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awning fell, not from any inherent defect in its original construction, or from an unsound condition which rendered it unfit for the ordinary use for which it was constructed, but from an unreasonable and improper use of it for a purpose for which it was not constructed; for the uncontroverted facts are that a great number of people were crowded upon it to witness the march of a public procession through Broadway, and they got onto the awning through a hall in the second story of the building to which it was attached. The hall was then occupied and controlled by a political club to whom it had been rented, and the janitor of the club permitted the public to go through the hall, and out of the windows, onto the awning, taking with them the chairs and benches of the hall. The lower story of the building was also at the time rented to different tenants in possession.

The exact time when the premises were demised to the tenants in possession does not appear. The only evidence upon the question is the following by the defendant Shattuck: "Previous to the 9th of September, 1880, I leased the hall to the Republican Central Club of Oakland. From July to November, 1850, I had no control over the hall in any way whatever." Nor is it made to appear by any evidence what was the condition of the awning at the time the building, or any part of it, was let to the tenants. The sole ground upon which the verdict and judgment seems to be founded is that the relation of landlord and terant existed between the appellants and the occupants of the building, and that it was the duty of the landlords to prevent the fall of the awning, although the building was in possession of their tenants at the time. Therefore it is contended that they, as owners and landlords, are liable to the plaintiff for the consequences resulting to her from the fall of the awning.

But there is no proof that Maria Hillegas had any connection with the construction of the awning, or leased any part of the building, or claimed that those in possession were her tenants, or received any rent from any of them. In the complaint she is described as the administratrix of the estate of William Hillegas, deceased, who, in his life-time, was co-owner with the defendant Shattuck of the building. But as she had no connection with the construction of the awning, had not demised any part of the building, never claimed that the persons occupying it were her tenants, or received any rents from them, she cannot be said to have made herself, as administratrix or otherwise, in any way responsible for the continuance of the awning, even if it was a nuisan e, or for the consequences to the plaintiff from its breaking down. As to her the verdict and judgment are therefore unsustained by the evidence. Oakham v. Holbrook, 11 Cush. 303.

As to the defendant Shattuck the only question is whether, as owner and landlord of the building, he is liable for the consequences to the plaintiff of a nuisance in connection with the building, in the possession and control of his tenants. It is well settled that a landlord is not liable for such consequences unless (1) the nuisance occasioning the injury existed at the time the premises were demised; or (2) the structure was in such a condition that it would be likely to become a nuisance in the ordinary and reasonable use of the same for the purpose for which it was constructed and let, and the landlord failed to repair it (Jessen v. Sweigert, 4 Pac. Rep. 1188; Rector v. Buckhart, 3 Hill. 193; Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567; Husssy v. Ryan, 2 Atl. Rep. 728; Wood Nuis., §§ 295, 676; Wood Landl. & Ten. 918), or (3) the landlord authorized or permitted the act which caused it to become a nuisance occasioning the injury.

The rule of law on the subject is thus stated by the English courts: "To bring liability home to the owner of real property," says Cromptou, J., in Gandy v. Jub

ber, 5 B. & S. 73, 485, "the nuisance must be one which is, in its very essence and nature, a nuisance at the time of the letting, and not something which is capable of being thereafter rendered a nuisance by the tenant." "The nuisance," says Blackburn, J., in the same case, "must be, if I may so term it, a normal one." To the same effect will be found the law in cases in the courts of the United States.

In Owings v. Jones, 9 Md. 108, the defendant, a landlord, was held liable to the plaintiff for the consequences of an unlawful act, in the original construction of the sidewalk in front of the building, committed by him before he demised the building. The unlawful act was the making of a hole in the sidewalk, which he covered with a sufficient grating, but without obtaining the requisite license from the city authorities. The plaintiff fell through the hole, and was injured, and the court held, that although the premises were at the time of the accident in the possession of the defendant's tenant, the defendant was liable for the consequences of his unlawful act; and while it is true, says the court, if property not then a nuisance is demised, but becomes so only by the act of the tenant, the landlord is not liable, yet where the owner leases premises which are a nuisance, or must in the nature of things become so from their user, and receives rent, he is liable.

On like ground, in Bellows v. Sackett, 15 Barb. 96, a landlord was held liable for injury from the drip from a roof built of defective materials, where the injury arose from the ordinary user of the premises. And in Godley v. Hagerty, 20 Penn St. 387, and Carson v. Godley, 26 Penn. St. 111, a landlord was held liable for injuries from the fall of buildings defectively constructed for storage, for which purpose they had been let to tenants in possession. The liability of the owner was made to turn upon the question: "Did the landlord permit the buildings to pass from his possession deficient in some particular essential to their future safety when reasonably used in the business and for the purposes for which they were constructed?" It was admitted that if a building, constructed with ordinary care, falls from the tenant's misuse, or if the tenant had ordered the construction, inspected and accepted it, then he alone would be liable for injuries from its fall. "But," says the court, "if the catastrophe results from occult defect, * as if the materials be inferior, etc., the landlord, and not the tenant, would be liable. * *The wrong consisted ✶ ✶ * in building and renting a store for a specific purpose for which it was unfit."

*

*

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So in Swords v. Edgar, 59 N. Y. 28; S. C., 17 Am. Rep. 295, a lessor was held liable for injuries to a third person, caused by the fall of a wharf which was unsafe and defective at the time he leased it, although it was in the possession of the tenant at the time of the accident.

But it is maintained that, whatever may have been the time of the demise to the tenants in possession, the awning was a nuisance per se, because it was constructed over the sidewalk without license or leave of the corporate authorities, and without the sanction of the legislature. Bill, Mun. Corp., § 521; Wood. Nuis., § 502. That however is the assumption of a fact which nowhere appears in the case. No such issue was raised by the pleadings, or proved at the trial. The complaint contains no allegation which expresses, or from which it could be implied, that the awning was constructed without license or authority. On the contrary, seemingly assuming, that it had been lawfully constructed, liability for the injuries occasioned by its fall was sought to be enforced against the defendants on the sole ground of negligence on their part in suffering it to be in such an unsound and unsafe condition that it fell and injured the plain

tiff. To the maintenance of that allegation, as the ground of her cause of action, all the evidence given for the plaintiff was directed. We must therefore presume that those who constructed the awning acted under authority of law. Yet even upon that assumption, the law would impose upon them the obligation to keep in repair what they were authorized to erect and maintain; and if they, by neglect, unskillfully constructed it, or negligently maintained it, so that it was or became a nuisance, they would be answerable civiliter in damages to a person injured by their neglect to perform their obligation to properly erect and sufficiently maintain it. It was upon that principle that the plaintiff's cause of action was founded and tried.

But there was no such cause of action made out against the appellants; for there was no evidence that the awning was defectively constructed, or that it was in such a condition, at the time of the demise of the building, that it constituted a nuisance, or would be likely to become such in the ordinary uses for the purposes for which the awning was constructed. On the contrary, it was shown by evidence, in which there was no substantial conflict, that the fall of the awning was attributable to an improper and negligent use of the awning by the tenant. It did not fall in consequence of the negligence of the owner to keep in repair, as in the cases of Jessen v. Sweigert, 4 Pac. Rep. 1188, and Burke v. Schwerdt, 6 Pac. Rep. 381. It would not have fallen if it had not been for the people that crowded upon it by the permission of the tenant. It broke down because subjected to a weight too heavy for it to bear. Permitting it to be used in that way was the wrongful act which made of it a nuisance, and as a nuisance it was created by the tenant, and the tenant alone is liable; the landlord is not, unless he is shown to have participated in the wrongful act by authorizing or permitting it to be done. "A landlord," says the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, "is not responsible to other parties for the misconduct or injurious acts of his tenants to whom his estate has been leased for a lawful and proper purpose, when there was no nuisance or illegal structure upon it at the time of the lease. Saltonstall v. Banker, 8 Gray, 195. See also Mellen v. Merrill, 126 Mass. 545; Leonard v. Storer, 115 Mass. 86; S. C., 15 Am. Rep. 76; Wood Nuis. 79, 80, 142. Judgment and order reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.

We concur: Morrison, Ch. J.; Ross, Myrick, Sharpstein, McKinstry, JJ.

ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE-
CISIONS.

APPEAL UNDERTAKING — RECOGNIZANCE-SURETIES.-A party giving a bond to perfect his appeal from a District to the Supreme Court, pursuant to an order of the District Court, in an action in which that court had full jurisdiction, may not, after final judgment, object that the form of the security should have been by recognizance instead of by bond, and the bond will be held valid both as against the principal and the sureties. But where the objection to the jurisdiction in a civil action rests simply on the ground that the party appealing did not give security for the prosecution of his appeal in the proper form, but gave a bond instead of a recognizance, where there was no actual requirement to adopt the particular form of a bond, where the conditions of the bond are the same, which are prescribed by statute, and it is not apparent that any injury can have resulted from the substitution of a bond in place of a recognizance; where no suggestion of a mistake in this respect was made in the appellate court, but the cause proceeded without

any objection or suggestion of mistake to a hearing and final judgment, and where the party appealing thus got the full benefit of his appeal by an unobstructed and full hearing on the merits in the appellate court, it is not open to him afterward to question the validity of the judgment, on the ground of his own failure to furnish security in proper form for the prosecution of his appeal, as to him the judgment stands valid and irreversible. Glazier v. Carpenter, 16 Gray, 385; Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 11 id. 203. But if the party himself is not entitled to a reversal of the judgment on a writ of error or review, neither can the sureties avoid it by plea and proof. There is no suggestion of any collusion or fraud on the part of the defendant in improperly submitting to a judgement in order to charge the sureties. The provisions of the bond are no more onerous than those which a recognizance would have contained. The bond contemplated precisely the proceedings which were actually had aud the result which was reached. The object for which it was given has been fully accomplished. The liabil ity on a bond is no greater than it would have been on a recognizance. Execution is only awarded for so much of the penal sum as is due and payable in equity and good conscience. Pub. Stats., ch. 171, § 10. The judgment being valid as against the principal, there is no good ground upon which the sureties can impeach it. Fall River v. Riley, 140 Mass. 488. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 30, 1886. Opinion by C. Allen, J.

Granger v. Parker.

DIVORCE -DISMISSAL "WITHOUT PREJUDICE.". A decree dismissing a libel for divorce, prejudice," even after the evidence has been beard, is "without not a bar to a new libel for the same cause. The general practice has obtained in this country and in England, when a bill in equity is dismissed without a determination of the merits, for the purpose of giving the complainant the right or privilege in his election to take further legal proceedings upon the subjectmatter of the controversy, for the court to express in its decree that the dismissal is without prejudice. When a dismissal is so qualified it

is never regarded or treated as an adjudication of the merits of the subject-matter between the same parties. Freem. Judg. 270: Borrowscale v. Tuttle, 5 Allen, 377; Bigelow v. Winsor, 1 Gray, 301; Foote v. Gibbs, id. 412; Sewall v. Eastern R. Co., 9 Cush. 5; Perine v. Dunn, 4 Johns. Ch. 140; Neafie v. Neafie, 7 id. 1; Walden v. Bodley, 14 Pet. 156; Parish v. Ferris, 2 Black, 606; Hughes v. U. S., 4 Wall. 237; Durant v. Essex Co., 7 id. 107; Woollam v. Hearn, 7 Ves. 211, b; Lindsay v. Lynch, 2 Sch. & Lef. 10; Stevens v. Guppy, 3 Russ. 171; Coop. Eq. Pl. 270; 2 Dan. Ch. Pr. 993-5; Mills v. Mills, 18 N. J. Eq. 444; Gove v. Lyford, 44 N. H. 525. No authority has been brought to the attention of the court which entertains a different view. Cases may at times be so peculiarly circumstanced after full hearing of the evidence, even as to make it manifestly equitable and proper for the court, in order to prevent probable injustice being done, to dismiss the proceeding without prejudice. The power of the court in such cases, after hearing the evidence, to enter up such a qualified judgment is fully recognized in Hepburn v. Dunlop, 1 Wheat. 179. Courts of hearing and determining libels for divorce, are proplaw, in the exercise of their special jurisdiction of erly given as great discretion as courts of equity in equity proceedings. The precedents uniformly show that the discretionary power of courts in divorce proceedings, in continuing causes and ordering and entering of final decrees against libellants is very large. A suit for divorce is different in character from a private action in which the personal rights of the parties alone are concerned. It is one in which the public have an interest, and in the conduct and result of

which the best interests of society are concerned. The rights and interests of society and the public, as well as of the parties, are in a measure involved in each libel, and must not be overlooked. This of itself is sufficient reason for the courts exercising this jurisdiction with great discretion, and in modes unknown to the common law, and in paying little attention to the strict rules of pleading applicable to common-law cases. Such is the procedure in divorce cases, not only in this State, but in Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Maine and several other States where jurisdiction in divorce proceedings is given to courts of law. 2 Bish. Marr. & Div. 767; Thurston v. Thurston, 99 Mass. 39; Brown v. Brown, 37 N. H. 536; Ashmead v. Ashmead, 23 Kans. 262; Vance v. Vance, 17 M. E. 203. In Thurston v. Thurston, 99 Mass. 39, it was held that "in libels for divorce the usual form of a final decree against a libellant is that the libel is dismissed. In this respect it is like a decree against a plaintiff in equity. If it is not intended to be a bar to a new libel for the same cause the decree is that it be dismissed without prejudice." Such is the recognized rule of practice in this State; and when the libel is, in the discretion of the court, dismissed without prejudice, it is not a conclusive adjudication on the merits, nor a bar to a new libel for the same cause. The same rule of practice is followed in New Jersey. Mills v. Mills, 18 N. J.Eq. 444. The court in its discretion may, after hearing the evidence, continue the cause to another term of court for the purpose of giving opportunity to procure further evidence, which the court, in the discharge of its duty to the public and the parties, deem ought to be heard; or if the evidence develops such a peculiar state of circumstances as satisfies the court, in view of such duty, that a bill of divorce ought not then to be granted, and that a dismissal of the libel ought not to be a bar to another libel for the same cause, it may in its discretion dismiss the libel without prejudice. Such a qualified dismissal cannot be attacked collaterally, nor can the reasons of the court for making such an order of dismissal be inquired into in a second libel for the same cause. It is all within the judicial discretion of the court to which the petition for divorce is addressed. Vt. Sup. Ct., July 1, 1886. Burton v. Burton. Opinion by Walker, J.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT COPARTNERSHIP - INDORS ER-NOTICE OF PROTEST.-A notice to a member of a firm, indorsers of certain promissory notes, that the makers have on demand refused payment, is good if sent to what had been the place of business of the firm, where its affairs are actually in process of settlement under a trust deed of assignment, the firm being insolvent; it being the place where the member expected that notices and letters would be sent to him, and had arranged that if sent there they should be handed to his counsel to be forwarded to him, and there was no other place of business of the firm, or of the member, and he had absconded. And notice so sent is good, although the court finds that the member's family was residing in a town which was the member's domicile, because he intended to return there when he thought he was safe from arrest. Mass. Sup. Ct., July 3, 1886. Bank of America v. Shaw. Opinion by Field, J.

CONSIDERATION-IGNORANTIA JURIS.-The surrender of an old promissory note is a sufficient consideration for a new one executed by a surety, although the surety had been released from payment of the old note by the action of the insolvent principal, where both parties knew the substantial facts, but being ignorant of the law, in good faith supposed the surety was liable for the old note. In Stevens v. Lynch, 12 East. 38, the drawer of a bill of exchange, knowing

that time had been given by the holder to the acceptor, but apprehending that he was still liable on the bill in default of the acceptor, three months after it was due, said he knew he was liable, and would pay it if the acceptor did not, and it was held that he was bound by the promise. S. C., 2 Camp. 332. The universal rule is ignorantia juris non excusat, the word jus being used as denoting general law-the ordinary law of the land--and not a private right. 1 Benj. Sales, $611. The cases that hold that money paid in ignorance of the law is not recoverable are analogous. Brisbane v. Dacres, 5 Taunt. 144; Clarke v. Dutcher, 9 Cow. 674. Any act that is a detriment to the plaintiff is a sufficient consideration for a promise to pay money. Williamson v. Clements, 1 Taunt. 523. It was a detriment to the plaintiff to give up the old note, as it was good against Brown; and the fact that Brown was insolvent makes no difference, for the note must be taken to have some value, and a small consideration will support a larger promise. Hitchcock v. Caker, 6 A. & E. 438; Creswell, J., in Southall v. Rigg, 11 C. B., 381, 494; Denman, C. J., in Haigh v. Brooks, 10 A. & E. 309; Harrington v. Wells, 12 Vt. 505. In Shortside v. Cheek, 1 A. & E. 57, the giving up of a note against a third person was held to be a sufficient consideration from a promise to pay the amount of it. Parke, J., said: "There is no doubt that the giving up of any note on which the plaintiff might sue would be a sufficient consideration." In Haigh v. Brooks, 10 A. & E. 309, the consideration for the promise was that plaintiff gave up to the defendant his guaranty on behalf of a third person; and it was contended that the guaranty was void for not expressing a consideration on its face, and that therefore the giving of it up constituted no consideration for the promise. But without deciding whether the guaranty could have been made available or not, the Queen's Bench gave judgment for the plaintiffs on the ground that they had parted with something they might have kept, and the defendant obtained that which he desired by means of his promise; that both being free, and able to judge for themselves, the defendant would not be justified in breaking his promise on afterward discovering that the thing in consideration of which he made the promise did not possess the value he supposed it did. The Exchequer Chamber affirmed that judgment, both on the ground that the guaranty might have been made good by explanatory evidence, and on the ground-Maule, J., doubting-that the actual surrender of the possession of the paper to the defendant was a sufficient consideration without reference to its contents. Vt. Sup. Ct., July 19, 1886. Churchill v. Bradley. Opinion by Rowell, J.

RAILROAD-FAILURE TO STOP AT STREET CROSSING. -The failure of a locomotive engineer to bring his train to a full stop at a street crossing, on discovering that an approaching team is frightened, is negligence. The defendant was not in the legitimate use of the crossing at the time of the accident, and that use involved the plaintiff in danger, avoidable by the defendant postponing its use of the crossing for a few moments. The supreme and first use of a street is for the ordinary travel over it-the right of a railroad to operate its trains across it is subordinate to the use by the general public. Tex. Sup. Ct., June 1, 1886. Houston & T. C. Ry. Co. v. Carson. Opinion by Robertson, J.

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well settled that when a known, described and defined article is ordered, even of a manufacturer, although it is stated to be required by the purchaser for a particu thing be actually supplied, there is no implied warlar purpose, and if the known, described and defined

"

tended by the buyer. In such case the purchaser takes
upon himself the risk of its effecting its purpose.'
consideration the contract was for the sale and deliv-
Rasin v. Conley, 58 Md. 65. In the case now under
ery of Keystone coal, either fine or the run of the
mine, and it was not even specified in the contract
that the coal was to be fit for any particular purpose.
The evidence of the plaintiff shows that the coal re-
ceived from the defendant was the kind of coal de-
scribed in the contract. Md. Ct. App., June 24, 1886.
ion by Yellott, J.
Warren Glass Works Co. v. Keystone Coal Co. Opin-

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MILL WATER

WATER AND WATER-COURSES WHEELS-USE OF RESERVATION.-A grant of a right to build a mill, and the privilege to draw and use the said mill”—the grantor reserving the right "to the water from a mill-pond "for the purpose of carrying use of sufficient water from said pond to carry a fulling-mill and three breast-wheels," with the machinery connected with the same-does not restrict the grantor to the use of breast-wheels, but limits him to "the quantity of water sufficient to carry three breastwheels." Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., July 3, 1886. Coburn v. Middlesex Co. Opinion by Field, J.

as the run of the mine," and that both sorts were furnished by the defendant. The plaintiff also offered proof in relation to the nature and extent of the dam. age to the glass caused by the use of the inferior coal. The evidence on the part of the defendant tended to prove that the coal delivered to the plaintiff was Key-ranty that it shall answer the particular purpose instone coal, fine, and the "run of the mine," and was not inferior to other coal of that description. It will be perceived that by the terms of the contract there is no express warranty with respect to the quality of the coal. In England the older decisions enunciate the general principle that the seller is not liable for defects of any kind in the thing sold unless there is an express warranty or fraud on the part of the seller. A sound price is not tantamount to a warranty of the quality of the thing sold. Harvey v. Young, Yelv. 21; Parkinson v. Lee, 2 East, 322. In Hall v. Conder, 2 C. B. (N. S.) 40, it is said that "the law is quite firmly established that on the sale of a known ascertained article there is no implied warranty of its quality." It is true that in some cases there may be what is termed falso demonstratio, as in the sale of goods by samples; and it has been held that under a contract to supply goods of a specified description, which the buyer has had no opportunity of inspecting, the goods must not only in fact correspond to the specific description, but must be salable or merchantable under that description. But no such case is presented by this record. The contract was for Keystone coal, fine coal, and the run of the mine, and the plaintiff's evidence shows that it received coal corresponding to this particular description. The contract specifies Keystone coal, fine, and the run of the mine," and there is nothing else in its terms to indicate the quality contracted for. When delivered at the place designated, the plaintiff certainly had ample opportunity to ascertain the quality by an inspection. There is therefore no foundation for an implied warranty, and the authority of Jones v. Just, L. R., 3 Q. B. 197, is applicable to the case presented by this record. It is true that at least in two of the States the doctrine of the civil law, that a sale for a sound price implies a warranty of the thing sold, was at one time recognized and adopted. Bailey v. Nickols, 2 Root, 407; Whitefield v. McLeod, 2 Bay, 380. But in most of the States this doctrine has been repudiated. In Seixas v. Woods, 2 Caines, 48, Kent, J., adopting the language of Sir Edward Coke, says that "by the civil law every man is bound to warrant the thing he selleth, albeit there be no express warranty; but the common law bindeth him not, unless there be a warranty in deed or law." And in a later case the same court decided that "there is no implied warranty in a general sale that the quality shall be equal to the price." Hart v. Wright, 17 Wend. 269. In Mixer v. Coburu, 11 Metc. 561, Chief Justice Shaw says: "The defendant contends that there was an implied warranty on the sale that the goods were merchantable and sound. But we think this position cannot be maintained. The rule of the common law is well established that upon a sale of goods, if there is no express warranty of the quality of the goods sold, and no actual fraud, the maxim caveat emptor applies, and the goods are at the risk of the buyer." The citation of authorities supplied by the decisions in other States would seem to be unnecessary, as in Barnard v. Kellogg, 10 Wall. 383, the Supreme Court of the United States says: Of such universal acceptance is the doctrine caveat emptor in this country that the courts of all the States in the Union where the common law prevails, with one exception, sanction it." The rule caveat emptor has always received the sanction of the courts in this State. Hyatt v. Boyle, 5 Gill & J. 120; Gunther v. Atwell, 19 Md. 171; Rice v. Forsyth, 41 id. 404. And in one of the latest cases in which this question was presented the court said: "The law is

WILL-BEQUEST GRANDCHILDREN OF TESTATOR TAKING BY PER CAPITA.-A testator, after making provision for his widow, bequeathed a certain portion of his estate to his executors, as trustees, to pay the income to his two sons J. and F. in equal shares during their lives, and on the decease of either, leaving no children or wife, the reversion to go to such children and wife. The third clause of the will provided that if J. and F. “leave no issue, then my will is that said reversion, in both cases or either case, shall go to all my grandchildren in equal shares, as hereinafter provided with reference to other portions of my estate. A subsequent clause in the will provided that certain other portions of the estate should be given to J. and F., and with the same disposition of the reversion and remainder to their wives and children as provided in the said third clause; and if they should leave no wife or children, "then equally to all my grandchil dren that may be living." Held, that upon the death of J., leaving no wife or children, that all the grandchildren of the testator were entitled to have the share of J., held by the trustees, divided among them per capita, and that the fund was not to be divided per stirpes. Held also, that the words "that may be living" meant "living at the death of J. or F." Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., July 3, 1886. Morrill v. Phillips. Opinion by Morton, C. J.

ANNUITY

APPORTIONABLE

INTEREST

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also "the whole interest and income of $6,000, to be TAXES.-The will gave $1,000 to the testator's wife; paid to her each and every year during her life;" and so much of the $6,000 itself as shouid be required to support her in a manner becoming her station in life, if the "said interest or income" should prove insufficient to effect that purpose, and then provided that the personal estate should be sold or rented "to raise funds to pay debts, legacies and expenses." Held, that the widow was entitled to the whole of the income and interest, without deduction of taxes or expenses. An annuity given to a widow in lieu of dower is apportionable, and payable for a part of a year to the time of the annuitant's death. Vt. Sup. Ct., July 19, 1886. Matter of Cushing's Will. Opinion by Veazey, J.

The Albany
Albany Law Journal.

ALBANY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1886.

CURRENT TOPICS.

THERE
HERE is no reading more entertaining than
French history, and very good vacation read-
ing for lawyers is Mr. James Breck Perkins' new
history of "France under Mazarin, with a review
of the administration of Richelieu." This work

and who was ignorant alike of the art of the troubadour and the weight of a coat of mail.” Speaking of the crazy queen Christine, he says: "Her reputation as a murderess did not make her so unwelcome as her character as a bore." She "possessed a considerable amount of miscellaneous information, which was perhaps extraordinary in a monarch, but would have been very superficial in a subject." Of Mad. de Longueville, a Condé, the mistress of Rochefoucauld, who becoming penitent after losing her power, retired to a convent: "The next year, wishing to do still more penance for her gives a rapid but very comprehensive view of the past sins, she returned to her husband in Norevents of Richelieu's administration, without add-mandy, and lived with him till his death." Of the ing much to our former stock of information, or Elector of Saxony he says, "his piety was such presenting the wily, intrepid and unscrupulous carthat on the days when he received the communion dinal in any new light. But the main topic, the he never got drunk in the morning." Again: It administration of Mazarin, is treated with considerwas felt that the right to beat one's peasantry, ocable fulness, and the writer has had the advantage casionally, ran with the land." We can heartily of some new sources of information, particularly commend these volumes as a learned, dignified, the carnets, or note-books of the minister, in wise and entertaining contribution to French hiswhich he set down his inmost thoughts and his real tory by an American scholar. designs and opinions. Mr. Perkins also convinces us that Mazarin was the favored lover of the regent, Anne. These two great cardinals unintentionally did a great deal toward bringing about the fall of monarchy in France by depressing the nobles and exalting the crown to absolutism, until the inevitable result was the rising of the oppressed people against the king a century later. These volumes will convince the reader that the world is better than it used to be, despite the contrary opinion of some gloomy religionists. There certainly never was a viler and more despicable people or era than those here depicted. It was the age of easy virtue and uneasy vice. Everybody was false, faithless, venal, greedy, cruel, licentious, debauched, unpatriwomen as well as men, and the women rather the worse - the only restraining characteristic was timidity, and the only alleviating characteristics that we can recall were the bravery which has always been common to Frenchmen, and the wit which has been the possession of many. Mr. Perkins' style is not remarkable, but it is by no means dull or heavy, and is occasionally enlivened by some touches of antithesis and sly humor. count of the development of the French judicial system will be of peculiar interest to lawyers. The first judges were the nobles, but judicial duties becoming irksome to them they called in clerks, learned in the law, to act as advisers. "The advisers and assistants," says Mr. Perkins, "in time became themselves the judges. They became the bombazine for the ermine. To hear prolix discussions of Latin texts which they could not understand, containing rules of law which they could not comprehend, was repugnant to gentlemen who did not wish to exchange their swords for inkstands. It was not pleasant for a gentleman longing for the chase or the tournament to listen to a tedious and confusing trial, only to become in his decision the mouthpiece of some black-gowned student of Bologna, who did not know the first rules of venery, VOL. 34-No. 12.

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His ac

Those gentlemen who believe that nobody can ever tell what any statute means will feel great joy over the disagreement between the Court of Appeal and the lord chief justice in respect to the construction of the statute which provides that costs shall follow the event unless the trial judge shall "for good cause otherwise order." The lord chief justice takes this to invest the trial judge with an absolute and conclusive discretion; and on the other hand the Court of Appeal treat the existence of good cause as a question of fact, and subject to review. Non nostrum tantas componere lites, but here our courts would probably say that the matter was reviewable only for a manifest "abuse of discretion." The lord chief justice argues that "good" implies opinion and a moral judgment, as to which opinions will widely differ, and rather satirically observes that "it is desirable to treat it as a question of fact only if it is wished to multiply appeals, and to introduce the interesting element of Certain uncertainty into the otherwise strict and certain science of the law," and he concludes his judgment in Huxley v. West London Extension Ry. Co., 17 Q. B. Div. 373, with the following lively remarks: "I make no apology for the strength of some of the expressions which I have used. If I have spoken strongly it is because I have felt strongly. It cannot be necessary to disclaim all intentional offense. For the Court of Appeal I have, as every lawyer must have, deep and genuine professional respect. But I think that in their recent decisions on this matter they have unnecessarily, and therefore mischievously, interfered with the discretion of the judges. I do not speak of their dignity and independence. These are personal, and may exist and be displayed as well by the youngest magistrate of the smallest borough as by the lord chancellor himself. But I speak of an interference which, if unnecessary and uncalled for, is a practi

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