Imágenes de páginas
PDF
EPUB

vice, or duty which he may be assigned to as aforesaid," or which he may assume or undertake for or on behalf of said trustees, and shall and will well and truly "account for and to the said trustees for all moneys, goods, chattels, rights, credits, property, and estate which may or shall come into his possession, power, custody, or control by reason or on account of the said employment, work, service, or duty, or otherwise howsoever." All the parol evidence given is insufficient to limit or qualify the clear and expressive language of the bond. It is not sufficient that the principal and co-obligee may have represented its purpose to be otherwise than its language declares. No one authorized to bind the trustees or the city of Philadelphia said or did any thing which will change the legal effect of the obligation. The principal was not an officer for any specific term designated by law. He was merely an employee, without limitation as to time. His term was co-extensive in time with his employment. The one continued as long as the other. He was to perform all work to which he might be assigned, from time to time, by his employers. His duty and obligation were to account for and pay over all moneys which came into his hands, possession, or control. He failed to so account and pay over. The learned judge committed no error in refusing to open the judgment which was entered on the bond. Penn. Sup. Ct., Apr. 12, 1886. Lane's Appeal. Opinion by Mercur, C. J.

TIME-COMPUTATION.-Appellant and M. were opposing candidates for the office of township trustee. M. held a commission as justice of the peace for a term of four years from April 17, 1882. The term of trustee began April 16, 1886. Held, that M.'s term as justice of the peace did not expire until midnight of April 16, 1886; that he was therefore ineligible, and appellant having received the next highest number of votes, was entitled to the office. The two material and controlling inquiries are, when did M.'s term as justice of the peace expire? and when did the term of township trustee begin? The record shows nothing as to the beginning of M.'s term as justice of the peace, except what is shown by his commission from the governor. That commission, as we have seen, fixed his term at four years from the 17th day of April, 1882. If the 17th day of April was a part of the term, the term ended at midnight of the 16th day of April, 1886. If the 17th is to be excluded, the term ended at midnight of the 17th day of April, 1886. Wells v. Wells, 6 Ind. 447. The general rule may be said to be, that when time is to be computed from a day upon which an act is done, that day will be excluded. Hathaway v. Hathaway, 2 Ind. 513; Swift v. Tousey, 5 id. 196; Womack v. McAbren, 9 id. 6; Martin v. Reed, id. 180; Blair v. Davis, id. 236; see also Hill v. Pressley, 96 id. 447; Benson v. Adams, 69 id. 353; Best v. Polk, 18 Wall. 112. There is a section of the Code which provides that "the time within which an act is to be done as herein provided shall be computed by excluding the first day, and including the last." Rev. Stat. 1881, § 1280; Faure v. U. S. Exp. Co., 23 Ind. 48; Noble v. Murphy, 27 id. 502; State v. Thorn, 28 id. 306; Byers v. Hickman, 36 id. 359. The above section of the statute evidently has reference to matters properly falling within the Code of Civil Procedure, and not to matters in no way connected therewith, although some of the cases seem to give it a broader application. See Towll v. Hollweg, 81 Ind. 154. It must be apparent that the above section of the Code has no application to the office of justice of the peace. Neither the office, nor any thing relating to it, is provided for in the Code. The circumstances and reason of particular cases may be such as to require that they shall not be governed by the general rule as above stated. The terms of a contract may be such as to require a de

parture from that rule in the computation of time. Cook v. Gray, 6 Ind. 335; Brown v. Buzan, 24 id. 194; Newby v. Rogers, 40 id. 9. In the case last above cited it was held that where property is contracted to be delivered from the 15th to the 28th of a specified month, both the 15th and 28th are to be excluded. See also Fox v. Allenville, etc., Turnpike Co., 46 Ind. 31, where it was held that in giving notice thirty days previous to the time when payments were to be made on gravel-road assessments, the first day of publication should be counted. See also Hill v. Pressley, 96 Ind. 447, where a like ruling was made in relation to a published notice of a sheriff's sale. In the case of Tucker v. White, 19 Ind. 253, it was held that in determining the expiration of the stay of execution "from the time of signing the judgment," the day on which the judgment was signed should be counted, because execution might have been issued on that day but for the entering of replevin bail. That was a case "where the reason of the thing," as stated in the case of Cook v. Gray, supra, controlled. Ind. Sup. Ct., Sept. 14, 1886. Vogel v. State. Opinion by Zollars, J.

TRESPASS-QUARE CLAUSUM-MEASURE OF DAMAGES. --In trespass quare clausum for felling the defendant's trees across the line fence, and covering the plaintiff's land with brush, the measure of damages is not confined to the expense of removing the brush, nor is it limited to the value of the land incumbered. The expense is a fact to be considered in connection with other evidence; such as the value of the land before and since the cutting, the uses to which it was adapted, and the extent to which the plaintiff had been deprived of the use. The damages may be more, and they may be less, than the cost of removing the brush. The plaintiff is not obliged to remove it. The defendant may, with the plaintiff's license, remove it. In the assessment of damages for land taken for a highway, the question is not what the value of the land taken is, but what is the damage to the whole tract by the taking of a part? Special benefits to the owner from the construction of the way, not shared by others, may be considered; also the increased expense of fencing, and any injury to the rest of the land from the taking of a part. Adden v. R. Co., 55 N. H. 413. In this case the injury may not have been confined to the strip covered by the brush, but may have extended to the whole tract. If A. cuts down my shade trees, my damages are not necessarily limited to their value for wood or timber. If he cuts and carries away my timber trees, if they were worth more to grow than to him as timber, my damages are not ne cessarily measured by their value as timber. Foote v. Merrill, 54 N. H. 490, 494. "The owner may sometimes be entitled to greater damages for the destruction or conversion of property than its market value; he may be entitled to damages for the consequential injury to other property, or to his feelings, for interruption of business, or loss of comfort and health." Cocheco Co. v. Strafford, 61 N. II. 455, 481. See also Holt v. Sargent, 15 Gray, 102; Mayo v. Springfield, 138 Mass. 70; Jones v. Gooday, 8 Mees. & W. 146; Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 368; and Mayne Dam. (Wood's ed.), $569. N. H. Sup. Ct., July 30, 1886. Hutchinson v. Parker. Opinion by Smith, J.

WILL-TRUST FOR CHARITY -UNCERTAINTY.-This case involves the construction of the following clause of a will: "I hereby authorize and empower my executrix to disburse and give (in furtherance of my wishes expressed to her at sundry times) from my estate, to such worthy persons and objects as she may deem proper, such sums as it is her pleasure thus to appropriate, not to exceed in all the total sum of five thousand dollars." Is this a valid gift? It clearly is not a trust. There is no person or object named, or

even hinted, as the cestui que trust. There is no person who could claim in a court of equity an enforcement of the trust. It is a case where, if the $5,000 had been given to the executrix to be disposed of at her pleasure, the law would regard the property given as vested in her, while the direction for its use was merely precatory and of no legal force. In such a case the law regards the legatee as taking the gift absolutely, and with no enforceable duty as to its use. But there is no gift to the executrix. She has merely a power of distribution. Nothing vests in her. It is precisely as if no disposition whatever of the fund had been suggested, but the executrix had been empowered to direct how $5,000 of the estate should go. It is, in other words, an authority given to a third person to direct how a part of the testator's property should be disposed of. If good for a part of the estate, it would be good for the whole. Would then a will in the following words be a valid one: "I direct that A. B. shall declare how all my property shall be disposed of." The supporters of this will say that such a will would be valid, and quote in support of their claim a dictum of Judge Seymour in Wait v. Huntington, 40 Conn. 11, as follows: "It is familiar law that a testator may confer on executors and on others an absolute power of appointment and disposition over his property." But the case itself did not call for this remark, nor involve the question of its correctness, and it seems hardly probable that the learned judge intended that it should have the wide application given it. There is a singular absence of all reference to this question in the text-books, and we have found no decisions that bear with any directness upon it. In the absence of such authority we should regard such a will as of no legal effect. We think the law never intended to accept as a valid will so vague and indefinite a direction, such a mere authority. It is in no proper sense a will. It indicates no intent whatever on the part of the testator as to the disposition of his property. It is really a public declaration that he has no such intent. It is a trayesty of terms to call such an instrument a will. The bequest being inoperative, the $5,000 appropriated by it falls into the residue. This is the well-settled rule in the case of void bequests of personal property. Greene v. Dennis, 6 Coun. 292; Thayer v. Wellington, 9 Allen, 295; James v. James, 4 Paige, 115. Conn. Sup. Ct., Dec. 14, 1885. Bristol v. Bristol. Opinion by Loomis, J.

VESTED OR CONTINGENT ESTATE. -No estate will be held contingent unless very decided terms are used in the will, or is it necessary to hold the same contingent in order to carry out the other provisions or implications of the will. Thus the testator bequeathed his estate to trustees in trust for his daughter. They were directed to apply if necessary the whole income to her education and maintenance, and when she should arrive at eighteen or be married, it was discretionary with them whether or not to deliver to her the whole estate. In case the legatee died before eighteen the estate was disposed of by bequests over. She was never married, and died at twentythree, with the funds in the possession of the trustees. Held, that the daughter took a vested estate at least when she was eighteen, which upon her decease passed to her devisees. When a man sits down to dispose of his property by will, it is fair to presume that he does not intend to die intestate nor to become intestate after death, and so courts lean against intestacy. Now here the testator made no bequests over except in the single event of his daughter dying before eighteen. If then she did not take a vested interest at least at eighteen, the testator became intestate at her death, and his estate is left to be distributed by law; for it

would be absurd to read this will as giving bequests over in case his daughter died after eighteen, as she did. Then again the very fact that he made no disposition over in case she died after eighteen is a circumstance of no little weight to show that he intended his estate to vest in her at all events on her becoming eighteen. 2 Redf. Wills, 606. In England a gift over in one event is generally regarded as favoring vesting in all other events, on the ground that the gift over being made to depend upon particular events, the presumption is that in every other event the estate was intended to remain in the first taker. But we think, as said by Judge Redfield, that this form of argument is more forcible when there is no disposition over, for then it may well be said that the testator intended the estate to vest in the last named donee. The trustees were the brothers and a brother-in-law of the testator. He made them his executors, and reposing confidence in them, was willing to leave it to them as trustees to say when and to what extent his daughter, after, after becoming eighteen or marrying, should be permitted to come into the actual possession and enjoyment of his estate; but we do not think he intended to leave it to them to say whether she should ever have it at all or not in interest. He had willed "in trust for her," and the discretionary clausetreating it as valid, and as to which see Gray Perp., § 120-was inserted for her supposed benefit, and more by way of giving directions to the trustees as to the time and manner of payment than as importing con dition or contingency. And this idea of a trust is im portant, and well nigh decisive of the case. The remarks of Lord Justice Turner on this subject in Oddie v. Brown, 4 De G. & J. 179, 193, are exceedingly pertinent. He says: "When, as in this case, funds are given to trustees to be held by them upon trust, directions must of course be given to them as to the time and manner in which they are to deal with the funds in favor of the persons for whose benefit they are intended. Words therefore that in other cases might import condition or contingency may in such cases be used for a wholly different purpose, namely, for the purpose of conveying the necessary directions to the trusteess. The court therefore in such cases looks, I apprehend, more to the substance of the gift than to the words in which it is expressed. It considers for whose benefit it was made-who were intended to be the cestuis que trust." See also Saunders v. Vantier, 1 Cr. & Ph. 240. (2) It is not enough to say that the Court of Chancery would not have controlled the judgment and discretion of these trustees further than to have compelled an honest exercise thereof, according to Bacon v. Bacon, 55 Vt. 243; Sharon v. Simons, 30 id. 458; French v. Davidson, 3 Mad. 396, and Walker v. Walker, 5 id. 424; for that is quite another question from saying whether this legacy vested, and is not at all determinative of it, for the legacy might have vested and yet the legatee not have been entitled to the possession and full enjoyment of it. Citing Churchill v. Lady Speake, 1 Vern. 251; Hone v. Van Schaick, 20 Wend. 564; Leeming v. Sherratt, 2 Hare, 418; Millard's Appeal, 87 Peun. St. 457; Fox v. Fox, L. R., 19 Eq. 286; Watson v. Hayes, 5 Myl. & Craig, 125; Harrison v. Greenwood, 12 Beav. 192; Rouse's Estate, 9 Hare, 649; Wynch v. Wynch, 1 Ax. 433; Pink v. De Thrusey, 2 Mad. 157; Malcolm v. O'Callaghan, id. 347; Atkins v. Hiccocks, 1 Atk. 500. Vt. Sup. Ct., Aug. 2, 1886. Weatherhead v. Stoddard. Opinion by Rowell, J.

NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS.

SHIRLEY'S LEADING CASES. The third edition of this well-known work is an im provement upon the former editions, in that "the tone

of flippancy and jocularity, modified to some extent in the second edition, has been almost discarded in this, so that the serious and sober-minded law student, who never can understand a joke, will find little or nothing to distract his attention from the particular rule or doctrine of law under consideration." Leaving out the sorry attempts at wit, the cases are very clearly and exactly and concisely stated, and the work is a useful one, especially for students. Published by Stevens & Sons, London.

MAXWELL'S RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.

This is a small-paged, limp book of 114 pages, published by L. K. Strouse & Co. of New York. The reason of its being is hard to guess, unless it may be to air certain rhetorical and ethical observations on woman. It seems to be addressed more to the laity than the legal profession. But the authors ought to be more exact than to tell them that husband and wife, by the New York Code, may "testify for and against each other in all cases of a criminal nature. But in such cases they are admitted solely to prove the fact of marriage in case of bigamy."

BIDDLE AND BULLARD ON SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS.

The third edition of this work has grown to more than 600 pages, and is a handsomely printed work, published by L. K. Strouse & Co., New York. It purports to be adapted to all States having a practice similar to that of this State, and it appears to be well arranged. Certainly it is large enough to be exhaustive. It has forms.

BREWER AND LAUBSCHER'S OHIO CORPORATIONS. This volume of some 408 pages, published by Robert Clark & Co., Cincinnati, brings together the constitutional and statutory provisions of Ohio, relating to private corporations, with notes of decisions, forms for organizing, and a code of regulations and by-laws for managing all kinds of companies and associations, and is designed not only for lawyers, but for managers of corporations. It seems to be exceedingly well executed. The authors state in the preface that in 1883, 1334 companies were found in Ohio, with a capital of $209,000,000, and since 1851 over 10,000 have been formed, with a capital of more that $2,000,000,000.

GIBBON'S AMERICAN CRIMINAL REPORTS. The fifth volume of this series is published by Callaghan & Co., Chicago, contains some 700 pages, and is a fair selection of cases, with some notes.

POMEROY'S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

This is the ninth edition of this excellent introductory work, revised and enlarged by Edmund H. Bennett, and published by Houghton, Mifflin & Co. It is perhaps the best introductory work for the law student.

PATTERSON'S RAILWAY ACCIDENT LAW.

This handsomely printed volume, by Christopher Stuart Patterson, published by T. & J. W. Johnson, Philadelphia, is restricted to the subject of the liability of railways for injuries to the person. It is written upon the plan of propositions and illustrations, like Underhill's Torts, and seems to be comprehen

[ocr errors]

sive and accurate. It should prove a useful handbook for preparation and trial of the numerous class of cases of which it treats. The table of cases cited covers ninety-six double-column pages. We admire the skill with which the author has compressed the decisions into small compass.

RANDOLPH ON COMMERCIAL PAPER.

A Treatise on the Law of Commercial Paper, containing a full statement of existing American and foreign statutes, together with the text of the Commercial Codes of Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain. By Joseph F. Randolph, of the New Jersey bar. In three volumes, with appendix. Jersey City, N. J. F. D. Linn & Co. This is a very serious and important undertaking. If anybody had asked us, with a view to the publication of such a work, whether there is room and would probably be a demand for it, we should have said no. In view of the recent great work of Daniel, and other works on the subject, we should have supposed the field pretty thoroughly occupied. We cannot until this work shall be completed give any thing more than an impression of what it so far is-not even a prophecy as to what is to be forthcoming. We have formed a favorable idea of the present volume. It is certainly exhaustive, concise, and well arranged. The table of cases cited covers forty-five double-column pages, and the index covers 150. The text covers 612 pages in large type. These facts show that there is no padding, and evince a vast amount of hard work. So far, we should judge that the author is less apt to express his own opinions than Mr. Daniel. He refers constantly to Chitty, Story, Byles and Daniel, giving their respective views when they disagree. The notes are copious, and the text is not overloaded. Judging from this installment, we should expect that the work would prove a useful addition, if not a substitute for the ponderous volumes already weighing down our groaning shelves. The inclusion of the statutes and

codes is a valuable and distinctive feature.

THE

COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS.

following decisions were handed down Friday, Oct. 29, 1886:

Judgment reversed, new trial granted-- People, respondents, v. Lipman Arensberg, appellant.—Judgment affirmed with costs-In re petition of Cyrus W. Swan et al., for draining, etc.; Rose F. Langlois, adm'x, respondent, v. President Delaware and Hudson Canal Co., appellant; Mary J. Dewey v. Same: John A. Deraismes, executor, respondent, v. Laurence Ennis, appellant; Henry A. Weeks, ind. and as adm'r, respondent, v. Charles H. Ostrander et al., executors, appellants.-Judgment of Supreme Court reversed, and that entered on report of referee affirmed with costs-John Hone, ex'r, respondent, v. John Watts de Peyster, ind. and as ex'r, appellant.

-Orders of Special and General Terms reversed and motion denied-Alfred N. Beadleston, appellant, v. Mary E. Beadleston, respondent.-Order affirmed with costs-John S. Stubbs and another, ex'rs, v. Edward C. Ripley, impleaded, etc.

The court took a recess until November 22, 1886.

NOTES.

A letter from Washington thus sketches men big of body as well as brain: It is seldom that such a fine looking body of men call at the White House as the one that called to-day. It was the justices of the Su

preme Court of the United States; and as is their cus tom, they visited the President and paid their respects at the opening of their annual session. The justices are all large men. Almost any one would attract attention by his great size and appearance; and consequently, when the court drove up to the executive mansion and filed into the blue room, they were the observed of all observers. The attorney-general was with them, and he too is a good sized man. When the President joined the group in the blue room the party of big men was complete, The judges did not remain long. They simply paid their respects and drove off again to the capitol.

"Not long ago a lawyer from one of the western States, who had never visited Washington before, came here to argue a case before the Supreme Court," writes the Washington correspondent of the Boston Traveller. "He created a sensation which made the chills creep up and down the backs of the venerable justices who had to listen to him. When he came into court he wore a red flannel shirt, coarse woolen clothes and cowhide boots. His hair hadn't seen the scissors for several seasons, and the razor was a stranger to his face. At first he was taken for a crank, but when the case was called the court soon found out that he was a man of great ability. The question at issue was involved in a patent suit, and was quite intricate and complicated. It took the country lawyer two days to argue the case, and he finally won it. After adjournment on the first day one of the court officers suggested that a white shirt, collar, cuffs, and cravat would make an improvement in his personal appearance. The lawyer told him that he didn't own one. The next day however he wore a paper collar about the width of an ordinary cuff pinned on to his red shirt."

In Mullin v. Insurance Co., 58 Vt. 113, the court said: "It is easy to see that respecting an inventory of household effects destroyed by fire the wife would, in most cases, be much better informed as to articles lost than her husband. What man of us, under such circumstances, could inventory the linen, bedding, crockery, and a thousand and one articles in his house, if they were burned, without the aid of his wife? But if the plaintiff was compelled to get the aid of his wife he assumes all responsibility for her errors as he would for his own."

said the other. "Wait till the lawyer comes out. We'll tackle him."-Life. Now let some other chestnut gatherer say, "There ought to be honor among thieves."

"I passed some 'queer,' and here I am in prison, all on accounterfeit," he sighed.—Life.

A physician's startling views of utilizing capital prisoners are thus told by the Chicago Journal: "What we need now," he said, "is a legal enactment turning over criminals convicted of heinous capital offenses to the medical fraternity for experimentation on the vital forces. Of course I never expect to see this done. The sentimentalists would rather see a million good people languish and die for want of medical skill than to see one cut-throat like Frank Rand subjected to surgical operations which would prove fatal. The truth is that this would be less liable to the charge of inhumanity than the vivisection of the lower animals. It would pain me exceedingly to have a dog subjected to torture, because the dog is an innocent and affectionate animal, whereas some of the men we now hang deserve a worse fate. Then, too, we would not have to keep up the practice for years. If there were only a law turning over the worst capital criminals of the year 1886 to us for the purpose, the benefit to suffering humanity could not be estimated. The chief subjects that we wish to elucidate concern the brain and nerves."

Recently in Kern county, California, a man charged with murder was held by the Superior Court in $500 bail. A few days after a prisoner was before a justice charged with stealing a suit of clothes. He was held to answer, and when the question of bail came up the justice said, after figuring awhile: "The judge of the Superior Court releases a man who is charged with murder on $500 bail. I think, after comparing the degrees of crime, I will give you a chromo and let you go."

In the Circuit Court Monday, Judge Logan presid ing, an incident occurred of more than usual interest. A case involving a small amount (an appeal from a justice), in which Mr. Harvey, a well-known operator in marble in this county, was a defendant, was on trial. When Mr. Harvey was called to the witness stand, Mr. Green, of counsel for the plaintiff, asked to put him on his voir dire, when the following substantially occurred: Counsel-Mr. Harvey, do you believe in the

That must be a pious firm of lawyers in St. Louis-existence of a God? Witness-(Evidently surprised
Thoroughman, Christian & Priest.

In Sawyer v. Hebard, 58 Vt. 375, it was held that a son-in-law cannot recover for boarding his mother-inlaw twenty-six and a half weeks in all, on five different occasions during four years, the stays or visits being made sometimes at the suggestion of her daughter, sometimes of the physician, when the auditor was unable to find that she expected to pay. It was necessary to prove either an express contract or a mutual expectation of the parties that the board should be paid for. The court said: "It would be a crime against nature and humanity, to give to all the courtesies, favors, and visits that are exchanged between parents and children, the mercenary quality of dollars and cents. The courts have universally refused to give such a quality to such transactions, and have

verse.

and thinking a moment)-I do not believe in God, but I do believe in God, the power that controls the unirewards and punishments? Witness-I believe that Counsel-Do you believe in a future state of every human being suffers in this life for every viola tion of natural and moral laws. Not accepting the Bible as a divine revelation, I know nothing about the future. I do not know whence I came or whither I am going. Therefore I cannot say that I have any be lief as to my future state. Counsel-Do you believe in a conscience? Witness-Most certainly I do. I believe that every sane man has an innate sense of right and wrong to guide his conduct. The CourtMr. Harvey, do you believe in the binding obligation of an oath in a court of justice requiring a witness to tell the truth? Witness-I do. The court, after some deliberation, held, that the witness was not competent

especially guarded against allowing the surviving to testify, and he was directed to stand aside. Ex-
party to change such transactions into one of dollars
and certs against the estate of the deceased party.”

Two pickpockets saw a gentleman receive a large sum at the bank, and followed him for some time to get a chance at it. Finally the watched turned into a lawyer's office, and one of the watchers said: "That settles it. He's gone. Come along." "No! no!"

ception was taken by Capt. Kain, counsel for defendant, and an appeal taken to the Supreme Court. We understand there are several old decisions regarding the competency of "atheists," "infidels," and "free thinkers" as witnesses, but that we have no Supreme Court decision covering precisely the state of facts presented in this case.-Knoxville (Tenn.) Journal.

1

The Albany Law Journal.

THE

Cockburn, Lush, Quain, Archibald, Kelly, Cleasby

Journal. Willes, Byles, Martin, James, Mellish, Thesiger,

ALBANY, NOVEMBER 13, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

Holker, Amphlett, Hall, Hatherley, Malins, Cairns,
Jessel, Phillimore, Watkin Williams; and of Kars-
lake and Benjamin, who were not judges. This is
a very entertaining book, written in a light, rapid,
vivid style, evincing strong powers of discrimina-
tion, and the greatest boldness and independence.
The author's favorites are Cockburn, James, Cairns
and Jessel. The sketches are enlivened by many
amusing and interesting reminiscences.
told how Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, being au-
daciously called on for a song at a bar dinner, sang
"The Somersetshire Poacher "-

We are

"It is my delight on a shiny night." "in a broad west country dialect, with great gusto and in good style;" how Lush was, as a judge, guilty of the eccentricity of preaching on Sundays," and instead of saying to capital convicts, "and may God have mercy on your soul!" would say, "and may you be led to seek and find salvation! how he was fond of wine, and once, on a cry of "Lush and Shee!" some one said, "that is the old toast of wine and woman; "how Kelly, being attacked at night on the street by two ruffians, although a very aged man, backed against a railing and beat them off with his cane; how on the trial of Tawell, the quaker, for poisoning, he suggested in the defense that the victim was poisoned by eating too many apples, whence he got the name of "Applepip Kelly;" how the kind-hearted Cleasby said to a prisoner, "you are one of the worst men I ever tried," and then gave him a month; how Byles used to ride a horse which the wags named “Bills," in order to realize "Byles on Bills," but which he and his clerk called "Business," so clients could be told that he was "out on "Business;" how he "amused his last days with theology, wrote a religious book," and left more than a million of dollars; how Martin was rumored to have an interest in racing-horses, and how he sentenced an offender, "you are an old villain, and you'll just take ten years' penal servitude;" how on a summer circuit, his cushioned seat getting hot, he ordered a soap-box to sit on; how James and Mel

HE judicial scramble is over for a few days, and Judge Peckham is successful by a majority of six or eight thousand in a State having a million voters. The State will be well represented, and he will be tired of the monotonous slavery of the place long before the people are tired of him. Now the governor has two appointments to make to the Supreme Court bench-in Justice Peckham's place and in Justice Osborn's. Looking at the matter geographically we should say that one ought to be made from Hudson and one from Albany or Troy. Hudson would accommodate more than Catskill, and there is a judge at Kings- | ton. Mr. Edwards, of Hudson, would be a good appointee young, industrious, learned and fairminded. Mr. Patterson, of Troy, would make an excellent judge, and Judge Ingalls will retire in a very few years, leaving Troy fairly entitled to a judge. In Albany there are a number of men suggested for the place, among others Mr. Moak, whom we can hardly conceive as wanting it, for the salary would just about suffice to buy his books, legal and miscellaneous, for the year. If he really would take it no better man could be found in this | city. His learning is great; his industry makes one tired to think of; despite his habits of advocacy he has a receptive mind; while his integrity is beyond the suggestion of question. Several other names have been mentioned, but it is no disparagement to them to say that they must yield to Mr. Moak in most of the essential qualities for the office. Some Schoharie gentlemen are urging the claims of that county. They would have reasonable claims if they would "move in town." There is not law business enough out there to justify the appointment of a judge to reside there. We have said thus much on the assumption that the governor will appoint democrats, although in view of the recent action of the Republicanlish were familiarly known as "Flames and Helparty in not opposing Judge Parker, he might gracefully appoint one Republican. In such case he could not do better than take Mr. Isaac Lawson. But there is little hope of his doing any thing of the sort. When a governor shall do such a thing we shall admit the possibility that the appointing system may be as good as the elective. How can the supporters of the appointing system hold up their heads and raise their voices in favor of its advantages, when they see governors every year appointing obscure and third-rate lawyers for political reasons, when they might easily make worthy appointments? Caucus selections are bad enough, sometimes; back-stairs appointments are generally worse.

"A Generation of Judges, by their Reporter," is the title of a little book of biographical sketches of VOL. 34-No. 20.

lish; " how Hatherley went to church every morning before breakfast; how Malins "gloried in his bad law," and "his personal virtues were judicial vices," and how "his death was accelerated by that failing of most lawyers, bad riding;" how Cairns was fond of a posey in his button-hole, taught in the Sunday school, and "to hear Moody and Sankey was, he declared, the richest feast he could have;" how Jessel, when overruled by the House of Lords, would exclaim when the decision was quoted, "don't cite to me the decisions of remote judges; " how he had trouble with his h's; how Karslake was a bit of a dandy, and on a wet day went to take a "view" in elaborate boots and gaiters, and how he left a million dollars; how Benjamin tied up his papers, dropped his argument, and left the House because Selborne said "

non

« AnteriorContinuar »