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ilege could not and ought not to avail him if the deviation was equivalent to an abandonment of the original journey for purposes of pleasure or family visiting. If when he left bis home in California, his

ably added to what is there said ou the subject. In Cushing's Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, at section 582, it is said: "In the Federal government, and in many States, members are privileged while going and returning merely without other lim-intention was to make a journey, not to Washington itation of time. Where the duration of the privilege is thus stated, members are entitled to a reasonable, or as it was expressed by the House of Commons, on occasion, a convenient time for going and returning. Thus they are not obliged at the close of the session to set out immediately on their return home, but may take a reasonable time to settle their private affairs, and prepare for the journey; nor will the privilege be forfeited by reason of some slight deviation from the most direct road."

The Manual of Parliamentary Practice, published by authority of the House of Representatives in 1860, states the rule thus: "The time necessary for going to and returning from Congress not being defined, it will of course be judged of in every particular case by those who will have to decide the case. While privilege was understood in England to extend, as it does here, only to exemption from arrest, eundo morando et redeundo, the House of Commons themselves decided that a convenient time was to be understood. 1 Hats. 99, 100. Nor is the law so strict in point of time as to require the party to set out immediately on his return, but allows him time to settle his private affairs, and to prepare for his journey, and does not even scan his road very nicely, nor forfeit his protection for a little deviation from that which is most direct, some necessity perhaps constraining him to do it. Str. 986, 987."

but to Milwaukee, there to spend an indefinite time visiting relatives, and then to go from Milwaukee to Washington after such prearranged delay at the for mer place as would still enable him to arrive at the capital in reasonable time to enter upon his public duties, so that it might be fairly said that the object of his journey at the time he set out upon it was not then to go to the capital, but elsewhere, it is clear that while in Milwaukee he could not assert the constitutional privilege of exemption from arrest or service of process.

tion, nor ought the court to measure with mathematical accuracy the days and hours required by the most rapid course of transit to travel from Pasadena to Washington. In short the defendant was in good faith on his way to the seat of government to enter upon his public duties as a member elect of the fortyninth Congress when the process in these cases was served upon him. His deviation to Milwaukee was but an incident in the journey, and seems to have been occasioned by circumstances which made the deviation justifiable if not absolutely necessary. He was therefore entitled to the protection of his privilege.

Applying these principles to the facts as here presented, I am of the opinion that the defendant was privileged from the service of process upou him in these cases. It is evident that when he set out with his family from Pasadena, his intended destination was Washington. The primary object of the journey was to go to the capital to prepare for and enter upon his duties as a member of Congress. He had a right to exercise a reasonable judgment in connection with the settlement of his family in Washington, as to the time required for the accomplishment of his primary purpose, with its necessary incidents. It cannot be said from the facts shown that his destination was Milwaukee. It is evident that the health of his family to a large extent controlled his movements. Under the circumstances, bis deviation from the direct route was not such as to justify an inference of abandonSuch also is in substance the language of Judgement of the original journey or its primary object. Story, in his work on the Constitution, section 864. His privilege, in view of all the facts shown, ought As a result of the authorities that bear on the ques-not, I think, to be adjudged forfeited by such deviation, it is held in Hoppin v. Jenckes, supru, that the privilege from arrest of a member of Congress is limited to the continuance of the session, and to a reasonable time for going and returning; and this is now the law in this country. What is a reasonable time for "going to and returning" from the seat of government must depend upon circumstances, and may be difficult to determine. The observations of Judge Story, that the law does not scan the road which the member may take in his journey very nicely, nor forfeit his protection for a slight deviation from the route which is most direct, nor it may be added, measure with precision the time absolutely necessary for going to or returning from the capital, furnish a just and sensible test in considering the question. To entitle the defendant to the privilege here invoked, he must have been in good faith on his way to the seat of government to enter upon the discharge of his public duties; that must have been the primary object of his journey. He must have left his residence in California with the intent of then going to Washington to take his seat in Congress to which he was elected, and the time taken for the journey must have been reasonable. He had a right, without forfeiture of his privilege, to set out from his residence at such time before the session should open as would enable him conveniently to establish his quarters, and settle his family and household affairs at the capital, and also, I think, to enable him to inform himself as a new member regarding pending legislation, so that he might enter advisedly upon the discharge of his duties. A slight deviation from the usual route for rest, convenience, or because of family sickness, ought not to cause a loss of his privilege, if such deviation was but an incident to the principal journey. Nor ought the duration of the privilege to be strictly measured by the exact number of days, with the present facilities for travel required for a journey from his residence in California to Washington. At the same time his priv

The defendant having appeared specially in the State court both in his motion to set aside the service of the summons in these cases and in his application for the removal of the cases to this court, and the motion made in the State court having been denied without prejudice to a renewal of the same, the defendant has not waived his privilege, and can assert it here with the same force and effect as if the suits had been brought and the motion made in this court in the first instance. Atchison v. Morris, supra; Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476; Sanderson v. Ohio Cent. R. & C. Co., 61 Wis. 609; S. C., 21 N. W. Rep. 818. Motion to set aside the service of summons granted.

MASTER AND SERVANT-EMPLOYERS' LIABIL
ITY ACT-DEFECT IN CONDITION OF WAYS.

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, JULY 8, 1886.

THOMAS V. QUARTERMAINE.* The plaintiff was employed in a cooling-room in the defendant's brewery. In this room were a boiling vat and a cooling vat, and between them ran a passage which was *17 Q. B. Div. 414.

A

in part only three feet wide. The cooling vat had a rim
rising sixteen inches above the level of the passage but it
was not fenced or railed in. The plaintiff went along this
passage to pull a board from under the boillng vat. This
board stuck fast and then came away suddenly, so that
he fell back into the cooling vat and was scalded. In an ac-
tion under the Employers' Liability Act, held, that the
plaintiff could not recover,
for there was no evidence that
he had been injured by reason of any defect in the con-
dition of the ways, works, or plant of the brewery, within
the meaning of the act.

not recover for injuries so received, and the reason of this principle is expressed both powerfully and tersely by Lord Bramwell in a memorandum written by him on the case of Clayards v. Dethick, 12 Q. B. 439, and printed in the Appendix B to Smith on Negligence. Lord Bramwell there points out that in such a case the accident is not due to the defendant's negligence but to the voluntary act of the plaintiff.

I now proceed to consider whether the Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict., ch. 42), has made any

PPEAL by motion from the decision of the judge difference, and whether the provisions of section 1,

of the County Court of Surrey.

W. Graham, and Hewitt, for defendant.

Crump, Q. C., and Hodson, for plaintiff.

WILLS, J. I am of opinion that this appeal must be allowed, and that the defendant is entitled to have judgment entered for him.

I will inquire first what our decision ought to be if there were no such statute in force as the Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict., ch. 42), and then I will proceed to consider the effect of that statute upon this case. Apart from that statute the plaintiff could not, in my opinion, maintain this action. I take as one element in this case the fact found by the County Court judge that there was no contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff; but nevertheless the evidence discloses a state of facts which I consider would disentitle him from recovering without the aid of the statute, for it appears that if any danger did arise from the arrangement of this brewery, and the relative position of the two vats or of the cooling vat and the plank, that danger was known to the plaintiff, and that he, knowing the risk that he ran, yet voluntarily did that which resulted in the injury for which he now claims compensation. The danger, if danger there were, was certainly patent, and the plaintiff must have been no less aware of it than was any one else connected with the brewery. This being so, the well-known principle which is embodied in the maxim volenti non fit injuria applies, and the plaintiff cannot

recover.

There were in the same room at this brewery a boiling vat and a cooling vat; between them ran a passage which was in part only three feet wide, the cooling vat had a rim rising sixteen inches high above the level of the passage, but it was not protected by any rail or fence. Under the boiling vat there was a receptacle wherein lay a plank or board which served as alid. The plaintiff went to get this lid, he pulled it, but as it stuck he pulled harder, when it came away, as he stated, all at once, and he fell back into the cooling vat and was scalded. The accident therefore did not arise from the narrowness of the passage considered as a passage or gangway, but only because there was not width in it to enable a person meeting with such an accident to fall at full length across it.

Even supposing there were any risk arising from the passage being narrow, that risk was one which the plaintiff could understand as well as any one else could, nor could the employer know, nor ought he to know, any thing more about either the nature or extent of the risk than the plaintiff himself.

Out of many cases to which reference may be made, Woodley v. Metropolitan District Ry. Co., 2 Ex. D. 384, and Britton v. Great Western Cotton Co., L. R., 7 Ex. 130, recognize in clear terms the principle that a person who continues in an employment with full knowledge of the risk run, and who voluntarily goes to do that which he knows will expose him to danger, can

subsection 1, apply to this case. By that section the workman is entitled to the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer as if he had not been a workman-in case he receives personal injury caused "by reason of any defect in the condition of the ways, works, machinery, or plant connected with or used in the business of the employer." That is there must be such a defect due to the negligence of the employer or those for whose negligence he would be responsible to a stranger. But I can see no evidence of any defect in the condition of either ways or plant. The way, as a passage or gangway, was safe enough, and as far as appears, wide enough for any legitimate use that it could be put to as a way. There was no defect in the vat as a vessel to hold liquor to be cooled. The defect, if defect there were, was not in the way, considered as a way, nor in the vat considered as a vat, but in the proximity of the vat to the place where a piece of board was kept, which piece of board stuck by some accident when required for use. Now the test whether machinery or plant be defective or not within the meaning of the statute, laid down in the case of Heske v. Samuelson, 12 Q. B. Div. 30, and adopted by the Court of Appeal in Cripps v. Judge, 13 Q. B. Div. 583, was whether the machine was fit or unfit for the purpose for which it was applied. The same test must of course apply to a "way," and following that test I am of opinion that there was in this case no defect within the meaning of section 1, subsection 1 of the statute, and therefore that this case is not brought within the provisions of the Employers' Liability Act, 1880.

It appears to me that the decision in this case must turn on the question whether the statute applies to this case. If I am wrong in holding that it does not apply to this case at all, then I think that Weblin v. Ballard, 17 Q. B. Div. 122, is an authority which governs the present case, for that decision binds us, and it seems to me to be authority conclusive for the plaintiff, if the statute in question applies at all.

In that case the judges held that there was evidence that the ladder (being without hooks or stays) used as it was upon the crooked pipe, was not in a proper condition for the purpose for which it was used, aud that therefore there was evidence of a defect in the condition of the ways or plant." And again, it was there said "the use of the ladder appeared by the evidence to have been so manifestly dangerous that every one who saw the ladder so used must have been aware of the danger. This it was argued by the defendant proved that the deceased had been guilty of contributory negligence. We do not agree.'

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The learned judges therefore in that case took a view of the meaning of the clause at the end of section 1, which enacts that a workman "shall have the same right of compensation and remedies against the employer as if the workman had not been a workman of nor in the service of the employer," which will place him in certain cases in a better position than a person not in the service of the employer. Such a person, in the circumstances found in the judgment in that case, fully alive to the danger he was running,

MERCE-STATE LAW FORBIDDING DIS-
CRIMINATION BY CARRIERS-CON-
TRACTS FOR CARRIAGE BE-
YOND STATE.

RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT,
MAY 5, 1886.

PROVIDENCE COAL Co. V. PROVIDENCE, ETC., R. Co.
A statute, which forbids discrimination by a common carrier
in his charges for transportation, applies to contracts
made in this State for transportation to points beyond the
State, and is not in conflict with the provision of the Con-
stitution of the United States, that "Congress shall have
to regulate commerce * *
power
with
foreign nations and among the several States.

BILL

*

ILL in equity for an account and injunction. Ou exceptions to the answer. The opinion states the

question.

certainly could not have recovered, though asked by CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-REGULATION OF COMthe employer to do the work. But they held that in such cases the defense that the servant has contracted to take upon himself the known risks attending the engagement is, by the statute, taken away from an employer when sued by a workman under the act. In the case of a servant this is probably equivalent to saying that the defense that he knew of the danger is taken away, and it seems to have been so treated in that case. Speaking for myself it seems to me that this really does place the servant, not in the same position as a stranger, but in a better position. It is very difficult at all times to apply a hypothesis which is contrary to the fact. Is the hypothetical person, not in the service of the employer, to be treated as a person lawfully engaged in the operation in question, or unlawfully there; as a person doing the operation at the request of the employer or as a volunteer? These are questions which suggest only samples of the difficulty of applying an incomplete hypothesis to a state of facts which really negatives the hypothesis. Without therefore expressing any doubt as to the correctness of the decision in Weblin v. Ballard, 17 Q. B. Div. 122, I should have desired, had it been necessary, carefully to consider whether the fact, that the defendant in such cases can no longer set up the defense that the plaintiff contracted to take the risks of the service, also precludes him from setting up that in the particular operation which in the particular case caused the injury, the plaintiff, treating him as not a servant, must yet have perfectly appreciated the danger of what he was going to do. This is not stated in terms in Weblin v. Ballard, 17 Q. B. Div. 122, but it certainly seems involved in the decision, and it is difficult to see how any such distinction as I have referred to, and which was pressed upon us in the argument, can be maintained. The result certainly seems to place the workman in a better position than a stranger, and in his case, to deprive the employer of the benefit of the maxim, volenti non fit injuria. My ground therefore in this case for holding that the defendant is not liable is that, in my opinion, the facts of this case do not bring it within the statute, and that therefore the provisions of 43 & 44 Vict., ch. 42, do not apply to it at all.

GRANTHAM, J. I also am of opinion that this case is not within the Employers' Liability Act, 1880. That act enacts, I think, in effect that a servant shall be in the same position as a stranger. Could a stranger have recovered in this section? The authorities are all unanimous to the effect that he could not. Reliance was placed by the plaintiff on Weblin v. Ballard, 17 Q. B. Div. 122, but that case is not an authority in his favor, for the judges decided it on the ground that the ladder was not in a proper condition for the purpose for which it was used, so that there was evidence of a defect in the condition of the ways or plant, whereas in this case there was no such evidence. The way was, as a way, perfect, and the vat was, as a vat, perfect, and therefore the section of 43 & 44 Vict., ch. 42, on which reliance has been placed, does not apply to this

case.

I agree with my Brother Wills, in the view which he has expressed as to the construction of the statute on which the judgment in Weblin v. Ballard, 17 Q. B. Div. 122, is based, and I think that the learned judges having found that the ladder was in itself dangerous, their judgment does not cover this case.

In Heske v. Samuelson, 12 Q. B. Div. 30, the lift was also in itself dangerous, so that in both those cases there was a defect within the meaning of the act, which we do not find exists in this case. Judgment for the defendant.

Leave to appeal granted.

James Tillinghast, for complainant.

Charles Hart and Edwin Metcalf, for respondent. TILLINGHAST, J. The main questions presented for our consideration by the numerous exceptions to the defendant's answer to the bill are, first, whether the provisions of Public Statutes R. I., chapter 139, which prohibit discriminations being made by common carriers in the transportation of goods and merchandise, can be construed to affect contracts made in this State for the transportation of goods and merchandise to points beyond the limits thereof; and second, if they can be so construed, whether they are not to that extent in conflict with the "commercial clause" of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "the Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the several States." The defendants are common carriers owning and operating the Providence and Worcester railroad, which is situated partly in Rhode Island and partly in Massachusetts. The corporation has been consolidated under the statutes of both States. The bill seeks relief against the defendants for discriminations alleged to have been made by them against the plaintiffs, both on contracts for the transportation of merchandise to points within this State, and also to points without the State, on the line of their road. Most of the exceptions are to the refusal of defendants to answer the allegations of the bill as to business transacted by them on contracts made for the shipment of merchandise to points without the State. The defendants contend that they are not called upon to answer these allegations, because they are only a Rhode Island corporation, owning and operating a railroad wholly in this State; that part of the road beyond the limits thereof being owned and controlled by another and distinct corporation, created by and only amenable to the laws of another State. By the express provisions of the defendant's act of incorporation in this State, of May, 1844, sections 15 to 18, the consolidated company forms but one corporation, and by section 18 it is expressly made subject to all the duties and liabilities of the Providence and Worcester Railroad Company created by the provisions of this act and to the general laws of this State to the same extent as the said Providence and Worcester Railroad Company and the stockholders therein would have been had the whole line of said railroad been located within the limits of this State. The defendants then are a consolidated railroad company owning and operating a railroad extending, as alleged in the bill, from Providence, Rhode Island, to Worcester, Massachu

setts; and we think it is well settled that such a corporation is but one entity, "and that the acts and neglects of the corporation are done by it as a whole."

In Boston, etc., R. Co. v. New York, etc., R. Co, 13 R. I. 260, 262, this court, speaking of the Boston, Hartford and Erie Railroad Company, which was chartered by the State of Connecticut, says that it "was not a Rhode Island corporation except so far as it became, by virtue of the sale and action of the Legislature, the successor of the Hartford, Providence and Fishkill Railroad Company. Yet as a foreign corporation it might be empowered to own and operate a railroad within this State, the policy of such authority being wholly within the discretion of the Legislature." * ** "But the Boston, Hartford and Erie Railroad Company can hardly be regarded as a foreign corporation. True, it was not a Rhode Island corporation in the sense that it was chartered here, but it was subject to Rhode Island laws and control as fully as a domestic railroad company." And then, after reciting the legislative action concerning it, the court further says, "it was thenceforth a corporation in this State, though not of this State."

In Scofield v.Lake Shore, etc., R. Co.,43 Ohio St.571; S. C., 54 Am. Rep. 846, wherein this question has recently been fully considered by the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court says: "A further question is presented, whether the decree for plaintiffs should be limited to and enforced only in this State, or should it extend to and be enforced against the defendant at all points reached by defendant's railroad, its branches and connecting lines?" "The District Court finds that the defendant is a consolidated company, its lines of road extending to various points in Pennsylvania, New York, Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois. It is an artificial person and the same person in all this territory, and this court has acquired jurisdiction of the person of the corporation and the right to enforce all proper decrees against it."

* * *

"The railroad is an entirety, whether within the State or without; and the artificial person, by the acts of the several States authorizing consolidation, has been created one and not two or more, and no reason is perceived why it may not be dealt with by the courts of either State that has procured jurisdiction." "This artificial person not only holds itself out, but does make contracts for the transportation of freight over its connecting lines as well as its own line, and it makes rates to points only reached by connecting lines. No reason is perceived why it should not be ordered to make no discriminations to the injury of the plaintiff in its rates to points thus reached. Of course it may, at any time, refuse to make any rates beyond its own lines; but if it makes rates to points on connecting lines, the rates should be equal to all." See also McDuffee v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 52 N. H. 430; S. C., 13 Am. Rep. 72; Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, 176; Horne v. Boston, etc., R. Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 50.

This doctrine is now so fully settled that a review of the cases is quite unnecessary.

Construing the statute then, to include contracts for the transportation of merchandise to points without the State on the line of defendants' road, is it obnoxious to the constitutional provision before mentioned? We do not think it is. It is not in our judgment a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the "commercial clause" as heretofore construed, either by the State courts.or by the final arbiter of questions of that sort-the Supreme Court of the United States. It opposes no obstruction and causes no delay to commerce. Neither does it lay any tax thereon so as to make it obnoxious to the rule as laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in Hays v.

Pacific Mail Steamship Co., 17 How. 596; Morgan v. Parham, 16 Wall. 471; Steamship Co. v. Port Wardens, 6 id. 31; Case of the State Freight Tax, 15 id. 232; Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U. S. 259; Walling v. Michigan, 116 id. 446; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsyl vania, 114 id. 196, and many others of the same class. It simply prohibits discrimination being made in favor of one and against another having occasion to use the facilities afforded for the transportation of goods by common carriers under like circumstances, a substantial declaration of the common-law doctrine upon this subject. Messenger v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 37 N. J. Law, 531; S. C., 18 Am. Rep. 754; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. People, 67 Ill. 11. And although a statute of this sort may doubtless be properly said to affect commerce, yet as held in the State Tax Railway Gross Receipts, 15 Wall. 284, 293, "it is not every thing that affects commerce that amounts to a regulation of it within the meaning of the Constitution."

In Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 U. S. 164, in which the power of the Legislature of Wisconsin to provide by law for a maximum charge to be made for fare and freight for the transportation of persons and property carried within the State, or taken up outside the State and brought within it, or taken up inside and carried without, was considered, the Supreme Court of the United States says:

"As to the effect of the statute as a regulation of interstate commerce, the law is confined to State commerce, or such interstate commerce as directly affects the people of Wisconsin. Until Congress acts in reference to the relations of this company to interstate commerce, it is certainly within the power of Wiscon sin to regulate its fares, etc., so far as they are of domestic concern. With the people of Wisconsin this company has domestic relations. Incidentally these may reach beyond the State. But certainly until Congress undertakes to legislate for those who are without the State, Wisconsin may provide for those within, even though it may indirectly affect those without."

In the case of Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U. S. 155, 161, the same doctrine was maintained.

The conclusion deducible from the numerous decisious bearing upon this subject, as well stated by the Supreme Court of Indiana in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pendleton, 95 Ind. 12; S. C., 48 Am. Rep. 692, “is, that the States cannot embarrass commercial communication, abridge the freedom of commerce, discriminate in favor of the products of one State, lay burdens upon the instruments of commerce, or exact licenses from persons, natural or artificial. engaged in interstate commerce." See cases there cited.

Accepting this as a summary of the law applicable to the case before us, we do not see that the statute under consideration is obnoxious thereto. Commercial intercourse is not thereby abridged or fettered, and no new duty or burden is imposed thereon. The defendants are only called upon to do, under a certain penalty, precisely what the common law declares it to be their duty to do without the statute, viz., to treat all alike under similar circumstances-a mere police regulation.

The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently had occasion to construe a similar statute, and in so doing inter alia says: "It is no doubt true that the statute to prevent unjust discrimination in the rates of charges of railroad companies, under which this action was brought, may affect commerce, but in our judgment it cannot be said to be a law regulating commerce among the States, within the meaning of the Federal Constitution. The law does not purport to exercise control over any railroad corporation except those that own or operate a railroad in the State, such corporations as have domestic relations with the peo

ple of the State; and as we understand the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, similar laws enacted by State authority have been upheld and sustained, although such laws may affect commerce." People v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 104 Ill. 476. See also Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485, 487; Peik v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 94 id. 164; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Iowa, id. 155; Munn v. Illinois, id. 113.

The exceptions are sustained in so far as they are based upon the omission of the defendants to answer the allegations of the bill as to transactions reaching beyond the limits of the State.

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William A. Ketcham, for appellant.

R. N. Lamb, A. L. Mason and Ralph Hill, for appellee.

ZOLLARS, J. It is well settled that this court will not grant a rehearing upon grounds not urged in argument preceding the decisions. Board Comm'rs of Marion Co. v. Center Tp., 105 Ind. 422, and cases there cited. The main question presented by the record in this case is an important one. A rehearing was granted, and an oral argument solicited by the court upon that question. It is now alleged that the complaint is technically defective. These objections were not urged in argument prior to the former decisions, and as a rehearing would not have been granted on account of them, we think that in this particular case they should not enter into the decision. Without intending to commit the court in the way of a ruling we may say, in passing, that if we were to write upon those questions as at present advised, we should feel constrained to hold that the objections are not well taken. If however appellant is correct in his contention he may make available what he now urges by way of an answer below.

The one important question presented by the record is this: In the assessment and taxation of shares of national bank stock, are the owners thereof, having no credits or moneyed capital from which to deduct their bona fide debts, entitled to deduct them from the assessed value of such shares of stock? The law of this State provides that in the assessment and taxation of what in the statute is denominated credits, the individual tax payer, as owner thereof, may deduct therefrom his bona fide debts, except debts of certain designated classes. Rev. Stat. 1881, §§ 6332, 6333, 6336.

The first question for decision is, from what credits may such debts be deducted by the individual tax payer, and what does the word "credit" include?

The statute further provides that the assessor shall furnish to the tax payer blanks upon which he shall furnish a list of his personal property of every descrip

8 N. E. Rep. 97.

tion owned by him on the first day of April. Section 6330, Rev. Stat. 1881.

So far as material here, section 6332 is as follows: "In making out the statement each person shall put down the credits due and owing from any person or corporation, whether in or out of the county, separately from the rest of his personal property; and every credit for a sum certain, payable either in money or labor, shall be valued at a fair cash value for the sum so payable; and if for any article of property or for labor, or for services of any kind, it shall be valued at the current price of such property, labor or services. In making up the amount of credits which any person is required to list for himself or for any other person, company or corporation, he shall be entitled to deduct from the gross amount of credits the amount of all bona fide debts owing by such person, company or corporation to any other person, company, or corporation, for a consideration received. **Nothing in this section shall be so construed as to authorize any deductions allowed by this section to be made from the value of any other item of taxation than credits. In making out the statement he shall also exhibit to the assessor, for the purpose of valuation, a list of all notes, drafts, mortgages and judgments held or owned by him; and he shall also, for the information of the assessor, furnishing him with a list containing the number and amount of all United States bouds and notes, and other securities of the United States not taxable, held or owned by him on the said first day of April."

*

The tax payer is not allowed to temporarily convert his property and money into non-taxable securities for the purpose of escaping taxation. The above provision of the section is perhaps to insure good faith in that regard, by furnishing the assessor some data from which to determine as to whether or not the tax payer by such conversion has attempted to evade taxation. See also section 6335.

The list furnished to the tax payer has two columns in which to set down the value of the articles of personal property or credits, etc. In one of these the tax payer is required to set down the value, and the other is designed to be used by the assessor for a like purpose. If the value affixed by the tax payer is satisfactory to the assessor, he may adopt it; if it is not, he It may disregard it and affix a valuation of his own. is required by the several sections of the statute, and especially by sections 6330 and 6336, that the tax payer shall put down upon the list furnished to him all of his personal property, including credits due to him of every description. In putting down "the credits due and owing," the tax payer is not required to itemize, but may put down the sum of them all, and his estimate of their value. In this he may be mistaken, or he may intentionally underestimate their value. For the purpose of enabling the assessor to detect and correct the wrong, it is provided in the latter part of section 6332, supra, that the tax payer shall exhibit to him a list of all notes, drafts, mortgages and judgments held or owned, etc. These are not to be furnished for the purpose of being listed by the assessor, but for the purpose of valuation.

Of course if the owner has neglected to list them the assessor may do so, but the law comtemplates a listing by the tax payer. This all shows that notes, drafts, mortgages and judgments are all credit, within the meaning of that section of the statute, and hence credits from which the designated bona fide debt may be deducted by the tax payer. This, it seems to us, must be plain. The statute also provides the form of the schedule to be furnished by the assessor to the tax payer. Section 6336. That schedule is full and specific, and was intended to and does provide in detail the place and manner of listing for taxation all articles

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