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has paid the whole debt may still serve further to elu- against his directious. A master is liable for the acts cidate our conception of the true rule. He says very of his servant, done within the scope of his authority, correctly that the liability inter sese does not depend although the servant disobeyed instructions. The upou any covenant or contract between themselves. former is only sbielded from liability when the latter Their sole expressed contract is to pay the obligee. steps outside his general duty, and does an act to subBut suppose that in the bond there was iuserted an serve his owu interest or gratify his passions. If the express covenant running not to the obligee but to herder in this case had driven the sheep upon the reeach other to bear respectively one-half of the debt. | spondent's land to vex, annoy and harass the respondIn such a case their mutual liability would depend ent-had done it to indulge in his own malevolenceupon no equitable doctrine but be fixed by an express the appellant would not have been liable, unless he covenant, which would by itself sustain and support was privy to the act; but if he did it to advance the the right of action. The covenant here is of that appellant's interest-did it to enable the sheep to character. It is not one running to the creditors, as is thrive, and thereby gain an advantage to the appelthe covenant of the ordinary bond, but one running lant-the latter would be liable, although the act was to each other, and establishing their rights and duties willful. It is said to be a universal rule that whether as between themselves. June 1, 1886. Dwinelle v. the act of the servant be of omission or commissionEdey. Opinion by Finch, J. [12 Daly, 253, affirmed.] whether his negligence, fraud, deceit or perhaps even

willful misconduct, occasion the injury-80 long as it

be done in the course and soope of their employment, ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE his master is responsible is damages to third persons. CISIONS.

And it makes no difference that the master did not give special orders; that he did not authorize, or even

know, of the servant's act or neglect; for even though CRIMINAL LAW-LARCENY-PART OF GOODS NOT KNOWN.-Where a party feloniously took a coat which

he disapproved or forbade it, so long as the act was

done in the course of the servant's employment he is contained a watch in the pocket, of which he claimed not to be aware at the time of the taking, but which

none the less liable. Schouler Dom. Rel., $ 637. And

in Shearman & Redfield on Negligence it is said that be appropriated, held, that he was liable for all the

“there is no such rule of law as that the master is not property taken by him. Neb. Sup. Ct., May 17. 1886.

liable for the willful and wrongful acts of his servants, Stevens v. State. Opinion by Maxwell, C. J.

though such a doctrine has often been propounded in LANDLORD AND TENANT-CHANGES IN BUILDING BY

judicial opinions. There are many cases in which a TENANT-WASTE.The contention of the plaintiff is | master must be held liable for such acts, and there are that a tenant, whether rightfully in possession or not, numerous decision

numerous decisions holding him so liable, which comcannot, without the consent of the landlord, make | mend themselves to every man's sense of justice. The material changes or alterations in a building to suit | true ground upon which a master avoids liability for his taste or convenience, and if he does it is waste. | most of the willful acts of his servants, when unanThe law is undoubtedly so settled. “Any material thorized by him,

| thorized by him, is that they are not done in the course change in the nature and character of the build

of the servant's employment. When they are so dono ings, made by the tenant, is waste, although the master is liable for them."' $ 65. The herder the value of the property should be enhanced in this case had charge of the sheep. It was his by the alteration." Kidd v. Dennison, 6 Barb.

duty to keep them off the respondent's land, and 13; Douglass v. Wiggins, 1 Johns. Ch. 435; Story

whether he negligently or willfully violated it, canEq. Jur., $ 913; Will. Eq. Jur. 373. In Jackson V. An

not, it seems to me, shield the appellant from liability drew, 18 Johns. 434, the court say “that a tenant can.

for the damages done the respondent, so long as the not, under the pretense of advantage to the rever

act was within the course of the herder's employment. sioner, change the nature of the buildings; and many

If he was the appellant's servant while doing the act, cases show that such changes, though beneficial, would

the latter is responsible; but if he were a principal in be waste." "The ground on which alterations in de

the transaction-were his owu master, were doing the mised premises, not prejudicial to the value of the

act upon his own responsibility, and to accomplish property, have been declared waste, is that they change

private ends-he alone is liable. The question to be the identity of the estate." Will. Eq. Jur., supra.

determined in such cases is whether the party commit"If a tenant makes any essential change in a dwelling

ting the act was in fact a servant, or was a principal he is liable in waste. Thus if he takes down a parti

in the affair. The rule of respondeat superior is appli. tion and makes two rooms into one, or if he sets up a

cable, and if the servant transcends the bounds of his permanent partition, and makes one room into two, it auch

| authority he becomes pro hac vice the superior, and the is waste." Wood Landl. & Ten. 704 "A landlord

1 ouly one that can be made to respond to the injured need not wait until waste is actually committed; for

party. I distinguish between the willful doing of an If he ascertains that the tenant is about to commit any

act in such case and doing of it maliciously. The foract which would operate as a permanent injury to the

mer may imply that it was done through stubbornness estate the court will interfere and restrain him from

and obstinacy, but not necessarily for any ulterior purdoing such act; and whether he begins or threatens or

pose, while the latter implies that it was done with an shows an intention to commit waste, an injunction

1 intent to injure. The one exhibits a set purpose to do will be granted." Tayl. Landi. & Ten., $ 691; Poert

the thing itsell; the other to do it in order to gratify ner v. Russel, 33 Wis. 193. Wis. Sup. Ct., May 15, 1886.

hatred or ill-feeling. It was the appellaut's duty to Brock v. Dole. Opinion by Cole, C. J.

keep his sheep off the respondent's land. He was no334.1

tified to do so, and if he employed ineffectual means

to do it he should be responsible unless he were preMASTER AND SERVANT--COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT. vented by means over which he had no control. The The master is liable for the act of his herder in allow.herder may have acted willfully in the matter, but so ing sheep to trespass upon the lands of another | loug as he kept within the limit of his employment land-owner, eveu though the herder has been | the appellant was answerable for his acts. Whart. expressly directed to keep the sheep off such lands. Neg., $ 171. Whether the herder was pursuing the We do not agree with the counsel that the appellant course of his employment or not, when he permitted was not liable for bis sheep baving trespassed upon the the sheep to eat otf the respondent's grass, was a ques. respondent's land, if his berder willfully allowed it tion for the jury. Their finding that he acted will

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fully in regard to the matter would not have been suf- tled to recover it must be shown that the defendants
ficient unless they should also find that he was acting to knew, or ought to have known, of the dangerous con-
subserve a private end. Rounds v. Delaware, L. & W. | dition of the oven, and that the plaintiff did not know
R. Co., 64 N. Y. 129; Whart. Neg., supra. Oreg. Sup. or could not reasonably be held to have known of the
Ct., May 17, 1886. French v. Creswell. Opinion by defect, if such it was, which led to the injury. Knowl-
Thayer, J.

edge on the part of the defendants, or such lack of it — NEGLIGENCE-MACHINERY-NEW INVENTION.

as would render them culpably liable, and ignorance -An employee who engages in the service of a railway

on the part of the plaintiff of the alleged danger of decompany in the running of its trains is presumed to

fect, are essential prerequisltes to the maintenance of do so with a knowledge of the dangers incident to

this action. Beach Contrib. Neg., § 123; Shearm. & such service, and he assumes the risks of its ordinary

Redf. Neg., $ 99. Thus in the recent case of Griffiths hazards. An employer is not bound to furnish for his

v. London & St. Katharine Docks Co., 12 Q. B. Div. workmen the safest machinery, nor to provide the best

495, afterward affirmed in the High Court of Appeal, methods for its operation in order to save himself

13 id. 259, the plaintiff at the time of the accident was from responsibility from accidents resulting from its

in the employment of the defendant company, when use. If the machinery be of an ordinary character

one of the large iron doors upon the defendant's and in sound repair, and such as can with reasonable

premises, where the plaintiff was at work, suddenly care be used without danger to the employee, this is

gave way and fell upon the plaintiff; the court here all that is required. When the court instructed the

say: “If the master employs a servant to do work for jury for the plaintiff that the law requires a rail

him, not knowing of any special or latent danger in road company to use reasonable and ordinary care and

the work, the servant takes the consequences of any diligence in providing and maintaining reasonably

danger there may be in it. The master does not missafe structures, tracks, side tracks, switches, turnouts,

lead the servant, but only avails himself of his voluneto., and if it fails to do so, and an injury happen in

tary service. On the other hand, if the master knows consequence thereof to an employee in the exercise of

of danger which the servant does not, it is clearly the due and reasonable care, then the railroad company

duty of the master to communicate his knowledge of would be liable, the jury must have understood from

the danger to the servant. If the master requires the the instruction that the railroad company was abso

servant to do something out of the ordinary course of lutely required to use blocks in its switches and

his employment, and dangerous, the servant may disturn-outs. There was no other negligence charged in

obey him. It is clearly the duty of the master to comthe declaration to which this instruction could refer.

municate a danger which he knows and which the Had it been proven that an unblocked switch or turn

servant does not. It is necessary to allege that the out was unsuitable or unsafe, or that defendant had servant does not know of the danger, because if the not used proper care and skill in constructing its turn

servant knows of the danger, and does the act which out or switch at Bureau Junction, a different question

may and does cause injury to him, he has nothing to might be presented; but such was not the case. It is

complain of, and cannot bring an action for the damapparent from the evidence that unblocked switches

age sustained.” Welfare v. Brighton Ry. Co., L. R., have been in use on the various railroads all over the

4 Q. B. Div. 696; Priestly v. Fowler, 3 M. & W.1; Incountry for years, and it is a fair inference from the dianapolis R. Co. v. Love, 10 Ind. 554; Wright v. N. evidence that the blocking of switches is yet but an

Y. C. R. Co., 25 N. Y. 566; Hayden v. Smithville experiment. The invention is yet in its infancy. At

Manuf. Co., 29 Conn. 548; Buzzell v. Lacopia Manuf. all events the utmost that can be claimed for the new

Co., 48 Me. 113; Hull v. Hall, 78 id.; S. C., 4 East. Rep. appliance is that where blocks are used it may be safer 395. Me. Sup. Ct., May 17, 1886. Nason v. West. for the employee than where the switch is constructed Opinion by Foster, J. according to the old plan. Conceding this to be true, NEGLIGENCE-NOTICE OF INJURY-CONDITION PREas we have seen from the authorities cited, the failure CEDENT.-- A horse railroad company was required by its to use the new device does not render the company charter to grade and keep in repair the surface of the liable. It must appear before the defendant can be held street for a space not less than two feet in width on liable that the switch or turn-out, as constructed and each side of each rail. Held, that where an injury was used, was not reasonably safe, or that it was not con

caused by the defective condition of such part of the structed with the usual care and skill. An employer

street the company was entitled, before being liable is not required to change his machinery in order to

to a suit, to written notice of the injury under the apply or adopt any new invention. Whart. Neg. 213.

statute (Session Laws of 1883, p. 283), which provides The fact that a few of the railroads of the country

that no action for an injury from a defective highway have adopted the new device, or that the defendent shall be maintained against any town, city, corporahas used it on a part of its road, is not enough to estab tion or borough unless written notice of such injury lish its utility, and establish negligence in every other and of its nature and the place of its occurrence shall road that adheres to the old system. The old system

be given within sixty days. The complaint we must of constructing switches must be condemned; it must treat as a complaint founded upon the statutory liaappear that unblocked switches are unfit for the pur bility of the defendant, and before the plaintiff can pose for which they are constructed. It is not enough

enforce its provisions against the defendant he must to prove that in the opinion of witnesses blocked

perform his own duty under it; he must give the writswitches are safer for the employee, as the law does

ten notice prescribed; and the giving of such notice is

ten notice prescribed and the giving of pot require the lawyer to furnish absolutely safe ma

furnish absolutely safe ma- a condition precedent to his right to maintain the acchinery, or the most approved pattern; he is only re- tion. This has been so often and so recently decided quired to furnish that which is shown to be reason

that it needs no further consideration. Hoyle v. ably safe and proper for the purpose for which it is con- Town of Putnam. 46 Conn. 61: Shaw y. City of Wastructed. Ill. Sup. Ct., May 15, 1886. Chicago, R. I. &

terbury, id. 266; Cloughnessey v. City of WaterP. Ry. Co. v. Londergan. Opinion by Craig, J.; Mul: I bury, 51 id. 405; Wall v. Toomey, 52 id. 35. Conn. key, C. J., Shope and Magruder, JJ., diesenting Sup. Ct., Feb. 12, 1886. Fields v. Hartford, etc., Horse

R. Co. Opinion by Granger, J. - NEGLIGENCE-DANGEROUS STRUCTURE. — In an action for personal injuries sustained while clean WATER AND WATER-COURSE-RIPARIAN OWNERing out an oven for the defendant, caused by the fall- GRANT FROM UNITED STATES - TITLE TO BED OF ingin of thu oven, before the plaintiff could be enti. STREAM-PRESUMPTION.—The owner of the bank of a

navigable stream by purchase from the Uuited States in the testator, does not operate as a repocation of the is presumed to be the owner of the bed of the stream will; and upon the revesting of the title in the testator in front of his purchase to the middle or thread the estate is subject to the will, and the interest of the thereof, and the same presumption arises in favor of devisee exists if no conveyance had been made. It the owner of such bank in all cases, however such was formerly essential to the validity of a devise of owner acquires his title; but the presumption in the freehold lands that the testator should be seised case of owners not deriving their title directly from the thereof at the making of the will, and that he should government is not conclusive. The owner of lands bor continue so seised, without interruption, until his dederivg upon a navigable stream, and of the bed of the cease. If therefore the testator subsequent to his will stream in frout of the lands, may separate the owner by deed aliened the lands which he had disposed of ship of the lands upon the bank of such stream from | by his will, and afterward acquired a new freehold esthe ownership of the bed of the stream, and convey tate in the same lands, such pewly-acquired estate did the shore and bank to one grantee and the bed of the not pass by the devise, which was necessarily void. 1 stream to another. When the owner of lands border Jarm. Wills, 147. The will was regarded in law in the ing upon a navigable stream makes a deed as to such nature of a conveyance of the land devised. It could lands, the boundaries mentioned in which include the operate only upon land in which the testator had an whole of the bank and shore along the stream for the interest at the time of the execution of his will, and whole length of the lot conveyed, tbere arises a pre consequently after-acquired real estate could not pass sumption that the grantor intended to convey, aud by it. George v. Green, 13 N. H. 521. When the condid convey, all his rights to the bed of the stream ju | veyance subsequent to the devise, though made for a front of the lands described in the deed to the middle partial purpose, embraced the entire fee-simple or the of such stream; and that presumption can only be re whole estate of freehold which was the subject of the butted by an actual reservation in the deed, or by the devise, the rule under the old law was that the conproduction of such facts and circumstances in evi veyance, though limited in its purpose, and though it dence attending the making of the conveyance as iustantly revested the estate in the testator, produced clearly show au intention to limit the grant to the ex a total revocation of the devise. 1 Jarm. Wills, 148. act boundaries fixed by the description in the deed. A conveyance by the devisor subsequent to the devise Wis. Sup. Ct., Apri 6, 1886. Norcross v. Griffiths.

-except in mortgage or for the purpose of partition Opinion by Taylor, J. [27 N. W. Rep. 606.]

-of the estate devised, removes it from the operation

of the will, and of vecessity operates as an ademption WILL-CERTAINTY AS TO DEVISEES.- A bequest "for

of the subject of the devise, and in effect as a revocatbe special benefit of the worthy, deserving, poor, tion of the will pro tanto. If the alienation is partial white, American, Protestant, Democratic widows and the revocation is partial, and if the alienation is of orphans residing in the town of Bridgeport, Connecti the entire estate, it is in effect a total revocation of cut,” is not void for oncertainty as to the persons in the testamentary disposition of the estate; not bethe class named. It is a matter of common kuowledge

cause of any infirmity or want of operative force in that there is a political party known as the Demo

the will, but by reason of the withdrawal of the encratic party, to which a large portion of the voters in tire estate from its operation. Marston v. Marston, every one of the States adhere; which they support 17 N. H. 503, 506. And as formerly, no after-acquired by speech and act, by advocating its principles and real estate could pass by a will, a conveyance of the voting for its candidates for office; and that the de entire estate was regarded as an absolute revocation termination of the question as to what persons and of the testamentary disposition of property. In Engprinciples shall be in the ascendant in government for land since 1837, by the statute of 1 Vict., ch. 26, no the time being depends upon the belief of the voter will is revoked by any presumption of an intention on that the speech and the act of the candidate are true the ground of a change of circumstances, and every indexes of his opinion. The trustees are to inquire will is construed to speak and take effect as if it had and decide concerning a given man, whether they be been executed immediately before the death of the lieve that he adhered to aud supported the prin testator, unless a contrary intention appears by the ciples of the Democratic party; and they may will. So in this State many of the conditions upon well rest upon reasons which are sufficient to which the doctrine of implied revocation was formerly control the general mind of voters in a matter of the based in England no longer exist. Under this alterahighest importance. They may be " orphaus.” This tion of the common law (Loveren v. Lamprey, 2. N. word describes a child who has lost one or both of its H. 434) any form of words showing the intent of the parents. He may be extremely young, and so of testator to devise all the estate which he should own course without character, religious belief or political at the time of his decease, passes all his property, real principles; and as by law neither women nor children and personal, whether owned at the time of making vote, so in the common speech neither are said to the will or acquired afterward. If a testator, after have Democratic or other political principles. There executiug bis will, makes a conveyance of land specififore it must be determined to have been the intent of cally devised, and subsequently becoming re-vested tbo testator as to an orphan not of sufficient age to with the title, is the owner of the same land at his de. have acquired a character, that he should have been cease, it passes by the will as if there had been no born of white, American and Protestant parents, of a alienation. But at common law such conveyance opDemocratic father, and be destitute; and as to a erated as an absolute revocation of the will as to the widow, that she should be worthy, deserving, poor, estate conveyed, although the testator died seised of white, American, Protestant, and have had a Demo the identical estate which he possessed at the making cratic husband. Conn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 13, 1886. Beards of the will. N. H. Sup. Ct., March 12, 1886. Morey v. ley v. Selectmen of Bridgeport. Opipion by Pardee, J. Sohier. Opinion by Clark, J. [5 East. Rep. 203 ) [3 Atl. Rep. 557.)

- DEVISE-LIFE ESTATE-INTENTION – Where a -- AFTER-ACQUIRED PROPERTY-REVOCATION. will devised to A. the “porth end of the house, the When it appears to have been the intention of a teg. north kitchen, and what she needs of the smoke-bouse tator that all after-acquired property should pass by and lumber-house, and as much land as she can work bis will, a conveyance of all the estate previously de- ber hands on," and the same will devised the same vised by a trust deed containing a power of revocation | land to B., it was held, that A. only took a live estate, which is subsequently exercised and the title revested | B. the remainder in fee. Unquestionably if this devise in the defendant had stood alone in the will, by 451) and Plato's Laws. Mr. Merriam would seem to virtue of the act of 1784, Code, 8 2180, she would have incline to an earlier date for the fragments. taken the fee simple therein. For the act provides : Professor Roby states that in their character and “When real estate shall be devised to any person, the extent, these tables take the lead of all legal inscripsame shall be held and construed to be a devise iptions, either of Greece or Italy. Certainly they are fee simple, unless such devise sball, in plain and ex- | the most complete. The fragmentary character of the press words, show, or it shall be plainly intended by Roman Decemviral Code has long been a subject of the will, or some part thereof, that the testator in great regret to scholars. Now after all it seems as if tended to con vhy an estate of less dignity." But the the early Greek laws, once almost wholly disregarded statute, while prescribing a rule of construction, still because of their incompleteness, were destined to leaves the question open as to the intention of the tes- spring into notice after a lapse of almost the whole tator, to be collected from the whole provisions of the period of Roman law, and actually to point the way to instrument. The main and leading intention of the the solution of the most interesting and profound testator, to be gathered from the will, is to give the fee problems of comparative jurisprudence. What a vinsimple to his son John in the home place, which indication of the almost inexhaustible resources of the cluded the dwelling-house, and the devise of one end | Hellenic race! of the house, eto., and “as much land as she can em The London Quarterly translation does not give ploy her hands on, and what she needs of the barn and the Greek text as does the American edition, but it is stable," was secondary, and must be construed to be interesting to compare the several translations, Engin subordination to the general devise of the whole-a lish and American. In some points they greatly difdifferent construction would derogate from what was fer, but this is not strange, the original dialect being the manifest intention of the testator, that is, that wholly archaio and the alphabet of only eighteen letJohn shall have the fee simple of the home place. ters. It is written Bovotpoondov, (ox-turning-wise) i. e. This interpretation is in accordance with the doctrine from right to left and the succeeding line from left to apnounced by the court in Ross v. Toms, 4 Dev. 376, right and so on continuously. Mr. Merriam, with the where it is held “when there is a particular and a gen modesty of a true scholar, disclaims infallibility for eral paramount interest apparent in the same will, and his excelleut and sonorous translation, conceding they clash, the general interest must prevail." N. C. that the ultimate solution of the text demands much Sup. Ct., Feb. Term., 1886. Leeper v. Neagle. Opinion exegetical work. He has given the subject more critby Ashe, J. (93 N. C. Rep. 338.]

ical attention however than has evon Professor Roby.

DEWEY ON CONTRACTS FOR FUTURE DELIVERY. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. A Treatise on Contracts for Future Delivery and Commer

cial Wagers, including "Options, Futures and Short Law CODE OF GORTYNA IN KRETE.

Sales." By T. Henry Dewey, of the New Youk Bar.

Baker, Voorhis & Co., publishers, 66 Nassau street, N.Y. Text Translation, Comment, by Augustus C. Merriam. Bal. 1886. Pp. xvi, 385. timore, 1886.

The object of this work is to make clear "the disIn 1884 came to light one of the most interesting of all tinction between open board of trade transactions for the monuments of antiquity and one promising much future delivery" and "bucket shop" business. To this to our correct understanding of early institutions. It

end the author has classified the cases involving the seems the occupier of a mill stream at Hagioi Deka, in

subject matter as follows: Chapter 1, Wagers; Crete, turned off the water and discovered in the bed

chapter 2, Wagers between principals; chapter 3, some stone blocks, bearing an inscription. The atten Fact and circumstances which bave been considtion of several savants, Doctors Halbherr and Fabri ered by the courts as indicating an intention to wager; cius was called to these,and they were found to be the chapter 4, Evidence divided into three rules and confragments of a very ancient Cretan Code, perhaps the sidered in reference to subjects treated of in chapter very one familiar to Lykurgos, Solon and others of the 1 3. chapter 5. Wagers considered in rafaro

3; chapter 5, Wagers considered in reference to hroνομοθεται.

kers and commission merchants, reduced to five rules, Ever since this discovery many minds have been di.

and under each rule the English and American cases rected to deciphering the archaic contents of these

are cousidered. It will no doubt be found useful as a fragments. The most celebrated editions are those of

compendium of the law relating to the particular Professor Comparetti of Florence, of Dr Fabricius, of

class of contracts treated of, but we cannot avoid Lewy, of Bernhöft, of Bücheler and Zittelmann, the

coming to the conclusion that it is written in their deBaunaks and perhaps several others. These are all | fense. In our opiniou gambling, whether done on the foreign editions.

“Exchanges” or in “ bucket shops,” is equally illeThe edition now before us for notice is wholly Amer

gal and should be dealt with accordingly. The author ican. It is reprinted from Vol. I, No. 4, and Vol. II,

conteuds that in a case where the contract is in writNo. 1, of the American Journal of Archaeology, and

ing, and the understanding that no delivery is to be was evidently made prior to the first English edi.

mado is not expressed, parol evidence is inadmissible tion.

to establish that fact. We do not so understand the The London Law Quarterly for April last had a

rule. The evidence is admissible, not for the purpose very complete historical notice of what it calls “The

of contradicting the agreement in writing, but for the Twelve Tables of Gortyn" and the text of the first

purpose of showing that the intent of the parties was English trauslation, from no less a pen than Professor

merely to gamble; notwithstanding it may have the Roby's. It may be well for the inquiring reader to

effect to vary the terms of the writing; see pp. 54-7. turu there. In Mr. Merriam's American edition these

Again it has been held that evidence to establish any laws are more properly called the Law Code of the defect of this character (illegality) in the alleged conKretan Gortyna. Gortyna was a town mentioned by

tract does not come within the spirit or the letter of Homer and its laws, from the very dawn of our civil- l the rule excluding parol evidence. Jones on Construcization, played an important part in Greek legislation. tion of Contracts, $191, citing authorities. See also The date of the Gortyna laws is placed about 400 B. Kreigh v. Sherman, 105 Ill. 49, and the very recent case C. or midway between the Roman XII Tables (B. C. of Stewart v. Garrett, Md. Ct. App, 4 Atl. Rep. 399.

The Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, JULY 17, 1886.


PEFORE we again address our readers, Albany D will have celebrated the two hundredth anniversary of the founding of the city. This will be done with a magnificence and an expense never paralleled at the north. One procession alone will cost above ten thousand dollars. In our opinion, it would be much better to bestow this large sum in some lasting memorial — a bronze statue of Philip Schuyler for our park, for example. But the very manner of the celebration is a survival of the ancient Dutch love of civic display, with its allegorical ships and fountains of wine -- the latter on this occasion being faintly but efficiently indicated by a thousand saloons where lager-beer is dispensed. Few cities of this country have been so influential in its general affairs, and few have so distinctly preserved the characteristics of its founders, as Albany. Albany is to this day distinctly Dutch, although surrounded by Yankees and Puritanism -Hudson, settled by the Nantucket whalers, and Troy, founded by men from the east, both within a century. Not to speak of such a trifling matter as the habit of going to bed early, and of digging a canal as soon as the State was rich enough, our city, we believe, cherishes and exemplifies the love of liberty and of country, the thrift, the peaceableness and the integrity which were the predominant characteristics of the sturdy men who planted the infant colony, Old Albany physically is nearly passed away. A few weeks ago the second oldest house — of the seventeenth century — was demolished to make way for a superb new building, and this very week our city's most ancient and peculiar characteristic -- the customary out-door market in State street, answering in modern times no purpose but to litter up that magnificent avenue with horse dung, sheep's pelts and rotting vegetables, and to play into the hands of hucksters pretending to be farmers --- has wisely been abolished by our mayor, John Boyd Thacher. Our old capitol disappeared some five years ago, and marked the growth of the State in a surprising manner. The old building, erected in the early part of the present century, cost only about one hundred and ten thousand dollars, and yet the State was so small and poor that it had to resort to a lottery to raise the money to complete it --nominally for the “improvement of IIudson's river;" while we have already spent some seventeen millions on the new capitoi, and no one has felt it. The old North Dutch Church remains, of which Halleck sings in “The Croakers: "

Its sway however is divided with the spire of a neighboring Presbyterian Church, surmounted by a gilt codfish weather-vane, supported by a gilt pumpkin, emblems respectively of Massachusetts and Connecticut, whose people established the church; with the tower of St. Peter's Episcopal Church, unrivalled for beauty; the growing walls of the Episcopal Cathedral, and the lofty spire of a grand Roman Catholic Cathedral. Our new capitol is a conglomeration of nearly every conceivable order of architecture, but in the new City Hall we have a building appropriate to the traditions of the spot where it stands, with steep roofs to shed the snow that seldom falls. Albany has produced many men of mark in politics, in religion, in medicine, in the fine arts, in literature, in education,and in trade, of whom it is not within our province or space to speak, but we may point with especial pride to the pre-eminence of her lawyers. Her bar has always been the most distinguished of the State after the city of New York, and has only yielded to that because of her smaller population. Not to speak of the living, nor to go beyond our own recollection, what bar can parallel the names of Nicholas Hill, Ira Harris, Rufus W. Peckham, Lyman Tremain, Peter Cagger, John H. Reynolds, Henry Smith, Grenville Tremain, William J. Hadley and Samuel Hand. They have some worthy successors among the living, and we have faith to believe that there are among the younger members of the bar some who will prove fit to carry forward the banner of our progression with credit and distinction. Of legal journalism, it may be permitted us to plume ourselves a little on the fact that the ALBANY LAW JOURNAL was the pioneer of its class. We ourselves may possibly not be here on the next bi-centennial celebration, but the JOURNAL will be, no doubt. As “Coco,” says in “The Mikado," "we shall not be there to see the fireworks, but they will be there all the same." This is too grand an occasion to be allowed to pass in cold prose, and so "we drop into poetry,” and attest our enthusiasm by the following, recently published in the Albany Evening Journal :

OLD ALBANY. Quaint and sturdy burgomasters,

In the simple olden time, Braving maritime disasters,

Left their chilling northern climeBearded men in leathern breeches.

Men of faith and courage rare, With long pipes and solemn speeches,

Sailed before the soft south air, Seiled up this mysterious river,

Listening to the forest's roar, While the Indian's painted quiver

Glearned along the wooded shore; Till at length their journey ending,

They espied a fertile plain, Trees to gentle breezes bending,

Green turf fed by mellowing rain. Here they builded gabled dwellings,

And upon the roof the vaue Veered and rattled in the swellings

Of the wind that stirred the grain. Graceful elms o'erhung the gables,

In the field was nodding corn; Almoner of bounteous tables

Rang at noon the welcome horn.

" Long has proud Albany, elate,

Reared her two steeples high in air, And boasted that she ruled the State Because the Governor lives there."

Vol. 34 — No. 3.

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