this governments, licenses to sell at retail beer, wine State have been sensibly shortened during the last and liquors. Held, that the misrepresentations in few years. This is probably due to the fact that the application constituted a breach of the contract such a large body of principles has been finally set- of insurance which avoided the policy, and that it tled by the adjudications of that court.

The libra. was error to leave the question to the jury. The rian of the State library recently stated in our hear- court, by Ruger, C. J., said: “The question called ing that reports of other States are pow very sel- for no opinion, and was capable of a precise, defiudom sent for from the court room, and not more ite and categorical answer.

It was intentionally than one book now to where ten were called for a framed in broad and comprehensive terms appa

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rently to avoid any evasion of its object, but was, questions involved in the construction of the connevertheless, expressed in clear and unambiguous tract to the jury for their speculations. The logical language. If an intention to inquire concerning effect of such a disposition was the holding that the conduct of the regular or principal business of contracts expressed in the same language and the assured could be implied from the use of the executed under the same circumstances might word 'engaged,' an idea that such was the only legally be held valid in one locality and invalid in meaning of the question was negatived by the another according to the capricious and often confurther words 'connected with the manufacture or flicting opinions of juries. The theory upon which sale of any beer,' etc., which pointed unmistakably the trial court submitted the case to the jury is to every transaction of the kind described, however implied from the circumstances pointed out in the limited its character or remote his connection with charge for its consideration. Its attention was it might have been. The motive prompting the directed to the fact that Dwight kept no bar and question was reasonable, natural and proper, and did not sell liquor to people generally, but only to apparent even to the most careless reader. The in

his guests and as an incident to the business of quiry could not have referred to the general busi- keeping a hotel, and from these facts it was imness employment of the insured, because inquiries pliedly advised that it was authorized to find upon on that subject had previously been exhausted and this question for the plaintiff. In other words, the the question had no office to perform in that jury was instructed that because the assured had respect. It carried upon its face the object which not been engaged in or connected with the manuthe insurer had in making it, and required an facture or sale of liquor, etc., in a particular way answer as to whether the applicant was, or had been,

he could truthfully represent that he had not been engaged in or connected with the manufacture or

connected with it in any way, and if he did not sell sale of liquors, etc., not in a limited or restricted

to everybody, without limitation or exception, that capacity or employment, but in any and every way he was justified in replying to the question that he in which uch acts could have been performed. did not sell to any one. The fallacy of such a The question itself assumes that persons engaged charge is too plain for argument." in or connected with the manufacture or sale of liquors in any manner were more hazardous subjects for insurance than those employed in more

In the same case it was held that Dwight reputable employments and that the insurer would had not truthfully stated his business or occuregard such employment as an objection to the pation in the application. He represented himproposed contract. The extent to which the self to be a real estate and grain dealer, sayemployment affected the character of the applicant, ing nothing about hotel keeping; but it was or his value as a risk, was a question solely for the shown that he had only an occasional transacinsurer. The defendant had a right to a full and

tion of this sort, and his own testimony was profrank disclosure of any and all facts bearing upon duced showing that lotel keeping was his only the subject, and this confessedly it did not obtain. regular business. The trial judge left this question It was misinformed as to the precise facts which to the jury. Held, error. The court said: “It is had been agreed upon as a fact material for it to quite clear that these answers gave no informaknow in determining the propriety of entering into tion as to the actual employment and business of the proposed contract, and by the party who had Dwight to the defendant, and would have been Assented to the proposition that such information quite as correct and satisfactory if he had represhould invalidate any contract made. If the fair sented himself to be a geologist or professor of import of the language used indicates that the elocution. We think it was clearly the duty of the interrogator intended to include within its scope trial court upon this evidence to direct a verdict for and meaning single transactions or incidental occu- the defendant. It is claimed by the plaintiffs that pations, neither courts nor juries have authority to if there is a scintilla of evidence in support of a say that such transactions may properly be dis- proposition, or if the evidence against it does not regarded in the answer made. The defendant amount to a demonstration of its incorrectness, that must be deemed to have meant what it said, and its a question is raised which must be left to the jury. express language embraces all transactions, and its We do not so understand the rule. If the proof of express contract has made every transaction of the a fact is so preponderating that a verdict against it kind material to the risk.

It would seem

would be set aside by the court as contrary to the from the authorities hereinbefore referred to that evidence, then it is the duty of the court to direct a no questions affecting the interpretation of con- verdict. People v. Cook, 8 N. Y. 67; Wilds v. Hudtracts can properly be submitted to a jury except son R. R. Co., 24 id. 433; Appleby v. Astor Ins. Co., those arising upon a conflicting evidence as to the 54 id. 253; Kelsey v. Northern Light Oil Co., 45 id. terms of agreement, or when extrinsic evidence 509; Cagger v. Lansing, 64 id. 427; Neuendorf v. raises some doubt over the identity of the subject

World Mut. Ins. Co., 69 id. 392. It was said in matter, or of the claimants thereunder. Add. Cont. Baulec v. N. Y. & Harlem R. Co., 59 N. Y. 366, by 165. Instead of following the plain rule laid down Judge Allen, that it is not enough to authorize in the authorities cited, the trial court assumed the the submission of a question as one of fact to the existence of an ambiguity and referred the legal jury that there is some evidence.' A scintilla of

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evidence or a mere surmise that there may have definition of “case." “There are included, in the been negligence on the part of the defendants amount allowed to Mr. Kellogg, fees charged for would not justify the judge in leaving the case to the trial of certain matters before the railroad comthe jury,' quoting from Williams, J., in Tooney v. missioners. Another objection is that the act of 1881 Railway Co., 3 C. B. (N. S.) 146. See Culhane v. will not justify those charges. The language of the N. Y. Cent., etc., R. Co., 60 N. Y. 136; McKeever v. act is, “in cases tried for said city.' Bouvier de N. Y. Cent. R. Co., 88 id. 667. In Hyatt v. Johnson, fines a 'case' to be a contested question before a 91 Penn St. 200, Justice Sharrett says: Since the court of justice; a suit or action; a cause.' Webster scintilla doctrine has been exploded both in Eng- defines it to be a state of facts involving a question land and in this country, the preliminary question for discussion or decision; especially a cause or of law for the court is, not whether there is literally suit in court.' These definitions are sufficiently no evidence, or a mere scintilla, but whether there comprehensive to include matters pending before is any that ought reasonably to satisfy the jury that railroad commissioners. They are a special tribunal the fact sought to be proved is established, citing authorized by statute to hear and determine certain Ryder v. Wombwell, L. R., 4 Exch. 39. The rule matters pertaining to railroads. Towns and other held by the Supreme Court of the United States is communities and individuals often have important expressed by Mr. Justice Clifford in The Improve- interests involved in such matters; and these inment Co. v. Munson, 14 Wall. 442, as follows: ‘Nor

terests are generally determined and the rights of are judges any longer required to submit a question the parties settled after formal and expensive trials. to a jury merely because some evidence has been such a matter may properly be called a case, and introduced by the party having the burden of proof, the tribunal before which the questions involved unless the evidence be of such a character that it are discussed and by which they are decided may would warrant the jury in finding a verdict in favor with equal propriety be called a court of justice; of that party. Formerly it was held that if there not an ordinary court, to be sure, but a special was what was called a scintilla of evidence in sup- tribunal authorized to administer justice in a class port of a case, the judge was bound to leave it to

of cases which experience proves cannot so conthe jury; but recent decisions of high authority veniently and so satisfactorily be tried before the have established a more reasonable rule, that in regular courts.” every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not INSURANCE-INTEREST OF NEPHEW IN LIFE 01 whether there is literally no evidence, but whether AUNT-CREDITOR-CESSATION OF INTEREST. there is any upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon

PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT, OCT. 4, 1886. whom the onus of proof rests.' To the same effect are Pleasants v. Fant, 22 Wall. 120; Commissioner,

APPEAL OF CORSOX. etc., v. Clark, 94 U. S. 284; Griggs v. Houston, 104 A nephew has not, by force of the mere relationship existing id. 553; Bailey v. Cleveland Rolling Mill, 21 Fed.

between them, an insurable interest in the life of his Rep’r, 159; Witherbee v. Wasson, 71 N. C. 451. We

But a creditor has an insurable interest in the life of his think this a case where the conclusive character of

debtor, and the policy does not become void by the paythe proof required the application of the rule, and ment of the debt. that the court should have intervened to prevent a

, verdict


evidence so insufficient to support it.” Lean, deceased, from the decree of the Court of Danforth, J., dissented; Miller, J., did not vote, Common Pleas No. 4, Philadelphia county. and Finch, J., took no part.

Bill in equity, wherein Robert Corson, executor, etc., is plaintiff, and the Provident Savings Life Assurance Society of New York and James Garnier, de

fendants, the facts sufficiently appear in the opinion In Smith v. City of Waterbury, Connecticut

of the Supreme Court. The master reported in favor Supreme Court of Errors, July 8, 1886, it was held

of plaintiff. Exceptions filed thereto having been susthat the provision of the State Constitution pro- tained by the court, plaintiff took this appeal. hibiting the Legislature from increasing the com- John Sparhawk, Jr., and N. Du Bois Miller, for appensation of any public officer during his continu- pellant. ance in the office, means continuance in office under J. H. Anders and William F. Johnson, for appellee. one appointment. The court said:

" When Mr. CLARK, J. Although a policy of life insurance is Kellogg was appointed in 1879 he continued to hold not, like a fire or marine policy, a mere contract of inunder that appointment until the judge's term of

demnity, but a contract to pay al certain sum of money office expired, which was on the first Monday in July,

in the event of death (Scott v. Dickson, 16 Week. Notes

('ases, 181), yet the assured is not entitled to his action 1881. On that day he was reappointed by the judge

on the policy, unless he had, as the basis of his conof the District Court. Afterward he held under that

tract, an interest in the subject-matter insured. This appointment and not under an appointment previ- is a rule founded in public policy, and is of general npously made. It follows that the Constitution does plication. Ruse v. Mutual Ben, Co., 23 N. Y. 516. If not prevent the operation of the statute of 1881 in

it were not so, the whole system of life insurance

would become the mere cover for wicked speculation respect to fees charged by Mr. Kellogg during his

by wager in human life, and thus prove the occasion last term of office."

The same decision gives a for the commission of the grossest crimes. Au insur


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able interest however is not necessarily a definite pe- ing the insurance, either as creditor of or surety for ouniary interest, such as is recognized and protected the assured, or from the ties of blood or marriage to at law. It may be contingent, restricted as to time, bim, as will justify a reasonable expectation of advanor indeterminate in amount, but it must be actual, tage or benefit from the continuance of his life. It is such as will reasonably justify a well grounded expec- not necessary that the expectation of advantage or tation of advantage, dependent upon a life insured, so benefit should be always capable of pecuniary estithat the purpose of the party effecting the insurance mation; for a parent has an insurable interest in the may be to secure that advantage, and not merely to life of his child, aud a child in the life of his parent; put a wager upon human life. Therefore a wife has a husband in the life of his wife, and a wife in the life of an insurable interest in the life of her husband, or the her husband. The natural affection in cases of this husband in the life of his wife (Baker v. Union Mut. kind is considered as more powerful-as operating Life, 43 N. Y. 283); and a single woman, under con- efficaciously to protect the life of the insured-than tract to marry, in the life of her intended husband. any other consideration. But in all cases there must Chisholm y. National Life Ins. Co., 52 Mo. 213. A be a reasonable ground, founded upon the relations of parent has in like manner an insurable interest iu the the parties to each other, either pecuniary or of blood life of a child, and a child in the life of a parent. or affinity, to expect some benefit or advantage from Loomis v. Eagle Ins. Co., 6 Gray, 396; Mitchell v. the continuance of the life of the assured. Otherwise Union Life Ins. Co., 45 Me. 104; Reserve Mut. Co. v. the contract is a mere wager, by which the party takKane, 81 Penn. St. 154.

iug the policy is directly interested in the early death In the last case cited the court says: “It would be of the assured. Such policies have a tendency to cretechpical in the extreme to say that a son has no in- ate a desire for the event. They are therefore, indesurable interest in his father's life. Poverty may over- pendently of any statute on the subject, condemned take the father in his life-time, and thus both father as being against public policy.” and mother be cast upon the son, or if the father die It cannot be pretended that Garnier had an insura. before her, the necessity may fall at once upon the ble interest in the life of his aunt by force of the mere 800. Why then should he not be permitted to make a relationship existing between them. No case has been provision by insurance to reimburse himself for his brought to our notice which carries the rule to this outlays, past or future? What injury is done to the extent. Between husband and wife and parent and insurance company? They receive the full premium, child the relationship is so close and intimate, and the and they know in such case from the very relationship mutual dependence and legal liability for support so of the parties that the contract is not a mere gambling manifest, that nothing more is wanting to establish the adventure, but is founded in the best feelings of our insurable interest. Garnier however did not hold any nature, and on a legal duty which may arise at any such relation to Ellen McLean, either natural or astime."

sumed. He was simply her “friend and adviser." He In Lord v. Dall, 12 Mass. 115, a young, unmarried fe- was doubtless a valuable friend. He had advanced male, without property, who for several years had money to bring her to Philadelphia.

He fitted up, been supported and educated at the expense of her stocked, and from time to time replenished the store brother, who stood tu her in loco parentis, was held to at Teuth and Manilla. Having disposed of this for have an insurable interest in his life. So also a cred- her benefit, he purchased the establishment on Fitzitor has an insurable interest in the life of his debtor. water, and selling this, he bought for her a third, on American Life Ins. Co. v. Robertshaw, 26 Penn. St. Fifth below Christian. She repaid Garnier however 189; Cunningham v. Smith's Ex'rs, 70 id. 450.

for his outlays in her behalf, from time to time, from Io Keystone Mut. Ass'n v. Beuverson, 16 Week. the ordinary receipts of the several stores, and from Notes Cases, 188, the assured, an unmarried lady, lived the proceeds of the sales. with her brother, who supported or maintained her The only relation existing between James Garnier in his family, under circumstances tending to consti- and Ellen McLean which could give Garnier an insurtute the relation of debtor and creditor between them, able interest in her life was that of debtor and cred. and it was held that he had such an insurable interest | itor, and upon this ground alone the case must be in her life as would support a policy of insurance taken considered. It is not denied that at the date of the out by him therein.

"This case,

says the court, policy Mrs. McLean was indebted to Garnier for was not submitted to the jury under a ruling that money advanced and expended in her behalf, in some the mere fact of a person on whose life the policy was amount between $500 and $750. It is said however taken, being a sister of the defendant in error, gave to that Garnier in his auswer disclaims as a creditor that the latter an insurable interest in her life, although he places bis right to the proceeds of the policy on reputable authorities have recognized such relation- other grounds, and makes no claim whatever by reaship to be sufficient. Etna Life Ins. Co. v. Frunce, 94 son of any indebtedness. We do not so understand U. S. 502. In the present case evidence was given that either the answer or the evidence given by the dehe was supporting and maintaining her in his family fendant in the case. The bill charges in the first parunder circumstances tending to constitute the relation agraph, in substance, that the policy was taken out of debtor and creditor. It was under all the facts of and applied as a collateral security to the debt which the case that the court held he had an insurable inter- Mrs. McLeau then owed Garnier; and in the subseest in the life of his sister. It is very clear that the in- quent paragraphs that the debt having been fully paid surance was obtained in good faith, and not for the in the life-time of the assured, the proceeds of the purpose of speculating upon the hazard of a life in policy should pass into her estate. This fact is specifiwhich he had no interest. Scoit v. Dickson, supra. cally denied. The defendant in his answer says it is The policy in question shows the willingness of the not true that the policy of insurance, referred to in company to take the risk on the ground of relationship | paragraph 1 of the complainant's bill, was applied for alone."

and issued upon the life of Ellen McLean for any such The rule deducible from all the cases is thus stated reason or purpose as therein stated.” in Warnock v. Davis, 104 U. S. 775, by Mr. Justice It is undisputed however that at the issuing of the Field: " It is not easy to define with precision what policy the relation of debtor and creditor did exist, will in all cases constitute au insurable interest so as and to the extent stated. The defendant having deto take the contract out of the class of wager policies. nied that the policy was taken as collateral security It may be stated generally however to be such an in- for that debt, a question of fact is thus raised to be terest, arising from the relations of the party obtain-determined by the evidence. Upon examination of the proofs we find no evidence from which the fact life of the debtor cannot be grossly disproportionate to might be fairly inferred. The insurance was not ef- the benefit which might be reasonably supposed to acfected at the iustance of Mrs. McLean, but at the sug- crue from the continuance of the debtor's life, withgestion of ber son Samuel McClatch, in whose name a out leaving the transaction open to the imputation of second policy in $1,000 was at the same time issued. being a speculation or wager upon the hazard of a life. The premiums were paid and the policy maintained by Wainwright v. Bland, 1 Moody & R. 481; Miller v. Garnier. Indeed there is not the slightest proof in Eagle Life Co., 2 Smith (N. Y.) 268. support of the plaintiff's hypothesis, and the policy The case of Cammack r, Lewis, 15 Wall. 613, is exwas held in trust for the debtor, and in the absence actly in point. The policy was taken out by Camof such proof the presumption is that the rights of the mack, the creditor, upon the life of Lewis, his debtor. parties appear upon the face of the policy. Cunning- in the sum of $3,000-$2,000 for his own benefit, and ham v. Smith, 70 Penn. St. 450.

$1,000 for the benefit of Lewis. Lewis in fact only owed It has been said however on the authority of Godsall Cammack $70, although he voluntarily and without v. Boldero, 9 East, 72, an insurance upon the life of a consideration gave his obligation at the time debtor, in behalf of a creditor, is in legal etfect but a for $3,000. "If the

transaction," said Mr. Jusguaranty of the debt; and if the debt is paid the in- tice Miller, “as get up by Cammack be true, surance is at an end. But it is now settled that this

then so far as he was concerned, it was a sheer case is not the law. It was directly drawn in question wagering polioy, and probably a fraud on the in. and was expressly overruled in Dalby v. India & Lon

surance company. To procure a policy of $3,000 to don Life Assur. Co. (decided in the Ex equer Cham

cover a debt $70 is of itself a mere wager. The disber), 15 C. B. 365. The law seems to be well settled proportion between the real interest of the creditor that it is wholly unnecessary to prove an insurable in- and the amount to be received by him, deprives it of terest in the life of the assured at the maturity of the all preteuse to be a bona fide effort to secure the debt, polioy if it was valid at its inception; and in the ab

and the strength of this proposition is not diminished sence of express stipulation to the contrary, the sum by the fact that Cammack was only to get $2.000 out expressed on the face of the policy is the measure of of the $3,000; nor is it weakened by the fact that the recovery. Rawls V. American Mut. Ins. Co., 27 N. Y.

policy was taken out in the name of Lewis, and as282; Mowry v. Home Ins. Co., 9 R. I. 346 (1869); Hoyt signed by him to Cammack. This view of the subject v. New York Life Ins. Co., 3 Bosw. 440; Phoenix Mut. receives confirmation from the note executed by Lewis Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 13 Wall. 616.

to Cammack for the precise amount of the risk in The doctrine of all the cases to which our attention the policy, which if Cammack's account be true, was bas been called is that if the policy was originally without consideration, and could ouly have been invalid, it does not cease to be so by cessation of inter- tended for some purpose of deception-probably to est in the subject of insurance wless such be the nec

impose on the insurance company." See also Connecessary effect of tho provisions of the instrument itself. ticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Luchs, 108 U. S. 498. Therefore where a husband insured his life for the In the case at bar the policy was $2,000. The amount benefit of his wife, and was subsequently divorced, it of the indebtedness was at the time undetermined, was held that notwithstanding the relation of hus

and therefore uncertain. It has since been ascertained band and wife no longer existed, and her insurable in- to have been between $500 and $750. Considering the terest bad thus ceased, yet she could recover the full character of their business relations, the unsettled amount of the policy. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. condition of their affairs, the age of the subject of inv. Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457. "Supposing a fair and proper surauce, the probable amount of premiums which insurable interest of whatever kind,” says the court might accrue, the accumulation from interest, we could in the case last cited, “to exist at the time of taking not say the transaction carries with it any inherent out the policy, and that it be taken out in good faith, evidence of bad faith. The essential thing is, as stated the object and purpose of the rule which condemuis by the learned judge of the court below, that the wager policies is sufliciently attained; and there is policy should be obtained in good faith, and not for then no good reason why the contract should not be the purposes of speculation upon the bazard of a lile carried out according to its terms.

in which the insured has no interest. To the same effect is McKee v. Phænix Co., 28 Mo. The case is materially different from Gilbert v. Morse, 383. All the cases to which we have referred, it is 13 Week. Notes Cases, 489. The principles involved in true, arose from suits brought upon the policies of in- that case are not drawn in question here. surance; but the same principles apply where the Wo find no error in the decree of the court below company, admitting its liability, has paid the money and it is therefore affirmed. into court to abide tbe result, and the controversy is The decree is affirmed, and the appeal dismissed, at between the remaining parties.

the costs of the appellant. In our own case of Scott v. Dickson, 16 Week. Notes Cas. 181, our brother Paxson, upon a review of the cases, concludes that where one has an insurable interest at

DEED-BOUNDARY-ON STREAM. the time an insurance is effeoted upon the life of another for his benefit, the fact that his interest ceases

ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL, JULY 22, 1886. to exist at or prior to the death of the insured will not, as against the personal representatives of the in

MICKLETHWAIT V. NEWLAY BRIDGE COMPANY. LIMsured, deprive him of the right to receive the insur

ITED.* auce money. Therefore it was held that a surety on an official bond has an insurable interest iu the life of On the grant of land adjoining a highway or aʼnon-navigable the obligor, and that his right to recover upon the pol

river, it is presumed that one moiety of tho bed of the icy was not affected by the fact that no breach of the

river, or of the soil of the road, is intended to pass upless condition of the bond had ever occurred. But a merely

there is something to rebut the presumption in the lancolorable, temporary, or disproportionate interest may guage of the deed or in the nature of the subject matter present circumstances from which want of good faith. of the grant, or in the surrounding circumstances And and an intent to erade the rule, may be inferred,

this rule is applicable, although the thing granted can be Therefore, although the relation of debtor and cred- satisfied, in respect of quantity. without including the its may in general be said to establish an insurable in- moiety of the bordering river or road, and although the terest, the amount of the insurance placed upon the

*55 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 336.

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