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and items of personal property, including moneyed capital and credits of every description. These are to be put down opposite to numbers. The first five numbers or items are as follows: "(I) Money on hand or on deposit, within or without this State, subject to my order, check or draft; (2) all money loaned by me either on time or on call; (3) all honds belonging to me, or in which I have any interest, issued by bodies corporate either within or without this State; (4) all bonds belonging to me, or in which I have any interest, issued by public corporations, including State, county, city, town and all other bonds of this class; (5) all shares of stock in any corporation formed outside of this State, and also all shares of stock in any corporation formed in this State and conducting business outside of this State."

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From the above items the schedule makes no provision for deducting the designated bona fide debts of the tax payers. It will be observed also that the above items do not include the "credits" mentioned in section 6332, supra. Nor do they include money or interest," except as that may be included in and as meaning the same as money loaned. The only other number or item in the schedule material here is number or item 82, at the close of the schedule, which is as follows: "(82) Credits (by which is meant whatever is due to the party from any other person, company or corporation, in the shape of labor, property or money) amounting to $, less my bona fide indebtedness (subtracted from the credits), 8- leaving a residue of credits amounting to 8This item in the schedule is in perfect harmony with our construction of section 6332, supra, and embraces the same kind of credits, and none other, from which the bona fide debts may be deducted. It does not include the first two items in the schedule-money on hand or on deposit, and money loaned on time or on call; nor does it include the items of bonds and stocks. It therefore includes notes, drafts, mortgages and judgments held or owned by tax payers, except they are to secure money loaned; amounts due them for goods and various manufactured articles sold at wholesale or retail, for material furnished, for work and labor, for professional services; amounts due upon public improvements, on accounts of land sold; and all other credits of every description, due from any person, company or corporation, in the shape of labor, property or money, except amounts due on loans on time or on call. And this is so, whether the notes, mortgages, judgments and the other items of indebtedness draw interest under the provisions of our law. As a usual thing, notes and mortgages draw interest, and so as a general thing other accounts, for goods, raw material and manufactured articles sold, draw interest after the expiration of stated periods of credit. The fact then that credits may draw interest makes no difference under the schedule and section 6332, supra.

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Section 6335, at first blush, seems to be in conflict with the above sections as we construe them. That section is by way of a limitation upon deductions to be made by the tax payer. It provides that "no person, company or corporation shall be entitled to any deduction from the amount of any bonds, stocks, money loaned, or money at interest," etc. If "money at interest as used in the section means any thing different from money loaned-if in other words, it means that because accounts, notes, judgments, etc., may draw interest, they are "money at interest "then clearly the section that far is in conflict with the schedule and section 6332, supra. It is a settled rule that in the construction of a statute all of its various sections and provisions must be construed together, so as to ascertain the intention of the law makers, and make the statute in all its parts consistent as a whole.

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Thus construing the statute, we have no doubt that "money at interest was used as the equivalent of money loaned In ordinary parlance, "money at interest" has reference more to money loaned than to interest-bearing notes and accounts received for property sold.

Section 6273, in giving a definition of the terms "personal estate" and "personal property" as used in the act, provides that they shall include, among other things, all rights, credits, choses in action, all bonds and stocks, all money at interest, and all other credits and investments. Here evidently the term "money at interest" does not mean accounts and choses in action drawing interest, but money loaned. In section 6286 the term "money loaned" is used, and not the term "money at interest." Thus the terms "money loaned" and "money at interest" seem to be used in the act as convertible terms. If however there were an irreconcilable conflict between 6332 and 6336, which provides the schedule, the latter must govern. The schedule is the summing up and putting in shape for practical nse what is provided in the preceding sections. The schedule has heretofore been regarded as controlling. It was so regarded under the tax law of 1852, as amended in 1869. Clark v. Carter, 40 Ind. 190. It was so under the tax law of 1872. Matter of Campbell, 71 id. 512. It may be observed in passing that the act of 1872 is materially dif ferent from the act of 1881. And so the Supreme Court of the United States, in construing the tax law of 1872, placed its decision upon the schedule. Evansmille Nat. Bank v. Britton, 105 U. S. 322.

Upon the examination of the whole statute we are clearly of the opinion that the individual tax payer may deduct his bona fide debts, of the class designated in the act, from all his moneyed capital and credits, except from the classes specified in the first five items of the schedule as above set out, viz., money on hand or on deposit, money loaned, bonds, and shares of stock in corporations.

The National Bank Act provides that the shares of stock in the national banks may be subjected to taxation under the laws of the State, with other personal property, "subject only to the two restrictions that the taxation shall not be at a greater rate than is assessed upon other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens of such State, and that the shares of any national banking association owned by non-residents of any State shall be taxed in the city or town where the bank is located, and not elsewhere." Section 5219, Rev. Stats. U. S.

The limitations upon the taxation of shares of national bank stock, imposed by the above section are imposed in almost the same language by our statute. Rev. Stat. 1881, §§ 6306, 6307. It has been many times held by the Supreme Court of the United States that the authority of the States to tax shares of national bank stock is derived wholly from the above act of Congress, and that without the consent of Congress these bank stock shares could not be taxed by State authorities at all. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316; Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 id. 378; Weston v. Charleston, 2 Pet. 449; People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539-543. The authority and privilege of course must be exercised under the limitations and restrictioms imposed.

The controlling questions then are: What are the limitations and restrictions imposed? What is the "moneyed capital" as used in the act?

Were we at liberty to place our own construction upon the act, we should be very strongly inclined to hold that "moneyed capital," as therein used, has reference to capital invested as an investment for profit, whether in bonds, stocks, money loaned, or otherwise,

and not to debts due to the tax payer growing out of the ordinary affairs of business life. Such substantially is the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Waite, concurred in by Justice Gray, in the case of Evansville Nat. Bank v. Britton, supra. The court in that case however adopted a different construction, and it is the duty of this court, as it is the duty of all State courts, to follow the construction placed upon the act by that court. The above case arose under the assessment law of 1872, and the questions were, what is meant by "moneyed capital" as used in the above act of Congress? and whether the owner of national bank stock, having the designated bona fide debts, might deduct them from the assessed value of the shares of stocks. It was held that he could, and that "moneyed capital" includes not only bonds, stocks and money loaned, but all credits and demands of every character in favor of the tax payer.

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it denies the same right of deduction from the cash value of bank shares, operates to tax the latter at a greater rate than other moneyed capital."

There can be no doubt that under these decisions all credits, of whatever nature-which includes the credits from which the tax payer may deduct his bona fide debts, as here decided, whether interest-bearing or not -are moneyed capital in the sense in which the term is used in the act. And under these decisions also statutes which allow the tax payer to deduct his debts from such moneyed capital, and deny this right to the holders of shares of national bank stock, must yield to the paramount act of Congress which inhibits such discrimination.

But what shall be said when the tax payer is allowed to deduct his debts from a part of his moneyed capital, as here held—from his moneyed capital other than bouds, money loaned, and shares of stock? The act of Congress, as it has been held, does not require absolute equality, as that is difficult, if not impossible, of attainment. The cases hold however that the intention of Congress in the enactment of the statute was not to permit any substantial discrimination in favor of moneyed capital in the hands of the tax payer, as against capital invested in shares of national bank stock. Boyer v. Boyer, supra.

In that case, at page 693, in speaking of the case of Hepburn v. School Directors, 23 Wall. 480, Harlan, J., said: "That case is authority for the proposition that a partial exemption by a State for local purposes of moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens, does not of itself, and without reference to the aggregate amount of moneyed capital not so exempted, establish the right to a similar exemption in favor of national bank shares held by persons within the same jurisdiction. But it is by no means an authority for the broad proposition that national bank shares may be subjected to local taxation when a very material part, relatively, of other moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens within the jurisdiction or taxing district is exempt from such taxation."

Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the court, in stating and deciding the case, said: "The objection made to the Indiana statute is the same as that made against the New York statute, namely: that it permits the tax payer to deduct from the sum of his credits, money at interest, or other' demands, the amount of his bona fide indebtedness, leaving the remainder as the sum to be taxed, while it denies the same right of deduction from the cash value of bank shares. A distinction is attempted to be drawn between the Indiana statute and the New York statute, because the former permitted the deduction of the tax payer's indebtedness to be made from the valuation of his personal property, while in Indiana he can only deduct it from his credits; and undoubtedly there is such difference in the laws of the two States. But if one of them is more directly in conflict with the act of Congress than the other, it is the Indiana statute. In the schedule the subject of taxation from which the tax payer may deduct his bona fide indebtedness is placed under three heads, as follows: (1) Credits or money at interest, either within or without the State, at par value; (2) all other demands against persons or bodies corporate, either within or without this State; (3) total amount of all credits.' The act of Congress does not make the tax on personal property the measure of the tax on bank shares in the State, but the tax on moneyed capital in the hands of individual citizens. Cred-permit any substantial discrimination in favor of monits, money loaned at interest, and demands against persons or corporations are more purely representative of moneyed capital than personal property, so far as they can be said to differ. Undoubtedly there may be such personal property exempt from taxation without giving bank shares a similar right to exemption, because personal property is not necessarily moneyed capital. But the rights, credits, demands and money at interest mentioned in the Indiana statute, from which bona fide debts may be deducted, all mean moneyed capital invested in that way. It is unnecessary to repeat the argument in People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 539, on this point. We are of the opinion that the taxation of bank shares by the Indiana statute, without permitting the shareholders to deduct from their assessed value the amount of his bona fide indebtedness, as in the case of other investments of moneyed capital, as a discrimination forbidden by the act of Congress."

In the case of Boyer v. Boyer, 113 U. S. 689, Mr. Justice Harlan reviewed the cases, and from them deduced certain rules for the construction of the above section of the National Bank Act, the second of which is as follows: "That a State law which permits individual citizens to deduct their just debts from the valuation of their personal property of every kind other than national bank shares, or which permits the tax payer to deduct from the sum of his credits, money at interest, or other demands, to the extent of his bona fide indebtedness, leaving the remainder to be taxed, while

Again, at page 695, in speaking of the cases generally, it was said: “These decisions show that in whatever form the question has arisen, this court has steadily kept in view the intention of Congress not to

eyed capital in the hands of individual citizens as against capital invested in the shares of national banks."

And still further, at page 701: "But as substantial equity is attainable, and is required by the supreme law of the land, in respect to State taxation of national bank shares, when the inequality is so palpable as to show that the distrimination against capital invested in such shares is serious, the courts have no discretion but to interfere."

In that case the State of Pennsylvania had exempted from local taxation for county purposes mortgages, judgments, etc., and imposed such local taxes upon the shares of national bank stock. It was held that the result was a material inequality, and that the bank stock could not be taxed for such local purposes. See also First Nat. Bank, etc., v. Treasurer, etc., 25 Fed. Rep. 749; Ruggles v. City of Fond du Lac, 53 Wis. 346.

The California statute as in force in 1880 provided that "in assessing solvent debts not secured by mortgage or trust deed, a deduction therefrom shall be made of debts due to bona fide residents of the State," but did not allow a like reduction from the assessed value of national bank stock. It will be observed that the statute, like ours, does not allow such deduction from all moneyed capital. In the case of Miller v. Heilbron, 58 Cal. 133, after quoting from the opinion in the case of People v. Weaver, 100 U. S. 543, which involved a statute of New York allowing a deduction of

debts from the value of all personal property except from shares of national or State banks, it was said, so far as the immediate question is concerned, "there is but one difference between the law of New York and the laws of this State a difference in degree." It was held, that so far as the State statute denied the deduction to the holders of national bank stock, it was in conflict with the act of Congress.

The holding of the above cases is that the taxing laws of States cannot be upheld as against the act of Congress so far as they may discriminate against national bank stock by directly exempting a portion of other moneyed capital from taxation, or by doing the same thing in allowing a deduction of debts from the assessed value of a portion of other moneyed capital,and denies the same deduction to the holders of national bank stock, when such discrimination is so palpable as to show that it is material and serious; and that when such is the case, the holders of shares of national bank stock will be allowed to deduct their debts the same as the owners of other moneyed capital. Our statute makes no provision for deducting debts from the assessed value of shares of national bank stock, but as we have seen, allows such deduction from a portion of other moneyed capital, and thus discriminates against national bank stock. Is that discrimination so material and serious that the owners of such shares of stock are entitled to deduct their debts notwithstanding the statute? That depends upon the amount of moneyed capital from which the debts of the tax payer may be deducted as compared with the whole of the moneyed capital of the State.

This case comes here upon a demurrer to appellee's complaint for an injunction. Unless the court may take judicial notice of the fact that the moneyed capital from which the tax payer may deduct his debts, as here decided, is a material portion of the whole moneyed capital of the State, the complaint is fatally defective, because it contains no averment as to that fact.

Our statute provides that matters of which judicial notice is taken need not be stated in a pleading. Rev. Stat. 1881, § 374. May the court take judicial notice of that fact? As we have seen, for the purposes of taxation in the hands of the tax payers, the whole of the moueyed capital of the State, as specified in the schedule provided by the tax law, consists of money on haud or on deposit within or without the State, money loaned, bonds issued by bodies corporate, bonds issued by public corporations, and shares of stock in corpora tions, which includes shares of bank stock. For convenience, these several items may be regarded as constituting the first division of the moneyed capital of the State. From the assessed value of none of them can the debts of the tax payer be deducted. Another division includes all other moneyed capital of the State, the items of which consist, as we have also seen, of notes, mortgages and judgments, except for money loaned; amounts due for goods, wares and merchandise of all kinds-raw material, farming implements, machinery, and manufactured articles of all kinds sold at wholesale or retail; amounts due for labor and professional services; amounts due upon public improvements on account of sales of real estate, livestock, and farm products; and all other credits of every description due from any person, company, or corporation, whether drawing interest or not, except as included in the first division above. These several items, which form the assessed value, from which debts may be deducted, may be regarded as constituting the second division of moneyed capital of the State. That the second division constitutes a very large and material part of the credits in the business of the State, and thus a very large and material part of the whole moneyed capital of the State, is a matter of such common knowledge as to be known to the courts.

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There are many things of which the courts must take judicial notice. For example, they take judicial notice of the seasons, and the general course of agriculture (Abel v. Alexander, 45 lud. 523; Tomlinson v. Greenfield, 31 Ark. 557); that whiskey, beer and gin are intoxicating (Myers v. State, 93 Ind. 251; Eagan v. State, 53 id. 162); that ale is malt liquor (Wiles v. State, 33 id. 206); of the time it takes to go from one city to another (Fitzpatrick v. Papa, 89 id. 17; see also Pearce v. Langfit, 101 Penn. St. 507); of the geography of the country, and that a point on a railroad one mile from Rosedale is in Park county (Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Pierce, 95 Ind. 496); of the population of towns and cities (Kalbrier v. Leonard, 34 id. 497); of the meaning of "C. O. D." (United States Exp. Co. v. Keefer, 59 id. 263); and the meaning of "S. E. % of N. W. % sec. 18, T. 21 N., R. 7 E.-40 acres (Jordan Ditching, etc., Ass'n v. Wagoner, 33 id. 50; Frazer v. State, 7 N. E. Rep. 203); that the use of a farm in summer is worth more than in winter (Ross v. Boswell, 60 Ind. 235); of the duties and powers of cashiers of banks (Farmers', etc., Bank v. Troy City Bank, 1 Doug. [Mich.] 457; La Rose v. Logansport Nat. Bank, 102 Ind. 333, 340; Sturges v. Bank of Circleville, 11 Ohio St. 153); of the facilities of travel between different points (Hipes v. Cochran, 13 Ind. 175; Manning v. Gasharie, 27 id. 399); of the fact that there are classes of notes and bills other than bank bills in circulation in this State as money (Hart v. State, 55 Ind. 599); of the general pecuniary condition of the country as a part of the history of the times (Ashley's Adm'x v. Martin, 50 Ala. 537); of the division of the Methodist Church into the Methodist Church North and the Methodist Church South (Humphrey v. Burnside, 4 Bush, 215, 225); that ice-cream freezers had been in use before the invention for freezing dead bodies or fish (Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 42; Terhune v. Phillips, 99 id. 592; King v. Gal lun, 109 id. 99). "The courts of the State are bound to take notice from its general history, that during and since the war of the Rebellion the adjutant-general of this State has made records of the muster-rolls of the different regiments of volunteers furnished by this State in the military service of the United States." Board, etc., v. May, 67 Ind. 562. Upon the general subject of judicial knowledge, see Busk. Pr. 15 et seq., and cases there cited.

Mr. Greenleaf says: "In fine, courts will generally take notice of whatever ought to be generally known within the limits of their jurisdiction." 1 Greenl. Ev. $6, pp. 12, 13; Brown v. Piper, 91 U. S. 37, 42.

In speaking of what courts will take judicial notice, it was said in the case of Ho Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawy. 552, 560: "Besides, we cannot shut our eyes to matters of public notoriety and general cognizance. When we take our seats on the bench, we are not struck with blindness, and forbidden to know as judges what we see as meu."

To hold in the case before us that it was necessary to aver and prove that the above second division of the moneyed capital constitutes a large and material part of the whole moneyed capital of the State would be to hold that the courts cannot know judicially what must be known to the mass of the people, and what any intelligent person would be reluctant, if not ashamed, to confess he does not know.

To say that from the division of the moneyed capital the tax payer may deduct his debts, and that the holders of shares of national bank stock, having no other credits from which to deduct their debts, may not deduct them from the assessed value of such shares of stock, would be to establish such an inequality and discrimination against capital invested in such shares of stock as the act of Congress, with the interpretations given it by the Supreme Court of the United States, will not tolerate. The statutory privilege to tax payers of deducting their debts from the above second

division of moneyed capital is practically to relieve the most, if not the whole, of that capital, from taxation, and leave the burdens to rest upon other property, including other moneyed capital. A tax payer having that kind of moneyed capital may have a deduction of his debts from the assessed value thereof, while another, not having such capital, but having money on hand or on deposit, money loaned, and bonds and stocks (other than shares of national bank stock), may not have such a deduction. If there is any inequality or wrong in that, as between citizen tax payers, it is a matter wholly for the Legislature.

The holders of shares of national bank stock are upon an equality with tax payers having moneyed capital of the second division above; and if as between such holders and tax payers owning moneyed capital of the first, and not of the second, division above, there is an inequality, it is a matter for the Legislature and for Congress. The Legislature may so shape the State law as to result in this inequality. Against such legislation there is no inhibition in the National Bank Act. Possibly the Legislature might avoid this inequality, if it be such, by providing that tax payers, not having shares of national bank stock, may deduct their debts from all or a certain portion of their moneyed capital, and giving the same right to holders of shares of national bank stock to deduct their debts from a like proportion of their moneyed capital. Possibly Congress might amend the National Bank Act to advantage. Doubtless many holders of shares of national bank stock may have moneyed capital of the second division alone; and if so, they may deduct their debts from its assessed value, and thus the privilege of deducting their debts from the shares of stock in such cases can injure no one, as the debts can be deducted but once. That shares of national bank stock are taxed by State authority at all is a matter of grace or license, and not of right-so the Supreme Court of the United States holds. The States therefore must tax shares of stock in accordance with that license.

After a thorough re-examination of the question involved, we are constrained to hold, that under the averments of the complaint, the stockholders therein named are entitled to deduct their just debts from the assessed value of their shares of national bank stock. It has been suggested in argument that we ought, if possible, to rule otherwise, in order that the case might go upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States for a decision by that tribunal. We should be glad to have the case thus appealed, but we could not make a different ruling without disregarding our deliberate judgment, and placing this court, as we think, in an attitude of insubordination and hostility to the Supreme Court of the United States. It is the province of that court to interpret the acts of Congress, and the duty of the State courts to adopt and follow such interpretation.

The court below, at Special Term, sustained a demurrer to the complaint. That ruling was reversed at General Term. The judgment at General Term is affirmed at appellant's cost. Elliott, J., did not sit.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

BAIL -RECOGNIZANCE DEFECTIVE -COMMON-LAW BOND. A recognizance of the appearance of an accused person to answer to an indictment for felony, taken before and approved by an officer or person unauthorized by law, or where under the facts of the case the taking thereof is unauthorized by law, so that the

same fails to be binding under the statute, held, also, to be void as a common-law obligation. It is contended on the part of the defendant in error that as the "action is brought on an objection voluntarily entered into and solemnly acknowledged, and for a valuable consideration (the liberty of the accused)," etc., "it is a binding obligation, whether the sheriff bad authority to take it or not." In other words, that conceding that the recognizance was taken without authority of law on the part of the officer taking it, still it is binding as a common-law obligation, and may be enforced. I have carefully examined the numerous cases cited by counsel on either side upon this proposition. I find two cases, and only two, in which it is squarely held that a recognizance, taken without authority in a criminal case, may be enforced as a common-law bond. These are State v. Cannon, 34 Iowa, 325, and Dennard v. State, 2 Ga. 137. Neither of these cases are reasoned at all, nor does the Iowa case cite a single authority. The Georgia case cites three very old English and one South Carolina case; the former involving questions of obligation between individuals, and the latter a bond for the support of a bastard. From these and other authorities it is well settled, that in matters between individuals, a bond or other obligation given by one to the other, upon a lawful and adequate consideration, although such bond or obligation may be deficient in matter of form, or in the manner of its execution, acknowledgment, delivery or filing, yet where it is deficient to serve its beneficial purpose to the party at whose instance or for whose avail the same is given, it will be held binding according to its terms. But I do not think that these authorities apply to a case like the one at bar. Most of these cases arise upon appeal or forthcoming bonds, where although a certain sum is fixed as a penalty to be forfeited upon the failure of the party for whose benefit the obligation is given to prosecute his appeal, etc., or to deliver the property, yet the real measure of damages-the amount for which judgment is rendered on such obligation-is the costs of suit, or the value, use of, or damage to such property, within the limit of the penalty named in such bond or obligation, and with no other reference to it. In such cases the cause of action exists independent of the bond or recognizance, and its only office is to fasten liability upon the surety; but in the case of a recognizance for the appearance of an accused person to answer to an indictment, the obligation rests primarily and solely upon the paper itself; and the amount of the judgment is fixed and determined by the penalty named in the paper. The law does not favor penalties or forfeitures. When exacted, the authority therefore should rest upon express law. and not upon construction or implication. To hold that an unauthorized person may accept a recognizance running to the State, which will bind the person entering into it, is to hold that one private, unauthorized person may make another the debtor of the State-a proposition illogical in theory and dangerous in practice. While I desire to place this decision rather upon principle than upon authority, yet it must be admitted that the weight of authority on this branch of the case is with the plaintiff in error. In the case of Powell v. State, 15 Ohio, 579, the point was squarely presented, and the majority of the court held that a recognizauce taken before one of the judges of the Court of Common Pleas a court composed of three judges-while the court was in session, was void as well at common law as under the statute. This case was followed with approval in the later case of State v. Clark, id. 595. The case of Williams v. Shelby, 2 Or. 144, was while Williams, as treasurer of the county, sued Shelby as security on a boud executed by him for the appearance of one Potterson to answer to a charge of felony. The bond was taken

by a justice of the peace, and it appears from the opinion that there being no law then in force in that State authorizing justices of the peace to take such bonds, it was held by the Circuit Court void as a statute bond but valid as a common-law undertaking. Upon error to the Supreme Court the judgment was reversed. Harris v. Simpson, 4 Litt. 165; S. C., 14 Am. Dec. 101. Neb. Sup. Ct., Sept. 8, 1886. Dickinson v. State. Opinion by Cobb, J.

CERTIFICATE OF STOCK-TITLE-FRAUD-POWER OF ATTORNEY IN BLANK INNOCENT PURCHASER FOR VALUE.-(1) One claiming under the transfer of a certificate of stock acquires no more than the title of the transferrer, and should that be vitiated by fraud, he cannot rely upon his own good faith or the payment of value as a defense against the injured party. (2) Where an owner of a certificate of stock signs a power of attorney accompanying it, leaving a blank for any name the holder may see proper to insert, as that of the one by whom the authority is to be exercised, and delivers the certificate, etc., to another, who obtains from a third person, who is misled by the acts of the owner of the certificate, an advance of money upon the faith of the certificate, the first owner would be estopped from successfully claiming that the stock rightfully and entirely belonged to him, because the one to whom he had delivered the certificate had not fulfilled the trust reposed in him, but had disposed of the stock for his own benefit. (3) A. procured from B. a certificate of stock for a certain purpose, which certificate was attended with a signed power of attorney in blank; A. failed to use the certificate, as it was understood and intended he should when he received it, but used it for a totally different purpose, viz., being insolvent and being indebted to C., he, in consideration of C. accepting certain promissory notes at ten, sixty and ninety days, and not bringing suit till they matured, pledged to C. the certificate as collateral. Held, the pledge to C. was not such a purchase for value as to cure the defect in his title, or preclude B. from reclaiming his stock on the ground of fraud. Penn. Sup. Ct., April 5, 1886. Appeal of Linnard. Opinion per Curiam.

CONTRACT-EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED-SERVICES RENDERED BY RELATIVE.-A. and B., a married couple, living alone, having from advanced age become in a great measure unable to take care of themselves, their children, who were all married, of their own volition arranged, that among them they would attend to the wants of the parents during the day, and C., an unmarried grandson, residing with his parents upon a portion of the same lot with A. and B., should sleep at their residence at night; this was done for about four years, and until A. and B. died. Held, that in the absence of proof of authority from A. to his children to arange with C. to sleep in the house, etc., that C. could not recover compensation from the estate of his grandfather for so doing. Penn. Sup. Ct., April 5, 1886. Appeal of William P. Moyer. Opinion by Clark, J.

EMINENT DOMAIN-APPROPRIATION RAILROAD — DAMAGES.-In proceedings to condemn for railroad purposes two vacant city lots, the owner of which also asserted title to the entire block (also vacant and unoccupied) of which the two lots were a part, nothing being shown in respect to the appropriation of the property to any use, except the fact that it had been surveyed and platted into ordinary city lots, held, that the land-owner was not entitled to compensation for injury resulting to other lots than the two touched by the railroad. although the whole comprised one body or block of land. If one own distinct, although contiguous, farms, from one only of which the land is taken, he is not entitled to compensation for resulting

injury to the other. Minnesota Val. R. Co. v. Doran, 15 Miun. 230 (Gil. 179); St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. v. Murphy, 19 id. 500 (Gil. 433). And in numerous cases involving contests of this kind the use to which the property has been devoted has been deemed an important consideration in determining whether lands, being in one body, should be deemed one tract, or several distinct tracts, for the purposes of the assessment of compensation. Winona & St. P. R. Co. v. Denman, 10 Minn. 267 (Gil. 208); Minnesota Val. R. Co. v. Doran, supra; St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. v. Murphy, supra; Sherwood v. St. Paul & C. Ry. Co., 21 id. 122; Sherwood v. St. Paul & C. Ry. Co., id. 127; Wilmes v. Minneapolis & N. W. Ry. Co., 29 id. 242. In these and in other like cases such use, sometimes disputed, as in the case of Doran v. Murphy, supra, would have been unimportant, if the mere contiguity of the lands had been deemed enough to entitle the owner to compensation in respect to the whole. If the several lots of which this block consists had been actually appropriated to distinct uses, the owner would not have been entitled to compensation in respect to lots no part of which was taken. Minnesota Val. R. Co. v. Doran, supra. It is more doubtful whether, the lands being unoccupied, he may recover compensation for the whole as one tract. It is perhaps impossible to establish any rule applicable to such cases which will not be subject to criticism. But in respect to city property, in fact unoccupied, but which appears to have been platted or divided into blocks and lots, nothing more being shown, the property should be treated as lots or blocks, intended for use as such, and not as one entire tract. Prima facie that character has been given to it by the proprietor. Presumably the division or platting was with a view to the use of the property, or to its disposal or ultimate use, in such subdivisions as have been made; and if any facts exist which might be considered sufficient to rebut this presumption they should be disclosed. Minn. Sup. Ct., July 15, 1886. Wilcox v. St. Paul & N. P. Ry. Co. Opinion by Dickinson, J.

GUARDIAN AND WARD-LIABILITY OF SURETIESPAST DEFAULTS.-The question is whether the sureties on the second bond should be held liable for any ex cessive commissions retained by and allowed to the guardian in the previous annual settlements. The Probate Court has power to require the guardian "to give a new bond or additional security." The bond in this case is a new one, and it is conditioned that said Jones" shall take due and proper care of said James H. Locke, and manage and administer his estate," etc. The general rule is that sureties are not liable for past defaults unless made so by the terms of the bond. Farrar v. U. S., 5 Pet. 373; Murf. Off. Bonds, § 300. This rule evidently applies when the bonds are given during the same appointment or term of office, as well as where there are different bonds under successive appointments. There is nothing in this bond, or the statute under which it was made, which gives to it a retrospective operation. The plaintiff cites several cases in this court to show that there was a default after as well as before the date of the second bond. State v. Fields, 53 Mo. 474, and Haskell v. Farrar, 56 id. 497, only hold that sureties on the first bond are not relieved by a second, given upon an order mede by the court of its own motion. In State v. Drury, 36 Mo. 282, the curator made breach of the first bond by. converting the money of the ward to his own use. He gave a second bond, and carried the amount of money before converted into his subsequent settlements, so that the sureties on that bond had been held liable, and a judgment had been rendered against them. All this, it was held, did not relieve the first sureties, because the breach was made under the first bond. In

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