572, 584; Rasin v. Conley, 58 Md. 59; Gachet v. Warren, 72 Ala. 288; Jones v. Just, 3Q. B. Cas. 197, 202. Minn. Sup. Ct., July 15, 1886. Thompson v. Libby. Opinion by Dickinson, J. What amination, rendered of no avail. For example, the defendant is charged with adultery. It is admitted that he denied this emphatically upon direct examination. The insistment of counsel for the defendant is to the effect that you can only inquire upon cross-examination whether or not the defendant did or did not commit such act. In my judgment such examination in chief opens the way for the fullest cross-examination into the relations of the parties at or about the time of the alleged adultery. Whatever is unhusbandlike, whatever is evidence of unfaithfulness, whatever looks like cruelty, whatever shows an alienation of affection or estrangement, he may be examined about. Of course it must be within a reasonable time, for in most cases, if not within a reasonable time, the doctrine of condonation would apply. This doctrine as to cross-examination pervades the practice in all courts, civil and criminal. A defendant swears that he is not indebted to the plaintiff upon the note, bond or other obligation named in the declaration. Does that limit the inquiry, and preclude the plaintiff from the most minute and detailed examination respecting the transaction out of which the bond or other obligation originated, or as to what has transpired between the parties since? Certainly not. Again, since criminals are permitted to testify in their own behalf, do they complete their defense, and close the door of inquiry, by denying the commission of the crime with which they stand charged? Certainly nothing is plainer than that they may, after such denial, be inquired of with respect to whatever he may have said or done, or wherever he may have been, so far as either will shed any light upon the perpetration of the alleged crime, or his relation thereto. These illustrations, which are daily presenting themselves in every judicial tribunal, must suffice. Therefore it seems to me that it may safely be regarded as a rule of universal application, that where a party to a suit denies the principal allegation or charge made against him in his direct examination, he thereby lays himself liable to a cross-examination upon every circumstance or transaction with which he was connected which may tend to establish the allegation of charge. N. J. Ct. Chan., Sept. 3, 1886. Pullen v. Pullen. Opinion by Bird, V. C. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-CONVERSION OF CHATTELS.-Replevin for two counters. There was evidence that they belonged to the defendant, in 1867, when one Warner built a shop, put the counters in, nailed them to the floor, and afterward, on July 2, 1871, mortgaged the premises to one De Witt. In April, 1879, De Witt's executors foreclosed and sold the premises to the plaintiff. The defendant took the counters from the plaintiff's possession in 1881. The court found for the defendant. We understand the court to have ruled or assumed that although the statute would have run in favor of Warner or De Witt before the transfer to the plaintiff, the circumstances would not prevent the defendant from taking possession if she could, or entitle the plaintiff to sue her for doing so if she was the original owner. A majority of the court are of opinion that this is not the law, and that there must be a new trial. We do not forget all that has been said and decided as to the statute of limitations going only to the remedy, especially in cases of contract. We do not even find it necessary to express an opinion as to what would be the effect of a statute like ours if a chattel, after having been held adversely for six years, was taken into another jurisdiction by the originally wrongful possessor. we do decide is that when the statute would be a bar to a direct proceeding by the original owner, it cannot be defeated by indirection within the jurisdiction where it is law. If he cannot replevy he cannot take with his own hand. A title which will not sustain a declaration will not sustain a plea. It is true that the statute in terms only limits the bringing of an action. But whatever importance may be attached to that an cient form of words, the principle we lay down seems to us a necessary consequence of the enactment. Notwithstanding the disfavor with which the statute of limitations was formerly regarded, all the decisions or dicta which we know of, directly bearing upon the point, favor or go beyond that principle. Cockfield v. Hudson, 1 Brev. 311; Howell v. Hair, 15 Ala. 194; Jones v. Jones, 18 id. 248-253; Clark v. Slaughter, 34 Miss. 65; Winburn v. Cochran, 9 Tex. 123; Preston v. Briggs, 16 Vt. 124, 130; Baker v. Chase, 55 N. H. 61, 63; Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620, 623. And a similar doctrine has been applied to the statute of frauds. Carrington v. Roots, 2 Mees. & W. 248. See King v. Welcome, 5 Gray, 41. As we understand the statutory period to have run before the plaintiff acquired the counters, we do not deem it necessary to consider what would have THE gentlemen of the jury retired to consider their been the law if the plaintiff had purchased or taken the counters within six years of the original conversion from the person who first converted them, and the defendant had taken them after the action against the first taker had been barred, but within six years of the plaintiff's acquisition. We regard a purchaser from one against whom the remedy is already barred as entitled to stand in as good a position as his vendor. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Sept. 8, 1886. Chapin v. Freeland. Opinion by Holmes, J; Field, J., dissenting. WITNESS-CROSS-EXAMINATION-LIMIT OF DENIAL OF CHARGE.-Where a party to a suit denies the principal allegation or charge made against him, in his direct examination, he thereby lays himself liable to a cross-examination upon every circumstance or transaction with which he was connected, which may tend to establish the allegation or charge. A cross-examination is never limited or controlled by the mere words and phrases used in direct examination. If this were so, the truth might forever be suppressed, and the greatest aid in devolving it, i. e., a cross-ex THE JURY DELIBERATE. FROM "THE EVIL GENIUS," BY WILKIE COLLINS. Ε verdict. Their foreman was a person doubly distinguished among his colleagues. He had the clearest head and the readiest tongue. For once the right man was in the right place. Of the eleven jurymen, four showed their characters on the surface. They were: The hungry juryman, who wanted his dinner. The nervous juryman, who suffered from fidgets. Of the seven remaining members, one was a little drowsy man who gave no trouble; one was an irritable invalid who served under protest; and five represented that vast majority of the population—easily governed, tranquilly happy-which has no opinion of its own. The foreman took his place at the head of the table. His colleagues seated themselves on either side of him. Then there fell upon that assembly of men a silence, never known among an assembly of women-the si lence which proceeds from a general reluctance to be the person who speaks first. It was the foreman's duty, under these circumstances, to treat his deliberative brethren as we treat our watches when they stop; he wound the jury up, and set them going. "Gentlemen," he began, "have you formed any decided opinion on the case-thus far?" Some of them said Yes, and some of them said No. The little drowsy man said nothing. The fretful invalid cried, "Go on!" The nervous jury man suddenly rose. His brethren all looked at him, inspired by the same fear, of having got an orator among them. He was an essentially polite man, and he hastened to relieve their minds. "Pray don't be alarmed, gentlemen; I am not going to make a speech. I suffer from fidgets. Excuse me if I occasionally change my position." The hungry man (who dined early) looked at his watch. "Half-past four," he said. "For Hearen's sake cut it short." He was the fattest person present; and he suggested a subject to the inattentive jury man who drew pictures on his blotting-paper. Deeply interested in the progress of the likeness, his neighbors on either side looked over his shoulders. The little drowsy man woke with a start, and begged pardon of everybody. The fretful invalid said to himself "Damned fools, all of them!" The patient foreman, biding his time, stated the case. "The prisoner waiting our verdict, gentlemen, is the Honorable Roderick Westerfield, younger brother of the present Lord Le Basque. He is charged with willfully casting away the British bark John Jerminan,under his command, for the purpose of fraudulently obtaining a share of the insurance money, and further, of possessing himself of certain Brazilian diamonds, which formed part of the cargo. In plain words, here is a gentleman born in the higher ranks of life accused of being a thief. Before we attempt to arrive at a decision, we shall only be doing him justice if we try to form some general estimate of his character, based on the evidence-and we may fairly begin by inquiring into his relations with the noble family to which he belongs. The evidence so far is not altogether creditable to him. Being at the time an officer in the royal navy, he appears to have outraged the feelings of his family by marrying a barmaid at a public house." The drowsy jury man, happening to be awake at the moment, surprised the foreman by interposing a statemeut. "Talking of barmaids," he said, "I know a curate's daughter. She's in distressed circumstances, poor thing, and she's a barmaid somewhere in the North of England. Curiously enough, the name of the town has escaped my memory. If we had a map of England-" There he was interrupted, cruelly interrupted, by one of his brethren. "And by what right," cried the greedy man, speaking under the exasperating influence of hunger, "by what right does Mr Westerfield's family dare to suppose that a barmaid may not be a perfectly virtuous woman?" Hearing this, the restless gentleman (in the act of changing his position) was suddenly inspired with interest in the proceedings. "Pardon me for putting myself forward," he said, with his customary politeness. Speaking as an abstainer from fermented liquors. I must really protest against these allusions to barmaids." "Speaking as a consumer of fermented liquors, the invalid remarked, "I wish I had a barmaid and a bottle of champagne before me now." Superior to interruption, the admirable foreman went on: Whatever you may think, gentlemen, of the prisoner's marriage, we have it in evidence that his rela tives turned their backs on him from that moment, with the one merciful exception of the head of the family. Lord Le Basque exerted his influence with the admiralty, and obtained for his brother (then out of employment) an appointment to a ship. All the witnesses agree that Mr. Westerfield thoroughly understood his profession. If he could have controlled himself, he might have risen to high rank in the navy. His temper was his ruin. He quarrelled with one of his superior officers-" "Under strong provocation," said a member of the jury. "Under strong provocation," the foreman admitted. "But provocation is not an excuse, judged by the rules of discipline. The prisoner challenged the officer on duty to fight a duel at the first opportunity on shore: and receiving a contemptuous refusal, struck him on the quarter deck. As a matter of course, Mr. Westerfield was tried by court-martial, and was dismissed the service. Lord Le Basque's patience was not exhausted yet. The merchant service offered a last chance to the prisoner of retrieving his position, to some extent at least. He was fit for the sea, and fit for nothing else. At my lord's earnest request, the owners of the John Jerminan, trading between Liverpool and Rio, took Mr. Westerfield on trial as first mate; and to his credit be it said, he justified his brother's faith in him. In a tempest off the coast of Africa the captain was washed overboard, and the first mate succeeded to the command. His seamanship and courage saved the vessel under circumstances of danger which paralyzed the efforts of the other officers. He was confirmed, rightly confirmed, in the command of the ship. And, so far, we shall certainly not be wrong if we view his character on the favorable side." There the foreman paused to collect his ideas. Certain members of the assembly, led by the juryman who wanted his dinner, and supported by his inattentive colleague-then engaged in drawing a ship in a storm, and a captain falling overboard-proposed the acquittal of the prisoner without further consideration. But the fretful individual cried "Stuff!" and the five jurymen who had no opinions of their own, struck by the admirable brevity with which he expressed his sentiments, sang out in chorus, "Hear! hear! hear!" The silent juryman, hitherto overlooked, now attracted attention. He was a baldheaded person, of uncertain age, buttoned up tight in a long frock coat, and wearing his gloves all through the proceedings. When the chorus of five cheered he smiled mysteriously. Everybody wondered what that smile meant. The silent juryman kept his opinion to himself. From that moment he began to exercise a furtive influence over the jury. Even the foreman looked at him on resuming the narrative. "After a certain term of service, gentlemen, during which we learn nothing to his advantage, the prisoner's merits appear to have received their reward. He was presented with a share in the ship which he commanded, in addition to his regular salary as master. With these improved prospects he sailed from Liverpool on his last voyage to Brazil; and no one, his wife included, had the faintest suspicion that be left England under circumstances of serious pecuniary embarrassment. The testimony of his creditors and of other persons with whom he associated distinctly proves that his leisure hours on shore had been employed in card-playing and in betting on racehorses. After an unusually long run of luck, his good fortune seems to have deserted him. He suffered con siderable losses, and was a last driven to borrowing at a high rate of interest, without any reasonable prospect of being able to repay the money-lenders into whose hands he had fallen. When he left Rio on the homeward voyage, there is no sort of doubt that he was returning to England to face creditors whom he was unable to pay. There, gentlemen, is a noticeable side to his character which we may call the gambling side, and which (as I think) was too leniently viewed by the judge." He evidently intended to add a word or two more. But the disagreeable invalid insisted on being heard. "In plain English," he said, "you are for finding the prisoner guilty." "In plain English," the foreman rejoined, "I refuse to answer that question." "Why?" "Because it is no part of my duty to attempt to influence the verdict." "You have been trying to influence the verdict, sir, ever since you entered this room. I appeal to all the gentlemen present." The patience of the long-suffering foreman failed him at last. "Not another word shall pass my lips," he said, "until you find the prisoner guilty or not guilty, among yourselves-and then I'll tell you if I agree to your verdict." He folded his arms, and looked like the image of a man who intended to keep his word. The hungry juryman laid himself back in his chair and groaned. The amateur artist, who had thus far found a fuud of amusement in his blotting-paper, yawned discontentedly and dropped his pen. The courteous gentleman who suffered from fidgets requested leave to walk up and down the room; and at the first turn he took, woke the drowsy little man, and maddened the irritable invalid, by the creaking of his boots. The chorus of five, further than ever from arriving at an opinion of their own, looked at the silent juryman. Once more he smiled mysteriously; and once more he offered no explanation of what was passing in his mind-except that he turned his bald head slowly in the direction of the foreman. Was he in sympathy with a man who had promised to be as silent as himself? In the meantime nothing was said 'or done. Help less silence prevailed in every part of the room. "Why the devil doesn't somebody begin?" cried the invalid. "Have you all forgotten the evidence?" This startling suggestion roused the jury to a sense of what was due to their oaths, if not to themselves. Some of them recollected the evidence in one way, and some of them recollected it in another; and each man insisted on doing justice to his own excellent memory, and on stating his own unanswerable view of the case. half the cargo a storm did come on and break the vessel up; so the poor man was only wrong in the matter of time after all." "Allow me to remind you, gentlemen, that the prisoner was deeply in debt, and therefore had an interest in stealing the diamonds." "Wait a little, sir. Fair play's a jewel. Who was in charge of the deck when the ship struck? The second mate. And what did the second mate do when he heard that his owners had decided to prosecute? He committed suicide! Is there no proof of guilt in that act?" "You are going a little too fast, sir. The coroner's jury declared that the second mate killed himself in a state of temporary insanity." "Gently! gently! we have nothing to do with what the coroner's jury said. What did the judge say when he summed up?" "Bother the judge! He said what they all say: Find the prisoner guilty, if you think he did it; and find him not guilty, if you think he didn't.' And then he went away to his comfortable cup of tea in his private room. And here are we perishing of hunger and our families dining without us." "Speak for yourself, sir; I haven't got a family." "Consider yourself lucky, sir; I have got twelve, and my life is a burden to me owing to the difficulty of making both ends meet." "Gentlemen! gentlemen! we are wandering again. Is the captain guilty or not? Mr. Foreman, we none of us intended to offend you. Will you tell us what you think?" No: the foreman kept his word. "Decide for yourselves first," was his only reply. In this emergency the member afflicted with fidgets suddenly assumed a position of importance. Не started a new idea. "Suppose we try a show of hands," he suggested. "Gentlemen who find the prisoner guilty will please hold up their hands. Three votes were at once registered in this way, including the vote of the foreman. After a moment of doubt, the chorus of five decided on following the opinion which happened to be the first opinion expressed in point of time. Thereupon the show of hands for the condemnation of the prisoner rose to eight. Would this result have an effect on the merciful minority of four? In any case, they were invited to declare themselves next. Only three hands were held up. One incomprehensible man abstained from expressing his sentiments even by a sign. Is it necessary to say who that man was? A mysterious change had now presented itself in his appearance, which made him an object of greater interest than ever. His inexplicable smile had vanished. He sat immovable, with closed eyes. Was he meditating profoundly or was he only asleep? The quick-witted foreman had long since suspected him of being simply the stupidest persou present-with just cunning enough to conceal his own dullness by holding his tongue. The jury arrived at no such sensible conclusion. Impressed by the intense solemnity of his countenance, they believed him to be absorbed in reflections of the utmost importance to the verdict. After a heated conference among themselves, they decided on securing unanim The first man who spoke began at the middle of the story told by the witnesses in court. "I am for acquitting the captain, gentlemen; he ordered out the boats, and saved the lives of the crew." "And I am for finding him guilty, because the ship struck on a rock in broad daylight, and in moderate weather." I agree with you, sir. The evidence shows that the vessel was steered dangerously near to the land, by direction of the captain, who gave the course." "Come, come, gentlemen! let us do the captain jus-ity of opinion by submitting to the arbitration of one tice. The defense declares that he gave the customary course, and that it was not followed when he left the deck. As for his leaving the ship in moderate weather, the evidence proves that he believed he saw signs of a storm brewing.' "Yes, yes, all very well; but what were the facts? When the loss of the ship was reported the Brazilian authorities sent men to the wreck on the chance of saving the cargo; and days afterward there the ship was found, just as the captain and the crew had left her." "Don't forget, sir, that the diamonds were missing when the salvors examined the wreck." "All right, but that's no proof that the captain stole the diamonds; and before they had saved independent member present-the member who had taken no part in the proceedings. "Which way does your view of the verdict incline, sir? Guilty or not guilty?" The eyes of the silent juryman opened with the slow and solemn dilatation of the eyes of an owl. Placed between the alternatives of declaring himself in one word or in two, his taciturn wisdom chose the shortest form of speech. "Guilty," he answered-and shut his eyes again, as if he had had enough of it already. An unutterable sense of relief pervaded the meeting. Enmities were forgotten, and friendly looks were exchanged. With one accord the jury rose to return to court. The prisoner's fate was sealed. The verdict case has come to my notice, which I think you will ap. was Guilty. preciate. CORRESPONDENCE. THAT MATTER OF TASTE AGAIN. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: The two decisions cited by Mr. Brandt are in no way contradictory. In the first case the terms of the contract were in dispute, and the jury found that the contract was not to paint a picture "to the satisfaction" of the other party, but a "fair and good likeness." In the second, by the express terms of the contract, it was to be performed to the "satisfaction" of the other party. This clearly appears from the statement of facts. The judge holds in the first case that the mere fact that the contract involves a matter of taste does not prevent the jury from finding where there is a dispute about the terms that it was not in tended that the only criticism should be whether the party for whom the picture was to be painted was satisfied. In the second case he says that where the parties have stipulated in express terms that the contract is to be performed to the satisfaction of one of them, and the subject involved is a matter of taste, the person for whom the work is to be done is the sole arbiter. NEW YORK, Oct. 7, 1886. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: A. L. P. William Perry was accused of stealing three sides of beef and a horse and wagon, the property of David Rountell, of Weston. His counsel set up the defense that "the prisoner admits that he stole the beef, but elaims that he did not take the horse and wagon with felonious intent, but only as a means of conveyance." Perry had offered the meat for sale, but there was no evidence to show that he had so offered the horse or wagon. His defense was accepted, and thus a light sentence. WILLIAM H. HALE, following decisions were handed down Tuesday, Oct. 19, 1886: Judgment affirmed with costs-Mary E. Post, executrix of John Earl, respondent, v. William B. Dinsmore, president Adams Express Company, appellant. Commissioners of Docks of New York, respondents; Stamford Water Co., respondent, v. Herbert Stanley and another, appellants. -Order affirmed and judgmeut absolute ordered on the stipulation with costs-In re Judicial settlement of accounts of Gilbert A. Wood, executor, etc.-Appeal dismissed with costs-Ignatz Thalheimer, appellant, v. Ferdinand Hays and another, respondent; People, ex rel. Hudson Č. Tanner, appellant, v. Supervisors of Herkimer County, respondent.-Orders affirmed with costs-People, ex rel. Julia G. Jerome, appellant, v. Registrar of Arrears, Brooklyn, reJustice Pratt of the Second Department needs no spondent; People, ex rel. John J. Donovan, appellant, vindication, but the criticism contained in the last v. Commissioners of Department of Fire and Buildnumber of your valuable journal (p. 280) should be noings of Brooklyn, respondents: People, ex rel. John ticed. It is probably sufficient to note that in Brass-T. Cumming, appellant, v. Joseph Koch and others, ford v. Oelrichs, 24 Week. Dig. 233, the contract was simply to paint "a fair and good likeness of a yacht," which Justice Pratt said did not, as a matter of law, make the employer "the sole arbiter as to the question whether the contract was performed;" while in Cross v. Belknap, 24 Week. Dig. 256, the plaintiff agreed to perform certain work "to the satisfaction of the defendant," which Justice Pratt said would, "when the subject involved is a matter of taste, like the painting of a portrait," make the defendant (employer) the sole arbiter. The distinction lies in the different terms of the contracts. The decisions do not conflict and each has abundant authority both in principle and precedent. Had your correspondent quoted the balance of the syllabi in the cases the difference would have been apparent. Very truly yours, POUGHKEEPSIE, N. Y., Oct. 4, 1886. AN INQUIRY. Editor of the Albany Law Journal: C. B. HERRICK. NOTES. Here is a musty old "chestnut" going the newspaper rounds: Town Topics in the New York World: "The following story was vouchsafed by the urbane and gentlemanly' clerk of an uptown hotel. A country guest at a certain uptown hostelry having a dread of pickpockets and bunco steerers, went to the clerk and handed him a hundred dollar bill to be put in the safe. Asking for it next day, he was thunderstruck when the functionary to whom he had given the money coolly denied any recollection of the matter. Whereupon the countryman went to a lawyer. Get another hundred dollar bill,' said the lawyer, and go, accompanied by a friend, back to the hotel. Apologize to the clerk for your mistake; say it was a defect of memory; attribute it to drink or absent-mindedness; deposit the second hundred dollars in the presence of your friend, and come back to me.' The mystified ruralist obeyed instructions to the very letter. 'Now,' said the lawyer, 'go back alone to the clerk and ask him for the hundred dollars. Knowing that your friend saw him receive it, he will give back the second hundred dollar bill. Then take your friend with you the next day, approach the clerk, ask him boldly for that one hundred dollars, and as there was no witness to your receipt of the second bill, he will be forced to return the first also.' The ruse proved completely successful. The lawyer sent his bill next day. It was for a fee of one hundred dollars." Rogers, the poet, tells the like in his "Italy," if we recollect right, under the title of "The Bag of Gold." The Albany Law ALBANY, OCTOBER 30, 1886. CURRENT TOPICS. HE Solicitors' Journal has the following interest the prisoner's complaints and reproaches were 'wholly unintelligible, thanks to the combined effects of ignorance, confusion, fear and anger,' but by the help of hints from the judge the meaning of the defense was elicited, and the jury acquitted the prisoner. But suppose, instead of a patient judge, there had been on the bench an irritable judge, or a judge in a hurry for his dinner or anxious to catch a train, what would have been the result? ers were made competent witnesses there would be a considerable increase of perjury, and not merely of perjury, but in the case of wealthy and educated prisoners, of successful perjury. These people will Justice Stephen, in his article in the Nineteenth Cen-Again, Mr. Justice Stephen admits that if prisontury, has stated very fairly the results of his experience and observation of prisoners' evidence. He sets out by remarking that the value of the evidence given by prisoners varies according to the be so well advised as to the strong and the weak circumstances of each particular case as much as the evidence of any other class of witnesses does, points of their cases as to be able to lie in the witness box with skill and effect. And lastly, one reand that although their interest in the result is in many cases so important as to destroy altogether sult of the writer's experience is to show that failthe value of their evidence, there are also cases in ures of justice may occur by reason of the prisoner, which it is of great, and even of decisive import-back till the last moment, and then bringing unexeither from artfulness or mere blundering, keeping ance. He proceeds to support these propositions by references to actual cases tried before him. The point of some of these illustrations is to show that a prisoner's evidence is worthless when the circumstances are such that he cannot be contradicted on the subject-matter of his evidence; that in some cases the evidence of the prisoner is worthless, owing to his inability to give the only evidence which can be of any service to him-e. g., to produce or account for certain articles connected with the crime, and alleged to have been seen in his possession; that the evidence of the prisoner may be of the highest service to him when it supplies the thread on which corroborating facts can be strung; and that in some cases the evidence of the prisoner, though uncorroborated, bears upon it such marks of honesty and sincerity as to lead the jury at once to stop the case. These are points showing that the competency of prisoners as witnesses, while on the whole favorable to them, is also favorable to the administration of justice; but some of the illustrations hardly tend in this direction. They show that although a prisoner's evidence may be worthless for proving his innocence, the absence of it may be taken as a confession. If the law is altered every accused person will have to swear his innocence or be taken to have admitted his guilt. Mr. Justice Stephen thinks that this is just; but has he considered in this connection the fact, which further on in his article he admits, that 'a prisoner, generally speaking, is an ignorant, uneducated man, dreadfully frightened, very much confused, and almost always under the impression that the judge and jury know as much about his case as he does himself, and are able at once to appreciate whatever he says about it?' Is it just that a man in this condition, utterly unfit to understand what statements are likely to be useful to him or relevant to the case, should be practically compelled to make a statement which, however innocent he may be, will be worse than useless! What good would a mere statement that he is innocent do him? In a case mentioned by the learned writer he says that VOL. 34-No. 18. pectedly before the jury some specious defense which there is no time to test. Mr. Justice Stephen says he has known many cases of this, and he considers it one of the most dangerous tricks to public justice which could be played by persons accused of crime. It would seem that there is a considerable weight of evidence against the statement that the competency of prisoners as witnesses is 'favorable in the highest degree to the adhardly any difference on this subject in those States ministration of justice."" There is probably which have admitted prisoners as witnesses. Chief ablest magistrates in this country, long ago proJustice Appleton, of Maine, one of the oldest and nounced strongly in favor of the admission, both on principle and on experience, and there is seldom a voice heard against it. We are much better qualified to judge on this subject here than the English are, for we have tested the matter by long practice. There have been here some noteworthy cases of "wealthy and educated prisoners" who have not made perjury successful. It is our belief that it is a good thing for an innocent man and a bad thing for a guilty man to testify in his own behalf-in other words it tends to bring out the truth and effect justice. But what does our contemporary mean by insinuating that "irritable" and hungry judges do accused men injustice? This is one of the last accusations that could be made in this country, and we can hardly believe that in these days "The hungry judges quick the sentence sign, And wretches hang that jurymen may dine." This is probably a figure of speech on the editor's part. At all events, in this enlightened country, we try our criminals with the greatest patience and deliberation, frequently give them another chance, and only hang them with the deepest reluctance and very sincere apologies. Two of the most remarkable men now living are Mark Hopkins and David Dudley Field, who at the |