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are in favor of a patent law, but we think that a patent should carry some prima facie protection on its face, and that there should be radical reforms in the patent office and in the patent courts.

NOTES OF CASES.

N Davis v. Shepstone, Priv. Co., 55 L. T. Rep. (N. question. 1, it was held that statements made to a

ment and conduct, and these must prevail unquestioned in the course of procedure until they shall be altered, not summarily as proposed, but in the absence of statutory regulations, in a way consistent with justice to all parties directly interested, the importance of the matter in question, and the dignity and propriety of judicial action. It is always of serious moment to the public, as well as individual litigants concerned, to bring in question the official conduct of judges. Their errors should be corrected promptly and certainly, especially such as savor of nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance, but this should be done with fairness and due caution. This is due alike to the judge as an individual, his office and the public." The other passage is to be found in the case of an indictment against Jerry Jacobs for forcible entry. Jerry is entitled to commiseration, for he not only broke his own leg in his attack, and was convicted, but the court used the following strong language: "Such was the terrible order of his coming that all the inmates of the house fled panic-stricken therefrom, and betook themselves to places of concealment and safety. The door had been barred, but that formed no impediment to the furious onslaught of the redoubtable knight-errant. He kicked down the door, entered the house and fell over something, by which his leg was unfortunately broken iustead of his neck, and yet it is seriously contended before us that he is guilty of no offense."

reporter in the employment of the proprietor of a newspaper, for the purposes of the newspaper, are not privileged. The lord chancellor said: "The respondent was in December, 1882, appointed resident commissioner to Zululand, and proceeded in the discharge of his duties to the Zulu reserve territory. In the month of March, 1883, the appellants published in an issue of their newspaper serious allegations with reference to the conduct of the respondent whilst in the execution of his office in the reserve territory. They stated that he had not only himself violently assaulted a Zulu chief, but had set on his native policemen to assault others. Upon the assumption that these statements were true they commented upon his conduct in terms of great severity, observing: 'We have always regarded Mr. Shepstone as a most unfit man to send to Zululand, if for no other reason than this, that the Zulus entertain toward him neither respect nor confidence. To these disqualifications he has now, if our information is correct, added another which is far more damnatory. Such an act That was a rash moment when we opened our as he has now been guilty of cannot be passed over columns to an attack upon the patent laws. We if any kind of friendly relations are to be mainhave given place to the first of the communications tained between the colony and Zululand. There which it called out, but their name promises to be are difficulties enough in that direction without legion, and we confidently expect to hear from need for them to be increased by the headstrong, every patent lawyer in the United States on the and almost insane imprudence and want of selfsubject. We know now how Samson felt when he respect of the official who unworthily represents the pulled that temple down on himself, but we do not government of the queen.' In the same issue, unpropose to submit to being crushed by our own col- der the heading 'Zululand,' there appeared a stateumns. We shall draw the line " at once, and we ment that four messengers had come from Natal to announce, that the summer being ended, we can- Zululand, from whom details had been obtained of not give up the JOURNAL to long communications the respondent's treatment of certain chiefs of the on this topic. For example, we have now on our reserve territory who had visited Cetewayo, and table a communication of fifteen foolscap pages, what purported to be the account derived from which might better have been compressed into five, these messengers of the assault and abusive lanwell written, but too, too long. Writers for legal guage of which the respondent had been guilty, journals should profit by the idea of war which was given in detail. On the 16th of May, 1885, McClellan professed but did not practice-"short, the appellants published a further article relating sharp and decisive." In the communication to to the respondent, which commenced as follows: which we refer the writer says among other things: Some time ago we stated in these columns that "The writer of the article in question puts great Mr. John Shepstone whilst in Zululand had comstress upon the fact that when a man obtains a pat-mitted a most unprovoked and altogether incoment he must go to the courts with it before he knows whether it is good. Does not a man who has a deed of a farm have to go to the courts before he knows his title is good?" But if he is in possession he is in the enjoyment of the property, and he "lets the other man do the walking." In the case of a patent the patentee absolutely gets nothing until the end of the fight, but is the prey of every infringer. We may just as well say now that we

66

prehensible assault upon certain Zulu chiefs. At the time the statement was made a good deal of doubt was thrown upon the truth of the story. We are now in a position to make public full details of the affair, which the closest investigation will prove to be correct. A representative of this journal, learning that a deputation had come to Natal to complain of the attack, met five of the number, and in the presence of the competent in

maintenance seems first to find expression in our law in the case of Rothewell v. Pewer, 9 Hen. 6, p. 64, in the course of which Martin, J., of the Common Pleas, said: 'I can give gold or silver to a man that is poor to maintain his plea if he himself cannot through his poverty; this is not maintenance against the law,' and in the case of Power or Pomeroy v. The Abbot of Buckfast, 21 Hen. 6, p. 15, Paston, a judge of the Common Pleas, said: 'Suppose that I of my charity give a sum of money to a poor man who has a suit, in order to aid him in the suit, it is no maintenance; no more is it in the case at the bar.' Again, in 22 Hen. 6, p. 35, Prisot, Serjeant, who appears to have been counsel in the case, observed: "That in writ of maintenance it is a good plea that he who is supposed to have been maintained is a poor man, and had no means to defend himself in the suit which the plaintiff had against him, and that the said now defendant of his alms gave him 208., which is the same maintenance alleged.' These authorities found, as might be expected, their place in the Abridgments of Brooke and Rolle (Brooke Abr. Maintenance, 14; Rolle Abr. Maintenance, Q. 1). The result of them appears in Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown (I, 460, 8th ed.), in the statement 'it seems to be agreed that any one may lawfully give money to a poor man to enable him to carry on his suit,' and in Blackstone's Commentaries in the words 'A man may however maintain the suit of his near kinsman, tenant and poor neighbor, out of charity and compassion with impunity.' Vol. iv, 134. Similar statements are to be found in Viner's and Bacon's Abridgements (Viner Abr. Maintenance, Q. 1; Bacon Abr. Maintenance, B 4). It is no doubt remarkable that no case can be found in our law in which the defense of charity has been raised to a

terpreters took down the stories of each man.' The article then gave at length the statement so taken down, which disclosed, if true, the grossest misconduct on the part of the respondent. It was in respect of these publications of the appellants that the action was brought by the respondent. * * * There is no doubt that the public acts of a public man may lawfully be made the subject of fair comment or criticism, not only by the press, but by all members of the public. But the distinction cannot be too clearly borne in mind between comment or criticism and allegations of fact, such as that disgraceful acts have been committed or discreditable language used. It is one thing to comment upon or criticise, even with severity, the acknowledged or proved acts of a public man, and quite another to assert that he has been guilty of particular acts of misconduct. In the present case the appellants, in the passages which were complained of as libellous, charged the respondent, as now appears without foundation, with having been guilty of specific acts of misconduct, and then proceeded, on the assumption that the charges were true, to comment upon his proceedings in language in the highest degree offensive and injurious; not only so, but they themselves vouched for the statements by asserting, that though some doubt had been thrown upon the truth of the story, the closest investigation would prove it to be correct. In their lordships' opinion there is no warrant for the doctrine that defamatory matter thus published is regarded by the law as the subject of any privilege. It was insisted by the counsel for the appellants that the publications were privileged, as being a fair and accurate report of the statements made by certain messengers from King Cetewayo upon a subject of public importance. It has, indeed, been held that fair and accurate reports of proceedings in Parlia-proceeding for maintenance. But the proposition ment and in courts of justice are privileged, even though they contain defamatory matter affecting the character of individuals. But in the case of Purcell v. Sowler, 2 C. P. Div. 215; 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 416, the Court of Appeal expressly refused to extend the privilege even to the report of a meeting of poor law guardians, at which accusations of misconduct were made against their medical officer. And in their lordship's opinion it is clear that it cannot be extended to a report of statements made to the Bishop of Natal, and by him transmitted to the appellants, or to statements made to the reporter in the employ of the appellants, who for the purposes of the newspaper sought an interview with messengers on their way to lay a complaint before the governor."

In Harris v. Briscoe, Ct. of App., 55 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 14, the questions were: "First, is charity a defense to an action for maintenance? Second, is thoughtless and inconsiderate kindness toward a particular person charity within the meaning of the defense, if such defense there be? Fry, J., said: "The doctrine that charity is an excuse for

that charity is a good defense was asserted by the judges as well known and understood law more than four hundred years ago, when the law of maintenance was more familiar than it is now, and it has been adopted and accepted by the compilers of the digests to which we are accustomed to look for guidance, and upon this proposition no judge, counsel or writer has, so far as we can learn, thrown any doubt. We hold that the proposition is part of the law in England. But if the law be correctly laid down in the passages we have cited it appears to us to follow that the limitation put on the meaning of the word charity by Wills, J., cannot be maintained.

He requires that charity shall be thoughtful of its consequences, shall be regardful of the interest of the supposed oppressor as well as that of the supposed victim, and shall act only after due inquiry and upon reasonable and probable cause. If we were making new law, and not declaring old law, it would in our opinion be well worthy of consideration whether such a limitation of the doctrine that charity is an excuse for maintenance would not be wise and good. But is it not an anachronism to suppose any such view of charity to have been present to the minds of the

part of the land in terms protected. The proposition that the mill and gin machinery are exempt as tools of trade cannot be seriously insisted upon. That it was urged that they were part of the homestead ought to be a sufficient answer to a claim so diametrically opposite. No authority has been cited which has gone far enough to embrace as tools of trade this kind of property, and the analo

judges of the reign of Henry VI? A view which even now is present to the minds only of a select few, and does not commend itself to a large proportion of the kindhearted and charitable amongst mankind. To say that charity is not charity unless it be discreet appears to us without foundation in law. Of this limitation on the word charity no trace can be found in any of the authorities which have been cited, and furthermore, in the other ex-gies and reason of the law do not persuade us to ceptions to the law of maintenance, such as those pioneer such extreme doctrine." arising from the relations between lord and tenant, master and servant, neighbor and neighbor, there appears, so far as we can learn, to be no case or dictum in the books in which the duty of making inquiry, or of acting on reasonable and probable ground's has been recognized as a limitation on the decided by the Superior Court of Delaware in 1881, right of giving assistance."

THE ENFORCEMENT OF USURIOUS FOREIGN
CONTRACTS.

[N the case of Derringer's Adm. v. Derringer's Adm..

but as yet unreported, one of the causes of action was a promissory note, which stipulated for interest at the made in Pennsylvania, where the payee resided; and The note was rate of twelve per cent per annum.

as no other place was specified, Pennsylvania was conceded to be the place of payment. The contract therefore was a Pennsylvania contract. It was made there, and that was the place of performance.

The legal rate of interest in Pennsylvania at the time of the making of the note was six per cent, the same as in Delaware. But the legal consequences in the two States of a stipulation for excessive interest were very different.

In Pennsylvania, as was proved by the testimony of members of the legal profession from that State, usury did not avoid a note on which it was charged. The principal, together with legal interest, could be collected, the note being void only as to the usurious excess. In Delaware usurious contracts were, and are now unenforceable.

be collected in Delaware. It was, the court declared, The court held that the note in question could not unquestionably usurious, bearing interest at a rate forbidden both by the laws of Pennsylvania and those of Delaware. It had been shown that according to the laws of Pennsylvania, with reference to which the note was made, the principal of a usurious note could be collected, together with legal interest; and it was sought on the ground of comity to enforce that law in the Delaware courts. But, the court continued, comity did not go to that extent. Whilst every State should show due regard for the laws of other States, it could not concede so much to them as to permit the enforcement of contracts which were immoral or against

In Cullers v. James, Texas Supreme Court, June 25, 1886, it was held that an abandoned wife may claim a dwelling-house, even though built on leased grounds and a mere chattel, as an exempt homestead. The court said: "It is contended that the homestead, under the Constitution, cannot embrace personal property. The exemption is in terms of The exemption is in terms of lots or acres of land; but the object was to secure to the family a home. 'House' is necessarily embraced in the word 'homestead.' Franklin v. Coffee, 18 Tex. 417. If the head of a family owns a house, and no interest or estate in the land on which it stands, the house is a chattel. If he occupies it with his family it is their home. He may be compelled to move it from one lot to another as fast as legal process can oust him, still, though ambulatory, unsatisfactory, and in all its appointments mean; though it advertises the thriftless poverty of its proprietor, and is a caricature of the princely possibilities of the exemption laws, it is the home of a family, and is embraced in the spirit and purpose, if not the letter of the Constitution. The same principles, under our present Constitution, must be applied to the place of business of the head of the family. To give effect to the object of the law the dwelling-house and the gin-house must be held to have been improperly seized under the plaintiff's writ. But we do not feel authorized to extend the scope of the law's purpose any further than this. The mill and gin, and pertinent apparatus and machinery, may become part of the homestead in town or country, not because they are in themselves exempt, but because they are parts of that which is exempt. If they are annexed to and form part of a tract of land, in which a family has a homestead right, their location and use will aid in determining what portion of the tract is under protection with the case of Derrringer v. Derringer is that of the from seizure, as in the case of Railroad Co. v. Win-nature and meaning of what is called the comity of ter, 44 Tex. 597. But to be exempt as part of the nations, in conformity with which the court considhomestead they must be part of the exempt realty. ered their decision to be in that case. They form no part of the home proper, which it was the overruling purpose of the Constitution to secure to the family, and can be claimed as exempt only when embraced in the words of the law as

its public policy. The courts of Delaware had declared again and again that contracts infected with the taint of usury were void and could not be enforced, and in the case under consideration the court could not extend the rules of comity so as to permit such an enforcement. In support of this view the court cited 2 Kent Com. 458; and Story Confl. Laws, § 244, etc., in both of which it is laid down that no State is bound to enforce a contract which is immoral or against its public policy. The note was accordingly thrown out of the case.

The first question to be considered in connection

It is generally said that comity is the ground upon which, in construing a foreign contract, the courts of the place where the contract is sought to be enforced adopt as their guide the law with reference to which the contract was made. In one sense, this is true.

Every sovereign State has supreme authority over its own tribunals, and can say how far it will or will not give effect to a foreign law.

But all civilized States are subject to the rules of international law. In England and the United States it is recognized as a part of the common law. And it is a rule of private international law, which is a branch of the law of nations, that the validity of juridical acts, performed or to be performed in a foreign State, is to be determined by the law of that State. "When we have determined what that law is, we find what the common law is as to the particular issue." Whart. Conf. Laws, & la.

By comity therefore we are not to understand "simply politeness, meted out either at the caprice of the judge, or granted in consideration of similar concessions by the State whose law is for the particular case accepted." Id. Or to quote the language of Story: "It is not the comity of the courts, but the comity of the nation, which is to be administered, and ascertained in the same way, and guided by the same reasoning, by which all other principles of the municipal law are ascertained and guided." Story Confl. Laws, § 38.

not consider the contract in this case as liable to any portion of these exceptions."

A much stronger case than that of excessive interest is a contract for the sale of lottery tickets. And yet it has been held in Massachusetts, where the sale of lottery tickets is prohibited, that a contract for the purchase of lottery tickets will be supported, although the vender belonged to a State where the sale is illegal. McIntyre v. Parks, 3 Met. 207. An analogous decision has been made in New York, where the sale of lottery tickets is also prohibited. An action was brought on a bond conditioned for the faithful performance of certain duties enjoined by a law of Kentucky, which authorized the obligees to sell lottery tickets for the benefit of a college in that State. The bond was held valid, it being so at the place where the condition was to be performed. It was moreover held to be immaterial whether the bond was executed in New York, or in Kentucky. Kentucky v. Bassford, 6 Hill, 526; Story Confl. Laws, § 528a.

This case is far stronger, as will appear further on, than any analogous case of excessive interest can be with reference to the laws of Delaware. Not only was the sale of lottery tickets prohibited in New York, but it was also an indictable offense, punishable with fine and imprisonment; and the statute of New York respecting lotteries did not make any exception in favor of lotteries authorized by the laws of other States. People v. Sturdevant, 23 Wend. 418.

It is a general rule of private international law, in relation to contracts, that the lex loci contractus governs their validity and construction. This principle was forcibly stated by Lord Stowell in Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Consist. 59. The question in controversy was the validity of a Scotch marriage; and his lordship employed in reference to that question the following language: "Being entertained in an English court, it (the cause) must be determined according to the principles of the English law applicable to such a case. But the only principle applicable to such a case, by the law of England, is that the validity of the marriage rights must be tried by reference to the law of the country where, if they exist at all, they had their origin. Having furnished this princi-local government to be of a positive moral nature, abple, the law of England withdraws altogether, and leaves the legal question to the exclusive judgment of the law of Scotland."

To the rule that the lex loci contractus governs the validity and construction of foreign contracts there are certain exceptions. It is generally conceded that no State is bound to enforce a contract which conflicts with its public policy, or which is contrary to good morals; and these are questions determinable by the lex fori. Whart. Confl. Laws, §§ 490, 494. Such are contracts involving foreign distinctions of status or caste, conflicting with the distinctive policy of the country where it is sought to enforce them; contracts for future illicit cohabitation; for the printing or circulation of obscene publications; to promote the commission of crimes; and to corrupt or evade the due administration of justice.

The principles of international comity, as they have been above enunciated, have been recognized and enforced by the Delaware courts.

In the cases of Pollard v. Shisler, 1 Harr. 349; and Fisher v. Stayton, 3 id. 271, the court recognized the validity of assignments in Pennsylvania giving preferences. although as was expressly said in the opinions, such assignments in Delaware are void In the former case the court said: "This contract (of assignment) was made in Pennsylvania, and between citizens of that State, who entered into it expecting it to stand or fall according to the laws there. Generally speaking, the validity of a contract is to be decided by the laws of the place where it was made; but to this rule there are said to be exceptions. No people are bound to enforce in their courts of justice any contract which is injurious to their public rights, their morals, their policy, or violates a public law. We do

Having discussed generally the rules of comity, it is proper, before proceeding to consider their application to usurious contracts, to ascertain what the law of Delaware is on the subject of usury. For it may be admitted, that if any thing can be found either in the enactments of the legislature, or in the common law of the State, that forbids the enforcement by the courts of usurious contracts, such contracts cannot be enforced there. When usury laws are declared by a

solutely binding in the country on which they are imposed, they may be enforced by the judges of such country on all litigants coming before them. Whart. Confl. Laws, § 511. But it is to be remembered, that to carry this principle to its logical conclusion, contracts not usurious by the law of the country where suit is brought on them may be enforced there, although they were tainted with usury in the country in which they were made.

The statute of Delaware relating to usury ($1, ch. 43, Rev. Code, p. 535), provides as follows:

"The legal rate of interest is six per centum per annum; and if any person shall directly, or indirectly, take for the loan, or use of money, more than six dollars for the loan, or use, of one hundred dollars, for one year, and in that proportion, he shall forfeit and pay, to any one who will sue for the same, a sum equal to the money lent, one-half for the use of the person so suing, and the other half for the use of the State."

The cases decided by the Delaware courts on this statute are seven in number, and are entitled as follows: Gardner v. Daniel, 2 Hous. 300; Cook v. Pierce, id. 499; Newport Nat. Bank v. Tweed, 4 id. 225; Colley v. Erb, id. 315; Cleaden v. Webb, id. 473; Nailor v. Daniel, 5 id. 455; Plunkett v. Dillon, 4 Del. Chan. 198.

The general purport of these cases is that contracts entered into and to be performed in Delaware, and usurious by the law of that State, cannot be enforced there. They contain nothing in support of Derringer's case, either expressly or inferentially. On the contrary, it was said in the case of Colley v. Erb that the taking of a higher rate of interest than is allowed by the statute must be intentional, in order to constitute usury and incur its consequences. And surely

it cannot be maintained that a contract made with reference to the laws of Pennsylvania, although it may violate them, is an intentional violation of the laws of Delaware.

The general rule in reference to interest, both in England and the United States, is that the rate of it is to be determined by the law of the place where the contract is to be performed. See cases collected in Whart. Conf. Laws, § 504. This rule has been followed in Delaware.

In the case of Bailey v. Seal, 1 Harr. 237, 267, seven per cent was allowed on a New York contract, that being the legal rate there. And in the case of Purks v. Evans, 5 Houst. 576, ten per cent was allowed on a Missouri note, under similar circumstances.

in Connecticut and New York, it is correct in further stating the main question in the case to be, whether the laws of the former or the latter State are to control as to the defense of usury. In the one case the plaintiff would lose only a sum equal to the amount of interest taken or reserved. In the other he would lose the whole amount of the note."

It has been held in Michigan that where a usurious contract is made and to be performed in another State, but the law of that State do not avoid it on that ground, as the law of Michigan does usurious contracts to be performed there, the contract may be enforced by the Michigan courts. Iron Co. v. Burkam. 10 Mich. 283.

The last case I shall cite on this point is that of Bowman v. Miller, decided by the Court of Appeals of Vir

These two rulings are unqualified declarations of the fact that the law of Delaware in relation to interest,ginia in 1874, and reported in 25 Gratt. 331. The issue far from being of a positive moral nature, binding on all litigants who come before the Delaware courts, is in entire accord with the law as it is generally held in England and this country. They declare that the rate of interest charged in a foreign contract is, from a moral point of view, a matter of unconcern to the Delaware courts.

But suppose the rate of interest exceeds that allowed by the lox leci contractus. The reply is that this is no offense against the laws of another country where the contract is sought to be enforced. As an offense against the foreign law-i. e., the lex loci contractus-it is to be considered solely with a view to its effect on the validity of the contract. This principle has been forcibly expressed by Wells, J., in the case of Akers v. Demond, 103 Mass. 323, in the following words: "The general principle is that the law of the place of performance is the law of the contract. But the question of its validity, as affected by the legality of the consideration, or of the transaction upon which it is founded, and in which it took its inception as a contract, must be determined by the law of the State where the contract was had. No other law can apply to it. Usury, in a loan effected elsewhere, is no offense against the laws of Massachusetts. But when a usurious or other illegal consideration is declared by the law of any State to be incapable of sustaining any valid contracts, and all contracts arising therefrom are declared void, such contracts are not only void in that State, but void in every State and everywhere. They never acquire a legal existence."

In the case of Jewell v. Wright, 30 N. Y. 259, there was a contract made in Connecticut, and to be performed in New York, which stipulated for interest at a higher rate than was allowed by the law of either State. The principal question discussed by the court was what law governed the construction of the contract, and the conclusion having been reached that the validity of the contract must be determined by the law of the place of performance, the note was held void, that being the penalty of usury in New York. This case was referred to and discussed in Dickinson v. Edwards, 77 N. Y. 578; and in the opinion of the court in the latter case, delivered by Judge Folger, we find the following comments: "One criticism upon it (Jewell v. Wright) is, that as the note there was obnoxious to the usury laws of Connecticut, as well as of New York, there was no need of the reasoning of the opinion, resting the judgment upon the rule that the law of the place of performance must govern; and that hence the opinion rendered was obiter. This criticism is not well founded. The usury law of Connecticut is not as fatal as that of this State. By the law of that State, the contract is not utterly void, but void only as to the whole interest reserved or taken. Fisher v. Bidwell, 27 Conn. 363. So that though the opinion of Jewell v. Wright starts with saying that the note was negotiated at a rate of interest illegal, both

in this case was the validity of a promissory note which was given in general settlement of certain usurious transactions which took place in Maryland. The court held that the contract was to be construed with reference to the laws of Maryland, where the usurious transactions occurred; and that the note could be collected in Virginia, although in that State usurious contracts are void, it appearing that under the Maryland law usurious loans are not void, but are valid to the extent of the principal, and six per cent interest. In the course of the opinion the court said: "It is not an offense under the Maryland law to take usury, as it is here. The contract is not thereby vacated as here. The taint does not affect the instrument as here. On the contrary, the security is valid; the debt perfectly secure to the extent of principal and interest; though the debtor, under the proper pleading, may be relieved of the excess. Now concede it is a violation of that law to demand more than six per cent, is it possible that when a suit is brought here upon a Maryland contract executed upon the faith of their statutes, we are to apply our laws, and declare the whole contract null and void, in the very teeth of the Maryland statutes, which affirm the validity of the contract to the extent of principal and lawful interest? Such a doctrine is in violation, not merely of the principles of the comity of States, but of the plainest principles of equity and justice."

These cases in Massachusetts, New York, Michigan, and Virginia, amply illustrate and declare the law in reference to interest on foreign contracts, not only as it is laid down in the United States, but as it is applied im most commercial States. See Bar Int. Law, 267, 286, 289. For once admitting that by the lex fori the rate of interest on a foreign contract is to be determined by the lex loci actus, it follows as a legal conclusion that the effect of usury on the contract is also to be determined by that law. The foreign law either governs, or does not govern. But as we have shown, it generally governs, unless the contract is immoral or against public policy. Now this question as to the morality or the policy of the contract must be determined by the lex fori. To deny this would be to concede to the foreign law extraterritorial force. For questions of morality and of policy are domestic ques tions.

So far as the laws of Delaware are concerned, seven per cent interest on a New York contract, which was allowed in Bailey v. Seal, supra, that being the legal rate in New York, was as much an offense against those laws, as a stipulation for ten per cent would have been, or as a stipulation for twelve per cent would have been in Parks v. Evans, supra, on the Missouri contract on which ten per cent was charged and allowed. The fact that the interest exceeds the rate prescribed by the foreign law is a matter which does not concern the courts of the place where the enforcement is sought, except in so far as the usury may af

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