« AnteriorContinuar »
ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE
ligence against defendants by showing that when the CISIONS.
accident occurred the train and railway were exclu
sively under their managenent. A rule nisi for a new CARRIER--PASSENGER--DUTY TO CARRY SAFELY--BUR. trial on the ground of misdirection having been obDEN OF PROOF.—When a carrier has failed to convey its tained at the argument in the King's Bench, the emipassengers safely the burden of proof is on the carrier nent counsel for the defendant gave up the point. In to show that it has exercised requisite care and fore- Skinner's case, where one railroad ran into another, sight. It may be said that the plaintiff is bound to and a passenger in the first train was injured by the establish by evidence all the material averments in his
accident, it was held that the fact of the accident was declaration, and as he has averred the defendant's | prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the negligence as the foundation of his action, the burden
carrier. These citations show the state of the law in of proof is upon him to establish it. The proposition Maryland on the question presented by the fifth prayer is most true when abstractly considered. And yet
of the defendant. We are aware that highly respectaabstract propositions most usually mislead and per
ble authorities elsewhere hold otherwise. But we are plex the judgment when they are stated without ref- bound by our own decisions, and moreover they are erence to the circumstances which justly modify their agreeable to reason. Md. Ct. App., June 24, 1886. Balapplication. Let us consider the facts to which this timore & Y. Turnpike Co. v. Leonhardt. Opinion by prayer was applied. It was not controverted that the Bryan, J. plaintiff had received an injury while travelling as a CORPORATIONS-MORTGAGE OF CORPORATE PROPpassenger on one of the defendant's cars. Indeed the ERTY--ALL STOCK OWNED BY ONE PERSON.-When all very terms of the prayer assume these facts; they do the stock of a private corporation is owned by one not ask that the jury are to find whether the plaintiff person, a mortgage executed by him creates a valid was injured, but proceeding on the basis that the in- equitable lien on the property of the corporation, enjury had beeu inflicted, they seek to instruct the jury forceable against him and his representatives, and it · as to the rule by which they are to decide the question is pot necessary for the corporation as such to unite of negligence. They say that under these circum- with him in the mortgage. We think the mortgage to stances the burden of proof is on the plaintiff. The Swift was good and operative to charge the property contrary is established law of this State. It being the conveyed by it, irrespective of the attempted execuduty of the carrier to convey his passengers safely, so tion by the company. At the time of its execution, far as it can be done by human care and foresight, Cruikshank had become the owner of all the stock of when he has failed to convey them safely, it is held the company, and of all its property. From that mothat he must show that he has exercised all that care ment he might have renounced his rights under the avd foresight which were required of him by his con- act of incorporation, and might bave conducted the tract with them. In Stokes v. Saltonstall, 19 Pet. 181, business as a private individual, without corporate where an action was brought by the plaintiff to re- formalities. Being then absolute proprietor in equity cocer damages for injuries received by his wife from of all that belonged to a purely private enterprise, in the upsetting of a stage coach in which she was a pas- which the public had no interest whatever, we know senger, the first instruction given by the court at nisi of no principle, on the ground of public policy or othprius stated that the facts that the coach was upset erwise, requiring his act, in charging the property for and the plaintiff's wife injured were prima facie evi- the agreed indebtedness of the corporation to Swift, dence that there was carelessness or negligence or
for loans to and claims against it, and for his stock in want of skill on the part of the driver, and that they it sold to Cruikshank, to be denied efficacy because he threw upon the defendant the burden of proving that had not then reorganized the company, and brought the accident was not occasioned by the defendant's in other persons to help him to do that in a corporate fault; this ruling was approved by the Supreme Court. way which we think, from the very nature of the In its opinion the court refers with approbation to business, he had a right to abandon entirely, and even Christie v. Griggs, 2 Camp. 79, where it was held that the business if he chose. A mau can certainly do what the plaintiff made a prima facie case by proving his he pleases with his own property, if he does not going on the coach, the accident, and the damage he thereby prejudice any of the rights of subsisting cred. had suffered. Both of these cases have repeatedly re- itors. It does not appear that any existing creditors ceived the sanction of the court. In Worthington v.
were injuriously affected thereby. The appellees beB. & 0. R. R. Co., 21 Md. 275, where an injury to a
came such afterward. It is true that the corporation, passenger was caused by the displacement of a switch as such, united (whether effectually or not is immate. on the railroad track, the court approves an instruc
rial to discuss) with Cruiksbank in the mortgage. tion to the jury to the following effect, as stated in the Why it was thought necessary for it to do so we do opiniou: "That the injury to the plaintiff was pre
not know. Its doing so bas certainly complicated the sumptive evidence of negligence ou the part of the de- matter, and as we think, diverted the mind of the fendants, and it was incumbent on them to prove that court below from the true and only equitable aspect they were not negligent in order to discharge them- of the case. If there had been no attempt on the part selves from liability.” In B. &0. R. R. Co .v. State,
of the corporation to unite in the mortgage, and it had use of Mahone, 63 Md., an action for negligent killing, only been executed by Cruikshank, who was the sole the plaintiff's second prayer maintains that if the de- owner of all the property mortgaged, how could it ceased was killed while occupying the relation of a have been denied operation? And would not the per. passenger, the presumption was that the injury re- sons who took stock from Cruikshauk afterward, and sulted from the negligence of the defendant, unless participated in perpetuating the operations of the corthe defendant showed that the injury did not result poration, have held subject to the mortgage put on the from its negligence, or that it could have been effects of the corporation before they bought the avoided by ordinary care on the part of the deceased. stock? And with such mortgage of record, would not And this court held that it was properly granted. The persons dealing with and trusting the corporation afopinion of the court refers with approval to Christie terward be affected with knowledge of such mortgage, v. Griggs, Stokes y. Saltonstall, Stockton v. Frey, 4 and be subordinated to it? There would seem to be Gill, 406; Carpue v. London & Brighton R. Co., 5 Q.B. no escape from such conclusion. In the Bellona Co 749; 48 E. C. L. R.; Skinner v. Loudon R. Co., Exch. case, 3 Blaud, 446, the chancellor says the ownership 786. In Carpue's case Lord Denman ruled at nisi prius by one person of all the stock of a private corporation that the plaintiff proved a prima facie case of neg.
aggregate virtually dissolves the corporation. For the
time being it certainly does suspend corporate action, although according to the now generally received understanding of the law, such sole owner may dispose of some of his stock to others and continue the corporate existence by the election of necessary officers. Russell v. McLellan, 14 Pick. 70; Newton Manuf. Co. v. White, 42 Ga. 148; Boone Corp., SS 199, 200. While therefore the purchase by Cruikshank of all the stock in the corporation, and all its property, did not necessarily work a surrender of the company's franchise, it did virtually, for the time being, suspend its operations as a corporation until the election of new officers through new stockholders purchasing from Cruikshank. Il from the moment of becoming sole owner, Cruikshank, as already suggested, had concluded to conduct the business as an individual, and without corporation formalities, can it be doubted that in such case this mortgage, executed by him, created a valid equitable lien on the property, enforceable against him and his representatives, and that in such case the execution, or attempted execution, thereof by the corporation could be wholly disregarded? The mortgage expressly provides for the payment to Cruikshank or bis representatives (and not to the corporation) of any surplus proceeds after satisfying the mortgage in case of sale for default. It thus appears that the transaction was regarded by the participants in it (and all who were interested did participate) as giving Cruikshank the absolute control and ownership of all that pertained to the company. If so, his right to equitably charge it with the company's debts and his own ought not, it would seem, to be questioned. Md. Ct. App., June 23, 1886. Swift v. Smith. Opinion by Irving, J.
DAMAGES--EXEMPLARY-LIABILITY OF CARRIER FOR ASSUALT BY SERVANT.-The second exception is that the mate's visit to the deck-room was to remove the deck passengers from the freight there, and this was accomplished before any assault was made by the mate; and it is insisted that the injury was not inflicted in the removal of the plaintiff from the freight, and therefore not in the performance of his duty as servant, and the defendant cannot be held for exemplary damages. The court had charged that upon the contract count plaintiff could not recover exemplary damages, but that the jury might under the second count, if they found that the mate of the defendant, while having charge of the vessel, committed an assault upon plaintiff, a passenger, not in his own defense, and that the blow which injured the plaintiff was inflicted with malice, willfully, etc., give exem. plary damages. The argument is that the act complained of is not within the scope of the servant's employment; that it was done in the execution or furtherance of the removal of plaintiff from the freight. But the court charged the jury, and we think properly, that if the mate, while in charge of the vessel, committed an unwarrantable assault upon the plaintiff, a passenger, plaintiff might recover. This priuci. ple is declared in Thomp. Carr. 392, and in the case therein reported of Pendleton v. Kinsley, reported in 3 Cliff. 416. In the opinion of Justice Clifford, of the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting in the United States Circuit Court, Rhode Island district, it is said the principles of law applicable to the relations of master and servant do not fully define the rights, duties and obligations between carriers and their passengers. The carrier agrees to carry for hire the passengers from one place to another, and is responsible for any breach of the obligation they assume, in the ill treatment of the passenger by himself or employees. And in the case cited it was held that the clerk of a steamer, on one of her regular trips, getting into a dispute with one of the passengers, and inflicting per
sonal injuries upon him, the owner was liable; and this would be so, irrespective of the dispute, and as if nothing had arisen, although defendant did not authorize the acts of his employee. Exemplary damages in actions for torts are given where fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression intervenes (Sedg. Dam. 35), and where the liability of the principal arises from the acts of agents, employees or officers, the law is well settled in Tennessee that the rule prevails in respect to exemplary damages. Haley v. Mobile & O. R. Co., 7 Baxt. 240; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 8 Lea, 438; Louisville, N. & G. S. R. Co. v. Guinan, 11 id. 98. See also Sedg. Dam. (6th ed.), bote on pages 570, 571. This second exception is not well taker, and will be overruled. Tenn. Sup. Ct., June 10, 1886.
Springer Transp. Co. v. Smith. Opinion by Deaderick, C. J.
EXEMPLARY_TORT-HUSBAND'S LIABILITY FOR WIFE'S TORT.-Exemplary damages are recoverable in an action against a husband and wife for the malicious trespass of the wife, even though the husband is free from blame. When two persons have so conducted themselves as to be jointly liable for a tort, each is responsible for the injury committed by their common act; but when motive may be taken into consideration, the improper motive of one caunot be made the ground of aggravating the damages against the other if he is free from such motive. In such case the plaintiff must elect against which party he will seek aggra. vated damages. Clark v. Newsam, 1 Exch. 131. So & master, sued for the trespass of bis servant, is not liable for exemplary damages, however evil the motive of the servant, if he is himself without malice. The Amiable Nancy, 3 Wheat. 546; Cleghorn v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co., 56 N. Y. 44. In all these cases it is to be observed that the plaintiff has his election to proceed against all or any of the wrong-doers; and as in such cage it would be unjust to make the malicious motive of one party the ground of enhancing damages against another who is free from such motive, if the plaintiff proceeds against all, he thereby deprives himself of the right he otherwise would have bad to claim exem. plary damages. But the case is different when suit is brought for a tort of the wife, for which the husband is liable solely by reason of her coverture, for then the plaintiff has no election, but must proceed against both. And herein lies the distinction between this case and the cases relied upon by the defendant; for the husband is liable, not as master, but as husband, and because of the oneness of the twain in the eye of the law. We have not referred to, nor have we fouud, much authority for this distinction, but we think it must exist in principle. Vt. Sup. Ct., Aug. 21, 1886. Lombard v. Batchelder. Opinion by Rowell, J.
DISCONTINUANCE BY PARTNER-FRAUD.--Although where partners are plaintiffs, and the obligation sought to be enforced is to the partnersbip, the right of one plaintiff to discontinue the action against the will of the co-plaintiff is generally conceded, he will not be permitted so to discontinue the action wben shown to be acting in fraud or collusion with the debtor, or when it appears that the remaining plaintiff will suffer injury. Noonan v. Orton, 31 Wis. 265, 274276; Loring v. Brackett, 3 Pick. 403 ; Winslow v. Newlan, 45 Ill. 145; Holkirk v. Holkirk. 4 Madd. 50. In such circumstances the most which the plaintiff desiring to discontinue can require is indemnity from bis co-plaintiff against damage in case judgment should go for the defendant. Winslow v. Newlan, 45 III. 145. R. I. Sup. Ct., July 10, 1886. Arnold v. Greene. Opiu. ion per Curiam.
REMOVAL OF CAUSE-SUIT AGAINST UNITED STATES MARSHAL ATTACHING GOODS.-A United States mar
shal who has taken goods on attachment, and is sued about his own business, the sender may reasonably in the State courts for conversion, has no right as such hope and expect the answer to be paid for by the marshal to remove his defense into the Federal courts. other party. Again, often a transient person in disIt has been thought proper by Congress to give to offi- tress, and with reduced funds, might wish to rely on cers appointed under or acting by authority of the the other party to pay for the answer; and since the revenue laws of the United States, and under lawsin. company may protect itself by refusing to take the tended to secure to all the equal enjoyment of the answer without prepayment by its sender, it would elective franchise, the right to a trial in a Federal seem an unreasonable hardship, under those circumcourt if claimed. Rev. Stats. U. S., S 643. Under this stances, to demand that he pay for both messages in statute it was held that while a United States marshal advance. Or he might wish to go away to receive the and deputy marshal were not officers appointed under answer, or to receive it over another line, or at another the revevue laws of theUnited States, yet that they were place, etc., and so under many imaginable circumentitled to remove a cause pending against them in a stances, be reasonably exempt from the burden of deState court to a Federal court, if the act which is positing money in advauce for a message he may made the basis of the action be one done under the never receive, and find it inconvenient and expensive authority of a revenue law of the United States. to get back his deposit. Hence, take it altogether, I Davis v. South Carolina, 107 U. S. 597. This was not should not support the reasonablenes of this regulation because the defendant was a marshal or a deputy mar. | wholly on the ground of the sender's obligation to pay shal, but because of the fact that he was actiug under for the answer. He may very often be not so obliged, the revenue laws. The fact that the right to remove and that is an answer to it. But I think this regulafrom a State court to a Federal court is given to those tion is a reasonable one, notwithstanding the force of persons whose duty it is to enforce named laws, or the plaintiff's attack on this Iudiana case. It should who may be appointed under them, strongly evidences not be segregated from the other regulatious of the the intention of Congress that only those so appointed company on the subject of collecting the tolls, and or employed shall have such right by reasou of the tested by itself alone, on the reasoning of plaintiff's laws under which they are appointed or act. The fil- argument, as above set forth. This is only one reging of a transcript of the record in the Federal court, ulation of a carefully devised system for securing payand the action subsequently bad in that court, could ment of tolls, consistently with enlarged accommodanot affect the right of the appellee to have the cause tiou of the public in allowing the customers of defendtried in the State court, which properly acquired and ant to regulate among themselves this very matter of retained jurisdiction. Tex. Sup. Ct., June 6, 1886. adjusting the burden of these tolle. I have quoted in McKee v. Coffin. Opinion by Stayton, J.
the statement of facts the entire regulations on the STATUTE OF FRAUDS — MEMORANDUM PAROL EVI- subject, as I find them printed, italics and all, and an DENCE.-It is sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds analysis of them shows that the company is endeavorrequiring that the memorandum of guaranty shall ing to accommodate the public as much as possible in show who are the parties to the contract, if that fact
this matter. It might reasonably, as the railroads do appears by description instead of by name; and if the as to passenger fares, demand prepayment by the senpromisor or promisee is described instead of named, der of all messages, whether they be originals or ansparol evidence is admissible to apply the description
wers. But it does not do this. It allows auswers to and identify the person meant. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., be sent at the expense of the person whose message is June 80, 1886. Jones v. Low. Opiniou by Morton, answered, and this is a privilege and a benefit it seeks C. J.
to confer on the original sender by undertaking to TELEGRAPH – REASONABLE REGULATIONS-DEPOSIT
collect of him that toll instead of requiring his corTO PREPAY ANSWER.--A rule of a telegraph company
respondent to pay it, thereby lessening the chances of requiring that a transient person sending a message
his answering at all. It requires all original mescalling for an answer shall deposit in advance an sages to be prepaid or guarantied. If guarantied the amount sufficient to pay for a reply of ten words is company will allow the sender, if he choose, to place not unreasonable. The only case directly in point as
the burden of the toll on the addressee, by itself unto the reasonableness of these rules in their relation
dertaking to collect the toll of him in the first into the deposit of money to pay for the expected
stance, but of the sender at last, if the other refuses to answer by transient persons, is that of W. U. Tel. Co.
pay. It seeks as to answers to accommodate the pubv. McGuire, 104 Ind. 130; S. C., 54 Am. Rep. 296, where
lic in the same way, by undertaking to collect of the it was held to be reasonable, and I am of the same person addressed; and as I understand the regulaopinion. I am not entirely satisfied with the grounds
tions, the sender of the answer is not expected to pay of that judgment; for it seems to me to place the rul- at all, certainly not to prepay, unless it be au answer ing too entirely upon a mere question of etiquette be- to a message which has been sent to be collected from tween the parties to the correspondence. But there himself, or is sent to parties away from home, or adis great force in the argument of plaintiff's counsel dressed to hotels: and in these last-mentioned cases he that it is none of the telegraph company's business to
need not prepay if it be an answer to a message marked enforce rules of social courtesy like that; and since it
answer prepaid.” In order to give them their corcannot know whether there will be any reply, or
respondents, and all persons who are interested in the whether if there be the circumstances may not be
use of the telegraph, the benefit of this system of colsuch that the gender of the answer should himself pay
lecting and adjusting tolls, the requirement is made pay for it, and be anxious and willing to do so, the
that transient persons shall pay for the expected company should not refuse to send the original mes
answers in advance, and it is not unreasonable, as a sage, if it be paid for. He likened it to a regulation of part of that system. It may be that a more liberal a carrier of passengers refusing to transport a passen
rule might be devised for transient persons, and that ger at regular rates, unless he should buy a return this one operates sometimes harshly and inconventicket. And I take it that in an equal number of iently; but that is not the question. In view of the cases the relation of the parties may be such that the whole system, a court cannot say that the power and sender might reasonably expect and demand, notwith- discretion of the company to determine for itself standing the social rule of courtesy above referred to, what is best for all concerned has been unreasonably that his correspondent should pay for the answer, and exercised. It has a choice of its own regulations, and that in an equal number of cases he does do so. In the test of reasonableness is not whether some other many other cases, when the original message is solely would answer its purposes as well or better, but
whether this is fairly and generally beneficial to the of procuring its allowance without the expenditure of company, and all its customers, Cir. Ct., W. D. Tenn., a cent by the inventor. July 1, 1886. Hewlett v. Western Union Tel. Co. And as regards the difficulty and expense of proOpinion by Hammond, J.
tecting and enforcing the rights of the inventor after he has become a patentee, no doubt, the expense of a suit
in equity is considerable, sometimes very heavy, and CORRESPONDENCE.
no doubt a wealthy and unscrupulous client, aided by
a sharp attorney,can somewhat delay the final decision; THE PATENT LAWS.
but this is no more true of patent causes than of others, Editor of the Albany Law Journal :
inasmuch as the same law and the same rules of practice In an article published in the JOURNAL of Septem- apply to all, and whatever is true of a suit for the inber 4, entitled “Shall the Patent Laws be Repealed ?" fringement of a patent is true of the whole system of your correspondent arraigns the present system of equity jurisprudence. While it would require omnispatent laws, on the ground that as administered they cience to frame a perfect system of law, and omnipooperate only to the benefit of the “rich, the powerful, tence to enforce it absolutely without error, I do not and the influential,” and do not tend to “promote the believe that the judges of the United States courts are progress of science and the useful arts." The remedy so stupid or corrupt as to fail to do justice, according for this supposed state of affairs, the only hope for the to the facts presented by the testimony in the great poor inventor, ground down by the iron heel of capi-majority of cases brought before them, whether in rotal, he finds, not in any possible change in the laws re- gard to patents or other subjects. lating to patterns, but in their repeal. While it is not In the case supposed by your correspondent the poor likely that any such backward step will be taken in complainant is finally thrown out of court because of this or any other country, still the suggestion has been his inability to print the mass of irrelevant testimony made of late with sufficient frequency to fairly de- taken on behalf of the respondent. This however is mand a reply.
entirely a local trouble. It could not have happened That the “ progress of science and useful arts” has in New York, where each party is required to print his been promoted by our patent laws may be freely in- own testimony, a rule which is in force in most of the ferred from the wonderful improvements that have United States Circuit Courts, and the poor patentee been made in the appliances of every branch of indus- might have entirely avoided the expense of printing, try under the operation of the patent laws. The in- as well as the delay incident to taking testimony out of dustry and ingenuity of the inventor is stimulated by court, by bringing an action at law to recover damages the hope of gain which the possession of a patent for for the infringement of his pateut instead of a suit in his improvements offers. Tbat a large proportion of equity. the devices patented are never commercially remune- As an illustration-and the only one given-of the rative is no doubt true, but for the time and money alleged flagrant disregard of the law by the courts, wasted in devising “improvements," which are not
your correspondent says: “Under section 823, Revised improvements, and articles for which there is no de- Statutes, this (the cost of printing testimony) is absomand, the patent laws are no more responsible than lutely prohibited from being taxed as costs; yet in dethey are for attempts to solve the secret of perpetual fiance of the statute the court goes straight on and motion or to find the philosopher's stone.
taxes printing as costs against the losing party all the But is the actual inventor of real and valuable im- same." A more careful reading of the statute, or the provements able to obtain a patent for his invention advice of competent counsel, will show him that sec. under our laws? I venture to assert that in the ma- tion 823 does nothing of the kind, but relates solely to jority of cases where he does not it is owing either to the amount of compensation to attorneys and others his own neglect or the incompetency of his attorney. which shall be taxed as costs (vid. 12 Blatchf. 195), The law gives to the inventor every opportunity to es- while section 983, United States Revised Statutes, distablish the facts relating to his invention and to ob- tinctly provides that the cost of printing may be taxed tain a patent when he should rightfully have one. as costs against the losing party. Such manifest er.
If dissatisfied with the decision of the primary ex- rors in detail tend to make one doubt the accuracy of aminer, who first passes upon his application, he can other statements. appeal to the board of examiners in chief, from these In Atlantic Works V. Brady, 107 U. S. 199, Justice in turn to the commissioner in person, and from the Bradley says: "The process of development in commissioner (except in interference cases) to the Su- manufactures creates a constant demand for new preme Court of the District of Columbia, and if still appliances.
Each step forward preconvinced that justice has not been done bim, may by pares the way for the next, and each is usua bill in equity have the decision of either the commis- ally taken by spontaneous trials and attempts in a sioner or the District Court, reviewed in a United hundred different places. To grant to a single party a States Circuit Court, and thence can (probably) go to monopoly of every slight advance made, except wbere the Supreme Court of the United States.
the exercise of invention somewhat above ordinary However much of corruption, collusion and bribery mechanical or engineering skill is distinctly shown, is there may be in the patent office (and I have yet to unjust in principle and injurious in its consequences. learn that matters are worse there than in other de. The design of the patent laws is to reward those who partments of the government), it would be strange in- make some substantial discovery or invention wbich deed if justice is not found somewhere before the bot- adds to our knowledge, and makes a step in advance tom of this well is reached, certainly the law has given in the useful arts. Such inventors are worthy of all every opportunity. But all this costs money. Cor- praise." tainly it is no fault of the law nor its administration And such inventors will in the great majority of that the rights of contending applicants cannot be de- cases find an adequate reward for their intelligence termined for nothing.
and industry under the patent laws as now in force The patent office fees are undoubtedly reasonable and administered. While error and fraud will now and much lower in this country than in almost any other then be found in the administration of the law to atwhile the courts recognize the poverty of an applicant tempt to prevent this by repealing the law would be as a valid exouse for otherwise unreasonable delay in like cutting down a tree in order to kill the worms on filing his application. As a matter of fact an interest in its branches. the prospective patent frequently pays all the expenses NEW YORK, Sept. 14, 1886. CLARKSON A. COLLINS
The Albany Law Journal.
them, and vouched for the truth of the charges. We have no sympathy with such hasty proceedings;
but we think the law, as laid down by the privy ALBANY, OCTOBER 2, 886,
council, is unsatisfactory. Charges of official misconduct, when made against public men on prima
facie evidence, and reasonably and moderately CURRENT TOPICS.
stated, ought to be privileged.” WO recent Indiana decisions will be of interest
to those engaged in the championship of Mr. Justice Grantham, of England, recently met women's rights. In Watkins v. Romine, 106 Ind. with an accident in the cricket field which disabled 378, it was held that an administratrix, a second him from performing judicial duties for some time. wife, is not entitled to an allowance for expenses This should be a warning to the occupants of the incurred in removing the body of the decedent from bench not to descend to cricket. Do our transone cemetery to another, where the former was suit-Atlantic brethren “catch on?" Gibson's Law Notes able, had been selected by the decedent, was nearer will, we know. his home, and was the ore where his first wife was buried, and where his children desired he should The Central Law Journal, commenting on our rebe interred. Cremation would render the solution cent article on the abuses of the patent system, of such questions much easier. The other case is says: “We are strongly inclined to the opinion Henning v. State, 106 Ind. 386, where the court that there is a good foundation for these charges, said: “The refusal of a person to carry out a mar- and that this dark corner in Federal jurisprudence riage contract, or a suspicion on the part of the ac- might well bear, not a little, but a good deal of ilcused that the deceased, being his betrothed, was lumination. The interests of the public, we are indulging in sexual intercourse with other men, or persuaded, would be greatly subserved by a a detection by the accused of the deceased in an thorough investigation of the whole subject of the act of illicit sexual intercourse, will not constitute patent laws, and especially of the procedure of the such a provocation as will reduce the killing from Federal courts in their administration, followed by murder to manslaughter. We think it abundantly appropriate legislation. We are strengthened in settled that no man can deliberately take a woman's this opinion by our knowledge of the methods of life, even though she is his betrothed, because he the Federal courts in the matter of receivers, and believes that she is false to him, and if he does slay their arbitrary and unreasonable extension of the her, after time for deliberation, he is guilty of mur- authority and functions of those officers. This der in the first degree. If upon first discovering matter has long been the subject of criticism in her infidelity he slays her, then possibly the killing professional circles, and has been commented on might be reduced to manslaughter, but it is noth- with great severity by one of the most eminent and ing less than murder, when after ample time for distinguished justices of the Supreme Court of the passion to subside, he deliberately kills her.” Why United States, who portrays in the most masterly should the court in the last sentence thus obiter en- manner the abuses and injustice which have grown courage disappointed suitors to hurry up the kill- out of the prevalent perversion of the functions of ing?
a receiver, It is not unreasonable to expect that a
proper investigation will disclose the existence of The London Law Times, commenting on Davis v. wrongs, equally flagrant, in the administration of Shepstone, which we reported last week, pronounced the patent laws, of unnecessary delays which operthe decision “ calculated to do a dis-service to the ate à denial of justice, and costs and expenses welfare of the public,” and continues: “To appre- which amount to confiscation." The Central then ciate these remarks it must be remembered that the quotes the following from our editorial remarks on judicial committee are speaking of the reports of this topic: “We have no doubt, too, that some of acts and words supposed to have been done or said the Federal judges carry on things with a high by men in their public capacity. If this ruling is hand when the mood is on them. This comes of thoroughly regarded by the press there will be little making them independent of the people whose sercheck indeed on the doings of public officials, for vants they are. It is a wholesome thing to have a no newspaper can safely report any act of official judge to know that he is liable to step down and misconduct unless its editor has such complete evi- out at a fixed time if he does not behave himself,” dence as can be relied upon as sufficient to prove And observes: “We are hardly prepared to indorse the misconduct to the satisfaction of a court of jus- | the extreme and radical remedy for the evils of the tice. It is obvious that this can rarely be obtained, patent law procedure which is suggested in the so that the public servants may, if they think fit, last three sentences of this extract. We are not as commit all sorts of official misconduct and iniquity much addicted to iconoclasm as our contemporary, with little fear of the press daring to expose them. and hesitate to assail a l' outrance, and without apIn the particular case before us the newspaper propriate preliminaries, so venerable and venerated seems to have been somewhat reckless in its asser- an idol as the life tenure of Federal judicial office. tions, and not only reported the alleged facts of Milder measures are first in order, and contrary to misconduct, but actually charged the plaintiff with the philosophy of the spelling-book fable, we would