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the widow could not be endowed therein, except after the mortgage had been satisfied. The surplus would represent in part the mortgaged premises. See Elmendorf v. Lockwood, 57 N. Y. 322. Oct. 5, 1886. Hinchliffe v. Shea. Opinion by Andrews, J.

PARTNERSHIP-FRAUDULENT COMPROMISE OF FIRM DEBT-ACCOUNTING.--In an action brought by one member of a firm against his copartners to recover for a collusive and fraudulent settlement of a firm claim by them for less than the amount actually due, the plaintiff can recover only his individual share of the amount lost to the firm by reason of the fraud. Before the plaintiff can have judgment in such an action there must be a settlement of the partnership accounts to ascertain the amount he is entitled to as a member of the firm. Oct. 5, 1886. Sweet v. Morrison. Opinlon by Finch, J.

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PLEADING UNVERIFIED ANSWER -WHEN MAY SERVE. In au action brought against a defendant to recover a debt due by a manufacturing corporation of which he was a trustee, because of his failure to make the annual report required by the general manufacturing act, the defendant may serve an unverified auswer to a verified complaint. The Code of Civil Procedure provides that the verification of an answer may be omitted-where not otherwise expressly prescribed -where the party pleading would be privileged from testifying as a witness concerning an allegation or denial contained in the pleading. $523. Section 837 declares that a witness shall not be required to give an answer which will tend to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture. This action is brought against the defendaut to recover a debt due by a manufacturing corporation of which he was trustee, and he is sought to be made liable therefor on the ground that he failed to make the annual report required by the general manufacturing law. The action is not to recover a debt which he owes, but to impose upon him, as a penalty for his default, the payment of the debt of the corporation. We have repeatedly held that such an action is an action for a penalty or forfeiture. Any admission which he might make in his answer, in support of the plaintiff's allegations, would therefore necessarily tend to expose him to a penalty. Merchants' Bank v. Bliss, 35 N. Y. 412; Veeder v. Baker, 83 id. 156; Stokes v. Stickney, 96 id. 326. The liability sought to be enforced against the defendant does not arise out of any contract obligation, but is imposed by the statute as a penalty for disobedience of its requirement. The distinction between the nature of this liability and that of stockholders under the same statute is clearly pointed out in Wiles v. Suydam, 64 N. Y. 173; Veeder v. Baker, 83 id. 153, 160. This action is not founded on any debt owing by the defendant. The debts owing by the company are made the measure of the penalty. Oct. 5, 1886. Gadsden v. Woodward. Opinion by Rapallo, J.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE-MARES-COLTS.-Where chattel mortgages are executed upon the dams of colts before the latter are foaled, the mortgages attach to the colts until they are weaned, and they are not liable to attachment by a creditor of the mortgagor. The right of possession of the colts follows the dams, for the reason that the two cannot, or ought not to be separated; and when a mare having a young colt is sold, the foal usually goes with her, unless by express agreement it is retained by the selier. The reason for this rule rests upon the necessity of permitting the foal to draw nurture from the dam until weaning time.

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between the mortgagor and mortgagee, this rule, we think, is not only supported by reason, but it has the sauction of authority. See the following cases: Winter v. Landphere, 42 Iowa, 471; Funk v. Paul, 64 Wis. 35; Hughes v. Graves, 1 Litt. 317: Evans v. Merriken, 8 Gill & J. 39; Forman v. Proctor, 9 B. Mon. 124; Fowler v. Merrill, 11 How. 375, 396; Kellogg v. Lovely, 46 Mich. 131; Darling v. Wilson, 60 N. H. 59. The attaching creditor acquires through his attachment no higher or better right to the property seized than was held by the defendant when the attachment was levied, unless some fraud or collusion of the parties would change the rights of those concerned. Thomas v. Hillhouse, 17 Iowa, 67. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 12, 1886. Rodgers v. Highland. Opinion by Beck, J. EVIDENCE-ADULTERY

PREPONDERANCE.

- The rule as to the strength and quality of testimony required to justify a finding of guilt, where the issue in a civil action involves a charge of crime other than adultery, having been established by repeated judgments of this court, we have concluded, after much deliberation, that the same rule should obtain when adultery is charged in an action for a divorce. That rule is that the issue should be determined by the clear and satisfactory preponderance of the evidence. The jury in such a case should be so instructed, but not that the crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before they can properly find it has been committed. This rule may not differ greatly from that stated in Berckman v. Berckman, 17 N. J. Eq. 454. where is is said that "the evidence must be such as to satisfy the human mind, and leave the careful and guarded judgment of the court free from any conscientious and perplexing doubts as to whether the charge be proved or not;" or from the rule laid down by Lord Stowell in Loveden v. Loveden, 4 Eng. Ecc. 461, to the effect that to justify a finding that the crime charged has been committed, "the circumstances must be such as would lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just man to the conclusion." These rules received the approval of Chief Justice Dixon in Freeman v. Freeman, supra. But whether those rules, and that herein laid down and adopted, do or do not differ, the latter rule occupies middle ground between a mere doubtful or uncertain preponderance of proof on the one hand, and that degree of absolute proof implied in the formula "beyond a reasonable doubt" on the other, and is, we believe, the sounder and safer rule. These views are simply sustained by high authority. In 1 Greenl. Ev., § 13a, note a (4th ed. 1883), it is said: "There seems to be at the present time no exception in the United States to the two rules (1) that in criminal cases the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt by the proof, and (2) that in civil cases they may decide upon the mere preponderance of evidence. The rule, that when a criminal act is alleged in a civil suit, the proof of the criminal act must satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, has now been abandoned in most States, and the same rule applied to these as to other civil cases." Many cases are there cited to support the proposition. In a very late case, decided by the Court of Appeals in New York (Allen v. Allen, 101 N. Y. 658) the same rule is laid down. The action was for divorce, and the issue upon a charge of adultery. The court say: "We understand the rule to be that in a civil action the fact of adultery may be proved by such facts and circumstances as under the rules of law are legal evidence, admissible in a court of justice, which clearly satisfy the mind of the tribunal which is required to pass upon the question of the commission of the act. In weighing the evidence, and considering the facts and circumstances, great care is necessary, on the one hand, not to be misled by circumstances reasonably capable of two interpretations-into giving them an

evil rather than an innocent one; nor on the other by refusing to give them their plain and natural significance, on the theory that a different standard of judgment applies to such cases from that which in ordinary transactions guides the conclusions of intelligent and conscientious men. The circumstances must be considered separately and as a whole. The single threads of circumstances may be weak, but united they often lead with assured conviction to the final fact which is the subject .of the investigation. Williams v. Williams, 1 Hagg. Cons. 299; Durant v. Durant, 1 Hagg. Ecc. 748; 2 Greenl. Ev., §§ 40, 41. Wis. Sup. Ct., Oct. 12, 1886. Poertner v. Poertner. Opinion by Lyon, J.

similar goods, because the use of such materials is a right common to all, and cannot be exclusively appropriated by any one. The use of arbitrary terms such as "Tin Tag" or "Wood Tag" by a manufacturer, to indicate goods produced or sold by him, might be allowable if the person so using the name or words branded them upon his goods, or in any way gave the goods the name, but that would give no right to the exclusive use of the tin or wood as a material to designate the goods. A person may appropriate any word, figure, or emblem as a trade-mark, but that does not give an exclusive right to the use of the well-known material substances upon which the word, figure, or emblem may be impressed or engraved. I am therefore of opinion that this bill should be dismissed for want of equity; but this disposition of the case is made without prejudice to the complainants' right to sue upon any of its specific trade-marks depending on the coloring, design, shape, or letterings on the tin label. Cir. Ct., N. D. Ill., July 26, 1886. Lorillard v. Pride. Opinion by Blodgett, J.

THE

GROTIUS.

HE statue of Grotius, which is to be unveiled at Delft, his native town, to-day (Sept. 17) is not one of those tardy monuments which the world, in a moment of contrition for past neglect, is in the habit of voting to the memory of its benefactors. For two centuries and a half the great Dutchman's name has been a name to conjure with. If not, strictly speak

TRADE-MARKS-IN MATERIALS—“ TIN TAG."-There can be no valid trade-mark in a piece of tin used as a tag for tobacco, regardless of its color, shape, or inscriptions upon it, and no one,by using it as a label or tag for goods, can acquire an exclusive right in a popular designation applied by the public to such goods, as “Tin Tag.” Complainants aver that they have the exclusive right to employ a tin tag, whatever its appearance, color, or shape, and state that they bring this bill for the purpose of establishing and maintaining their exclusive right to the use of the piece of tin of any shape as a trade-mark for plug tobacco, and to prevent the use upon plug tobacco not made by them of pieces of tin which would cause said tobacco to be sold in the market as "Tin Tag Tobacco " or "Tin Tag Plug." Tin is one of the common metals in use by the public for a very large variety of purposes. It is easily stamped or impressed with letters, figures, or characters, or cut into various shapes, and takes read-ing, the founder of international law, he was the ily different colors or shades besides its natural metallic lustre; and like paper, becomes the vehicle or material for receiving whatever impression or color may be stamped upon it. It seems to me it would be as reasonable to assume that the complainants could have adopted paper or wood, or a piece of cloth or leather, as a badge or indicia of their goods, as that they could have taken a piece of tin. That they had a right to appropriate to their exclusive use a piece of tin, without regard to its color, shape, or the characters or letters it bears, does not seem to me to be within the scope and purpose of the law of trademarks. I think it may be taken as established by the proof that the words "Tin Tag" do not now designate complainants' goods, or goods manufactured by the complainants upon the market or the trade, and that plug tobacco made by other manufacturers is now designated and sold by the name of "Tin Tag" tobacco, although not labelled or branded with such name, because they bear a tin label or tag of some form. But if the public has been imposed upon, or the goods of others have been sold as the goods of complainants, to the damage of complainants, it is because complainants were unfortunate in the selection of a designation for their goods, and made their claim to the use of tin as their trade-mark more broadly than the law will permit; and if goods of other manufacturers are now known and sold by the name of "Tin Tag," it is not because they are so branded, named, or designated, but as a short and popular mode of describing all goods marked with tin tags. If other dealers have the right to use tin as a material from which to make a tag or label, they cannot be held to violate complainants' rights, because the public designate all goods marked with a tin label as "Tin Tag" goods. If complainants had put upon the market goods marked with paper, wood, or leather tags, and such goods had come to be popularly known and designated in the trade as "Paper Tag," "Wood Tag," or "Leather Tag," complainants could not by such use acquire the right to prevent all other persons from putting a paper, wooden, or leather tag upon

father of international morality. If his ethical system was based upon a faulty principle, and if he confused the duty and the practice of nations, the lofty and Christian ideals of international dealing which he sketched for the consideration of princes and principalities have never been superseded, and civilization still labors after some of them in vain. It is true that his great work is cumbered by tedious and irrelevant quotations, vitiated for modern philosophers by false postulates, and disfigured by theological casuistry. Many of his propositions are now superfluous. The growth of tolerance in religion has made it unneces sary to labor the point that wars are unjust which are made in order to fulfill a scriptural prophecy. But amid the din and tumult of the thirty years' war the counter theory might well have found supporters. Not even Grotius himself had grasped the modern idea of religious toleration. Although he denounces the persecution of heretics, aud with more hesitation, the making war on pagan nations, he proves elaborately that war may justly be levied on those who set religion at naught when they have had the advantage of a Christian education. Not only the cooling down of religious passions, but the diminished importance of the dynastic principle in European politics, has, since Grotius wrote, put many vexed questions to sleep; such for instance as caused him to lay down that "when there is no want of opportunity of marriage, any marriage denied cannot supply a cause for war."

But although Grotius touched and dwelt upon themes which are obsolete, and left untouched many others which are now of supreme importance, his words are treasured up by text-writers as pearls of wisdom. He is their beginning-a Jove principium; and sometimes they get no further than he takes them. He is also their informing spirit. He led the way in adapting the private morality of Christians to the relations between State and State. Until the publication of the "De Jure Belli ac Pacis" the employment of force and fraud as the proper solvents of international difficulties had never been seriously called

in question. Grotius was the first to whisper in the ears of governments that regard for the rights of others, as well as self interest, ought to have somə voice in shaping their conduct. His extreme scrupulousness-as where he lays down that those who have deserved war may not defend themselves, or again, that even the hangman ought to decide in each case whether the sentence is a just one before he proceeds to his sad office-has found few imitators or admirers. But his vindication of conscientiousness in international dealings, although occasionally pushed to an extravagant length, has produced a lasting impression upon the public life of Europe.

It would be interesting to inquire how far the present practice of international morality has come up to the ideals of Grotius, or how far these are regarded as visionary goals, to which mankind can but faintly aspire. Grotius insists that a State ought not to go to war except for a just cause. His definition of a just cause is sometimes vitiated by being deduced from an imaginary "natural law." When he argues that the desire for liberty or autonomy does not justify a resort to arms he is at variance with a large class of modern politicians, which regards autonomy as the only thing except self-defense really worth fighting for. It would be curious to know whether Russia subscribes to another of his doctrines, that a claim to gratitude, as it cannot be prosecuted in a court of justice, so also cannot be asserted by force of arms, or in other words, by an occupation. 'It is unjust," Grotius says, to claim lands on the ground of having discovered them, when they are occupied by another, even though the possessors be bad men, with wrong notions of God and dull intellects."

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How many States at this day recognize any such right on the part of barbarous aborigines? "There is an intolerable doctrine in some writers that by the law of nations we may rightly take arms against a power which is increasing, and may increase, so as to be dangerous." Here Grotius seems to impugn the whole doctrine of the balance of power-a doctrine which has governed Europe during the greater part of this century, and still holds the field. France went to war with Germany for no other reason than because the proximity of so powerful a neighbor was intolerable; and if events now developing in Eastern Europe should bring Austria and Russia into collision, it will be because the equilibrium of power is similarly disturbed by Russian aggrandizement. Grotius divides causes of war into pretexts and impelling causes. The State, he says, which makes war without a pretext commits piracy. When the pretext is particularly flimsy, as in the cases of Tunis and Madagascar and the invasion of Bulgaria by Servia, it would perhaps be just as well at once to assume the character which Grotius ascribes to those who dispense with the pretext. But putting aside any difference of opinion as to when a war is just or unjust, how many States are there which seriously attempt to conform to the canon of Grotius? How many powers at the present day, before entering upon a war, engage in any domestic discussion or self-examination as to whether the war is morally justifiable? It is a melancholy truth that self-interest, which Grotius only allows as a guide when justice points the same way, is still the supreme arbiter of national conduct. If the frequency of wars has diminished, it is because States are more convinced that peace is better in their own interests, and not because they have become more conscientious. Perhaps, with the exception of the United States, which is almost removed from the sphere of consideration, our own country is the only one in which there exists a sufficiently pronounced public feeling on the side of justice to insure a perfunctory inquiry into

the morality i an impending war. Grotius lays down that it is wrong to go to war without arbitration. Civilization sometimes plumes itself on the increasing tendency to settle disputes in this way; but where arbitration has been employed, in how many cases was the motive fear or mutual convenience, and in how many the love of peace for its own sake? In other words, when a vital question of honor or selfinterest has been at issue between two States, each of which fancied itself a match for the other, when has the aid of arbitration been invoked? Yet toward this ideal reform, as conceived by Grotius, as toward another which philanthropists are ever vainly attempting to reach before its time, the world has made some progress. "It would be useful, and indeed it is almost necessary, that certain congresses of Christian powers should be held, in which the controversies which arise among some of them may be decided by others who are not interested, and in which measures may be taken to compel the parties to accept peace on equitable terms." But even for the approximate realization of these ideals it would certainly appear that we must look, not to any increasing pressure of conscience, public or private, but to that very self interest to which Grotius will allow no place in governing international conduct.

However little real advance the world may have made in the direction of these lofty standards; although equivocation and deceit are far from unknown in modern diplomacy; and although some States have no compunction in breaking promises and treaties when it suits them, there are practical matters in which we have profited by Grotius' precepts even more than Grotius himself could have anticipated. A witness of the horrors of the religious wars of his time, Grotius protested against the prevailing idea that when war was once declared the contending parties were set free from all moral restraint. Of the practice of butchering prisoners, of sacking towus, of outraging women, and destroying libraries and artistic treasures which cannot be conveniently carried away, we have seen the last. Whether war would have remained as ferocious as ever if Ayala, Albericus, Gentillis and Grotius had never lifted their voices is doubtful. But to these writers, and especially to Grotius as the writer of greatest authority, we owe the debt of gratitude which is due to those who boldly place themselves ahead of the public opinion of their own time in order to accelerate the march of humanity.-London Times.

NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION.

The attention of the members of the New York State Bar Association is called to the approaching annual meeting thereof to be held at Albany on the 18th and 19th of January next. Circulars containing a programme of the proceedings of the meeting, prepared by the committee of arrangements, will in due time appear in the LAW JOURNAL, and each member of the association will receive a copy thereof by mail.

The highly prosperous condition of the association strongly exhibits the force of the late Hon. Samuel Hand's remarks concerning it:

"The State Bar Association has amply justified the faith of those who from the beginning contended that such an association was practicable, and that it could be made a successful and permanent institution, representing very fairly and reputably the lawyers of the State of New York. It has been successful in very many of the purposes for which it was organized and

chartered. Among these was to take measures by the initiation and regulation of proceedings against unworthy lawyers, by taking charge, as far as practicable, of the discipline of the members of the bar, whether in or out of the association, and by all other proper means to elevate and purify the profession, and to consider, discuss and adopt such rules of professional ethics with regard to the conduct of lawyers to their clients and toward each other as will give them the approval and respect of upright men of all classes. That we owe to the public some such censorship is indubitable. Vast interests are intrusted to lawyers. The public stands in many ways exposed and unprotected to the attacks of knavish attorneys. Their delinquen- | cies are often difficult to redress by law, for the very reason of their knowledge of it. It becomes us, as members of a highly honorable profession-a profession to which the administration of public justice and the care of our civil institutions are peculiarly confided-and of which we are and wish to remain proud, that we, as an association, should not permit it to remain in a single instance the shelter or lair of those who would plunder and feed on the public. The advantages of an interchange of professional amenities, and a liberal measurement of mind with mind, which our organization affords, are becoming happily apparent. While these results are manifested in the State organizations of the medical and other professions, they are more practically exhibited in the associations of the bar."

Members of the association, who have within the last year made any material change in their professional business, will please inform the General Managing Clerk of the Association, Capitol, Albany, N. Y., of its nature. Members will also please send to that officer the names of any and all attorneys and counsellors belonging to their respective bars in the State who have died during the year, with such brief notices of them as will be appropriate. C. J. BUCHANAN, Secretary Ex. Com.

ALBANY, Nov. 11, 1886.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

INDEXED DIGEST OF NEW YORK COMMON-LAW
REPORTS.

This is a digest of the eighty volumes of commonlaw reports of this State, down to and including Hill's, which have been re-published, with notes and references, by the Lawyers' Co-Operative Publishing Company of Rochester. It forms a volume of eleven hundred pages, and appears to be in every respect judiciously and thoroughly done. It has black- letter indications of the precise point of each syllabus. It is specially prepared for reference to the company's edition of the reports, but independent of that it is perfectly adapted for use in connection with the original editions. It is a very creditable example of a compressed digest.

NOTES.

Charles Lamb, in a letter to "Barry Cornwall". who by the way was a lawyer-stated a law case which he pretended was troubling nim and "fretting him to death," and avowed that he resorted to him because he was not on good terms with Henry Crabbe, Robinson and Talfourd. It is necessary to explain that the

case and the disagreement with the eminent counsel were playful figments of Lambs' imagination—a sort "My brother's widow left a will, made during the of mystification to which he was much given, He said: life-time of my brother, in which I am named sole executor, by which she bequeaths forty acres of arable property, which it seems she held under covert baron, unknown to my brother, to the heirs of the body of husband, in fee simply, recoverable by fine-invested Elizabeth Dowden, her married daughter by her first leet and quitrent-in short, worded in the most property, mind, for there is the difficulty-subject to guarded terms, to shut out the property from Isaac Dowden, the husband. Intelligence has just come of the death of this person in India, where he made a enough already) to the heirs of his body, that should will, entailing this property (which seem'd entangled not be born of his wife; for it seems by the law in the causes into exchequer process here, removed by India natural children can recover. They have put certiorari from the native courts, and the question is whether I should as executor, try the cause here, or again re-remove to the Supreme Sessions at Bangalore, which I understand can, or plead a hearing before property of Elizabeth Dowden, I am anxious to take the privy council here. As it involves all the little For God's sake assist me, for the case is so embarthe fittest steps, and what may be the least expensive. rassed that it deprives me of sleep and appetite. M. Burney thinks there is a case like it in ch. 170, § 5 in Fearn's Contingent Remainders. Pray read it over The complexity lies in the questionable power of the with him dispassionately, and let me have the result.

husband to alienate in usum enfeoffments whereof he was only collaterally seized, etc."

attorney-general to Western Australia as the reward No one will grudge Mr. Warton the appointment of of his five years' assiduity in Parliament. Transla tion to the antipodes may well have the effect of turning the right way up the very considerably talents which he possesses, but which were by some accident placed upside down on this side the equator. In a land of Topsyturvydom the snuff-box may be upset ouce for all, the handkerchief find repose in the pocket, and the jokes made to tell against the opponent and not the client. The bitter epigram may be sweetened, light conundrums replace the tedious arithmetical puzzle, and blocking bills give way to businesslike despatch in the legislative council of another hemisphere. Such we may well hope will be the happy result of turning the last of the members for Bridport into an attorney-general on the other side of the globe.-London Law Journal.

Mr. H. W. Paine, the Boston lawyer, relates that in his early years he and Rufus Choate were counsel for speeches to the jury, their client also had his own F. O. J. Smith in a railroad case. In addition to their say; and then a verdict was rendered against them. A few days afterward he saw in an Augusta paper a report of the trial, which stated that "Rufus Choate furnished the eloquence, Henry W. Paine the law, and Mr. Smith the slang." Inquiry elicited the fact that the graphic paragraph, picturing the three men exactly and without a superfluous word, was from the pen of James G. Blaine, who was just entering upon his editorial career.

There is a judge of the Supreme Court residing in Buffalo who contends that Kent and Story are great conveyancers." He has a span of horses thus

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named.

We have not said a word about Codification this week.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, NOVEMBER 20, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

ideas of compensation very respectable New York attorneys entertain. It appears from the opinion that Mr. Kahn was admitted in 1877, and that the employment in question occupied his time from September, 1882, till April, 1885, whether all the time we do not know, but we will assume that it occupied all his time. Mr. Green reports that Mr. Kahn ought to have a retaining fee of $5,000, comHE Central Law Journal has a long and strong pensation at the rate of $1,000 a month, and a editorial against the practice of allowing pris- solacing fee of $5,000 for having been discharged oners to testify in their own behalf lest they should and "subjected to the trouble and expense of this hurt themselves. This is too sentimental. The test of reference," making $41,000 in all. Leaving the the matter is this: the object of criminal trials is to solacing fee out of the question, Mr. Green awards ascertain the truth, not to shelter criminals under arMr. Kahn $36,000 for thirty-one months, or about tificial rules. If the prisoner's testimony will aid $13,161 a year. This to a young man who has been the ascertainment of the truth, it should be re- admitted only nine years, and at the time of his received, no matter which way it makes. In every tainer had been admitted only five years! A comcriminal trial, where the prisoner's testimony is not pensation much larger than that of the chief justice admissible, his counsel appeals to the jury on that of the United States, or any other judges in this score; his client's mouth is sealed; perchance he country except some in New York city! Mr. Kahn could explain away ugly circumstances if it were can go right up to the head! No other young not for the harsh rule of law. Now that his testiman in this country can command a retainer of mony is admissible his counsel takes the other tack, $5,000 and such compensation after being admitted and whines about the hardship of practically call-only five to nine years, we are sure. Mr. Kahn ing on him to explain. We have no doubt that the must be a very able young man; he has had a very general result of the admission is to help the inno-able referee; and if any court is able to affirm this cent and hurt the guilty. But it would be just as logical to censure the use of circumstantial evidence which the prisoner has created against himself. We think the law is right in giving the prisoner the option of testifying and enacting that his omission shall not be constituted against him. That is as near to absolute justice as we can get, and if his omission harms him in spite of the caution, it cannot be helped. At all events it is bad logic and bad morals to say that a man presumed to be innocent shall not be a witness if he desires to be. At our last accounts there was no community in this country more in need of strict and severe criminal justice than St. Louis. A score of alleged murderers were in her jail awaiting trial or under sentence. We are sorry to hear a voice from St. Louis against any measure tending to ascertain truth and effect justice. But it may safely be predicted that no community that has adopted the new rule will return to the old. We should not imitate the inhabitants of Tieck's "Schilda," Utopia, "where they carried their magnanimity so far at last that they read poems and odes to their convicts in order to reclaim them from the paths of vice, and in the mildest way to convert them without the aid of the gallows."

Mr. Aaron Kahn sends us, with his compliments, a printed copy of the "Report and Opinion of the Hon. Ashbel Green, referee, in the matter of the claim of Aaron Kahn, Esq., for compensation as proctor and attorney for Mary Irene Hoyt, in re the Hoyt Will case." We presume that he wants some notice taken of it. Really it is noteworthy. It is noteworthy as an evidence as to how fast a young attorney can get ahead in New York city in certain circumstances, and as to what broad and liberal VOL. 34-No. 21.

report it must be a very able court! No wonder there is a labor party springing up in this country.

Our lively friend, Gibson's Law Notes, failed to "catch on to our joke about descending from the "bench" to "cricket." A "cricket" is a "low stool."

We give a good deal of space this week to a very important decision of the United States Supreme Court on the constitutionality of a State statute regulating rates of freight on railroads running into other States. After we have read it in proof, and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Bradleywhich possibly we may also publish make some comments on the decision.

we may

Some of the criminal sentences imposed by English magistrates seem very inconsistent and capricious. Here are a few samples: A man for stealing a hand-cart, five years' penal servitude; and another man for assaulting a fellow-workman and knocking out his eye, forty shillings fine! A man for begging bread when he was unable to obtain employment, ten days' imprisonment at hard labor; and another, for going to the work-house rather than accept employment at three shillings a day, a month's servitude and twelve strokes of the cat-o'nine-tails! Again, a man for stealing a cotton shirt, five years penal servitude; and another man for criminal assault upon two infants, three months' imprisonment! The Law Times says: "We are not surprised to see some comments in the press on the sentences inflicted by Mr. Justice Day. Eighteen months' imprisonment of a clergyman for marrying

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