was sufficient, and was intended to concede that the action was brought in proper form. (2) The only other point raised on the motion for a nousuit was that the action was not of such a nature that it could be maintaiued against a joint-stock association in the name of its president or treasurer. Conceding that the Courier Company is not a corporation, but a partnership with some of the powers of a corporation, it is admitted that the association published the paper in which the libel was contained; and we can see no reason why it, and all its members, should not be responsible for a libel published by their authority. The officers of the unincorporated company, or the publishers or editors employed by it, have the same power. (3) The defendant's counsel now raises the point that the charge was erroneous, because the judge should have submitted the question of malice to the jury. We think this objection comes too late. There was no request to submit the question to the jury; nor was it claimed, on the motion for a nonsuit, that there was no evidence of malice. The nonsuit was asked for on different grounds. If the defendant desired to go to the jury on that specific point, he should have made the request, or should have stated the ground of exception to the charge at a time when it would have been in the power of the court to correct it in the respect complained of. The court evidently assumed to decide upon the evidence that the publications were not fair criticisms on the official conduct of the plaintiff, and therefore that they were not privileged. Without deciding whether or not, under the evidence in the case, it was within the province of the court to pass upon that question, we are of opinion, that if the defendant deemed himself entitled to have it left to the jury, he should have made the claim at the trial. June 1, 1886. Van Aernam v. Blustein. Opinion by Rapallo, J. ABSTRACTS OF VARIOUS RECENT DE- seem to be insuperable at the very first moment when the money does become due on such a policy as this, it is due, and belongs to the legal representatives of the assured and is of course assets in their hands for the payment of all his debts. There is not a single instant of intervening time after his death, and before the rights of his representatives accrue, during which a previously issued attachment can fasten upon the fund upon the theory that it is his. While it is his in the sense that his representatives may have it derivatively from him, their title to it is peculiar to themselves and immediately and necessarily inures to the benefit of all who are interested in the decedent's estate, whether as creditors or distributees. It is argued that a life policy is assignable by the assured and therefore ought to be regarded as attachable as his. The argument is not sound, regarded even as a general proposition, because things are not necessarily attachable because they are assignable. Almost every form of property or right, whether in esse or posse, is assignable. But many things are not attachable though they are in present existence. Thus wages of labor and money in the hands of an officer of the law are not attachable, the one by force of a statute and the other under the decisions of the courts. So a balance of money due to a defendant under the exemption law and in the hands of his attorney is not attachable. Gery v. Ehrgood, 7 Cas. 329. Nor an executor's commissions, 11 Wr. 94, Adams' Appeal; nor the fees due a public officer. Hutchinson v. Cormley, 12 Wr. 270. Nor money granted by the States for losses during the war. 5 P. F. S. 430. Other cases might be mentioned but it is unnecessary. Deginther's Appeal, 2 Norr. 337, was cited, but it has no application. It decided nothing more than that the husband, as a distributee of his wife's estate, was entitled to his share of the proceeds of a a policy effected by her on his life, and she having died first his representatives were entitled to receive his share upon his death. The decision was in entire conformity with the principles above stated. Penn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 15, 1886. Day v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. Opinion by Green, J. ATTACHMENT -INSURANCE MONEYS PAYABLE TO EXECUTORS.-A policy of insurance upon the life of A. was taken out, payable to A., his executors or administrators, for the benefit of his widow, if any; later, and when A. was a widower, an attachment execution was issued by B., a creditor of A., against the insurance company as garnishee of A., before an appearance entered or plea pleaded, A. died, leaving no widow. Held, that the sum due from the insurance company on the policy was not, upon the death of A., bound by the attachment of B., but passed at once to his (A.'s) legal representatives as assets. The law regarding attachments contemplates, and provides for actual proceedings resulting in judgment for one party or the other, not for entire suspension of proceedings for an indefinite and uncertain period. A policy effected at the age of twenty-one, payable at death, might not become payable in fact for sixty or more years. Can it be that an attaching creditor upon such a policy could demand the judgment of a court against the company as garnishee, payable at the death of the assured, or as an alternative claim that the court should suspend all proceedings until the assured shall die? It is incredible. No judgment could be given in advance of death because no court could possibly know for what amount the judgment should be rendered, nor whether any amount would ever become due. On the other hand an order to suspend proceed-ual, and is never imposed upon a class of persons in the BANKS-LIABILITY OF STOCKHOLDERS-EQUITY JURISDICTION.-The liability of stockholders in a savings bank to the depositors and creditors of the bank, to an amount equal to the amount of their stock, respectively, until after a transfer of stock, published in a public newspaper, is not a penal liability. It is said the alleged liability of the stockholders, under the statute, is penal. If this proposition can be maintained, it would of course exclude chancery jurisdiction, and depositors would have to resort to the law courts for whatever remedy might exist. Whether the liability of stockholders is primary, or a mere penality, depends upon the construction that shall be given to that clause of the amended charter which imposes responsibility upon them as to their individual property. The language of that as rendered is broad and comprehensive. It provides the stockholders of the corporation "shall be responsible, in their individual property, in an amount equal to the amount of stock held by them, respectively, to make good losses to depositors or others." It will be perceived, from a close reading of the charter, the liability it imposes is upon the stockholders" or the corporation as a class, and not separately as individuals. The imposition of a penalty is in the nature of punishment for wrongful or tortious conduct in an individ ings during the life of the assured is so entirely at war with the whole theory of legal process to enforce reme. dies, so unheard of in the practice, that it has neither precedent to sustain it, nor any sound principle to sanction it. But apart from those objections, which aggregate, as a body. The definition of a penal statute is well understood. It is "one which imposes a forfeiture or penalty for transgressing its provisions, or for doing a thing prohibited." A familiar illustration, often occurring, is where the charter requires So in Clark v. Parker, 106 Mass. 554, it was held that "the law presumes it to be the intention of the grantor to convey the fee of the land to the center of the way, if his title extends so far. This presumption is of course controlled whenever there are words used in the description showing a different intention. But it has been held that giving measurement, in the deed, of side lines which reach only to the outer line of the way, are not alone sufficient to overcome it." And in Berridge v. Ward, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 400, a reference in a deed to a plan annexed, the measurement and coloring of which would exclude the highway to the center thereof, passes by the conveyance. See also Walker v. Boynton, 120 Mass. 349: White v. Godfrey, 97 id. 472. The grant in such a deed of a right or privilege to use the passage-way or street does not exclude the inference of a grant of one-half thereof, because it is de certain things shall be done before any business shall be transacted by the corporation; and if done it will subject the corporators to ૧ certain measure of liability, that has always been held to be penalty, as punishment for wrongful or tortious conduct on the part of the corporators, which can only be recovered in an action at law. But the clause of the statute being considered, has no element that brings it within the definition of a penal statute. The provision of the charter simply creates a liability in favor of depositors. What may be the extent of that liability will be considered further on. It simply creates a liability upon the stockholders to depositors or others; and whatever that responsibility may be, it is primary, and exists with the liability of the bank to its depositors or other creditors. It is as much a fund for their security as the assets of the bank. This is declaring no new doctrine. It is simply the applica-signed to show that the grantee shall have a right to tion of principles settled by the previous decisions of this court. It has been repeatedly held the statutory liability of stockholders, created by the charter, for the debts of the corporation, is a common fund for the security of its creditors. The securing of a distribution, ratably or otherwise, of such fund among creditors entitled to share in it, is a proper ground for the equitable jurisdiction of a court of chancery, as was expressly decided by this court in Eames v. Doris, 102 Ill. 350, for the benefit of depositors. Ill. Sup. Ct., June 10, 1886. Queenan v. Palmer. Opinion by Scott, C. J. COUNTIES-BRIDGE-UNSPIKED FLOOR CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.-(1) The fact that the floor of a bridge was unspiked did not convict the township of negligence, unless the bridge was thereby rendered unsafe for easy passing. (2) To gallop horses over a bridge is contributory negligence which bars a recovery of damages for an accident. Penn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 23, 1886. Zimmerman v. Township of Conemaugh. Opinion per Curiam. DEED BOUNDARIES ADJACENT STREET OR PASSAGE-WAY.-Where there is a plan showing a tract of land laid out into streets and passage-ways, blocks and lots, the blocks and lots are usually defined by lines which are coincident with the outer lines of the streets and passage-ways, and the dimensions and boundary lines of the blocks and lots are usually expressed in figures which exclude the streets and passage-ways. And when, in a deed of a lot of land, reference is made to such a plan, it is usual to give the dimensions of the lot as shown by the plan. But although in such cases the literal description in the conveyances does not in terms include the grantor's interest in the adjacent streets or passage-ways, yet the presumption is so strong that a grantor, under such circumstances, does not intend to retain the fee therein, subject to the right of way, after disposing of all his interest in the land which is subject to exclusive occupancy, that it has come to be established as a rule of law that the conveyance will, by implication, be held to include one-half of such adjacent streets and passage-ways, if the grantor owns the same, unless there is something further to show a contrary intention. In Codman v. Evans, 1 Allen, 443, enough was found to show such contrary intention, and the passage-way was held not to be included in the grant. In Motley v. Sargent, 119 Mass. 231, a case in some particulars much like Codman v. Evans, sufficient evidence of such contrary intention was wanting; and the general rule was applied that where there is a boundary upon a fixed monument which has width, as a way, stream, or wall, even if the measurements were only to the side of it, the title to the land conveyed passes to the line which would be indicated by the middle of the monument. use the whole width thereof. Motley v. Sargent, 119 Mass. 231; Peck v. Denniston, 121 id. 17. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 28, 1886. Gould v. Eastern R. Co. Opinion by Allen, J. GUARANTY-JOINT—WITHDRAWAL OF ONE, BEFORE COMPLETION.--Where negotiations were made for the joint guaranty of a lease by several persons, and afterward, before the completion of the contract, one of the proposed guarantors withdrew from the proposed agreement, and notified the lessor, who thereupon accepted the lease as guarantied by the others, without notifying them of the withdrawal of the proposed joint guarantor, he cannot enforce the guaranty against them. Ill. Sup. Ct., June 12, 1886. Potter v. Gronbeck. Opinion by Scott, C. J. INSURANCE-FIRE-RIGHT OF INSURANCE COMPANY TO REPAIR-TO PAY MORTGAGE.-(1) Where a policy of insurance provides that the insurance company shall pay the loss within sixty days after proof of loss, or may, within fifteen days after the proof of loss, notify the insured of its intention to rebuild or repair the premises insured, the company will not be held to have been deprived of its right to elect, to rebuild or repair the premises where it appears that nine days after a fire, and after the agent of the company has appraised the loss, the mortgagee of the property insured, to whom the insurance was payable, began to repair the premises; such repairs being reasonable and necessary to protect the property from further damage. (2) Where the statute and the policy of insurance give an insurance company the right, in a case where it is not liable to the mortgagor or owner of property insured, to elect to pay the mortgagee the loss, or to pay the full amount secured by the mortgage and to receive an assignment of the mortgage and debt, the law implies a condition that this right of election shall be exercised within a reasonable time; and where the company did not make such tender until seven months after suit was brought upon the policy, and had filed an answer in the suit denying its liability, such tender is insufficient, not being made within a reasonable time. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 30, 1886. Eliot Five-Cent Savings Bank v. Commercial Union Assur. Co. Opinion by Martin, C. J. MASTER AND SERVANT LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF AGENT OR LESSEE OF EXPRESS LINE-PRESUMPTION.A., the defendant, was the owner of an express line known as "S.'s Express," doing business between B. and E., and had in his employ one C. A. subsequently, without the knowledge of plaintiffs, leased the line to D., in whose employ C. continued. The plaintiff's had for some time previous to the lease forwarded goods by A.'s express, and about a month after the lease to D. intrusted certain goods to C., with instructions to ing piece gives no patentable character to the loop. The attachment to the buckle is made in a customary well-known way. U. S. Cir. Ct., S. D. N. Y., June 15, 1886. Shenfield v. Nashawannuck Manuf'g Co. Opinion by Shipman, J. collect the pay for him, and return the latter to plaintiffs. C. delivered the goods, and collected the money which through no fault of C. was never returned to plaintiffs. Held, that in the absence of evidence that the plaintiffs were misled, by conduct or silence of A., into believing him to be the real party behind C. in conducting the business at the time referred to, A.. the defendant, was not liable, although the plaintiffs believed him to be the owner of the business. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 20, 1886. Rich v. Crandall. Opin-situs at another place; as where he has the money at ion by C. Allen, J. MORTGAGE-PROPERTY DESTROYED — APPLICATION OF INSURANCE MONEY-DEPOSIT OF, IN BANK AT MORTGAGOR'S REQUEST FAILURE OF BANK. (1) Where buildings on mortgaged property are destroyed by fire, and insurance money is collected by the trustee, at a time when the mortgagor is not in default, it is not the duty of the trustee to apply it on the loan, or to pay it over to the mortgagor on a mere promise to rebuild. An offer to pay it to the mortgagor on the completion of a new building on the property is an equitable proposition. (2) Where such moneys are deposited in bank at the mortgagor's request, and in the bank of his choice, during the rebuilding, and such bank fails, and the money is lost, the mortgagor cannot afterward insist on being credited with the amount of such money. Ill. Sup. Ct., May 15, 1886. Fergus v. Wilmarth. Opinion by Magruder, J. OCCUPATION MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-STREETSBY RAILROAD COMPANIES — INJUNCTION.- A mining company owned certain land near a city, which it platted, reserving "the exclusive right to lay a plank or railroad track through and across any of the streets reserved on the map." The street down which it seems they intended to run their road was laid out much wider than the rest, and was partly occupied for such purposes. Subsequently they assigned all their rights to a railroad company, which proceeded to build four tracks down this street, after having gained the city's permission so to do. A property owner along this street obtained an injunction against the company, and upon appeal it was held that the company had no right to blockade the streets without compensating property owners, and that the foregoing reservation in the plat did not give them the privilege to destroy the usefulness of private property. Mich. Sup. Ct., June 24, 1886. Redinger v. Marquette & W. R. Co. Opinion by Sherwood, J. NEGLIGENCE DEFECTIVE BRIDGE EVIDENCE SHYING HORSE.-In an action against a township for injuries received by plaintiff in being thrown from defendant's bridge, through the backing of plaintiff's horse while frightened at a hole in the bridge, testimony that other horses were known to shy at the same hole is admissible, as tending to show knowledge on defendant's part of the dangerous character of the bridge. District of Columbia v. Arms, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840; Quinlan v. City of Utica, 74 N. Y. 603; City of Chicago v. Powers. 42 Ill. 169; Augusta v. Hafers, 61 Ga. 48; Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N. H. 401; Hill v. Portland & R. Ry. Co., 55 Me. 439; Kent v. Lincoln, 32 Vt. 591; City of Delphi v. Lowery, 74 Ind. 520. Mich. Sup. Ct., July 1, 1886. Smith v. Sherwood Tp. Opinion by Morse, J. PATENT-INVENTION.-To make a suspender end of flat cord in substantially the same way that suspender ends of round cord had been made, and in substantially the same way in which flat button ends had been made, for the purpose of fastening or securing other articles of wearing apparel than trousers, is an exercise of the ordinary skill of the housewife or the seamstress. The connection of the end to the attach TAXATION-LOANS-SITUS.-A demand for money loaned may have an actual situs other than the domicile of the owner. The owner may give it a business such place, for investment and reinvestment, as a permanent business, under the full control and management of an agent resident at such place. In such case, the money being invested here, may, under the laws of this State, be taxed here. Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152; People v. Trustees, 48 N. Y. 390; People v. Gardner, 51 Barb. 352; People v. Smith, 88 N. Y. 576; Williams v. Board Sup'rs, 78 id. 561; Boardman v. Same, 85 id. 359; Wilcox v. Ellis, 14 Kan. 588; Fisher v. Rush, 19 id. 414; State v. St. Louis Co. Ct., 47 Mo. 594; Supervisors v. Davenport, 40 Ill. 197; Goldgart v. People, 106 id. 25; People v. Home Ins. Co., 29 Cal. 554; Redmond v. Rutherford Com'rs, 87 N. C. 122; Albany v. Meekin, 3 Ind. 481; Foresman v. Byrne, 68 Ind. 247; Battle v. Mobile, 9 Ala. 234; Finch v. County of York, 26 N. W. Rep. 589. In People v. Smith the New York court held these very credits not taxable in that State, because they were not personal property within that State, but that they were within this State; that is, had a situs here. Sup. Ct. Minn., May 26, 1886. Matter of Jefferson. Opinion by Gilfillan, C. J. WATER AND WATER-COURSE- ABANDONMENTDIVERTING WATER FROM NATURAL CHANNEL.-Where water from an artificial channel has been discharged into a stream as a matter of convenience, and abandoned, it cannot be diverted from its natural channel so as to prevent a lower riparian owner from enjoying its use. The effect of turning the waters into the channel was to make them a part of the stream, and subject to the same rights as the water naturally flowing therein. This principle will be shown by reference to authorities. In Goddard's Law of Easements, at page 51, it is thus stated: "Where a stream is natural, there can be no doubt that all waters which flow into it become a part of that stream, and subject to the same natural rights as the rest of the water, and that it makes no difference that the water so flowing to the natural stream was sent down by artificial means." In Wood v. Waud, 3 Exch. 779, the effect of mingling the waters of an artificial drain with those of a natural stream was considered. The court said: "Have the plaintiffs a right to the waters of this slough, as described in the third count of the declaration?" It appears to us to be clear that as they have a right to the use of the Bowling Beck, as incident to their property on the banks and bed of it, they have the right to all the water which actually formed part of that stream as soon as it had become part, whether such water came by natural means, as from springs, or from the surface of the hills above, or from rains or melted snow, or was added by artificial means, as from the drainage of lands or of colliery works; and if the proprietors of the drained lands, or of the colliery, augmented the stream by pouring water into it, and so gave it to the stream, it would become a part of the current. No distinction could then be made between the original natural stream and such accessions to it." See also Washb. Easem. 274; Ang. Water-courses, § 95; Eddy v. Simpson, 3 Cal. 249. In behalf of appellant it is claimed that the use of the channel for the purpose of conducting the water to the defendant's dam was not an abandonment of the water. Hoffman v. Stone, 7 Cal. 47, and Butte Canal Co. v. Vaughn, 11 id. 134, de cide that it is not an abandonment of artificial waters to mingle them with the water of a natural watercourse for the purpose of conducting them to the point where they are to be used. In such cases the prior appropriator cannot complain of the use made of the bed of the stream, so long as the party conducting the water does not divert more than he has added to the stream. But these cases are plainly distinguish able from the one at bar. In them the water was turned into the stream for the purpose of diverting a like quantity at a point further down, this was the end to be accomplished; while here the water was discharged into the stream as a matter of convenience, and without intention of recapturing it. Nevada Sup. Ct., June 80, 1886. Schulz v. Sweeny. Opinion by Belknap, C. J. WILL-CHARITABLE BEQUEST.-A bequest to trustees "to appropriate the principal and interest of a fund as they shall deem proper, to the aid of such indigent, needy and meritorious widows and orphan children of the town of W. as may need temporary help to keep them from being chargeable to the said town as paupers, leaving it to the said trustees and their successors to exercise a sound discretion as to who shall be made the subjects of such aid," is a valid gift to a charitable use. Conn. Sup. Ct., Feb. 5, 1886. Camp v. Crocker. Opinion by Pardee, J. PARTIES WITNESS-COMMUNICATIONS TO ATTORNEY BY BOTH AWARD.SUBMISSION TO ARBITRATION(1) When the parties in disagreement lay the facts in the case before an attorney for his opinion thereon, the question of privileged communication does not arise to exclude his testimony in a subsequent action, since there can be no privilege when both parties hear the communication, and where they are not made by a client confidentially to obtain counsel. (2) When two parties have agreed to submit their differences to an attorney, with the understanding that his opinion is to be binding upon them in settlement, such a case establishes a parol submission to an arbiter, and the testimony of the attorney is admissible to prove the award. Mich. Sup. Ct., July 1, 1886. Cady v. Walker. Opinion by Campbell, C. J. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. REPORTER DIGEST. The Reporter Digest; being a digest of The Reporter, volumes 1-17 (1876-1884), and the American Law Times Reports, volumes 1-4 (1874-1877); comprising about fifteen thousand cases, including the most important decisions in the Federal and State courts, with many important English cases. With references to the volume and page of the official reports in which the cases are published. By Howard Ellis, editor of "The Reporter." Boston: Houghton, Miflin and Co., 1886. Pp. 1233. This is a very useful compilation for those who possess the excellent series digested. We do not always admire the editor's classification. For example, we do not see the use of the separate heads of "Banks " and "National Banks," and "Husband and Wife," "Married Women," and "Marriage; " nor why some of "Homicide" should be put under "Criminal Law," and the rest under "Homicide," nor why "Manslaughter" should not be put under "Homicide;" nor why there should be separate heads of "Water Ways and Water Rights," "Riparian Rights," and "Navigable Rivers;" and of "Libel," and "Slander." But this is the chief criticism that occurs to us. The citation of the volume and page of the report is a valuable aid. The book is beautifully printed, and is of the size of the United States Digest. CORRESPONDENCE. THAT COMEDY OF ERRORS. Editor of the Albany Law Journal· If your correspondent G. H. C., who discovered the so-called comedy of errors in Hun's Reports, in which Castle v. Wallace appears as the two Dromios, will turn to 33 Hun, 663, he will learn, that after handing down the opinion reported in 32 Hun, 384, the General Term in the Fifth Department ordered a reargument. The opinion reported in 35 Hun, 189, was written on determining the case after the reargument. Very respectfully, NEW YORK, July 31, 1886. NOTES. HENRY H. BROWNE. In a very recent criminal law book it is laid down that in rape "penetration must be proved, but not emission." This is a very impolitic relaxation in favor of a very bad class of offenders! HOW TO ESCAPE THE TEDIUM VITE. He skurries o'er the checkered ways; To waft you over time and space; Ah! when the spirit feels the trouble And life's pleasance is o'erpast: L'ENVOI. Thus life is taught a tripping measure, No time to weep o'er faded flowers. And when the shadows slowly gather Where our burden we unload; -Va. Law Journal. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, AUGUST 14, 1886. CURRENT TOPICS. HE London Law Journal says: "The new extra *** Great Britain, which has been agreed upon by Mr. Phelps and Lord Rosebery, has been long delayed. The negotiations which have been going on for nine years have at length been brought to a head, and there can be little doubt that the result is due largely to the energy and experience of law possessed by the present United States minister in London. The existing extradition treaty between these two English-speaking countries is at present represented by one clause of the Ashburton treaty of 1842, and applies only to the crimes of 'murder, assault with intent to commit murder, piracy, arson, robbery, forgery, and the uttering of forged paper.' In addition to these offenses the new treaty is to apply to manslaughter, burglary, embezzlement, and larceny of the value of 107. and upwards, and malicious injuries to property whereby the life of any person shall be endangered. A long list of crimes will still remain unprovided for, such as counterfeiting money, rape, abduction and perjury These additional cases and others of inferior gravity are to be found in most of the treaties between Great Britain and other European countries. Mr. Phelps is quite right, as a general principle, when he says, in commenting on the new clause, requiring convicted persons to be given up, that if those accused of crimes should be surrendered, much more should those actually convicted;' but care should be taken that this clause, which does not appear in the Continental treaties, should not be introduced into them without careful inquiry into the law of the country in question. In the United States, as in England, there is no such thing as trial in absentiâ, and therefore the clause can do no harm in a treaty between these countries. The object however would have been much better met by inserting prison-breach' among the offenses for which extradition may be demanded on condition that the offense for which the prisoner was in prison was an offense within the treaty. In treaties with Continental countries, where criminal trials in absentiá are common, even the clause suggested would not be safe, as a man might be convicted in absentiâ, be arrested, and escape. No English treaty can afford to omit taking care that the man surrendered shall at least have a trial face to face with his accuser. The third article, solicitous for the security of those who have adopted a new country in reliance on the permanence of the existing law, provides that the new treaty shall not apply to offenses committed before its operation. The fifth article deals with a case which at one time gave rise to serious questions between the two countries. person surrendered is not to be tried for any other VOL. 34-No. 7. A offense than that in respect of which he is demanded until he has had an opportunity of returning to the surrendering country. The sixth article also expressly provides a rule on a subject at one time much discussed, namely, that the treaty shall be carried out subject to the laws of the surrendering State. The old extradition treaty with the United States was the first of the British extradition treaties, and made in days when the subject was undeveloped, and the new treaty, although far from perfect, is a very great advance on it." According to our London exchanges the judges seem to be getting on their ear" to a lamentable extent in this warm weather. Mr. Justice Field threatened to commit a non-suited plaintiff unless he paid the jury. And Mr. Justice Stephen talked violently to a solicitor for trying to take from his honor's clerk a paper to which the solicitor was entitled. The report of the colloquy shows the judge to have been very impatient and undignified and abusive, and the solicitor to have been long-suffering and respectful. But then our report comes from the Solicitors' Journal, which comments very boldly on the occurrence, and says, "surely the first lesson a judge has to learn is to refrain from expressing an opinion before he knows the facts"- or as we Americans say, "going off half-cocked." The Law Times "deplores " the occurrence, and says the judge's language was "absolutely inexcusable," and that the solicitor "must receive universal sympathy," and concludes: "Whether it is the distracting anxiety which Mr. Justice Hawkins says disturbs the judges, or the increased wear and tear of modern life, which is to be credited with the aggravated irritability which is to be found on the bench, we know not. But of this we are convinced, that if the judges are to retain the respect of the profession they must not presume too much upon their position." The Des Moines Journal of Commerce has a well written article of more than a column to prove that "judges are not above criticism." The Journal proves its case, although it is a case of thrice routing its foes and thrice slaying the slain. The discussion comes in very fitly with our extracts above from the English law journals on this subject. The Journal says: "Judges declare the sense of mankind on questions before them as understood during a series of years. If they fail to do this the people and press detect it at once, and it is not only their privilege, but their duty to publicly criticise the judge, and the decision which has thus failed in its purpose. Once admit the doctrine that the decisions of judges, right or wrong, good or bad, are to be received by the public humbly and without comment, and there is at once an end, not only to justice, but to the law itself. The decisions of the judges would speedily degenerate into individual, dogmatic and tyrannical decrees." The last two sentences are sound beyond question, but in the first two there is a fallacy. Judges frequently do |