of law on the same subject, which propositions are as follows:

"The court holds as law, that as the tolls or rates of compensation charged and collected by the defendant, in the instance in question, were for transportation service rendered in transporting freight from a point in the State of Illinois to a point in the State of New York under an entire contract or undertaking to transport such freight the whole distance between such points; that the act of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois, approved May 2, 1873, entitled "An act to prevent extortion and unjust discrimination in the rates charged for the transportation of passengers and freight on railroads in this State, and to punish the same, and prescribe a mode of procedure and rules of evidence in relation thereto, and to repeal an act entitled 'An act to prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in the rates to be charged by the different railroads in the State for the transportation of freight on said roads,' approved April 7, 1871," does not apply to or control such tolls and charges, nor can the defendant be held liable in this action for the penalties prescribed by said act.

"The court further holds as law, that said act in relation to extortion and unjust discrimination cannot apply to transportation service rendered partly without the State, and consisting of the transportation of freight from within the State of Illinois to the State of New York, and that said act cannot operate beyond the limits of the State of Illinois.

"The court further holds as matter of law, that the transportation in question falls within the proper description of 'commerce among the States,' and as such can only be regulated by the Congress of the United States under the terms of the third clause of section eight of article one of the Constitution of the United States."

All of these propositions were denied by the court, and judgment rendered against the defendant, which judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court on appeal.

The matter thus presented, as to the controlling in. fluence of the Constitution of the United States over this legislation of the State of Illinois, raises the question which confers jurisdiction on this court. Although the precise point presented by this case may not have been heretofore decided by this court, the general subject of the power of the State Legislatures to regulate taxes, fares and tolls for passengers and transportation of freight over railroads within their limits has been very much considered recently (State Freight Tax case, 15 Wall. 232; Munn v. Lilinois, 94 U. S. 133; C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, id. 155; Peik v. N. W. R. Co., id. 164; Stone v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 116 id. 307; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 id. 204; Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 id. 34), and the question how far such regulations, made by the States and under State authority, are valid or void, as they may affect the transportation of goods through more than one State, in one voyage, is not entirely new here. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case now before us, conceding that each of these contracts was in itself a unit, and that the pay received by the Illinois Railroad Company was the compensation for the entire transportation from the point of departure in the State of Illinois to the city of New York, holds that while the statute of Illinois is inoperative upon that part of the contract which has reference to the transportation outside of the State, it is binding and effectual as to so much of the transportation as was within the limits of the State of Illinois (People v. Wabash, St. Louis & Pacific R. Co., 104 Ill. 476), and undertaking for itself to apportion the rates charged over the whole route, decides that the contract and the receipt of the money for so much of it as was per

formed within the State of Illinois violate the statute of the State on that subject.

If the Illinois statute could be construed to apply exclusively to contracts for a carriage which begins and ends within the State, disconnected from a continuous transportation through or into other States, there does not seem to be any difficulty in holding it to be valid. For instance, a contract might be made to carry goods for a certain price from Cairo to Chicago, or from Chicago to Alton. The charges for these might be within the competency of the Illinois Legislature to regulate. The reason for this is that both the charge and the actual transportation in such cases are exclusively confined to the limits of the territory of the State, and this is not commerce among the States, or interstate commerce, but is exclusively commerce within the State. So far therefore as this class of transportation, as an element of commerce, is affected by the statute under consideration, it is not subject to the constitutional provision concerning commerce among the States. It has often been held in this court, and there can be no doubt about it, that there is a commerce wholly within the State which is not subject to the constitutional provision, and the distinction between commerce among the States and the other class of commerce between the citizens of a single State, and conducted within its limits exclusively, is one which has been fully recognized in this court, although it may not be always easy, where the lines of these classes approach each other, to distinguish between the one and the other. The Daniel Ball, 10 Wall. 557; Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485; Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 id. 460.

It might admit of question whether the statute of Illinois, now under consideration, was designed by its framers to affect any other class of transportation than that which begins and ends within the limits of the State. The Supreme Court of Illinois having in this case given an interpretation which makes it apply to what we understand to be commerce among the States, although the contract was made within the State of Illinois, and a part of its performance was within the same State, we are bound, in this court, to accept that construction. It becomes therefore necessary to inquire whether the charge exacted from the shippers in this case was a charge for interstate transportation, or was susceptible of a division which would allow so much of it to attach to commerce strictly within the State, and so much more to commerce in other States. The transportation, which is the subject-matter of the contract, being the point on which the decision of the case must rest, was it a transportation limited to the State of Illinois, or was it a transportation covering all the lines between Gilman in the one case and Peoria in the other in the State of Illinois, and the city of New York in the State of New York?

The Supreme Court of Illinois does not place its judgment in the present case on the ground that the transportation and the charge are exclusively State commerce, but conceding that it may be a case of commerce among the States, or interstate commerce, which Congress would have the right to regulate if it had attempted to do so, argues that this statute of Illinois belongs to that class of commercial regulations which may be established by the laws of a State until Congress shall have exercised its power on that subject; and to this proposition a large part of the argument of the Attorney-General of the State before us is devoted, although he earnestly insists that the statute of Illinois, which is the foundation of this action, is not a regulatiou of commerce within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States. In support of its view of the subject the Supreme Court of Illinois cites the cases of Munn v. Illinois, C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, and Peik v. N. W. R. Co., above referred to. It

cannot be denied that the general language of the court in these cases, upon the power of Congress to regulate commerce, may be susceptible of the meaning which the Illinois court places upon it.

navigable rivers, and many others, could be acted upon by the States in the absence of any legislation by Congress on the same subject.

By the slightest attention to the matter it will be

"We come now to consider the effect upon this statute of the power of Congress to regulate commerce. It was very properly said in the case of the State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 293, that it is not every thing that affects commerce that amounts to a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution.' The warehouses of these plaintiffs in error are situated and their business carried on exclusively within the limits of the State of Illinois. They are used as instruments by those engaged in State as well as those engaged in interstate commerce, but they are no more necessarily a part of commerce itself than the dray or the cart by which, but for them, grain would be transferred from one railroad station to another. Incidentally they may become connected with interstate commerce, but not necessarily so. Their regulation is a thing of domestic concern, and certainly until Congress acts in reference to their interstate relations, the State may exercise all the powers of government over them, even though in so doing it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate jurisdiction. We do not say that a case may not arise in which it will be found that a State, under the form of regulating its own affairs, has encroached upon the exclusive domain of Congress in respect to interstate commerce, but we do say, that upon the facts as they are represented to us in this record, that has not been done."

In the case of C. B. & Q R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, which directly related to railroad transportation, the language is as follows:

"The objection that the statute complained of is void, because it amounts to a regulation of commerce among the States, has been sufficiently considered in the case of Munn v. Illinois. This road, like the warehouse in that case, is situated within the limits of a single State. Its business is carried on there, and its regulation is a matter of domestic concern. It is empioyed in State as well as in interstate commerce, and until Congress acts, the State must be permitted to adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the peopie within its own jurisdiction, even though in doing so those without may be indirectly affected."

But the strongest language used by this court in these cases is to be found in Peik v. C. & N.W. R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, as follows:

"As to the effect of the statute as a regulation of interstate commerce. The law is confined to State commerce, or such interstate commerce as directly affects the people of Wisconsin. Until Congress acts in reference to the relations of this company to interstate commerce, it is certainly within the power of Wisconsin to regulate its fares, etc., so far as they are of domestic concern. With the people of Wisconsin this company has domestic relations. Incidentally these may reach beyond the State. But certainly, until Congress undertakes to legislate for those who are without the State, Wisconsin may provide for those within, even though it may indirectly affect those without."

These extracts show that the question of the right of the State to regulate the rates of fares and tolls on railroads, and how far that right was affected by the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States, was presented to the court in those cases. And it must be admitted, that in a general way, the court treated the cases then before it as belonging to that of regulations of commerce, which like pilotage, bridging

bridge may be authorized across a navigable stream within the limits of a State for the use of a public highway, and the local rules which shall govern the conduct of the pilots of each of the varying harbors of the coasts of the United States, depend upon principles far more limited in their application and importance than those which should regulate the transportation of persons and property across the half or the whole of the continent, over the territories of half a dozen States, through which they are carried without change of car or breaking bulk.

Of the members of the court who concurred in those opinions, there being two dissentients, but three remain, and the writer of this opinion is one of the three. He is prepared to take his share of the responsibility for the language used in those opinions, including the extracts above presented. He does not feel called upon to say whether those extracts justify the decision of the Illinois court in the present case. It will be seen from the opinions themselves, and from the arguments of counsel presented in the reports, that the question did not receive any very elaborate consideration, either in the opinions of the court or in the arguments of counsel. And the question how far a charge made for a continuous transportation over several States, which included a State whose laws were in question, may be divided into separate charges for each State, in enforcing the power of the State to regulate the fares of its railroads, was evidently not fully considered. These three cases, with others concerning the same subject, were argued at the same time by able counsel, and in relation to the different laws affecting the subject of the States of Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota; the main question in all the cases being the right of the State to establish any limitation upon the power of the railroad companies to fix the price at which they would carry passengers and freight. It was strenuously denied, and very confidently, by all the railroad companies, that any legislative body whatever had a right to limit the tolls and charges to be made by the carrying companies for transportation. And the great question to be decided, and which was decided, and which was argued in all those cases, was the right of the State within which a railroad company did busines to regulate or limit the amount of any of these traffic charges.

The importance of that question overshadowed all others, and the case of Munn v. Illinois was selected by the court as the most appropriate one in which to give its opinion on that subject, because that case presented the question of a private citizen, or unincorporated partnership, engaged in the warehousing business in Chicago, free from any claim of right or contract under an act of incorporation of any State whatever, and free from the question of continuous transportation througe several States. And in that case the court was presented with the question, which it decided, whether any one engaged in a public business, in which all the public had a right to require his service, could be regulated by acts of the Legislature in the exercise of this public function and public duty so far as to limit the amount of ebarges that should be made for such services.

The railroad companies set up another defense, apart from denying the general right of the Legislature to regulate transportation charges, namely, that in their charters from the States they each had a contract, ex press or implied, that they might regulate and establish their own fares and rates of transportation. These

more perfect union by the framers of the Constitution, if at every stage of the transportation of goods and chattels through the country the State within whose limits a part of this transportation must be done could impose regulations concerning the price, compensation, or taxation, or any other restrictive regulation interfering with and seriously embarrassing this

commerce.

The argument on this subject can never be better stated than it is by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 195, 6. He there demonstrates that commerce among the States, like commerce with foreign nations, is necessarily a commerce which crosses State lines, and extends into the States, and the power of Congress to regulate it exists wherever that commerce is found. Speaking of navigation as an element of commerce, which it is, only as a means of transportation, now largely superseded by railroads, he says: "The power of Congress then comprehends navigation within the limits of every State in the Union, so far as that navigation may be, in any manner, connected with 'commerce with foreign nations, or among the several States, or with the Indian tribes.' It may, of consequence, pass the jurisdictional line of New York and act upon the very waters (the Hudson river) to which the prohibition now under consideration applies" (p. 197). So the same power may pass the line of the State of Illinois and act upon its restriction upon the right of transportation extending over several States, including that one.

In the case of Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U. S. 460, the court held that "a telegraph company occupies the same relation to commerce as a carrier of messages that a railroad company does as a carrier of goods," and that "both companies are instruments of commerce, and their business is commerce itself." And relying upon the case of the State Freight Tax, 15 Wall. 232, already referred to, the court said that a tax by the State of Texas upon all messages carried within its borders was forbidden by the commerce clause of the Constitution, as being a tax upon commerce among the States; and observed that "the tax is the same on every message sent, and because it is sent, without regard to the distance carried or the price charged. * # * Clearly, if a fixed tax for every two thousand pounds of freight carried is a tax on the freight, or for every measured ton of a vessel a tax on tonnage, or for every passenger carried a tax on the passenger, or for the sale of goods a tax on the goods, this must be a tax on the messages. As such, so far as it operates on private messages sent out of the State, it is a regulation of foreign and interstate commerce and beyond the power of the State. That is fully established by the cases already cited."

In the case of Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275, it was said: "It will not be denied that that portion of commerce with foreign countries and between the States which consists in the transportation and exchange of commodities is of national importance, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation. The very object of investing this power in the general government was to insure this uniformity against discriminating State legislation."

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And in County of Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, the same idea is very clearly stated in the following language: Commerce with foreign countries and among the States, strictly considered, consists in intercourse and traffic, including in these terms navigation and the transportation and transit of persons and property, as well as the purchase, sale, and exchange of commodities. For the regulation of commerce as thus defined there can be only one system of rules, applicable alike to the whole country; and the authority which can act for the whole country can alone adopt such a system. Action upon it by separate States is

not therefore permissible. Language affirming the exclusiveness of the grant of power over commerce as thus defined may not be inaccurate, when it would be so if applied to legislation upon subjects which are merely auxiliary to commerce."

In the case of Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 204, decided two years ago, the court declared without dissent, that "it needs no argument to show that the commerce with foreign nations and between the States, which consists in the transportation of persons and property between them, is a subject of national character and requires uniformity of regulation." And still later in the case of Pickard v. Pullman Southern Car Co., 117 U. S. 34, the whole subject is very fully re-examined; and a tax of the State of Tennessee upon sleeping-cars of that company, which were used in carrying passengers through the State, and into it and out of it, was held void as a regulation of commerce among the States.

The case of Stone v. Farmers' Loun and Trust Co., 116 U. S. 307, argued at the same term as the present, while it does not decide the latter, evidently does not support the construction placed by the Supreme Court of Illinois upon the case of Munn v. Illinois, and the other cases on which the court relies.

We must therefore hold that it is not, and never has been, the deliberate opinion of a majority of this court that a statute of a State which attempts to regulate the fares and charges by railroad companies within its limits, for a transportation which constitutes a part of commerce among the States, is a valid law.

Let us see precisely what is the degree of interference with transportation of property or persons from one State to another which this statute proposes. A citizen of New York has goods which he desires to have transported by the railroad companies from that city to the interior of the State of Illinois. A continuous line of rail over which a car loaded with these goods can be carried, and is carried habitually, connects the place of shipment with the place of delivery. He undertakes to make a contract with a person engaged in the carrying business at the end of this route from whence the goods are to start, and he is told by the carrier, "I am free to make a fair and reasonable contract for this carriage to the line of the State of Illinois, but when the car which carries these goods is to cross the line of that State, pursuing at the same time this continuous track, I am met by a law of Illinois which forbids me to make a free contract concerning this transportation within that State, and subjects me to certain rules by which I am to be gov erned as to the charges which the same railroad company in Illinois may make, or has made, with referenee to other persons and other places of delivery." So that while that carrier might be willing to carry these goods from the city of New York to the city of Peoria at the rate of fifteen cents per hundred pounds, he is not permitted to do so because the Illinois railroad company has already charged at the rate of twenty-five cents per hundred pounds for carriage to Gilman, in Illinois, which is eighty-six miles shorter than the distance to Peoria.

So also in the present case, the owner of corn, the principal product of the country, desiring to transport it from Peoria, in Illinois, to New York, finds a railroad company willing to do this at the rate of fifteen cents per hundred pounds for a car-load, but is compelled to pay at the rate of twenty five cents per hundred pounds, because the railroad company has received from a person residing at Gilman twenty-five cents per hundred pounds for the transportation of a car-load of the same class of freight over the same line of road from Gilman to New York. This is the result of the statute of Illinois, in its endeavor to prevent unjust