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ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DECISIONS.

CARRIER--PASSENGER--DUTY TO CARRY SAFELY--BURDEN OF PROOF.-When a carrier has failed to convey its passengers safely the burden of proof is on the carrier to show that it has exercised requisite care and foresight. It may be said that the plaintiff is bound to establish by evidence all the material averments in his declaration, and as he has averred the defendant's negligence as the foundation of his action, the burden of proof is upon him to establish it. The proposition is most true when abstractly considered. And yet abstract propositions most usually mislead and perplex the judgment when they are stated without reference to the circumstances which justly modify their application. Let us consider the facts to which this prayer was applied. It was not controverted that the plaintiff had received an injury while travelling as a passenger on one of the defendant's cars. Indeed the very terms of the prayer assume these facts; they do not ask that the jury are to find whether the plaintiff was injured, but proceeding on the basis that the injury had been inflicted, they seek to instruct the jury as to the rule by which they are to decide the question of negligence. They say that under these circumstances the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. The contrary is established law of this State. It being the duty of the carrier to convey his passengers safely, so far as it can be done by human care and foresight, when he has failed to convey them safely, it is held that he must show that he has exercised all that care and foresight which were required of him by his contract with them. In Stokes v. Saltonstall, 19 Pet. 181, where an action was brought by the plaintiff to recover damages for injuries received by his wife from the upsetting of a stage coach in which she was a passenger, the first instruction given by the court at nisi prius stated that the facts that the coach was upset and the plaintiff's wife injured were prima facie evidence that there was carelessness or negligence or want of skill on the part of the driver, and that they threw upon the defendant the burden of proving that the accident was not occasioned by the defendant's fault; this ruling was approved by the Supreme Court. In its opinion the court refers with approbation to Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79, where it was held that the plaintiff made a prima facie case by proving his going on the coach, the accident, and the damage he had suffered. Both of these cases have repeatedly received the sanction of the court. In Worthington v. B. & O. R. R. Co., 21 Md. 275, where an injury to a passenger was caused by the displacement of a switch on the railroad track, the court approves an instruction to the jury to the following effect, as stated in the opinion: "That the injury to the plaintiff was presumptive evidence of negligence ou the part of the defendants, and it was incumbent ou them to prove that they were not negligent in order to discharge themselves from liability." In B. & O. R. R. Co .v. State, use of Mahone, 63 Md., an action for negligent killing, the plaintiff's second prayer maintains that if the deceased was killed while occupying the relation of a passenger, the presumption was that the injury resulted from the negligence of the defendant, unless the defendant showed that the injury did not result from its negligence, or that it could have been avoided by ordinary care on the part of the deceased. And this court held that it was properly granted. The opinion of the court refers with approval to Christie v. Griggs, Stokes v. Saltonstall, Stockton v. Frey, 4 Gill, 406; Carpue v. London & Brighton R. Co., 5 Q.B. 749; 48 E. C. L. R.; Skinner v. London R. Co., Exch. 786. In Carpue's case Lord Denman ruled at nisi prius that the plaintiff proved a prima facie case of neg

ligence against defendants by showing that when the accident occurred the train and railway were exclusively under their managenent. A rule nisi for a new trial on the ground of misdirection having been obtained at the argument in the King's Bench, the eminent counsel for the defendant gave up the point. In Skinner's case, where one railroad ran into another, and a passenger in the first train was injured by the accident, it was held that the fact of the accident was prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the carrier. These citations show the state of the law in Maryland on the question presented by the fifth prayer of the defendant. We are aware that highly respectable authorities elsewhere hold otherwise. But we are bound by our own decisions, and moreover they are agreeable to reason. Md. Ct. App., June 24, 1886. Baltimore & Y. Turnpike Co. v. Leonhardt. Opinion by Bryan, J.

CORPORATIONS-MORTGAGE OF CORPORATE PROPERTY-ALL STOCK OWNED BY ONE PERSON.-When all the stock of a private corporation is owned by one person, a mortgage executed by him creates a valid equitable lien on the property of the corporation, enforceable against him and his representatives, and it is not necessary for the corporation as such to unite with him in the mortgage. We think the mortgage to Swift was good and operative to charge the property conveyed by it, irrespective of the attempted execution by the company. At the time of its execution, Cruikshank had become the owner of all the stock of the company, and of all its property. From that moment he might have renounced his rights under the act of incorporation, and might bave conducted the business as a private individual, without corporate formalities. Being then absolute proprietor in equity of all that belonged to a purely private enterprise, in which the public had no interest whatever, we know of no principle, on the ground of public policy or otherwise, requiring his act, in charging the property for the agreed indebtedness of the corporation to Swift, for loans to and claims against it, and for his stock in it sold to Cruikshank, to be denied efficacy because he had not then reorganized the company, and brought in other persons to help him to do that in a corporate way which we think, from the very nature of the business, he had a right to abandon entirely, and even the business if he chose. A man can certainly do what he pleases with his own property, if he does not thereby prejudice any of the rights of subsisting cred itors. It does not appear that any existing creditors were injuriously affected thereby. The appellees became such afterward. It is true that the corporation, as such, united (whether effectually or not is immaterial to discuss) with Cruikshank in the mortgage. Why it was thought necessary for it to do so we do not know. Its doing so has certainly complicated the matter, and as we think, diverted the mind of the court below from the true and only equitable aspect of the case. If there had been no attempt on the part of the corporation to unite in the mortgage, and it had only been executed by Cruikshank, who was the sole owner of all the property mortgaged, how could it have been denied operation? And would not the per sons who took stock from Cruikshank afterward, and participated in perpetuating the operations of the corporation, have held subject to the mortgage put on the effects of the corporation before they bought the stock? And with such mortgage of record, would not persons dealing with and trusting the corporation afterward be affected with knowledge of such mortgage, and be subordinated to it? There would seem to be no escape from such conclusion. In the Bellona Co case, 3 Bland, 446, the chancellor says the ownership by one person of all the stock of a private corporation aggregate virtually dissolves the corporation. For the

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time being it certainly does suspend corporate action, although according to the now generally received understanding of the law, such sole owner may dispose of some of his stock to others and continue the corporate existence by the election of necessary officers. Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. 70; Newton Manuf. Co. v. White, 42 Ga. 148; Boone Corp., §§ 199, 200. While therefore the purchase by Cruikshank of all the stock in the corporation, and all its property, did not necessarily work a surrender of the company's franchise, it did virtually, for the time being, suspend its operations as a corporation until the election of new officers through new stockholders purchasing from Cruikshank. If from the moment of becoming sole owner, Cruikshank, as already suggested, had concluded to conduct the business as an individual, and without corporation formalities, can it be doubted that in such case this mortgage, executed by him, created a valid equitable lien on the property, enforceable against him and his representatives, and that in such case the execution, or attempted execution, thereof by the corporation could be wholly disregarded? The mortgage expressly provides for the payment to Cruikshank or his representatives (and not to the corporation) of any surplus proceeds after satisfying the mortgage in case of sale for default. It thus appears that the transaction was regarded by the participants in it (and all who were interested did participate) as giving Cruikshank the absolute control and ownership of all that pertained to the company. If so, his right to equitably charge it with the company's debts and his own ought not, it would seem, to be questioned. Md. Ct. App., June 23, 1886. Swift v. Smith. Opinion by Irving, J.

DAMAGES-EXEMPLARY-LIABILITY OF CARRIER FOR ASSUALT BY SERVANT.-The second exception is that the mate's visit to the deck-room was to remove the deck passengers from the freight there, and this was accomplished before any assault was made by the mate; and it is insisted that the injury was not inflicted in the removal of the plaintiff from the freight, and therefore not in the performance of his duty as servant, and the defendant cannot be held for exemplary | damages. The court had charged that upon the contract count plaintiff could not recover exemplary damages, but that the jury might under the second count, if they found that the mate of the defendant, while having charge of the vessel, committed an assault upon plaintiff, a passenger, not in his own defense, and that the blow which injured the plaintiff was inflicted with malice, willfully, etc., give exem plary damages. The argument is that the act complained of is not within the scope of the servant's employment; that it was done in the execution or furtherance of the removal of plaintiff from the freight. But the court charged the jury, and we think properly, that if the mate, while in charge of the vessel, committed an unwarrantable assault upon the plaintiff, a passenger, plaintiff might recover. This principle is declared in Thomp. Carr. 392, and in the case therein reported of Pendleton v. Kinsley, reported in 3 Cliff. 416. In the opinion of Justice Clifford, of the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting in the United States Circuit Court, Rhode Island district, it is said the principles of law applicable to the relations of master and servant do not fully define the rights, duties and obligations between carriers and their passengers. The carrier agrees to carry for hire the'passengers from one place to another, and is responsible for any breach of the obligation they assume, in the ill treatment of the passenger by himself or employees. And in the case cited it was held that the clerk of a steamer, on one of her regular trips, getting into a dispute with one of the passengers, and inflicting per

sonal injuries upon him, the owner was liable; and this would be so, irrespective of the dispute, and as if nothing had arisen, although defendant did not authorize the acts of his employee. Exemplary damages in actions for torts are given where fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression intervenes (Sedg. Dam. 35), and where the liability of the principal arises from the acts of agents, employees or officers, the law is well settled in Tennessee that the rule prevails in respect to exemplary damages. Haley v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 7 Baxt. 240; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 8 Lea, 438; Louisville, N. & G. S. R. Co. v. Guinan, 11 id. 98. See also Sedg. Dam. (6th ed.), note on pages 570, 571. This second exception is not well taken, and will be overruled. Tenn. Sup. Ct., June 10, 1886. Springer Transp. Co. v. Smith. Opinion by Deaderick, C. J.

EXEMPLARY-TORT-HUSBAND'S LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S TORT.-Exemplary damages are recoverable in an action against a husband and wife for the malicious trespass of the wife, even though the husband is free from blame. When two persons have so conducted themselves as to be jointly liable for a tort, each is responsible for the injury committed by their common act; but when motive may be taken into consideration, the improper motive of one cannot be made the ground of aggravating the damages against the other if he is free from such motive. In such case the plaintiff must elect against which party he will seek aggra vated damages. Clark v. Newsam, 1 Exch. 131. So a master, sued for the trespass of his servant, is not liable for exemplary damages, however evil the motive of the servant, if he is himself without malice. The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546; Cleghorn v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 44. In all these cases it is to be observed that the plaintiff has his election to proceed against all or any of the wrong-doers; and as in such case it would be unjust to make the malicious motive of one party the ground of enhancing damages against another who is free from such motive, if the plaintiff proceeds against all, he thereby deprives himself of the right he otherwise would have had to claim exemplary damages. But the case is different when suit is brought for a tort of the wife, for which the husband is liable solely by reason of her coverture, for then the plaintiff has no election, but must proceed against both. And herein lies the distinction between this case and the cases relied upon by the defendant; for the husband is liable, not as master, but as husband, and because of the oneness of the twain in the eye of the law. We have not referred to, nor have we found, much authority for this distinction, but we think it must exist in principle. Vt. Sup. Ct., Aug. 21, 1886. Lombard v. Batchelder. Opinion by Rowell, J.

DISCONTINUANCE BY PARTNER-FRAUD.-Although where partners are plaintiffs, and the obligation sought to be enforced is to the partnership, the right of one plaintiff to discontinue the action against the will of the co-plaintiff is generally conceded, he will not be permitted so to discontinue the action when shown to be acting in fraud or collusion with the debtor, or when it appears that the remaining plaintiff will suffer injury. Noonan v. Orton, 31 Wis. 265, 274276; Loring v. Brackett, 3 Pick. 403; Winslow v. Newlan, 45 Ill. 145; Holkirk v. Holkirk, 4 Madd. 50. In such circumstances the most which the plaintiff desiring to discontinue can require is indemnity from his co-plaintiff against damage in case judgment should go for the defendant. Winslow v. Newlan, 45 Ill. 145. R. I. Sup. Ct., July 10, 1886. Arnold v. Greene. Opiuion per Curiam.

REMOVAL OF CAUSE-SUIT AGAINST UNITED STATES MARSHAL ATTACHING GOODS.—A United States mar

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shal who has taken goods on attachment, and is sued in the State courts for conversion, has no right as such marshal to remove his defense into the Federal courts. It has been thought proper by Congress to give to officers appointed under or acting by authority of the revenue laws of the United States, and under laws in. tended to secure to all the equal enjoyment of the elective franchise, the right to a trial in a Federal court if claimed. Rev. Stats. U. S., § 643. Under this statute it was held that while a United States marshal and deputy marshal were not officers appointed under the revenue laws of the United States, yet that they were entitled to remove a cause pending against them in a State court to a Federal court, if the act which is made the basis of the action be one done under the authority of a revenue law of the United States. Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U. S. 597. This was not because the defendant was a marshal or a deputy marshal, but because of the fact that he was acting under the revenue laws. The fact that the right to remove from a State court to a Federal court is given to those persons whose duty it is to enforce named laws, or who may be appointed under them, strongly evidences the intention of Congress that only those so appointed or employed shall have such right by reason of the laws under which they are appointed or act. The filing of a transcript of the record in the Federal court, and the action subsequently had in that court, could not affect the right of the appellee to have the cause tried in the State court, which properly acquired and retained jurisdiction. Tex. Sup. Ct., June 6, 1886. McKee v. Coffin. Opinion by Stayton, J.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS MEMORANDUM - PAROL EVIDENCE. It is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds requiring that the memorandum of guaranty shall show who are the parties to the contract, if that fact appears by description instead of by name; and if the promisor or promisee is described instead of named, parol evidence is admissible to and identify the person meant. June 80, 1886. Jones v. Low. C. J.

apply the description Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., Opinion by Morton,

TELEGRAPH TO PREPAY ANSWER.-A rule of a telegraph company requiring that a transient persou sending a message calling for an answer shall deposit in advance an amount sufficient to pay for a reply of ten words is not unreasonable. The only case directly in point as to the reasonableness of these rules in their relation to the deposit of money to pay for the expected answer by transient persons, is that of W. U. Tel. Co. v. McGuire, 104 Ind. 130; S. C., 54 Am. Rep. 296, where it was held to be reasonable, and I am of the same opinion. I am not entirely satisfied with the grounds of that judgment; for it seems to me to place the ruling too entirely upon a mere question of etiquette between the parties to the correspondence. But there is great force in the argument of plaintiff's counsel that it is none of the telegraph company's business to enforce rules of social courtesy like that; and since it cannot know whether there will be any reply, or whether if there be the circumstances may not be such that the sender of the answer should himself pay pay for it, and be anxious and willing to do so, the company should not refuse to send the original message, if it be paid for. He likened it to a regulation of a carrier of passengers refusing to transport a passenger at regular rates, unless he should buy a return ticket. And I take it that in an equal number of cases the relation of the parties may be such that the sender might reasonably expect and demand, notwithstanding the social rule of courtesy above referred to, that his correspondent should pay for the answer, and that in an equal number of cases he does do so. In many other cases, when the original message is solely

- REASONABLE REGULATIONS-DEPOSIT

about his own business, the sender may reasonably hope and expect the answer to be paid for by the other party. Again, often a transient person in distress, and with reduced funds, might wish to rely on the other party to pay for the answer; and since the company may protect itself by refusing to take the answer without prepayment by its sender, it would seem an unreasonable hardship, under those circumstances, to demand that he pay for both messages in advance. Or he might wish to go away to receive the answer, or to receive it over another line, or at another place. etc., and so under many imaginable circumstances, be reasonably exempt from the burden of depositing money in advance for a message he may never receive, and find it inconvenient and expensive to get back his deposit. Hence, take it altogether, I should not support the reasonablenes of this regulation wholly on the ground of the sender's obligation to pay for the answer. He may very often be not so obliged, and that is an answer to it. But I think this regulation is a reasonable one, notwithstanding the force of the plaintiff's attack on this Indiana case. It should not be segregated from the other regulations of the company on the subject of collecting the tolls, and tested by itself alone, on the reasoning of plaintiff's argument, as above set forth. This is only one regulation of a carefully devised system for securing payment of tolls, consistently with enlarged accommodation of the public in allowing the customers of defendant to regulate among themselves this very matter of adjusting the burden of these tolls. I have quoted in the statement of facts the entire regulations on the subject, as I find them printed, italics and all, and an analysis of them shows that the company is endeavoring to accommodate the public as much as possible in this matter. It might reasonably, as the railroads do as to passenger fares, demand prepayment by the sender of all messages, whether they be originals or answers. But it does not do this. It allows auswers to be sent at the expense of the person whose message is answered, and this is a privilege and a benefit it seeks to confer on the original sender by undertaking to collect of him that toll instead of requiring his correspondent to pay it, thereby lessening the chances of his answering at all. It requires all original messages to be prepaid or guarantied. If guarantied the company will allow the sender, if he choose, to place the burden of the toll on the addressee, by itself undertaking to collect the toll of him in the first instance, but of the sender at last, if the other refuses to pay. It seeks as to answers to accommodate the public in the same way, by undertaking to collect of the person addressed; and as I understand the regulations, the sender of the answer is not expected to pay at all, certainly not to prepay, unless it be an answer to a message which has been sent to be collected from himself, or is sent to parties away from home, or addressed to hotels: and in these last-mentioned cases he need not prepay if it be an answer to a message marked answer prepaid." In order to give them their correspondents, and all persons who are interested in the use of the telegraph, the benefit of this system of collecting and adjusting tolls, the requirement is made that transient persons shall pay for the expected answers in advance, and it is not unreasonable, as a part of that system. It may be that a more liberal rule might be devised for transient persons, and that this one operates sometimes harshly and inconveniently; but that is not the question. In view of the whole system, a court cannot say that the power and discretion of the company to determine for itself what is best for all concerned has been unreasonably exercised. It has a choice of its own regulations, and the test of reasonableness is not whether some other would answer its purposes as well or better, but

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whether this is fairly and generally beneficial to the company, and all its customers. Cir. Ct., W. D. Tenn., July 1, 1886. Hewlett v. Western Union Tel. Co. Opinion by Hammond, J.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE PATENT LAWS.

Editor of the Albany Law Journal:

of procuring its allowance without the expenditure of a cent by the inventor.

And as regards the difficulty and expense of protecting and enforcing the rights of the inventor after he has become a patentee, no doubt, the expense of a suit in equity is considerable, sometimes very heavy, and no doubt a wealthy and unscrupulous client, aided by a sharp attorney, can somewhat delay the final decision; but this is no more true of patent causes than of others, inasmuch as the same law and the same rules of practice apply to all, and whatever is true of a suit for the infringement of a patent is true of the whole system of equity jurisprudence. While it would require omniscience to frame a perfect system of law, and omnipotence to enforce it absolutely without error, I do not believe that the judges of the United States courts are so stupid or corrupt as to fail to do justice, according to the facts presented by the testimony in the great majority of cases brought before them, whether in re

In an article published in the JOURNAL of September 4, entitled "Shall the Patent Laws be Repealed?" your correspondent arraigns the present system of patent laws, on the ground that as administered they operate only to the benefit of the "rich, the powerful, and the influential," and do not tend to "promote the progress of science and the useful arts." The remedy for this supposed state of affairs, the only hope for the poor inventor, ground down by the iron heel of capital, he finds, not in any possible change in the laws re-gard to patents or other subjects. lating to patterns, but in their repeal. While it is not likely that any such backward step will be taken in this or any other country, still the suggestion has been made of late with sufficient frequency to fairly demand a reply.

That the "progress of science and useful arts" has been promoted by our patent laws may be freely inferred from the wonderful improvements that have been made in the appliances of every branch of industry under the operation of the patent laws. The industry and ingenuity of the inventor is stimulated by the hope of gain which the possession of a patent for his improvements offers. That a large proportion of the devices patented are never commercially remunerative is no doubt true, but for the time and money wasted in devising "improvements," which are not improvements, and articles for which there is no demand, the patent laws are no more responsible than they are for attempts to solve the secret of perpetual motion or to find the philosopher's stone.

But is the actual inventor of real and valuable improvements able to obtain a patent for his invention under our laws? I venture to assert that in the majority of cases where he does not it is owing either to his own neglect or the incompetency of his attorney. The law gives to the inventor every opportunity to establish the facts relating to his invention and to obtain a patent when he should rightfully have one.

If dissatisfied with the decision of the primary examiner, who first passes upon his application, he can appeal to the board of examiners in chief, from these in turn to the commissioner in person, and from the commissioner (except in interference cases) to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and if still convinced that justice has not been done him, may by a bill in equity have the decision of either the commissioner or the District Court, reviewed in a United States Circuit Court, and thence can (probably) go to the Supreme Court of the United States.

However much of corruption, collusion and bribery there may be in the patent office (and I have yet to learn that matters are worse there than in other departments of the government), it would be strange indeed if justice is not found somewhere before the bottom of this well is reached, certainly the law has given every opportunity. But all this costs money. Certainly it is no fault of the law nor its administration that the rights of contending applicants cannot be determined for nothing.

The patent office fees are undoubtedly reasonablemuch lower in this country than in almost any other while the courts recognize the poverty of an applicant as a valid excuse for otherwise unreasonable delay in filing his application. As a matter of fact an interest in the prospective patent frequently pays all the expenses

In the case supposed by your correspondent the poor complainant is finally thrown out of court because of his inability to print the mass of irrelevant testimony taken on behalf of the respondent. This however is entirely a local trouble. It could not have happened in New York, where each party is required to print his own testimony, a rule which is in force in most of the United States Circuit Courts, and the poor patentee might have entirely avoided the expense of printing, as well as the delay incident to taking testimony out of court, by bringing an action at law to recover damages for the infringement of his patent instead of a suit in equity.

As an illustration-and the only one given—of the alleged flagrant disregard of the law by the courts, your correspondent says: "Under section 823, Revised Statutes, this (the cost of printing testimony) is absolutely prohibited from being taxed as costs; yet in defiance of the statute the court goes straight on and taxes printing as costs against the losing party all the same." A more careful reading of the statute, or the advice of competent counsel, will show him that sec tion 823 does nothing of the kind, but relates solely to the amount of compensation to attorneys and others which shall be taxed as costs (vid. 12 Blatchf. 195), while section 983, United States Revised Statutes, distinctly provides that the cost of printing may be taxed as costs against the losing party. Such manifest errors in detail tend to make one doubt the accuracy of other statements.

*

In Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U. S. 199, Justice Bradley says: "The process of development in manufactures creates a constant demand for new appliances. * * Each step forward prepares the way for the next, and each is usually taken by spontaneous trials and attempts in a hundred different places. To grant to a single party a monopoly of every slight advance made, except where the exercise of invention somewhat above ordinary mechanical or engineering skill is distinctly shown, is unjust in principle and injurious in its consequences. The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make some substantial discovery or invention which adds to our knowledge, and makes a step in advance in the useful arts. praise."

Such inventors are worthy of all

And such inventors will in the great majority of cases find an adequate reward for their intelligence and industry under the patent laws as now in force and administered. While error and fraud will now and then be found in the administration of the law to attempt to prevent this by repealing the law would be like cutting down a tree in order to kill the worms on its branches.

NEW YORK, Sept. 14, 1886.

CLARKSON A. COLLINS

The Albany
Albany Law
Law Journal.

ALBANY, OCTOBER 2, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

WO recent Indiana decisions will be of interest to those engaged in the championship of women's rights. In Watkins v. Romine, 106 Ind. 378, it was held that an administratrix, a second wife, is not entitled to an allowance for expenses incurred in removing the body of the decedent from one cemetery to another, where the former was suitable, had been selected by the decedent, was nearer his home, and was the one where his first wife was buried, and where his children desired he should be interred. Cremation would render the solution of such questions much easier. The other case is Henning v. State, 106 Ind. 386, where the court said: "The refusal of a person to carry out a marriage contract, or a suspicion on the part of the accused that the deceased, being his betrothed, was indulging in sexual intercourse with other men, or a detection by the accused of the deceased in an act of illicit sexual intercourse, will not constitute such a provocation as will reduce the killing from murder to manslaughter. We think it abundantly settled that no man can deliberately take a woman's life, even though she is his betrothed, because he believes that she is false to him, and if he does slay her, after time for deliberation, he is guilty of murder in the first degree. If upon first discovering her infidelity he slays her, then possibly the killing might be reduced to manslaughter, but it is nothing less than murder, when after ample time for passion to subside, he deliberately kills her." Why should the court in the last sentence thus obiter encourage disappointed suitors to hurry up the killing?

The London Law Times, commenting on Davis v. Shepstone, which we reported last week, pronounced the decision "calculated to do a dis-service to the welfare of the public," and continues: "To appreciate these remarks it must be remembered that the judicial committee are speaking of the reports of acts and words supposed to have been done or said by men in their public capacity. If this ruling is If this ruling is thoroughly regarded by the press there will be little check indeed on the doings of public officials, for no newspaper can safely report any act of official misconduct unless its editor has such complete evidence as can be relied upon as sufficient to prove the misconduct to the satisfaction of a court of justice. It is obvious that this can rarely be obtained, so that the public servants may, if they think fit, commit all sorts of official misconduct and iniquity with little fear of the press daring to expose them. In the particular case before us the newspaper

seems to have been somewhat reckless in its assertions, and not only reported the alleged facts of misconduct, but actually charged the plaintiff with VOL. 34-No. 14.

them, and vouched for the truth of the charges. We have no sympathy with such hasty proceedings; but we think the law, as laid down by the privy council, is unsatisfactory. Charges of official misconduct, when made against public men on prima facie evidence, and reasonably and moderately stated, ought to be privileged."

Mr. Justice Grantham, of England, recently met with an accident in the cricket field which disabled him from performing judicial duties for some time. This should be a warning to the occupants of the bench not to descend to cricket. Do our transAtlantic brethren "catch on?" Gibson's Law Notes will, we know.

The Central Law Journal, commenting on our recent article on the abuses of the patent system, says: "We are strongly inclined to the opinion that there is a good foundation for these charges, and that this dark corner in Federal jurisprudence might well bear, not a little, but a good deal of illumination. The interests of the public, we are persuaded, would be greatly subserved by a thorough investigation of the whole subject of the patent laws, and especially of the procedure of the Federal courts in their administration, followed by appropriate legislation. We are strengthened in this opinion by our knowledge of the methods of the Federal courts in the matter of receivers, and their arbitrary and unreasonable extension of the authority and functions of those officers. This matter has long been the subject of criticism in professional circles, and has been commented on with great severity by one of the most eminent and distinguished justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, who portrays in the most masterly manner the abuses and injustice which have grown out of the prevalent perversion of the functions of a receiver. It is not unreasonable to expect that a proper investigation will disclose the existence of wrongs, equally flagrant, in the administration of the patent laws, of unnecessary delays which operate a denial of justice, and costs and expenses which amount to confiscation." The Central then quotes the following from our editorial remarks on this topic: "We have no doubt, too, that some of the Federal judges carry on things with a high hand when the mood is on them. This comes of making them independent of the people whose servants they are. It is a wholesome thing to have a judge to know that he is liable to step down and out at a fixed time if he does not behave himself." And observes: "We are hardly prepared to indorse the extreme and radical remedy for the evils of the patent law procedure which is suggested in the last three sentences of this extract. We are not as much addicted to iconoclasm as our contemporary, and hesitate to assail a l' outrance, and without appropriate preliminaries, so venerable and venerated an idol as the life tenure of Federal judicial office. Milder measures are first in order, and contrary to the philosophy of the spelling-book fable, we would

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