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doctrine. Vice-Chancellor Hall, in the case of Re Clarke's Trusts, 1 Ch. Div. 497, adopted a narrower view, and refused to apply the cy près doctrine to a fund which had been given to a friendly society which had been dissolved. The conflict of opinion betwen the two judges is raised in an unusually distinct manner. Vice-Chancellor Hall says: 'Poverty of the member at the time of his sickness or lameness, or in his old age, was not required to entitle him to an allowance. It appears to me that the society was not a charitable institution.' ViceChancellor Bacon's words are explicit the other way: 'The object of charity is to relieve distress. Poverty is not a necessary element to entitle a person to receive a charitable donation.' It would appear, but not with absolute clearness, that the late Master of the Rolls, in the unreported case of Spiller v. Maud, referred to in Pease v. Pattinson, was inclined to take the narrower construction, although as that learned judge directed that the society with which Spiller v. Maud was concerned was a charity, it is not safe to press his words as if he had decided that it was not a charity. It seems absurd to lay down the rule that where you help people in aid of their own efforts there is no charity, whereas when they do not help themselves at all it is charity. The old definition that 'charity is a general public use' suggests the sounder principle of division that the fund or benefaction must be either for whole communities or ascertainable classes of people, as distinguished from private persons or particular families. Vice-Chancellor Hall's view would exclude all the great educational endowments of the country, as well as the objects enumerated in the statute of Elizabeth, such as the repair of bridges, forts, churches, highways, 'the marriages of poor maids, and the supportation and help of young tradesmen.'" In another recent case, Harris v. Brisco, chronicled by the Law Journal, the point decided was that charity is a good defense to an action of maintenance. The court had to go back to the Year Books, and the Journal says the argua severe strain on the Norman-French, both of bench and bar." "Charity, according to the Court of Appeal, is used by the law in its popular sense, and they could not be more emphatic than the apostle in laying down that it may cover the. multitude of sins' in the action maintained. Nothing was said by the Court of Appeal of the decision of the lord chief justice in Bradlaugh v. Newdegate, 52 L. J. Rep., Q. B., 454, except that it was an authority for the existence of the action of maintenance, but it can hardly stand when compared with this decision. If charity is a good defense to an action for maintaining a civil proceeding, the interest which every one has in the observance of the law must, à fortiori, be a good defense to an action for maintaining a penal proceeding to enforce the observance of a public law. The Court of Appeal say, in giving judgment, that 'if we were now making a new law it would be well worthy of consideration whether such a limitation of the doctrine as Mr. Justice Wills adopted would not be good.""


ment was


The Louisiana judges are still indulging in glowing rhetoric. In Armstrong v. Jackson, 37 La. Ann. 219, an action of assault and battery, provoked by an alleged libel, Fenner, J., said: "The irate Jackson, meeting Armstrong on Canal street, determined to empty on his unfortunate head all the vials of his wrath." (So he assailed him violently). "Jackson was a vigorous and burly man. Armstrong was a physical wreck, afflicted with that terrible disease, the name of which, owing to its octosyllabic length, is not grappled with by the writer of the transcript, but which, from its description, we infer to be known as Locomotorataxia." The jury gave $2,000 damages, and Fenner, J., said: "Let the tree lie as it has fallen." Manning, J., thought the damages excessive, observing: "Writers such as he have no sympathy for (sic) the powerlessness of those whom they assail, and their shafts inflict wounds compared to which the physical hurts of daggers and pistol-balls are but a trifle."

In these times of bribery it is well enough for lawyers to know just how far they can safely go in social attentions to the judges. When Edward I returned to England in August, 1289, his first care was to reform the abuses that had crept into the administration of the law during his absence. All the judges were examined before the new parliament and on proof of extortion were fined; only two judges out of the whole bench were found not guilty. From this time the judges were obliged to swear upon their induction into office that they would take no money or presents of any kind except a breakfast from such persons as had suits depending before them. We may thereupon conclude that to treat a judge to a breakfast is not bribery at common law. Drinks are not mentioned. Probably from their effects they would not come within the same category. Arm chairs were ruled out in Judge Barnard's case.


N Sexton v. Hawkeye Ins. Co., Supreme Court of

action was on a policy of insurance to recover for the loss of the building insured, by "a high wind, cyclone or tornado." The policy contains the following condition: "This company shall not be liable for any loss or damage while the above-mentioned premises shall be vacant or unoccupied, or resulting from neglect by the assured to use all possible effort to keep the property safely protected against fires that may originate on the prairies, or to save the property when on fire, or exposed thereto, or after the fire, or by theft at or after the fire." The evidence showed that the building insured was a dwelling-house, occupied at the time the policy was issued by a tenant, who moved out The of it about three months before the loss. plaintiff testifies that the tenant left in the house "two or three jars, and two large four or five

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gallon jars, and a molasses keg, and a table," which appear to have been in the house when destroyed. The plaintiff also testified that he had in the house at that time a wrench, hatchet, three empty cans, a rolling cutter, a plow file and a ladder." The house, after the tenant removed, was not used as a dwelling. The court said: "The court, in our opinion, rightly directed a verdict for defendant; for the reason that the condition of the policy against the vacancy, or its being permitted to remain unoccupied, was established without any conflict of evidence. The condition cannot be disregarded when the contract is attempted to be enforced. The parties contracted that the building should not be permitted to be vacant or unoccupied. We cannot vary or depart from their contract. It may be, but the point we do not determine, that if the condition required the performance of acts which in no way affected the hazard, or the non-performance of which could work defendant no prejudice, the courts would not regard it. But it cannot justly be claimed that the hazard of 'high winds, cyclones or tornadoes' was not increased by the vacancy of the building. The occupants of a dwelling, for their own safety, and the protection of the property they may have in it, will exercise care for the preservation of a building by keeping closed and secured the windows and doors of the house during high winds, which would, to some extent, secure to it increased stability and capacity of resistance to storms. The tools and other articles of the plaintiff, and other articles owned by the tenant in the house at the time of the loss, did not constitute occupancy, as contemplated by the policy. The building was described in the policy as a dwelling-house,' and was insured under the policy as such. The contract contemplates that it shall be occupied as a dwelling. Its occupancy, for the purpose of storing tools, jars, etc., did not comply with the condition against the vacancy of the building."


In Poggensee v. Mutual Fire, Lightning and Tornado Ins. Co., Supreme Court of Iowa, June 17, 1886, 28 N. W Rep. 485, an action to recover under an insurance policy against loss by tornadoes, it was claimed in defense that the storm causing the loss was not a tornado, such as was insured against, and that the damage arose mainly from the natural frailty of the buildings, or from water. Held, that testimony as to the damage done in the neighborhood was admissible as tending to prove the nature of the storm. The court said: "The defendant called as a witness one Schocker. He testified that he lived 120 rods north of the plaintiff's, and that he had stables and straw-stacks where he lived. He was then asked by defendant a question in these words: What, if any, damage was done, or dence of wind was there around the stables and straw-stacks?' The question was objected to as immaterial and incompetent, and the court sustained the objection. It had already been proven

that the wind was blowing from the north or northwest. If the fact was that there was no evidence of wind around Schocker's stables and straw-stacks, 120 rods north of the plaintiff's, such fact, we think, would have tended, at least, in a slight degree, to show that at the plaintiff's the wind did not amount to a tornado, and that the destruction of his stable was due either to its own frailty, or the action of the water. We think that the question should have been allowed. One McHenry was called by the defendant as a witness, who testified to seeing a grove near plaintiff's house after the alleged tornado. He was asked a question in these words: 'Did you notice any trees having been blown down?' This question, upon objection by the plaintiff, was excluded. We think it should have been allowed. Where a wind has not left behind it the ordinary indications of a tornado, there is some ground for supposing that it did not amount to a tornado. It is true that the path of a tornado is sometimes very narrow and sharply defined. The fact, then, that trees in a grove near the plaintiff's stable were not blown down would not have shown necessarily that there was not a tornado at the plaintiff's stable; but we think that it was a fact which the defendant was entitled to show as having, at least, some slight bearing in the case."

In Wakeman v. Chambers, Supreme Court of Iowa, June 17, 1886, 28 N. W. Rep. 496, it was held that the statute against selling intoxicating liquors does not make the buyer an abettor or particeps criminis. The court said: "The object of the statute is twofold: the protection of the people of the State, and that class of persons likely to become purchasers as a protection against themselves. Hence it is provided that a person found in a state of intoxication shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and be punished as prescribed in the statute. But the person so found intoxicated is invited to give information, under oath, when, where, and of whom he purchased or received the liquor, and thereupon the magistrate is authorized to remit the penalty prescribed for being found in a state of intoxication. It cannot be supposed that the Legislature, in thus inviting the intoxicated person to inform on the seller, contemplated that he thereby criminated himself in the crime of aiding and abetting in the sale, and was liable to be punished as a principal. The sale of intoxicating liquor is lawful at common law, and it becomes unlawful simply because the statute so provides. Under the statute the sale, or keeping with intent to sell, is a public offense, because the statute so declares. The statutory crime is bounded by the statute creating it, and the statute operates on, and has force and effect against the persons therein named, and no others. As the proevi-hibitory statute does not provide that the purchaser is guilty of any crime, it seems to us this fact practically ends the inquiry. If such had been the intent it would certainly have been so provided in express terms. So far from this being so, the impli

cation is clearly the other way. The prohibitory statute does not regard the purchaser as an aider and abettor in any criminal act, and it has been so held under similar statutes in State v. Rand, 51 N. H. 361, and Commonwealth v. Willard, 22 Pick. 476. It is said however that the decision in this last case would have been the other way if the crime had been of greater magnitude. We do not think this is so, and this clearly appears from the subsequent cases of Commonwealth v. Downing, 4 Gray, 29; Cobb v. Farr, 16 id. 597; Walan v. Karby, 99 Mass. 1; Adams v. Goodnow, 101 Mass. 81. In Doran's case, 2 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Penn.) 467, the statute made it a crime for any person 'to buy, use, or expose to sale' tickets in lotteries, and therefore it was held the purchaser could not be compelled to testify, for the reason that he himself was guilty of a crime. The only case to which we have been referred which seems to sustain the ruling of the District Court is State v. Bonner, 2 Head, 135. A statute in Tennessee prohibited the sale of liquor by slaves, and it was held in the cited case that a white man who purchased from a slave committed a criminal offense. We think that, both on principle and the authority of adjudged cases under statutes similar to ours, that the better rule is otherwise. It should be remembered that the prohibitory statute has been in force in this State for many years, and it is undoubtedly true that there have been many convictions thereunder on the evidence of the purchaser alone, for ordinarily no other evidence can be procured; and this is the first instance, to our knowledge, where the right of the State to such evidence has been questioned. Nor are we advised that a single prosecution against the purchaser for aiding in the commission of a crime was ever commenced, and this has a strong tendency to show what has been generally regarded as the proper construction of the statute."

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PLACE V. NORWICH & NEW YORK TRANSP. Co.* In a case of a collision occasioned by the negligence of the officers or hands of one of the vessels, without any neglect, privity or knowledge of her owner; and where said vessel took fire and sank, with loss of cargo, and never completed her voyage, nor earned any freight, but was afterward raised and repaired, and was then libelled and seized on behalf of the owners of her carge, and claimed and bonded at her then value by her owner, who filed an *S. C., 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1150. In Thommessen v. Whitwill, the decision in this case, in relation to the time when the value of the owner's interest in the ship is to be taken for fixing the amount of his liability, was applied to a case where the offending ship did not sink in consequence of the collision, but was afterward sunk and wrecked in the same voyage by the negligent navigation of those in charge of her; this sinking being held to be the termination of the voyage.

answer and a petition for limited liability; and where it further appeared that the owner received certain moneys for insurance of the ship against loss by fire, it was held, (1) that the owner was entitled to a limitation of liability to the value of its interest in ship and freight, under the act of 1851. (2) That the point of time at which the amount or value of the owner's interest in ship and freight is to be taken for fixing its liability is the termination of the voyage on which the loss or damage occurs. (3) That if the ship is lost at sea, or the voyage be otherwise broken up before arriving at her port of destination, the voyage is then terminated for the purpose of fixing the owner's liability. (4) That in the present case the voyage was terminated when the ship had sunk, and that her value at that time was the limit of the owner's liability, and that the subsequent raising of the wreck and repair of the ship, giving her an increased value, had nothing to do with the liability of the owner. (5) That no freight except what is earned is to be estimated in fixing the amount of the owner's liability. (6) That insurance is no part of the owner's interest in the ship or freight, within the meaning of the law, and does not enter into the amount for which the owner is held liable. (7) That the limitation of liability is applicable to proceedings in rem against the ship, as well as to proceeedings in personam against the owner; the limitation extends to the owner' property as well as to his person. (8) That the right to proceed for a limitation of liability is not lost or waived by a surrender of the ship to underwriters. PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York.

The opinion states the case.

J. Langdon Ward, R. H. Huntley, C. R. Ingersoll and Samuel W. Bower, for appellants.

J. W. C. Leveridge and Jeremiah Halsey, for appellee.

BRADLEY, J. This case arose out of a collision which occurred on Long Island Sound, opposite Hunt

ington, on the 18th of April, 1866, between the steamboat City of Norwich, belonging to the Norwich & New York Transportation Company, the appellees, and the schooner General S. Van Vliet, belonging to the schooner and her cargo were sunk and lost, and William A. Wright and others, appellants, by which

the steamboat was set on fire and sunk, and her cargo lost. The owners of the schooner filed a libel in personam in the District Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut against the owners of the steamboat, and obtained a decree for about $20,000 for the schooner and about $2,000 for her cargo, with interest. Before the decree was passed the respondents filed a petition, stating that proceedings in rem had been commenced against the steamboat in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York, for the recovery of damages for the loss of the cargo on board said steamboat; and they prayed leave to show the whole amount of damages sustained by all parties, and the value of the steamer and her freight then pending; and that the libellants might have a decree for only such proportion of damages sustained by them as the value of steamer and freight bore to the whole amount of damages sustained by all parties by the collision; this claim being made under the limited liability act of 1851.

The District Court denied the prayer of this petition, holding that it had no jurisdiction to give relief. On appeal to the Circuit Court the decree was affirmed, and the petition for limitation of liability was denied on the ground that cases of collision were not within the act. The case then came to this court, and we held: First, that the act of 1851 adopted the general maritime law in reference to limited liability,

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contradistinguished from the English law measuring the liability by the value of the ship and freight after instead of before the collision; secondly, that the act embraced cases of damage received by collision as well as cases of injury to the cargo of the offending ship; thirdly, that the District Courts of the United States, as courts of admiralty, have jurisdiction to administer the law; fourthly, that the proper court to hear and determine the question is the court which has possession of the fund-that is, the ship and freight, or the proceeds and value thereof. And in view of the want of rules of procedure, and of any uniform practice on the subject, we directed that proceedings should be suspended in the District Court of Connecticut, in order to give the respondents an opportunity of making the proper application to the District Court of the Eastern District of New York, which had possession of the steamer, or a stipulation for her value in lieu of the steamer itself. We also adopted some general rules of practice for the aid and guidance of the District Court in such cases 13 Wall. 104.

parties and the court; secondly, that the appraisement should have been for the value of the steamer immediately before the collision; thirdly, that it should have been for the value immediately after the collision, before the occurrence of damage by the fire; fourthly, that there should have been no deduction for the expenses of raising the steamer; fifthly, that the sum of $600 should have been added for the pend. ing freight; sixthly, that the money received for insurance on the vessel should have been added, amounting to $49,283.07.

The exceptions were overruled, and a decree was made authorizing the petitioners to pay into court the sum of $2,500, the value of the steamer, and directing a monition to issue, citing all parties interested to appear and prove their claims, restraining the further prosecution of all suits, and appointing a commissioner to take proof of claims. On the subsequent report of the commissioner a final decree was made in January, 1879, distributing the fund in court, and discharging the petitioners from further demands. The case was appealed to the Circuit Court, and argued before Mr. Justice Strong, who in October, 1879, affirmed the decree of the District Court, but the decree of affirmance was not entered until July 3, 1882. That decree is now before us for review.

The libel in rem, filed in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York was filed by George Place and Charles Place (now appellants here), in August, 1866, after the steamboat had been raised and carried to the shore of Long Island and repaired. The Norwich & New York Transportation Company appeared as claimants, and filed an answer and a petition to have the benefit of the act of 1851 for a limitation of their liability to the value of the steamboat and freight pending at the time of the collision and fire. Other libels were also filed by other owners of cargo. The steamer as repaired was appraised at $70 000.


The finding of facts by the Circuit Court is substantially as follows: (1) It states the fact of the collision, and that "it was caused by the negligence of the steamboat's officers or hands, without any design, neglect, privity or knowledge of her owners. Very soon, within half an hour after the collision, the boat took fire, her deck and upper works were burned off, and she sunk in about twenty fathoms of water. The fire was the direct consequence of the collision, and inseparable from it. It was caused by the rushing of the waters through the broken hull of the boat, whereby the fire was driven out of the furnaces upon the woodwork, and the boat sank by reason of her filling with water. (2) At the time of the disaster the boat had a cargo of merchandise on board belonging to different freighters, all of which was totally lost. The freight then pending amounted to $600, but none of it was earned or received by the ship-owners. (3) Some time after the steamboat was sunk, and her cargo destroyed, she was raised by salvors and taken to the Long Island shore, within the port of New York, where she was repaired." (4) It states the suit of Wright & Co. in the District Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, and the decision of the Supreme Court in that case. (5) It states the proceedings upon libel filed by George and Charles Place in the District Court for the Eastern district of New York, the appraisement at $70,000, and the release of the vessel to the complainants (the Norwich & New York Transportation Company), upon their giving stipulation therefor, adding: "The stipulation purported to be for the security, not only of the Messrs. Place, but also for the benefit of all persons who might, by due proceedings in said court, show themselves entitled to liens upon the vessel by reason of said collision. The appraisement was of the value of the vessel as it was after she had been raised and repaired. It was returned into the court on the 11th of March, 1867, and the stipulation in the amount of the appraisement was filed on the 29th day of the same month. On the 20th day of December, 1869, the District Court ordered decrees to be entered in favor of the libellants in all the suits commenced against the steamer as aforesaid. (6) Such was the condition of the litigation when the present petition was filed in July, 1872, after the rendition of the judgment by the Supreme Court in the case of the libel of William A. Wright et al. in the District Court of Connecticut. The petition prayed that in


On the 13th day of June, 1872, after the decision of this court was rendered in the case of Norwich & New York Transp. Co. v. Wright, 13 Wall. 126, the company, by leave of the court, filed a new petition in the District Court for the Eastern District of New York for the benefit of limited liability under the act of 1851, conformable to the rules adopted by this court. The petition stated the various claims against the vessel arising out of the collision (amounting to nearly $150,000), the previous proceedings that had been taken, the libels that had been filed, the circumstances of the loss, the raising and repair of the vessel, etc., and prayed for a new appraisement in accordance with the decision of this court, a monition to claimants, etc., as will more fully appear in the finding of facts made by the Circuit Court, hereinafter stated.

Orders for publication and appraisement were made pursuant to the prayer of the petition, and the commissioner appointed to make the appraisement reported as follows, to-wit: "In ascertaining the value of the steamboat City of Norwich, as directed by the order of reference herein, I have followed what I understood to have been the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Wright against the owners of this boat (13 Wall. 104), and have ascertained her value in the situation and condition she was in after the collision, and before she was raised; and I find from the testimony taken before me that she was at that time of the value of $2,500. I have arrived at such value by taking the testimony as to her value in New York after she was raised by her owners and brought there, which shows that she was then and there worth the sum of $25,000, and I have deducted from that amount the sum of $22,500, being the sum which, according to the testimony, it had actually cost to raise her and bring her to New York, which leaves $2,500 to be her value, as I have above stated."

Exceptions were taken to the report-First, that the former appraisement of $70,000 was binding on the

conformity with the act of Congress, the decision of the Supreme Court, and the admiralty rules made in pursuance thereof, the court would cause an appraisement to be made of the value of the interest of the petitioners in the steamboat, and her freight for the voyage in which she was employed, for which they were liable, and that an order should be made for paying the amount of such valuation into court, or for giving a stipulation therefor, with sureties. It prayed further for a monition against all the persons claiming damages arising out of the said collision and fire, citing them to appear and make proof of their claims; and it prayed also for a restraining order against the further prosecution of all or any suits against the steamboat or the petitioners for any damage caused by the collision, fire and loss. There was also a prayer for general relief. The monition was issued, the appellants appeared, and an order was made for an appraisement of the amount of value of the interest of the petitioners as owners respectively of said steamboat and her freight, pending for the voyage upon which she was employed, for which the petitioners were liable. A restraining order, as prayed for, was also made. Pursuant to the direction of the court an appraisement was made. The appraiser ascertained and reported the value of the steamboat as she lay immediately after the collision and fire, and before she was raised, to have been $2,500; and the District Court confirmed the report, and ordered the amount to be paid into the registry, which was accordingly done. (7) The value of the interest of the petitioners in the steamboat, as she was immediately after the disaster, was $2,500, and no more. (8) The value of that interest immediately before the collision was $70,000. (9) When the collision occurred the steamboat was insured against fire (not against marine disaster), and upon the several policies the petitioners, as owners, have recovered from the underwriters the sum of $49,283.07; that part of said sum was recovered by the petitioner herein in an action brought by it in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Connecticut, on one of said fire policies, against the Western Massachusetts Insurance Company. One of the defenses in that action was that the loss and damages were occasioned by the collision (which is the same mentioned in these proceedings), while the petitioner herein claimed that the greater part of the loss was by fire. The court held in that case that there were two classes of losses; one the damage done by the steamer by the collision itself, and the other caused by the fire. The damages caused by the collision were proved at $15,000. The damages caused by the fire were determined to be $69,000. The said insurance company moved for a new trial, but the motion was denied. (10) The steamboat itself has never been surrendered or transferred to a trustee for the persons injured by her fault."

The conclusions at which Justice Strong arrived upon these facts were (1) that the value of the steamboat immediately after her collision and fire, as she lay at the bottom of the Sound, with her pending freight, was the measure of the owners' liability, and the amount to be apportioned; (2) that insurance is not an interest in the vessel within the meaning of the third section of the act of 1851, or section 4283 of the Revised Statutes; (4) that the limitation of the owners' liability under the act is as applicable when the proceeding is in rem as when it is in personam, so that if the owners' liability is only the amount of the vessel's value when at the bottom of the Sound, the vessel's liability, after being raised and repaired, is no greater.

[Omitting a minor question.]

The next question to be considered is, at what time ought the value and her pending freight to be taken,

in fixing the amount of her owners' liability? Ought it to be taken as it was immediately before the collision, or afterward? And if afterward, at what time afterward?

The first question has been repeatedly answered by the decisions of this court. We held in Norwich Co. v. Wright, and have held and decided in many cases since, that the act of Congress adopted the rule of the maritime law as contradistinguished from that of the English law on this subject; and that the value of the vessel and freight after, and not before, the collision is to be taken. But at what precise time after the collision this valuation should be taken has not been fully determined so as to establish a general rule on the subject. That is a question which deserves some consideration.

In the case of The Scotland, 105 U. S. 24, the collision occurred opposite Fire Island light, and the steamer being much injured, put back in order, if possible, to return to New York, but was unable to get further than the middle-ground outside and south of Sandy Hook, where she sunk, and nothing was saved but a few striplings, taken from her before she went down. We held that these striplings were all of the ship that could be valued, although she had run thirty or forty miles after the collision. The value was taken, not as it was, or as it might have been supposed to be, immediately after the collision, but as it was after the effects of the collision were fully developed in the sinking of the ship.

An examination of the statute will afford light on this subject. Section 4283 declares that the liability of the owner of any vessel (for various acts and things mentioned) shall "in no case" exceed the value of his interest in the vessel and her freight then pending. When it says "in no case," does it mean that for each case of “embezzlement, loss, destruction, col1sion," etc., happening during the whole voyage, his liability may extend to the value of his whole interest in the vessel? Twenty cases might occur in the course of a voyage, and all at different times. Does not the provisions made in section 4284, for compensation pro rata to each party injured, apply to all cases of loss and damage happening during the entire voyage--happening, that is, by the fault of the master or crew, and without the privity or knowledge of the owner? Pending freight is of no value to the shipowner until it is earned, and it is not earned, if earned at all, until the conclusion of the voyage. Does this not show that every "case" in which the principle of liability is to be applied means every voyage? We think it does. It seems to us that the fair inference to be drawn from section 4283 is that the voyage defines the limits and boundary of the casus or case to which the law is to be applied.

This is rendered certain by the language of section 4284, which is: "Whenever any such embezzlement, loss or destruction is suffered by several freighters or owners of goods, wares, merchandise or any property whatever, on the same voyage, and the whole value of the vessel and her freight for the voyage, is not sufficient to make compensation!to each of them, they shall receive compensation from the owner of the vessel in proportion to their respective losses." There may be more than one case of embezzlement during the voyage, and more than one case of loss and destruction, and they may happen at different and successive times, yet they are to be compensated pro rata. This shows conclusively that it must be at the termination of the "voyage" that the vessel is to be appraised, and the freight (if any be earned) is to be added to the account for the purpose of showing the amount of the owner's liability.

This conclusion is corroborated by section 4285, which declares that it shall be a sufficient compliance

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