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to be rendered. Schuyler v. Van Der Veer, 2 Caines, 238; Aldrich v. Jessiman, 8 N. H. 519, 520; Jackson v. De Long, 9 Johns. 44; Gratz v. Gratz, 4 Rawle, 432, 439; Waite v. Barry, 12 Wend. 380; Porter v. Scott, 7 Cal. 314; Hawkins v. Colclough, 1 Burr. 277; Brown v. Hankeron, 3 Cow. 72; Woodward v. Atwater, 3 Iowa, 61; Strong v. Strong, 9 Cush. 560; Hayes v. Bennett, 2 N. H. 422; Jacob v. Ketcham, 37 Cal. 197. Cir.Ct., D. Cal., Aug. 16, 1886. Alexander v. McNear. Opinion by Sawyer, J.

ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS-VALIDITY-FRAUD-NOTICE TO GRANTEE.-A deed made by the grantor with intent to defraud creditors is null and void, whether the grantee had or had not notice or knowledge of such fraudulent intent, provided that the grantee is not a bona fide purchaser for a good consideration. In granting the first and third prayers of the claimant, Farnan, the court below seems to have assumed the law to be that before a deed of the character of the one before us could be found to be

combination between grantor and grantee (trustee), which it was perfectly competent for him to do; but the court held there was no legally sufficient evidence to show that the trustee had made any combination with, or was cognizant of any fraud of, the grantor; or that the grantor had committed any fraud. This is the extent of the decision. But neither that nor any other Maryland decision meant to determine that the fraud of the grantor was not sufficient to invalidate a deed like the present. Md. Ct. App., June 24, 1886. Farrall v. Farnan. Opinion by Stone, J.

BASTARD SUPPORT — ASSIGNMENT OF INSURANCE POLICY.-A Contract made by the father of an illegitimate child to secure its support is lawful; and an assignment by him of a certificate of insurance on his life to the child's mother for that purpose will be sustained against his administrator. It was not immoral for the mother to provide for the maintenance of the child, whatever may have been her previous conduct, and its support was a good consideration for the as

fraudulent in fact, that the grantee must have partici-signment of the certificate. Parker v. May, 15 N. H.

pated in the fraud; or in other words, however much the grantor may have intended to hinder, defraud and delay his creditors by the execution of such a deed, that the deed shall stand unless the degree was cognizant of and participated in such fraud. In such assumption the court below was in error. No case, in this court at least, has been produced that in our opinion sanctions such a doctrine. It would, we think, be in direct contravention of the statute to hold that a fraudulent grantor could uphold and sustain his own fraudulent act by selecting an innocent grantee and trustee. By the sixth action of the Statute of Elizabeth it is provided that the act should not extend to a bona fide purchaser for a good consideration, and without notice of the fraud. In such case it is necessary that the purchaser should have knowledge of the grantor's fraud, and having such knowledge, he is a participant in it. We think it will be found that most of the cases where it has been held that the trustee must be implicated are cases where the trustee has been considered a purchaser for a valuable consideration. But the instrument we are dealing with is an assignment of all the grantor's property for the benefit of all the grantor's creditors. The grantee in such an instrument is not a bona fide purchaser for a good consideration. Ratcliffe v. Sangston, 18 Md. 383, and Tyler v. Abergh, 3 Atl. Rep. 904 (decided by this court in March, 1886). The grantee in this case is therefore unaffected by the sixth section of the statute, and if the deed was in fact made by the grantor, with intent to hinder and delay and defraud his creditors, as hereinafter explained, as against them it is null and void, whether the grantee had or had not notice or knowledge of such fraudulent intent. Griffin v. Marquardt, 17 N. Y. 28; Stickney v. Crane, 35 Vt. 89; Ruble v. McDonald, 18 Iowa, 493. There are cases to be found where the grantee had knowledge of the fraudulent character of the deek. Such was the case of Main v. Lynch, 54 Md. 658. In such a case the grantor and grantee are in fact in a conspiracy to effect a common object, and the act of one is the act of the other in furtherance of such common object. It follows that in such case the acts of the grantee may form a proper subject of inquiry before the jury, and may throw a strong light upon the character of the transaction. While fraud in the grantee is not necessary to annul such a deed, it may and does tend to aggravate its fraudulent and covinous character. That is the amount of the decision on that point in Main v. Lynch. In Luckemeyer's case, 61 Md. 313, the question was whether there was evidence legally sufficient to authorize a jury to find against the validity of the deed. In that case the plaintiff attempted to show a

45, 51; Hoyt v. Cooper, 41 id. 14; Haven v. Hobbs, 1 Vt. 238; Holcomb v. Stimpson, 8 id. 141; Jennings v. Brown, 9 M. & W. 495; Hicks v. Gregory, 8 MacGr. & Sc. 378; Smith v. Roche, 8 C. B. (N. S.) 223. N. H. Sup. Ct., July 29, 1886. Brown v. Mansur. Opinion by Bingham, J.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-INTOXICATING LIQUORSSALE ON SUNDAY.-A statute prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors on Sunday, except by druggists upon physicians' prescription, is not void because it is part of a chapter enacting a license system, under an amendment to the State Constitution, prohibiting the manufacture and sale of such liquors as a beverage. The contention is that chapter 87 is inconsistent with the fifth amendment of the Constitution of the State, which declares that the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors to be used as a beverage shall be prohibited, because chapter 87 enacts a license system and section 31 is a part of it. We think there can be no doubt that a statute may be unconstitutional in part, and constitutional in part, and that while the unconstitutional part may be void the constitutional part may be valid, and may be carried into effect. It may be however that the parts of a statute are so connected and interdependent that it must be presumed that the statute was enacted as a whole, and was intended to be carried into effect as a whole; and when this is the case the entire statute is unconstitutional and void, even though parts of it, taken by themselves, would be constitutional if they could be separated from the rest. We do not think that section 31, taken by itself, is in conflict with the fifth amendment. It is a provision which might be enacted, in substance, to-day, without coming in conflict with the fifth amendment. The only question therefore is whether it is so interwoven with the rest of the chapter as to make it an inseparable part of the system there enacted. We do not see any reason for regarding it as such. The purpose of it seems to be to protect Sunday from desecration, rather than merely to prohibit the sale of liquors. It extends not only to those who sell without license, but to those who sell with license; the purpose being to prevent the selling altogether, except by registered pharmacies or registered pharmacists, or registered assistant pharmacists, upon a physician's prescription. Our conclusion therefore is that the section is not in conflict with the Constitution, but was as valid and effectual when the complaint was made as it was before the fifth amendment was adopted. R. I. Sup. Ct., July 26, 1886. State v. Clark. Opinion per Curiam.

CONTRACT-WHEN CLOSED-TELEGRAM — CONFLICT OF LAW.-A telegram accepting an offer, if sent within

the time agreed upon, completes the contract. The time of telegraphing is the time the contract was closed, and when sent from one State to another, the State from which the telegram was sent determines the place of the contract. The defendant cites a few cases which support its position (McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. 278; British & American Tel. Co. v. Colson, L. R., 6 Exch. 108; Langd. Cas. Cont., §§ 1-18; Langd. Sum. Cont., § 14-16), but the weight of authority strongly supports the instruction given by the court. 1 Add. Cont. *18, note 1, and cases there cited; Maclay v. Harvey, 32 Am. Rep. note, 40. This note contains a full report of the recent English case, Household Fire & Carriage Accident Ins. Co. v.Grant, 4 Exch. Div. 216. The case was decided in the Court of Appeal, July 1, 1879, by Thesiger and Baggallay, L. JJ.; Bramwell, L. J., dissenting. Its doctrine is that the contract is binding on the proposer as soon as a letter accepting the proposal, properly directed to him, is posted by the recipient, whether it reaches the proposer or not, if posted without reasonable delay, and the post is the ordinary and natural mode of transmitting the acceptance. In that case the letter did not reach the proposer, and Bramwell, L. J., who dissented, conceded that "where a posted letter arrives the contract is complete on posting." In the case at bar the arrival of the telegram is not disputed. We are of opinion that the contract, if made, was completed in Rhode Island notwithstanding it was to be performed in Massachusetts. Hunt v. Jones, 12 R. I. 265. R. I. Sup. Ct., July 24, 1886. Hope Iron Co. Opinion by Durfee, C. J. Perry v. Mount

CORPORATION-TORTS OF OFFICERS-FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AS TO STOCK-LIABILITY TO CREDITORS.Where managers of a corporation make false reports, or resort to fraudulent devices, and thereby induce persons to take stock, such purchasers, in order to recover in an action for fraud and deceit, must show that they relied upon the faith of the representations. Bigelow Fraud. 87; Dunn v. White, C3 Mo. 186. In those cases where managers of a corporation make false reports, or resort to fraudulent devices, and thereby induce persons to take stock, and are liable in an action of deceit, it is necessary to show that the plaintiff acted upon the faith of the representations. 2 Add. Torts (Wood's ed.), 412. It is clear here that the plaintiff did not rely upon any representation made by the certificates or books that the stock had been paid for at par. He had true information of all the property owned by the corporation, and upon that, and with that as a security, he made the loan. In the next place, if it be conceded to the plaintiff the most he can claim, and that is that these incorporators committed a fraud upon the corporation, still this does not give him as a creditor an action for fraud and deceit. The wrong was a wrong to the corporation, and not directed to any creditor or creditors. It might affect the credit of the company, but it does not follow that every creditor may sue the incorporators at law. "The wrong committed by the officers of a corporation which affects the stockholders generally, through their interests in the corporation, is not a wrong to them as individuals, but to the corporate entirety." Cooley Torts, 518. So too a wrong to the corporation which may and does affect the credit of the company and the creditors generally, is not a wrong to them as individuals, and they cannot maintain an action as for a tort. Ang. & A. Corp. (11th ed.) §§ 596, 597. We do not doubt the principles of law asserted in the many cases cited by appellant. Many of them assert the established doctrine of this court. But the plaintiff is not here asking for equitable relief, nor are the defendants pursued as owners of unpaid stock. Mo. Sup. Ct., June 21, 1886. White. Opinion by Black, J.

Priest v.

DEED-CONDITION SUBSEQUENT-RESTRICTION AS TO BUILDING AND USE- SUBSEQUENT QUIT-CLAIM.-A limitation and qualification, and the express condiprovision in a deed that the grant is made within the certain character shall be erected on the land, or if tions that if at any time thereafter any building of a it shall be at once forfeited, and revert to the grantor, the land shall be used for other than specified purposes his heirs and assigns, is a condition, and not merely a restriction or personal covenant. Warner v. Bennett, grantor to one claiming under the grantee conveys his 31 Conn. 468. A subsequent quit-claim deed by the reversion and right of entry for condition broken, and so destroys the condition, and makes the title absolute, able in Connecticut by statute. In Ely v. Stannard, the right to enter for condition broken being assign44 Conn. 628, the present chief justice, speaking for the court, says: "A quit-claim or release deed is one of the regular modes of conveying property known to where a party sells property and does not wish to warthe law, and it is almost the only mode in practice 'In law, a release, or deed of release, is a conveyance rant the title. Dr. Webster says in his dictionary: of a man's right in land or tenements to another who has some estate in possession.' This is a strictly techmakes no difference whether the releasee has an exnical definition; but by long-established practice, it isting estate in possession or not. The release will convey to him in any circumstances whatever interest the releasor has in the property." Besides, as is well said by the learned counsel for the plaintiff, "It is the universal rule that a deed must be construed strictly against the grantor, and must be taken to convey the entire property and interest of the grantor in the premises unless something appears to limit it to a partial interest." If Skiddy had intended to limit the effect of his deed to discharging the mortgage, it would have been an easy matter to say so; or he might have excepted this reversionary right from its operation. As he has not done so, the law conclusively presumes that he intended to convey all his interest to Robertson. This result is reached by whatever rules of construction the matter is tested. It may be that it was an inadvertence, and that the releasor did not intend to discharge this interest. Nevertheless he has in fact done so, and the law will afford him no relief. Conn. Sup. Ct. of Errors, June, 1886. Opinion by Carpenter, J.

-CONSIDERATION

Hoyt v. Ketchum.

MARRIAGE.-Marriage is a valuable consideration for a deed, and a deed executed for such consideration will not be set aside in behalf of existing creditors, unless it appears that both parties to the deed intended by the conveyance to delay the creditors of the grantor, or at least unless the grantee knew that the grantor so intended. Vt. Sup. Ct., Aug. 25, 1886. Pierce v. Harrington. Opinion by

Taft, J.

GIFT-PROMISSORY NOTE.-The gift of a promissory note by the payee to the maker is not rendered invalid by a subsequent arrangement, whereby the note is restored to the custody of the donor, with a right to collect thereon such amount as the donor may need for her support, in case she should become poor. N. II. Sup. Ct., July 29, 1886. Marston v. Marston. Opinion by Smith, J.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-NOTE AND MORTGAGEPAYMENT ON NOTE.-A mortgage given to secure a note is a mere incident thereto, and a payment on the latter which has the effect to prolong the time within which a suit may be brought thereon has the same effect on the former. On principle, whatever act or fact operates to keep the note alive, and prevents the stat ute from running against the remedy thereon, ought to have the same effect on the security. The one is the personal obligation of the party, and the other is

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the particular thing or means set apart and pledged for its fulfillment and performance. So long as this obligation lives, and a suit against the maker can be maintained thereon, the security for its payment should be subject to enforcement also. Ewell v.Daggs, 108 U. S. 146. But under section 25 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which declares that "whenever any payment of principal or interest" is made on an existing contract, whether it be bill of exchange, promissory note, bond, or other evidence of indebtedness," after the same becomes due, "the limitation shall commence from the time the last payment was made." I am unable to see why the payments which confessedly kept alive the remedy on the note did not directly have the same effect on the mortgage. In addition to being an incident of the note, it is a "contract," and "evidence of indebtedness," and the payments were as much made on it as on the note. The payment was made on the debt, and affected the mortgage as well as the note. It extinguished so much of the latter for which the former is security, and the unsatisfied existence of the one was as much acknowledged thereby as the other. The statute expressly declares that a payment on the "contract" shall have the effect to postpone the running of the statute until from und after the date of the last payment, and in my judg ment that logically and legally includes the mortgage, as well as the note it was given to secure. Cir. Ct., D. Oreg., Aug. 18, 1886. Allen v. O'Donald. Opinion by Deady, J.

USURY-LOAN BY AGENT-DEDUCTING COMMISSIONS. -The plaintiff made the loan of the money involved in this case through his general agent, who had full authority to act for her in the premises; and by agreement between them, he was to receive no compensation from her for his services in loaning her money, but "was to make what he could out of it." Hence whatever he did in exacting from a borrower any sum for his services to his principal in and about the loan must be taken to have been authorized and sanctioned by her, and in contemplation of law to have beeu her personal act; and while as held in Acheson v. Chase, 28 Minn. 211, it would have been competent for her to have authorized him to exact from the borrower a reasonable compensation for his services to her in making the loan, if he went beyond this, and with her sanction exacted a sum in addition to the highest legal interest, and to such reasonable compensation, then the case would be one of usury; for there would have been a taking of a greater sum for the loan or forbearance than the legal rate of interest, because there would be nothing else on account of which such sum could be said to have been taken. Now in this case the agent deducted and retained from the sum purporting on the face of the note to be loaned, viz., $125, a month's interest at the rate of ten per cent per arnum, viz., $1.04, and $6.46 as commission; and so far as the finding of facts shows, this commission was mostly, if not altogether, a bonus or gratuity; for there is nothing to show that the agent performed any services whatever for the borrower, or any for his principal, for which any such compensation would not be unreasonably large. The plaintiff's money was deposited in bank in the agent's name, in Minneapolis, where the agent resided, and the finding is that when he made loans he simply "drew checks on the bank." There is no finding that the agent rendered any services to the borrower, or any to his principal, for which he was entitled to make any thing more than a mere nominal charge. So far as the facts found show, the compensation charged as "commissions" was unreasonable, and as said in Acheson v. Chase, a mere cover for usury," and made the note and the transaction evidenced by it usurious in law. Minn. Sup. Ct., July 17, 1886. Avery v. Creigh. Opinion by Berry, J.

WILL-CHARITABLE TRUST-CERTAINTY.-Trustees in a will were empowered to spend a certain sum in erecting a church and parsonage, and were authorized, empowered and directed, upon completion thereof, to make a good and sufficient conveyance of said church, parsonage and grounds, and to turn over any balance of the said sum remaining in their hands to such organization or society, or organization of the Presbyterian Church in the State of Maryland as they in their judgment might see fit and deem best, etc. A codicil provided: "In explanation to the bequest to the church, in case it being carried out, I wish and desire it to be a branch of the Central Presbyterian Church," etc. Held, that the trust was sufficiently certain, and valid. Had he pursued a different course, and given the $50,000 directly to the Central Presbyterian Church of Baltimore, and directed that corporation to erect a church and parsonage at Brooklyn, in Anne Arundel county, the legal question would have been the same. "If," says this court in Barnum's case, 62 Md. 275; S. C., 50 Am. Rep. 219, "there be parties capable of taking the subject-matter of the trust, and objects legal and definite to be subserved or benefited by its execution, so that a court of equity may take cognizance of and enforce the trust, these are the essentiale and only essential to the validity of the trust, though the object of the trust be in its nature charitable. We have already seen that there is a party capable of taking the subject-matter of the trust. That the object was legal and sufficiently definite there is but little doubt. The testator prescribed the place where the church should be built, the amount of its cost, and the purpose to which it should be dedicated. What more ever was or could be done by a testator who desired to devote a portion of his property to a charitable use? He had the right to do as he pleased with his property, provided his object was a legal one, and his whole object will be accomplished when the church is built and conveyed to the Central Presbyterian Church of Baltimore. This direction of his can certainly be enforced by a court of equity. It may so happen that a worshipper may never enter the doors of the church or a pastor the parsonage, but such a possible contingency will not prevent a court of equity from decreeing that the present and clearly-defined purpose of the testator shall be carried out. The books are full of cases where money or property is left to build hospitals for the afflicted and schools for the promotion of education. The testator can provide for the benefit of the community, but we cannot compel them to accept it. So when Mr. Crisp provided the means for building the church, selected the place where it should be located, and appointed the agents to do the work, and designated who should own and hold it, he had done nothing that the courts cannot enforce. All this was manifestly intended for the use and benefit of the people of Brooklyn. Whether they will use as directed by him and appreciate his noble charity rests with them; at least that question cannot arise now, that use is certain. The forms of the worship of the Presbyterian Church is as well known as any other form of worship. This case differs entirely from Smith's case in 56 Md. Md. Ct. App., June 22, 1886. Crisp v. Crisp. Opinion by Stone, J.

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but in other respects the order of the General Term affirmed and the petition dismissed, with costs to the city of New York-In re Petition of Bradish Johnson to vacate, etc.

NOTES.

The gallant Lieutenant Henn, of the Galatea, comes given many distinguished members to the Irish bar. of a family from county Clare, Ireland, which has One of the most famous was Jonathan Henn, who won great renown on the Munster Circuit. He was a very | lazy man, and loved the sport of fishing. Once he was asked a question of Latin grammar, and he drolly answered that he had studied the Eton grammar, and eaten grammar is soon forgotten. A Galway attorney which he was sadly in need. His servant roused him went to his lodgings early one morning with a brief of from a sound sleep, saying the attorney wanted particularly to see the counsellor, and Henn roared out: This little story of Jonathan is not inappropriate "Tell the attorney to take his brief to the devil." ploits of his nautical young kinsman. When Jonathan while the newspapers are recording the sailing exHenn was roused to action he was a mighty fighter. On the trial of John Mitchell for seditious practices the then veteran leader of the Irish bar, Robert Holmes, made a speech in defense of him which for strength, pathos and eloquence stands unrivalled. Mr. Henn replied in a speech which serves as a model for a prosecutor; it must have been captivating, for Sir Colman O'Loughlin, a renowned lawyer himself, and of counclapped Jonathan on the back, and exclaimed, "Munsel for Mitchell, unable to conceal his admiration, ster forever." stormy weather to bring their best qualities out. It is in the blood of the Henns to need

appellant; Cornelius Vanderzee et al., respondents, v. William E. Haswell et al., appellants; Edgar Munson et al., appellants, v. George J. Magee et al., respondents; Urial Driggs, appellant, v. John H. Phillips et al., respondents; John Fisher, appellant, v. J. C. J. Langbein et al., respondents; Mortimer F. Reynolds, appellant, De Witt C. Ellis, assignee, etc., respondent; Edwin W. Hall, appellant, v. Whitehall Water Power Company, respondent; Board of Commissioners of Excise of Auburn, respondents, v. Cary S. Burns et al., appellants; Same v. Mosher; Daniel B. Halstead, respondent, v. Charles P. Dodge et al.; Nelson J. Botsford v. Charles P. Dodge et al.; In re Application for probate of last will, etc., of Eliza B. Becket, deceased; David S. Paige, respondent, v. Edmund Waring et al., executors, etc., appellants; George N. Manchester et al., respondents, v. Susan R. Kendall et al., executors, appellants; Mary B. Lyon et al., executors, appellants, v. Charles W. Hersey et al., respondents; Lawson A. Long, administrator, respondent, v. Richard H. Stafford, appellant; In re Estate of Elisha W. Ensign, deceased; Helena Flint et al., executors, respondents, v. William B. Bacon et al., trustees, appellants; Jane E. Olive, administratrix, appellant, v. Whitney Marble Company, respondent; Mary Maguire, administratrix, respondent, v. George Selden et al., appellants; People, ex rel. John J. Clark et al., respondents, v. Matthew D. Breen, appellant; John Schultz et al., executors, respondents, v. appellant. Mayor, etc., Judgment affirmed-People, respondents, v. Henry W. Jaehne, appellant.-Judgment affirmed without costs-Charles Lichtenberg, appellaut, v. Elizabeth Hertfelder et al., respondents.-Judg. ment reversed, new trial granted, costs to abide the event-Elizabeth R. Cogswell, appellant, v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, respondents: Joel Wheeler et al., appellants, v. William W. Lawson, respondent; William Post, appellant, v. Charles Kreisher et al., respondents; Henry Nugeut, Italy the king caused a bell to be hung in a tower in It is a beautiful story that in one of the old cities of respondent, v. Eli B. Jacobs, impleaded, appellant; George W. Conselyea et al., respondents, v. Dudley justice," and commanded that any one who had been one of the public squares, and called it "The bell of Blanchard et al., appellants; Eluathan Sweet, Jr., ap- wronged should go and ring the bell, and so call the pellant, v. Dorilus Morrison et al., respondents (two magistrate of the city, and ask and receive justice. cases); Frederick McLewee, respondent, v. Bolton Hall et al., appellants.—Orders of General and Spec- bell rope rotted away, a wild vine was tied to it to And when in the course of time the lower end of the ial Terms reversed, and application for peremptory lengthen it; and one day an old and starving horse writ of mandamus denied, with costs-People, respondents, v. Rome, Watertown and Ogdensburg to die, wandered into the tower, and in trying to eat that had been abandoned by its owner and turned out Railroad, appellant.- -Order affirmed with costsPeople, ex rel. Equitable Life Association, etc., appel-city, coming to see who rang the bell, found this old the vine, rang the bell. And the magistrate of the lants, v. Alfred C. Chapin, comptroller, etc., respondent; In re Application of Staten Island Rapid Transit Railroad Company.-Judgment reversed and complaint dismissed with costs-Henry Rozell, commissioner, respondent, v. Eliza Andrews, appellant; John Hinchliff, respondent, v. Margaret Shea, appellant. -Judgment affirmed, with costs to the respondent, to be paid by the appellant-Abram Hewlett et al., appellant, v. William Elmer, respondent.-Appeal dismissed with costs-In re Judicial settlement of accounts of William H. Snyder, executor.-Judgment reversed and new trial granted-People, respondent, v. Frank Mendou, appellant.-Orders reversed and motions granted, with costs in the court below and one bill of costs in this court-Henry A. Gladson, respondent, v. Edward H. Woodward, appellant; Douglass Dickson v. Same.-Order of General and Special Terms, so far as appealed from, reversed, and the petition of the receiver in respect to the items embraced in the appeal denied, with costs to the appellants, to be paid by the receiver as such, and not individually -Metropolitan Trust Company of New York v. Tonawanda Valley and Cuba Railroad Company..

-Order

of General Term, so far as it modifies order of Special Term reversed, and order of Special Term affirmed;

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and starving horse; and he caused the owner of that horse, in whose service he had toiled and been worn out, to be summoned before him, and decreed that as his poor horse had rung the bell of justice, he should should provide for him proper food and drink and have justice, and that during the horse's life his owner

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That was a singular will, written January, 18, 1867, admitted to probate on Monday in Philadelphia. It is handwriting of the decedent, Judge James R. Ludshort, covering but half a page of foolscap, and is in the low, one of the foremost jurists in Pennsylvania. He I request my executors to incur at my funsmall, and my wife and children ought to have every eral no expense not absolutely required. My estate is dollar for their support. Let no false pride dictate osbody, it matters little what becomes of that body, so tentatious display, for after the soul departs from the that it is decently buried. God will protect the dust, and on the resurrection day gather all together and reconstruct it according to his sovereign rite." He then devises his entire estate to his wife, Henrietta F. Ludlow, and appoints her guardian of their children and executrix.

The Albany Law Journal.

THE

ALBANY, OCTOBER 16, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

HE Central Law Journal has some views on the popular election of judges which coincide with our own. It says, among other things: "We do not believe that the appointment or election of judicial officers, whether by a governor or the Legislature, or the people, can ever be made independent of the control, partial or absolute, of party politics. As long as political parties exist they will strive to control every civil office of government to which is attached either honor or profit. No office is so high, and none so low, that the political party will not seek to render it, or its incumbency, a source of party capital. There are differences in degree, of course; party lines are not drawn as strictly in an election for the office of circuit judge as for a member of Congress, but the principle is the same, and with few exceptions the Democrat votes for the Democratic candidate for judge, and the Republican for the Republican candidate. We do not consider this a pessimistic view of the case, we regard it as a necessary and natural condition of popular government. If it is an imperfection of our system, it is inseparable from it. * * * Although in many States changes have been made from executive appointment and legislative election to popular vote, the reverse process, so far as we are advised, has never taken place; there are nulla vestigia retrorsum. Whatever universal suffrage has once obtained it has never relinquished. This in a great measure is the result of the prevalent sentiment that government should be of the people, for the people, by the people.' The fact remains however that the judges of those States in which they are chosen by universal suffrage have never suffered in the comparison, other things being equal, with the judges of those States in which the older and more conservative modes are retained. We therefore think that public policy does not demand any special changes in the modes of electing judges, and that among the many projects of 'reform' that have recently been suggested and advocated in bar associations, legal journals and newspapers, this is entitled to as little favor as any." The soundness of these views is just now confirmed by a practical test in our own State. Certainly no very serious criticism can be made against either of the nominees for the Court of Appeals judgeship, and certainly no better man would have been appointed by any governor. So long as party nominations were to have been made, it is at least creditable to the parties that men of such high character have been selected. The consideration of judicial fitness is quite another consideration.

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We have sometimes been accused of being too hard on the New York city clique who oppose codiVOL. 34-No. 16.

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fication. Here now is what the American Law Review thinks of one of them, and one of his schemes: "Mr. Albert, Mathews has published a communication in the New York Evening Post upon the subject of the agitation concerning the adoption of what is known as the Field Civil Code. He puts forth no new argument on the subject, and he concludes by making a suggestion which seems to be more original than profound. It is that the command contained in the Constitution of New York of 1846, requiring that the Legislature should codify the law of the State, has come to be at the most the command of a past generation; for which reason it would be better to let the matter slumber until a new constitutional convention assembles, which the writer supposes will not be later than the year 1888, at which time the people can again express themselves on the subject in their organic law. The force of this suggestion is not perceived. The plain sense of the matter is this: The Legislature is elected by the new generation just as much as a constitutional convention will be. The Legislature occupies a relation to the people as close as that which a constitutional convention occupies. The Legislature wields the sovereign power of the people in every respect, where not restricted by the organic law of the State or of the United States. The Legislature has ample power to codify the law of the State, either with or without the command of a constitutional convention. It is the body by which the work is to be done; and assuming that the force of the command contained in the Constitution of 1846 is spent because a new generation has come upon the stage of action, it is still comlaw shall be codified, and it is as competent for petent for a Legislature to say whether or no the them to say it as it is for a constitutional convention to say it. This being so, there is no more reaconvention, which may or may not assemble in the son in relegating such a question to a constitutional year 1888, than there would be in postponing it for the consideration of the Legislature which shall assemble in 1888. If the people ever get hold of the question the lawyers will learn how little influence politicians; they do not know that there is such a they really possess. Many lawyers are like certain thing as public opinion until they are knocked subject in a very short way, and the simple quesdown with it. The people can reason upon the tion which they will ask is, whether it is more reasonable to have the law written in one book than law properly written in one book if no draft of a in several hundred books. If they cannot have the code has been yet submitted to them which meets the public demand, they will find some means of having one made and submitted to them." We Mathews. It would be comparatively easy to pack have been expecting this plot developed by Mr. a convention against codification, but the obstructionists will find that the people will pay very little attention to them. They paid no attention at all to the last convention, we believe, except to adopt the judiciary article, which is rather significant.

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